

Rhodes' journal of banking

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STATE OF NEW YORK.

RECEIVERS TO BE INVESTIGATED—A SAMPLE CASE.

In the Legislature now in sesssion, Senator Jacobs has offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Committee on Banks be directed to investigate the affairs of all savings banks now in the hands of Receivers, and ascertain, first, the amount collected from the assets of each company; second, the amount paid to depositors, Receiver's counsel, accountants, clerks, and for every other purpose; third, whether the Receivers are not charging a larger commission than the laws allow; fourth, what legislation, if any, is necessary to correct abuses in the settlement of the affairs of insolvent companies, and for the purpose of furthering this inquiry, the committee are authorized to send for persons and papers, and to hold sessions in the City of New York.

Mr. Jacobs said it would be remembered that early in the session he offered a resolution, which was adopted, calling for certain information from the Superintendent of Banks relative to banks that had failed and been put in the hands of Receivers. The information sent to the Senate in response to this resolntion was not at all satisfactory. He [Mr. Jacobs] had taken the pains since that time to make a personal investigation of one of these savings banks, the name of which he would not at present give, and had ascertained the following facts: The bank was placed in the hands of a Receiver in 1871. On June 1, 1875, which was as late a date as he had been able to get accurate information, $275,000 had been collected by the Receiver, and $229,000 paid out, leaving about $45,000 held on the order of the Court. The amount paid for expenses, including the Receiver's fees, counsel fees, &c., was $61,646, of which $22,311 was for counsel fees. Since 1875, so far as he had been able to ascertain, the expenses had exceeded by more than 50 per cent. the total amount paid to depositors. So that up to the present time it had cost about 50 cents for every dollar that had been paid over to the depositors.

Mr. Ecclesine said he understood that there was a law now on the statute-book requiring Receivers to make reports within a year after their appointment. No attention appeared to have been paid to this law, and all of the Receivers were now liable to be removed for violation of the Statute. He moved, as an amendment to Mr. Jacobs' resolution, that the Bank Committee be authorized to sit in New York City and take testimony, with power to send for persons and papers. Mr. Jacobs accepted the amendment, and the resolution, as amended, was unanimously adopted.

SIXPENNY SAVINGS BANK DIVIDEND.

Justice Westbrook granted an order February 16th, that William F. Russell, Receiver of the Sixpenny Savings Bank, New York, pay a further dividend to the creditors of 15 per cent., making all that has been paid 65 per cent. The liabilities of the bank when it failed were $1,883,738.44, and the amount now in the hands of the Union Trust Company to the credit of Receiver is $276,925.20, and the amount required for the 15 per cent. dividend is $267,095.55.

Immigration in Twenty-four Years.

The statistician of Castle Garden has just completed a report showing the total number of immigrants who arrived at New York from January 1, 1855, to December, 31, 1878, their destinations, occupations, etc. Of the 3,772,707 who arrived in these twenty-four years 1,521,556, or 40 per cent., remained in this State. The rest were distributed as follows: Pennsylvania, 387,030; Illinois, 354,803; Ohio, 195,607; Wisconsin, 187,555; Massachusetts, 174,396; New Jersey, 118,563; Michigan, 105,222; Iowa, 81,955; Canada, 69,941; Missouri, 69,369; Connecticut, 68,726; Minnesota, 67,240; California, 51,863; Indiana, 47,687; Utah, 38,792; Rhode Island, 35,080; Maryland, 27,506; Kansas, 21,738; Nebraska, 19,728; Kentucky, 16,763; District of Columbia, 11,428; Virginia, 10,526; Louisiana, 6,698; Tennessee, 6,572; Vermont, 6,326; Maine, 6,276; Dakota, 5,300; Texas, 4,244; New Hampshire, 4,244; Delaware, 3,458; Georgia, 3,104; South Carolina, 2,724; Colorado, 2,356; Nevada, 1,895; West Virginia, 1,583; New Brunswick, 1,409; Mississippi, 1,349; North Carolina, 1,033; Alabama, 957; South America, 876; Oregon, 846; New Dominion, 816; Florida, 772; Arkansas, 728; British Columbia, 669; Cuba, 438; Mexico, 367; Montana, 318; Wyoming, 300; West Indies, 288; Nova Scotia, 233; Washington Territory, 174; Idaho, 173; New Mexico, 121; Central America, 117; Australia, 67; China, 22; Van Couver's Island, 15; Japan, 11; Arizona, 8; Sandwich Islands, 7; Bermuda, 2; New Foundland, 2; Russian America, 1.

STATE SUPERVISION.

Governor Robinson, in his message to the Legislature, recommended the abolition of the Insurance Department as a useless branch of the State Government. Thereupon Superintendent Smyth sent a circular letter to the officers of all the companies doing business by authority in the State, and has published extracts from the replies received; of these only five express an opinion adverse to State supervision; the rest consider the Department a decided protection, and some of them speak highly of the Department "as at present organized and conducted." The Superintendent could have worded his question so as to have called out greater scope in the answers. He makes only the alternative: "Is supervision as at present conducted in the State of New York a protection to the policy-holders, or would their interests as well as those of solvent companies be served if the various laws establishing the Department, were repealed, and supervision abandoned, and a simple rendering of an annual statement to the Comptroller substituted in place of present requirements ?" The question thus presented does not meet the requirements of the case; it could have been so put as to have called forth from the experienced men to whom it was addressed responses of great value to Mr. Smyth and to the insuring public.

Insurance supervision, as it was designed to be by its sponsors in New York, furnishes a guarantee that the companies having the indorsement of the Department are safe custodians of the people's money. So far as confidence is placed in this guarantee the exercise of individual judgment ceases; and thus when the official stamp of approval is placed upon a worthless company a double wrong is done:—not only is the public unwarned of a danger, which the Department was created to point out, but it is told in unequivocal language that there is no necessity for caution, for there is absolutely no danger.

Insurance supervision is essentially the same as bank supervision. How many depositors in the long list of savings banks which have crumbled like houses of cards, and yet which were afterwards shown to have been as hollow for years as on the day they fell, can be found to speak well of supervision of banks? Yet the mortality among savings banks has not been so great as that among life insurance companies, which, almost up to the hour of their death, carried a health certificate from the Department. Amalgamations have been permitted, the projectors of which were enriched with the money designed for the protection of widows and orphans; policy-holders have been frozen out in the most open manner in order to diminish the liabilities of companies, and no questions have been asked as to the methods by which the "surplus as to policy-holders" has been kept up to the required standard. For more than a year before the Continental Life went to pieces its insolvency and the unlawful practices by which it strove to retrieve itself were common newspaper gossip in several States; for years before the Security failed a casual glance at its books would have told the story of its hopeless condition. What assurance has the public that others are not now doing business which are no better than they, and a multitude of others were a few years ago? The dismal story dragged from the Insurance Department by a Legislature resolution, relative to the Globe Mutual Life, is not reassuring. The books of this company were examined more than a year ago by Mr. McCall, who made a report to Superintendent Smyth, in which he details pretty nearly every form of criminal mismanagement and fraudulent practice of which insurance officers can be guilty; the whole hidden from sight under falsified accounts and statements falsely sworn to. Yet this report was suppressed, and the company was permitted to go on under the same management, and the public received no warning. The dreary facts will become familiar enough to the public; for Frederick A. Freeman, recently elected vice-president of the Globe Mutual, is now under arrest for transactions connected with wrecking the Reserve Mutual, of which he was secretary, and the report comes from Albany that the Attorney General is about to begin proceedings against the Globe for the removal of its officers, of whom Mr. McCall said in his report, "No reformation is to be looked for at the hands of these men."

There is no question as to the importance of wholesome insurance laws, and of men of ability and integrity to see to their enforcement; but the enforcement must be intelligent, rigid and impartial to be of value. To permit the payment of a dollar to a fraudulent or insolvent company is a wrong not only to the man who ignorantly pays it, but to the solvent company which ought to receive it. Let us have supervision by all means, but let it be supervision which supervises.

The Inconvenience of a Receivership.

A despatch from Louisville says a company of two hundred men rode into Campbellsville, Ky., on Saturday, in search of J. R. Robinson, who had been appointed Receiver to collect a railroad tax from Taylor County in satisfaction of a judgment of the United States Circuit Court at Louisville. The search was fruitless. Robinson, it is said, has resigned the receivership.—*Associated Press despatch to the Cincinnati papers February 12.*

Doubtless this was a discreet thing for Mr. Robinson to do. Out of the ninety thousand depositors caught in the recently failed savings banks of New York, it would not be difficult to muster a band of about twenty-five times the size of the Kentucky company, who would not employ mob violence to right their wrongs, but their solemn protest against the unrighteous methods of the Receivers of their hard earned savings, would not only compel them to resign, but would consign them to a lasting obscurity.

The Internal Revenue Bill.

CHANGES IN THE U. S. TAX ON BANKS AND SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS.

[From the Official Text.]

The following is from "An Act to amend the Laws relating to Internal Revenue," as finally passed by Congress :

SEC. 22. That whenever and after any bank has ceased to do business by reason of insolvency or bankruptcy, no tax shall be assessed or collected, or paid into the Treasury of the United States, on account of such bank, which shall diminish the assets thereof necessary for the full payment of all its depositors ; and such tax shall be abated from such national banks as are found by the Comptroller of the Currency to be insolvent; and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, when the facts shall so appear to him, is authorized to remit so much of said tax against insolvent State and savings banks as shall be found to affect the claims of their depositors.

That in making further collections of internal revenue taxes on bank deposits, no savings bank, recognized as such by the laws of its State, and having no capital stock, shall, on account of mercantile or business deposits heretofore received, upon which no interest has been allowed to the parties making such deposits, be denied the exemptions allowed to savings banks having no capital stock, and doing no other business than receiving deposits to be loaned or invested for the sole benefit of the parties making such deposits, without profit or compensation to the banks, if such bank has paid the lawful tax upon the entire average amount of such business or mercantile deposits. But nothing in this section shall be construed to extend said exemptions to deposits hereafter made, or in any way to affect the liabilities of such deposits to taxation.

That section thirty-four hundred and eight of the Revised Statutes be amended by striking out all after the thirtieth line, and inserting the following:

"The deposits in associations or companies known as provident institutions, savings banks, savings funds, or savings institutions, doing no other business than receiving and loaning or investing savings deposits, shall be exempt from tax on so much of such deposits as they have invested in securities of the United States, and on two thousand dollars of savings deposits and nothing in excess thereof made in the name of and belonging to any one person or firm. That all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this section be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

SEC. 23. That wherever in any of the foregoing sections of this act the Revised Statutes are referred to, it shall be held to mean the "edition of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight."

STATE OF MISSOURI.

From the last report made to the Secretary of State of Missouri by the State Banks and Bankers, and to the Comptroller of the Currency by the National Banks of the State, the condition of all the banks in the State at that date is as follows: Loans and discounts, $29,069,-159; loans on real estate, $1,969,013; stocks and bonds (not including bonds of National Banks to secure circulation),

$5,947,616; real estate, $2,227,765; cash and cash items, $18,597,350; sight deposits, $25,023,590; time deposits, $8,805,-357; due banks, $6,147,189; capital, $14,645,045; surplus, $4,227,862. Total assets, $61,647,550.

The above data is furnished through the courtesy of Hon. Michael K. McGrath, Secretary of State.

GOOD OUT OF EVIL.

UNIFORMITY OF FIRE INSURANCE RATES.

The numerous and heavy losses by fire during the opening weeks of the present year ought not to have taken insurance companies by surprise, nor occasioned them any discomfiture. They were only what may be expected during any period of excessively cold weather, and were much less than would have been the case if when some of the fires occurred the wind had been blowing heavily. The fact that some companies suffered so seriously that, if they were required to make out their annual statements now, they would be unable to find the surplus required by the Department, is due to the unusual exemption from loss during the last few years, and the consequent demoralization of rates. If several millions of property had been destroyed in any one of our large cities three or four years ago, the old board rates might have been continued, to the manifest advantage of companies and the greater security of the insured. Yet there has never been a time when such a loss might not have occurred in a single night, and companies in their struggle for business have gone on as if the experience of a few exceptional years were a fit basis on which to build up a business. The awakening from a false dream of security has come none too soon. Ruinous rivalry is giving place to associated action in all fire insurance centres, and it is greatly to be hoped there will be some such combination among fire underwriters all over the country, before very long, as there was in the best days of the National Board. Boston underwriters have held several meetings, and have agreed upon a schedule of rates ranging from 40 cents for packages of provisions and dry goods in unopen packages, and in brick buildings, up to $2.50, for drugs, oil and varnish in retail wooden stores. In New York a Tariff Association has been formed, with which it is believed nearly all the companies represented here will unite. The plan of organization was presented by a committee, previously appointed, on February 21st, and was approved by all the representatives of the seventy companies then present. The plan sets forth the objects to be to secure uniform rates of premium, and to establish rules for the better government of the business. The association will be based upon the honor and integrity of its members, the actual withdrawal of any member to release all other members from their obligation. The companies agree to charge and obtain the rates to be fixed by the association, and by local boards or associations throughout the United States at points where they have no agents. Rebates will be abolished, and no commissions or other emoluments will be allowed to brokers. Agents may be appointed under a commission to solicit business, and they shall not be permitted to allow rebates out of their commissions or salaries to the assured in any form. Such agents will not be permitted to place insurance with any company outside the Tariff Association without written consent. Agents may be paid a commission of 10 per cent. only, and to any other person, except the assured or his employe, a brokerage of 5 per cent. on each premium may be allowed. The association will elect company agents, and violation of the rules will subject them to a cancellation of commissions.

All special agents, or persons other than managers and those previously referred to, will be employed at a regular salary only. Any violation or error in naming rates by which less than tariff charges are made, will cause the forfeiture of an amount equal to the correct premium on the sum insured, and a violation of the rates on rebate commission or brokerage will entail a penalty of $100.

Mr. Hope, of the Continental Fire Insurance Company, used to say that a company needed to meet with occasional losses in order to keep it in a healthful condition; perhaps the losses of the last few months may have the same effect upon fire underwriting as a whole.

THE MUTUAL'S NEW DEPARTURE.

That respectable old institution, the Mutual Life Insurance Company, has been the subject of discussion during the past year more than in all its previous history. Committees of policy-holders in nearly all the large Eastern cities, and the Judiciary Committee of the New York Assembly have discussed the "rebate plan" until, through the reports published in the daily newspapers, the entire reading community are as familiar with its merits and demerits as it is possible to be in a matter concerning which insurance experts differ most widely. The policy-holders' meetings which have been held to consider the subject have been chiefly attended by protestants against the plan, whose speeches have savored rather of denunciation than argument. The fairest discussions have been those before the Assembly Committee, where the strongest arguments on both sides have been presented by able counsel; where the Company's action has been defended by men like Joseph H. Choate, Robert Sewell, and others, and declared to be unjust and ruinous by such eminent theoretical actuaries as the venerable Elizur Wright, of Boston, and Shephard Homans, of New York. The organized antagonism which the rebate plan met caused the trustees of the Mutual Life to appoint a special committee to investigate the subject thoroughly, and make a report. The committee consisted of Alexander H. Rice, William E. Dodge, Samuel D. Babcock, George S. Coe, Martin Bates, and W. A. Haines. They held sessions extending over fourteen days, examined the subject fully, and on February 20th made a report, in which they submitted the following recommendations:

First—That instead of the rebate to new members of 30 per cent upon whole life policies, and 15 per cent. upon other forms, a reduction be made from the tabular rates of premium of 15 per cent. upon whole life policies, both old and new, and upon other forms a proportionate reduction, upon an equitable basis, to be ascertained by the actuary and approved by the trustees; or, at the option of policy-holders, a dividend of the equivalent of such reduction shall be made in additional insurance, payable with the policy; such reduction to continue until otherwise ordered by the Board of Trustees, it being understood that policies already taken or negotiated under the present rebate plan shall be so adjusted by the actuary as to fulfil the obligations of the company to the holders of such policies, and equate their participation in the dividends of the company with its other members.

Second—That a committee, consisting of one member of each standing committee of the Board of Trustees, be appointed to examine into the system of expenditures of this company in its several departments, in order to ascertain what reduction can properly be made in any or all, especially in law expenses, salaries and advertising, and report to the Board for its action.

Third—That in the matter of surrender values such a scale as shall be fair and equitable to those who retire from the company should be fixed and adopted, and no departure made therefrom, except by consent of the Insurance Committee.

Fourth—That the Agency Committee be directed to make a thorough investigation of the agency system as it has existed since the plan for commuting commissions was first adopted by the company, with the view of ascertaining the actual cost of obtaining new insurance in each subsequent year, and of making such arrangements for the future conduct of the agencies as will secure to the company the greatest permanent advantages under the plan now proposed for a general reduction of the rates of premium, the committee to report to the Board for its action at the next regular meeting.

It is believed that these recommendations will be adopted by the company, and that the reduction of the cost of insurance to the policy-holders, will be accompanied by a reduction of salaries paid to the officers. The committee appointed by the New York policy-holders say they will not disband until the whole rebate plan shall have been equitably adjusted, and other important questions with regard to the rights and duties of policy-holders in the selection of trustees and in the general management of the company, shall have been fully considered and finally determined.

In the meantime, the hostile criticisms of the officers of other companies would seem to indicate that they look upon the scheme for cheapening life insurance as one which they can not safely adopt, and therefore as likely to prove detrimental to their business. One of the requests made by the meeting of Massachusetts policy-holders, representing two millions of insurance, to Ex-Governor Rice, whom they looked upon as their representative on the Board of Trustees, was "to oppose the adoption of any plan of doing business that will antagonize the other sound life insurance companies (in which many of us are largely insured) or injure their business or financial standing." It is to be hoped that this action on the part of the Mutual Life is one which all companies can adopt. It is pretty evident that the rates of the past have been too high, and have led to extravagance of management, and—what is more—to carelessness in taking risks.

CALIFORNIA.

We present herewith statement of the condition of the Stockton Savings and Loan Society at the close of business December 31, 1878, showing a surplus as to depositors of $556,615.66:

ASSETS.	
Loans, bills receivable and overdrafts..	$1,338,451 27
Cash on hand and in banks......	357,795 32
Interest earned, but not collected......	74,701 00
Real estate (part of this is sold, but not yet paid for)	63,441 09
Furniture, etc...........................	5,563 35
Bonds of city of Stockton, $8,100 cost...	6,437 00
	$1,846,390 03
LIABILITIES.	
Capital subscribed, $500.000; paid up, $500,000............................ ...	$500,000 00
Reserve fund..........	31,615 66
Dividends on stock unpaid..............	25,000 00
Interest due depositors.................	33,423 51
Deposits	1,256,350 86
	$1,846,390 03

PENNSYLVANIA.

We have received the Twenty-fourth Annual Statement of "The Saving Fund Society of Germantown and its vicinity," T. Charlton Henry, President; George A. Warder, Treasurer. The assets as given in detail, are of the highest character as regards both security and availability.

Its liabilities to depositors, including interest added December 31, 1878, are $716,950.82, to meet which it has resources amounting to $767,593.54. The following data in regard to the bank present an enviable showing.

The Saving Fund Society of Germantown and its vicinity was chartered April 6, 1854, and the office opened for business on May 24th.

The first year there was received on deposit $16,314.20.

The following figures will show the

measure of success to which it has attained in a little less than twenty-five years.

Received on deposit in the year 1878 ...		$464,366 78
Interest paid in cash and credited to depositors in 1878		25,620 92
Amount paid to depositors in 1878		460,101 60
Received on deposit since organization.		5,794,360 62
Paid out to depositors since organization...		5,077,409 80
Amount due depositors this January 1, 1879		716,950 82
Interest paid to depositors since organization		243,190 19
Accounts opened in 1878	878	
" closed " "	653	
" opened since organization	13,145	
Accounts closed since organization	9,117	
" now open	4,028	

The Society has not been obliged, in any instance, to foreclose and purchase a single property upon which they held a mortgage.

There is at this time only *fifty dollars* interest outstanding on a mortgage over six months.

The Society has not met with a single loss since the year 1870.

The Finances of France.

[From the London Telegraph.]

What with the accumulation of fresh debt, the expenses of Army re-organization, and other indispensable outlays, a French budget now represents enormous totals on both sides of the account. M. Leon Say's estimates for 1880, which have just been submitted to the Chamber at Versailles, show an increase both in revenue and expenditure over the figures of 1879, which in their turn were above those of the previous year. In round numbers, the estimated revenue for 1880 is £110,242,812—an increase of £2,200,000 over 1879—and the expenditure is £110,177,304—an increase of £2,170,000. The surplus reckoned upon is thus very small, only some £65,000; but the Finance Minister may consider himself justified in leaving so narrow a magin, since the results of the years immediately preceding have, thanks to the general prosperity of France, far exceeded his most sanguine anticipations. It may be seriously doubted, however, whether next year's revenue will exceed by £2,000,000 the proceeds of the period that felt the stimulating effects of the great Exhibition; and, if it does not, the Minister will have to confess an unwelcome disappointment. For he has allotted, in advance, almost the whole of the anticipated excess, and we do not think that in France, any more than in England, the spending departments ever fall far short of the allowance given to them. The separate items that make up the total are not likely to stand much subsequent retrenchment. The two principal are the charge for the debt and the Army Department. The former, with dotations, takes £49,300,000, not far from half of the entire revenue; and the Minister of War absorbs £22,500,000. Of the £38,000,000 remaining the Navy and the Colonies take nearly £8,000,000, and Public Works £6,000,000. The cost of collecting all taxes and duties, direct and indirect, is £11,000,000. In the present state of Europe the military and naval estimates cannot be reduced; Frenchmen of all parties would unite on that point if they agreed on no other; and the debt charge, far from diminishing, is certain to increase, since, under M. Freycinet's munificent local expenditure arrangements for harbors, railways, and other schemes, redeemable rentes will be created by several millions annually for years to come, and the burden of these is certain, while the reproductive character of the outlay has still to be tested. Everything, therefore, will turn upon the question whether the exuberant prosperity which has distinguished France above all other nations during the last eight years will continue; and, although this is to be hoped, it would be very unwise to assume it. A succession of good harvests, regularly growing trade, and favorable commercial relations with other countries are all necessary to the fulfillment of M. Leon Say's estimates. One reflection, however, occurs, suggested by these optimist budgets. If France were to enter on a new fiscal policy of a protectionist character, as a result of obtaining freedom from the treaties now expiring or "denounced," the revenue would certainly fall short of anticipations, whatever might happen to expenditure. For the realization of M. Say's budget the nation must have sufficient freedom of trade to encourage both imports and exports, both agriculture and manufactures. Impede free exchange to a serious extent, and there is an end to "prosperity" budgets.

STATE OF MINNESOTA.

In the last issue of this JOURNAL there appeared some account of the effort being made to secure a general Savings Bank Law for the State of Minnesota. From the first annual report of Hon. Henry M. Knox, Public Examiner, which has just been published, it appears there are eight establishments called Savings Banks in the State. Referring to recent examinations which he has made, the Public Examiner says: "It is impossible to tabulate their statements from the fact that the banks are operating in such widely diverse methods. Each one is construing the law to suit itself and its own circumstances, and hardly any two are alike. * * * * Two only are purely banks for savings, one while doing exclusively a savings business, is organized within and under the same management as a private bank, which is the depository of its funds; two others exist within National Banks which receive their deposits and pay their interest. Two others are doing a general banking business in all its ramifications, under the very vague provisions of the Act of 1867 amended, chapter 14, 1868, or under the equally general provisions of a special act."

Notwithstanding this chaotic state in which the Examiner finds the savings banks, judging from his report, there appears to be a diversity of opinion among the managers of the banks as to whether or not any change is expedient or necessary. The law before the Legislature for its consideration is similar in its leading features to the New York law; from the following correspondence, which has just appeared in the Minneapolis *Tribune*, our readers can gain the best information respecting the points at issue. It is understood that the first letter is from the pen of J. E. Bell, Cashier of the Hennepin County Savings Bank, Minneapolis; the reply is signed by E. H. Moulton, who is the Treasurer of the Farmers' and Mechanics' Savings Bank, located in the same flourishing city.

To the Editor of The Tribune:

In considering the savings bank law, introduced by Senator Wilson, it would be well to first ascertain what safeguards are provided by our present laws. The condition and workings of our banks under them and inquire whether the protection and security we already have is not equal to or better than what the proposed law would give us.

Examiner Knox, in his last annual report, does complain of lack of uniformity in our laws, and undoubtedly they impose on him extra care and trouble.

All the savings banks of Minnesota, in their provisions and way of doing business, are organized under and governed and controlled by the savings bank law of 1867 and its amendments of 1868 and 1875.

Examiner Knox, after referring to a lack of uniformity of the laws, says of the banks working under them: "Of their solvency there can be doubt. Many slight defects have been corrected. It is a pleasure to state that this mixed state of things pertains only to the construction which may be put upon the laws and not to the methods of conducting the business undertaken by them. Many of these banks are conducted in the most careful and systematic manner; their laws are supervised with great care; their mortgages, with accompanying abstracts and policies of insurance, and other securities and assets will bear inspection."

Considering the workings of the present law and the conditions of the banks working under it, we find that the law has been in operation for ten years, and under it have been organized *eight* banks, which, during the perilous times for banking, have not lost a dollar of their depositors' money, and are now, as shown by Examiner Knox's report, in excellent condition. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

SAFEGUARDS OF THE PRESENT LAW.

Let us see what are the safeguards which the present law provides. Under it each savings bank must have not less than five trustees, each of whom must give a bond to be approved by the judges of the Supreme Court, and to be deposited with the State Auditor, and under these bonds each trustee may be held liable in the sum of $10,000 to the depositors of the bank; thus affording an aggregate amount of $50,000 in bonds for the protection of depositors of each bank. These bonds may also be increased by order of the District Court in whose jurisdiction any savings bank may be located, on a satisfactory showing to said Court that the interests of depositors make such an increase necessary. This law is so stringent that no banks have lately been organized under it. Considering the features of our present law, above referred to, it seems clear that no new law is needed.

THE PROPOSED LAW

is claimed to be better than the present one in that it is mutual and beneficiary. It provides for the investment of seventy per cent. of the deposits in bonds and real estate mortgages; but in New York mortgages held by savings banks can be made virtually call loans, and in case of default can be foreclosed within a short time and the possession of the mortgaged premises can there be readily obtained, under the laws of that State; but here in Minnesota at least fourteen months must elapse before possession could be obtained by the mortgagee of the mortgaged premises in case of forfeiture.

IN NEW YORK

all the life insurance companies located there must make their real estate investments within the State, and there are therefore millions of dollars invested in such security, and mortgages on real property are marketable there, and can be readily converted into cash. In this State there are no such amounts of capital seeking investment, and mortgage loans are generally for several years' time and cannot be in the nature of call loans, and a bank with its vault full of such mortgages might, under some circumstances, be greatly embarrassed and suffer almost irremediable losses. Imagine a run on such a bank! Where could it convert its assets into cash to meet the crisis?

If a savings bank in Minnesota was forced to close its doors, its assets, under the proposed law, would not be available for a long time, and its depositors, because of the necessary expense, costs and delay, would receive a comparatively small amount on their deposits.

With all the boasted safeguards of the New York law, there have been many large and disastrous failures under it. Governor Robinson, in his annual message of 1877, says, "Recent disasters among our savings banks admonish us of the necessity of rigid restraints against mismanagement."

The proposed law, as tested in New York, has resulted generally in giving the depositors only their stipulated interest—the profits, if any, have been put in bank buildings and furniture for the enjoyment of the bank officials. The mutual part is a delusion.

AS TO THE BENEFICIARY FEATURES,

it would be appropriate to inquire whether a man having liability of ten thousand dollars depending on his faithful performance of duty would not be likely to be a better trustee than he would be with nothing financial at stake.

It is generally conceded that most States suffer from too much legislation. The savings bank laws of Minnesota seem to have thus far met the necessities of the State. With increased population and a more thoroughly developed country and a greater number of large towns, and enlarged industries, may come the need of different savings bank laws; but at present what we have on the subject appear, in their workings, to be good enough.

Examiner Knox in his last report says:

"Whether the time has fully arrived, and whether many of our communities are yet densely enough populated to warrant the carrying on successfully of savings associations, pure and simple, may be a question."

With the exception of a very few localities in Minnesota there would not be enough of depositors to sustain a savings bank conducted under the proposed law. After paying to depositors six per cent. interest there would be nothing left for other expenses, which would have to come out of the depositors, as has been the case in New York State.

In view of the facts here presented it must be the almost unanimous verdict to stop this tinkering with good laws and let well enough alone.

[REPLY TO THE ABOVE.]

To the Editor of The Tribune:

In a letter in your issue of the 20th. headed "Savings Banks," your correspondent undertakes to champion the cause of the present flimsy, loose, vague savings bank law of this State, and to decry the model law of the United States, that of New York State, which process of defense and defamation is attempted by a series of assertions as loose and unreliable as the law which he attempts to champion.

Among other assertions, he says, that the five trustees of each savings bank may be held liable in the sum of $10,000 each to the depositors of each bank, thus affording an aggregate amount of $50,000 in bonds for the protection of depositors. The exact facts in regard to these bonds are that each of the five trustees must file a $5,000 bond with two sureties, for the faithful discharge of his duties, and that in case a depositor is aggrieved, he may sue on these $25,000 of bonds, and having exhausted them, may sue the trustees personally for $25,000 more if the trustees are good for it; but as the bonds are only penal bonds, the aggrieved depositor must first prove a neglect of duty on the part of the trustees, a very difficult thing to prove, as any lawyer knows. A savings bank might fail and lose half its deposits, and still the depositor might not be able to recover a single cent under these boasted protective bonds.

Your correspondent quotes Examiner Knox to prove that the banks now doing business are perfectly solvent. The argument is conclusive in regard to the solvency of the institutions, but proves nothing in regard to the system and laws under which they are organized. Examiner Knox told the writer that the laws of the State had nothing to do with the solvency of the banks, as only two banks in the State were even pretending to carry out the law. It is perfectly safe to say that the present savings banks in this State would be solvent as long as they are managed in the manner they now are by their present officers, but is that any argument in favor of the system?"

There is another part of Examiner Knox's report that your correspondent takes good care not to quote, which is: "If they [the savings banks] desire to do a general banking business only for profit why should they not be compelled to organize under a general banking act, such as it is hoped the State will furnish? If they seek to do only a savings business, and simply to invest the earnings of tradesmen, clerks, mechanics, laborers, and others, as trust funds, why should they not be compelled to undertake the trust freed from all the risks and complications which are attendant upon a more mixed and general business?"

The conundrum is easy to answer, they should; but the moment a law like that of New York, which would put an end to the dangerous and wicked system of allowing the trust funds of the laboring class to be used in general banking by the so-called savings banks of this State, is introduced in the Legislature, every defender of the present dangerous system raises heaven and earth to prevent the passage of a safe law that would prevent him from banking on the deposit of our mechanics.

The worst that your correspondent can allege against the New York law is that it requires seventy per cent. of the deposits to be loaned on bonds and mortgages, and then he imagines the effect of a run on a savings bank with its funds so invested. On the principle that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, I would say that a savings bank with its money well invested in bonds and mortgages would be very unlikely to have a run made on it. The writer of this letter has never had any experience in runs, but had he to meet one, he would rather have his vault full of bonds and mortgages than a lot of notes of firms that the bank is forced to carry.

When a run is brought about by a commercial panic and collapse, notes are about as valuable to raise money on as so much waste paper. In the panic of 1857 nearly every bank in the country doing a commercial business suspended, while the savings banks, with their bonds and mortgages which your correspondent deprecates, rode safely through the storm. If notes are so much better than bonds and mortgages, why is it that you cannot get the average workingman or small investor to touch a note with the longest possible pair of tongs, while he is only too glad to get a bond or mortgage? Did any one ever hear of a man dying and leaving small children that ever in his will authorized his money to be loaned on notes? Trust funds the world over, are invested in bonds and mortgages except in the so-called savings banks of Minnesota and kindred institutions.

Your correspondent makes the assertion "with all the boasted safeguards of the New York law, there have been large and disastrous failures under it," and by this assertion would have his readers believe that the New York law of 1875 was the cause of these failures. This assertion either shows the ignorance of your correspondent or that he willfully misrepresents. No savings bank organized under the New York law of 1875 has ever failed. Every student of the savings bank history of New York State knows the cause of the failures there. The model law of that State, passed in 1875, simply exposed the rottenness of the unsound banks—it did not cause their failure.

From the inception of the savings bank system in 1820 to 1875, a body of trustees wishing to organize a savings bank had to secure from the Legislature a charter to allow them to do so. These charters varied greatly in many cases, for instance that of the Third Avenue Savings Bank, which was the greatest departure from the bond and mortgage plan of investment, allowed the trustees to loan one-third their deposit in what were called available securities. The trustees of the Third Avenue institution, like your correspondent, found they could not negotiate bonds and mortgages in case of a run, so they loaded up with available securities. The consequence was the Third avenue institution got the very thing it was looking for, a run, in fact it got two of them, and their available (?) securities did not save them either, for they proved one of the worst, if not the worst, failures that ever disgraced the savings bank system.

A Legislature composed of good men, scrutinized closely these charters, and refused them to any but the right kind of trustees; and also refused to charter more savings banks than a locality could support; but William M. Tweed and the corrupt Legislatures packed by him were governed by no such scruples—they even gave savings bank charters to ward politicans to reward them for party services. In 1860 there were twenty savings banks in the city of New York—enough for all legitimate purposes; by 1870 this number, against the repeated and vehement protests of the Bank Commissioner, had increased to forty—more than the city could possibly support. When the panic of 1873 came on these weak concerns began to drop out.

The Legislature of 1875, seeing the dangers that the savings banks were drifting into under the charter system, passed the general law of 1875, its strict uniform provisions and many safeguards exposed the weakness of all rotten concerns, and while it closed up the dangerous traps it purified the system, leaving it in a healthy, sound condition.

While your correspondent infers that the failures of the savings banks under the New York law of 1875 showed it to be a bad law, he does not say that the failures of the State Savings Association and Murphy's concern in this city, under the law he advocates, points the same moral. Seems to me what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander.

Emerson Keyes, the most prominent writer on savings banks, and the great authority on such subjects, says that had the New York law of 1875 been passed twenty years earlier in that State there would not have been the necessity to chronicle that saddest of all misfortunes, a savings bank failure.

Allow me to refer to one more of your correspondent's extraordinary assertions and I am done. He says: "The proposed law as tested in New York has resulted generally in giving depositors their stipulated interest, the profits, if any, having been put in bank buildings, &c. The mutual part is a delusion." This slur comes with ill-grace from the defender of a system that uses the trust funds of our working class in general banking; of a system that has always paid as little as possible to depositors, but has exacted as high rates of interest in the shape of bonuses, commissions, &c., as it could get.

Your correspondent shows his utter ignorance of the workings of a mutual law when he says that in New York the banks give their depositors their stipulated interest. The profits if any, go into bank buildings.

Mutual savings banks in New York pay no *stipulated* interest nor do they promise to pay any. They simply divide every year their net earnings, except the amount that goes to the surplus fund to guard depositors against loss. The law of 1875 provides that this surplus shall not accumulate beyond fifteen per cent of the deposits—any further accumulation must, every three years, be divided among the depositors as an extra dividend. The law also says no bank shall put more than fifty per cent of its surplus into a lot and building; consequently a bank with a million on deposit could not invest more than $75,000 in buildings fixtures, and they could never do that but once; ever afterwards all the profits would have to go to the depositors.

Had your correspondent spent the time studying the New York law that he has given to working against it, it is possible that he might not have fallen into such egregious blunders. E. H. MOULTON.

THE REV. DR. PRIME

ON A SUCCESSFUL NEWSPAPER AND ITS EDITOR.

At Mr. Cyrus W. Field's country seat, when his friends were there to meet Dean Stanley, among the guests was Mr. George W. Childs, of Philadelphia. In the course of a very pleasant conversation with Mr. Childs, I learned some facts in regard to the great daily newspaper, the *Ledger* which he controls exclusively, as Mr. Bennett controls the New York *Herald*. What I learned from Mr. Childs, without interviewing him—for editors do not practise this art upon each other—and more that I learned from other sources, will answer a question often asked, "Does it *pay* to publish a pure, wholesome newspaper for the million?"

Mr. Childs, a native of Baltimore, came to Philadelphia, a boy of fifteen, got a situation in a publishing house, and made himself indispensable to his employers. That, by the way, is the secret of success for all assistants. Then he went into the same business on a small scale for himself, and was soon at the head of the firm of Childs & Peterson. In 1864 the *Public Ledger*, a daily penny paper, rapidly losing money, was for sale, and Mr. Childs bought it.

He converted it at once. This is *the* point, and for this only is this letter written. Mr. Childs excluded from the paper all details of disgusting crime; all reports of such vice as may not be with propriety read aloud in the family; that poison the minds of young men, inflame the passions and corrupt the heart; all scandal and slang, and that whole class of news which constitutes the staple of many daily papers. The same rule was applied to the advertising columns, and from them was excluded all that, in any shape or form, might be offensive to good morals. The friends of the new publisher predicted an early and total failure, and the more speedy because he doubled the price of the paper and increased the rate of advertising. But he was governed in his course by two considerations: first he had his own strong convictions of what is right, and, secondly, as strong convictions of what would pay; and it has been well said that when one's views of duty coincide with his pecuniary interests, all the faculties work in perfect harmony. The effect of this sudden change was at first to sink the sinking concern still lower. A class of readers and advertisers fell off. A less conscientious and a less courageous man would have staggered in the path he had marked. Not so with Mr. Childs. He employed the best talent, and paid fair wages for good work. He published six days in the week only, and on the seventh day he rested from his labors. His paper and his principles began to obtain recognition in the city. He made it a family journal. It gained the confidence of the best people, who became its daily readers, and, *therefore*, it was sought as the best medium of advertising.

Its prosperity dates from the first year of its life in the hands of Mr. Childs. In two years he was able to erect and enter the new Ledger Building, the model printing-house, unexcelled, if equalled, by any printing establishment in the world. His own rooms are fitted up with exquisite taste and convenience. His offices for printers and publishers are provided with every possible appliance for health and comfort of workmen. As he has been prospered through the fidelity of his aids as well as his own sagacity, he has procured for many of them paid-up policies of life insurance, so that they work with a sense of security for the future and grateful attachment for their chief. Expending the income of his paper without stint on itself and those who make it, he has also spread his money with judicious liberality over the world.

His own residence in Philadelphia is a magnificent mansion, where he dispenses a large hospitality, enjoyed by the most eminent of our citizens and distinguished guests from other lands. The poor and the unfortunate in all the departments of human want are the sharers of his wealth. Westminster Abbey, of which Dean Stanley is the Custodian, has a memorial window to the poets, Herbert and Cowper, presented by Mr. Childs, who, when asked to aid in its erection, cheerfully gave the whole. He is now erecting a library at Long Branch, which will be a monument to his taste as well as his liberality, and when these instances are cited they are but specimens of what he is doing constantly for the advantage and happiness of his fellowmen.

I am afraid to say what the ledger of Mr. Childs shows at the close of every day as the fruit of his labors. And the reason why I fear to state it is this: Some two months ago, in writing of the relations of capital to labor, and the obligations of rich men to the poor, I mentioned the name of a very wealthy and excellent friend, whose income had been reported at one thousand dollars a day. That allusion of mine to him and his income brought to him one thousand begging letters! I was mortified to learn that I had so many such readers; but on a moment's reflection I saw that the statement, being copied into hundreds of newspapers, reached thousands of people who never read my letter. Still I was the innocent cause of this affliction upon a good man of one thousand impertinent epistles! Such would be the fate of Mr. Childs, were his income to be known. But my object would not be reached if I did not add that the success of the *Ledger*, on the principles of its proprietor, and in defiance of the predictions of his friends, is without any equal in the history of daily newspaper enterprise in this or any other country. There may be one paper in New York that yields a larger revenue than the *Ledger* of Philadelphia. But, with this exception, Mr. Childs (it is believed) has the most profitable daily newspaper in the United States. And it is more prosperous now, in the midst of all the present prostration of business, than at any previous period.

The daily paper that approaches or exceeds the profits of the *Ledger* publishes on seven days in a week. One of the proprietors of one of these papers told me that every Sunday "the paper pays over and above all expenses the sum of $1,000 clear profit," and he said the addition of $52,000 a year to the profits was too great an inducement to be resisted, "though," he added, "I am opposed to publishing on Sunday."

Mr. Childs might or might not make more money by breaking the law of God, the law of the State, and that obvious law of nature which makes a Sabbath, or rest-day, one of the elements of health and safety to individuals and nations. But he has consistently, from his youth, wrought his way up through the ranks to the topmost round of the business ladder, on the square, solid and eternal principle that industry and integrity are the elements of success, and that riches gained by ministering to human depravity are not worth having. To be useful is the highest of all human ambitions, and when one can make it pay, exceeding great is his reward.

Mr. Childs has verified in his experience the prophecy of the wisest of ancient monarchs, who said, "seest thou a man dilligent in his business; he shall stand before kings." Mr. Childs is the acknowledged friend and guest of the most dignified men at home and abroad, and with singular modesty enjoys the distinction which he has won solely by means that would be esteemed honorable and virtuous if they had not also been crowned with the irresistible charm of a grand success.

And I do not know that a more wholesome lesson can be written for the encouragement of young America. Mr. Childs seeks no office, covets no man's wealth, pays his debts, gives to the poor in his own way, is generous in all the relations of public and private life, and enjoys the esteem and friendship of the best men in the world. That is a rounded life. He is not yet fifty years of age, and we may well trust that a career of brilliant usefulness and honor is before him in the line of journalism which he has chosen to illustrate and adorn. "IRENÆUS".

In the New York Observer.

Genuine Savings Banks.

[From the New York Times.]

Probably a great part of the fraud and disaster which have characterized th management, in recent years, of the sav ings banks of the country may have aris en from an unnoticed perversion o those institutions from the normal idea Originally, a savings bank was under stood to be a benevolent establishment These banks are coeval with the presen century; only the slightest traces of any thing of the kind are noticeable befor 1800. In the first decade of this century the first savings banks were created i Europe, and the model was soon repro duced in this country, though some o Franklin's counsels and devices to encour age economy may well be deemed an ea ly germ. Bnt the ideal in all the earlie forms was benevolent. No notion of pro fit or compensation to managers was in volved. The Trustees were regarded a acting from motives of public spirit an philanthropy. They gave their time an services in view of the good to be done in the same manner as Trustees of a ho pital are understood to labor from an in terest in promoting the public health, o Trustees of a college from enthusiasm f education, or Trustees of a church, fro love of religion. They did not draw sala ries, or divide profits. They manage the funds of the depositors according t their best judgment, and from motiv of benevolence. There has been a gre departure from this ideal in the practi dnring recent years.

But a late decision of the Supren Court of the United States sets in strong light the iniquity and illegality any device for dividing any profits of savings bank among its managers. seems that in 1870 Congress incorporate the National Union Savings Bank Washington. It was organized and we into operation, and was, so far as the d cision in question shows, faithfully and properly conducted. But at length one of the corporators and managers Huntington by name, died, and his family brought a suit to have a share of the profits of the bank set apart for them in virtue of Mr. Huntington's co-operation in the management. The court has decided that such a claim is wholly unfounded. A savings bank is not a commercial partnership. It is founded in a benevolent purpose to furnish a safe depository for the money of depositors. It is like a corporation of church-wardens formed for preserving the property of the parish, or a college of surgeons organized to promote medical science, and is founded in expectation of public advantage, without any pecuniary interest in its managers The family of Mr. Huntington could claim nothing from the profits, because he himself had no such right. The primary idea of a savings bank is that it is an institution managed by disinterested persons, the entire profits of which, after deducting necessary expenses of business, accrue, in dividends or in a surplus, to the benefit of the depositors.

A great many private bankers who have failed in this country have attributed their failure, no doubt justly, not so much to bad debts or expensive living, as to the vast amount of interest they have paid to depositors. It used to be the custom of private bankers, especially in the West and South, to allow 6 per cent. per annum interest on current deposits, and many of them do so still. But, in the East, it has been ascertained that no such rate can be paid with profit or with safety on the ordinary run of accounts current. To take large amounts, and agree to pay any such interest, is very apt to end in disaster. It is now believed that this is the prolific reason of the monetary mishap—to put it mildly—that has befallen Archbishop Purcell, of Cincinnati. His agreement, or that of his brother, Edward Purcell, his agent and factotum, to pay 6 per cent. has mainly caused the calamity. He has been the depositary long enough to make the interest double the principal; so that he may not have received of the $4,000,000 and upward, declared to be due his creditors, more than about $1,334,000. Where interest is given on interest, as it usually is, substantially, in such cases, it swells to a sum that confounds by its prodigiousness. It is said that if the $25 or so which was given to the Indians for this Island be calculated at compound interest, the amount would be actually greater than the entire City of New York, with all its improvements, would bring to-day at public auction.

Among the assets of the Dime Savings Bank, of Newark, are $180,000 worth of Hoboken improvement bonds. After the bank had bought the bonds the city claimed a reduction of 25 per cent., on the ground that some of the work had been imperfectly done. The bank refused to comply with the proposition, but agreed to take 90 cents on the dollar if prompt payment was made. At a late meeting the Hoboken Council tabled the resolution ordering the bonds paid, and the bank will at once proceed to bring suit for the full amount.

A run was recently commenced on the New Orleans Savings Institution. $500,000 was paid out in four days, and then the managers decided to pay 15 per cent. cash to depositors and the remainder after ninety days' notice, as allowed by the charter. The officers report the bank solvent. The January statement showed deposits aggregating $2,050,541. It is stated that the run was caused by rumors that the institution was heavily loaded with State bonds, which have recently depreciated 25 per cent.

A bill requiring banks, both State and National, to make quarterly statements of their condition, and to submit to examinations at any time, is before the Senate of Illinois.

How Banks are Wrecked in New York.

A SAMPLE OF H. L. LAMB'S OPERATIONS.

If there was any evidence to show that Mr. H. L. Lamb, acting Superintendent of the Bank Department, was conscientiously looking after the Savings Banks of the State with an eye single to their security and the consequent safety and quietude of the depositors, it would be a genuine pleasure to record the fact in these pages. There may be frequent cases where his official acts take on the semblance of seeking the public good, but his inordinate desire for notoriety, together with the high-handed methods employed to exercise his brief authority, more than counteract all such attempts. In a former issue of the JOURNAL we referred briefly to the action of Lamb in starting the troubles which have befallen the banks in Oswego. Later developments seem to indicate that the suddenness of the shock and the injustice and inhumanity to the depositors will be charged to the cupidity of Mr. Lamb.

The facts in the case, as furnished on good authority, are published herewith, and we venture the opinion that there cannot be found in the State a disinterested business man but who will pronounce judgment against the entire proceeding as unjust, inhuman, and calculated to destroy confidence in banks for savings, and defame the character of men who conduct them. In the case before us Lamb's hand first fell on the management, and over went the Oswego City Savings Bank, then followed the Bank of Oswego, then the City Bank—both State Banks, and under his control. After ousting the old Board of Trustees of the Savings Bank, and the election of a new Board, mostly of his selection or of his approval, the Savings Bank was allowed to go on, and is now recommended by him to the confidence of depositors. No new money has been put in, no securities changed—only the depositors are required to leave 10 per cent of their deposits to abide the decision o litigated town bonds. These town bond when they were taken were supposed t be the best investment that a bank coul hold. Special laws were enacted permit ting savings banks to invest in them They paid 7 per cent., and were consider ed next to Governments, at better inter est. Those of which Lamb especiall complained, the bank had held five year (Newfanes). He knew all these year that they had them; knew they wer litigated, and never until he pounce down on the bank had he complained o them or counseled their being replaced wit others. All at once, and while the hea officer was absent in New York, his exami ners appeared, examined the bank, de ducted $10,000 from the value of th Newfane bonds, $2,300 from Sodus & Wol cott bonds—which have never defaulte in interest (but which threaten to), cu off a $500 note or call loan of a ma worth $200,000, and reduced the bankin house, which cost $45,000, down t $15,000, and then said the bank wa $17,000 short!

Say, reduced on		Newfane bonds	$10,000
"	"	Sodus & Wolcott	2,300
"	"	Call Loan	500
"	"	Banking House	30,000
			$42,800

This was only a paper figuring down. There had been no run, no discredit—no danger from any known source, and the bank enjoyed the merited confidence of all that section of the State. The officers at once called in three experts—citizens of known worth and confidence. They looked over the assets, and put their valuation on them, and made the bank out solvent and $5,000 surplus. The citizens held a public meeting, and this committee so reported, and the people were satisfied. But Mr. Lamb had gone too far to recede. Mr. Kirkland, the examiner under him, was dismissed—but some action must be taken to justify him. He sent a mousing clerk named Clark to Oswego to examine the officers on oath—to pry into the books from the beginning of the bank's career—to swoop around and find some error, some wrong. Every thing was noted and sent to Albany; trifling things, innocent when they occurred, but against the present law, were jotted down and sent forward to be produced if ever Lamb's conduct was called to account. For example—the bank had made a loan to its President, Mr. Luther Wright, one of the most upright men in existence, secured as in all other cases, by Government or other bonds, and paid after a short interval; this was noted as a crime! While Clark was in Oswego, another emissary from Mr. Lamb's office arrived on the scene—a Mr. St. John. He also was hunting up proof of fraud or stealing. But no such turned up. Whatever might be concocted as to incapacity, no charge of fraud, defalcation, or stealing, direct or indirect, could be rooted out.

The result of all this was disastrous all around, not only to the banking interest in Oswego, but doubtless to the wily schemes of Mr. Lamb.

The new directors, unused to banking, made a claim for instantaneous payment by the Bank of Oswego for the money deposited there by the Savings Bank, which of course, unexpectedly, and in mid-winter, they could not pay. They telegraphed to Mr. Lamb, at Albany, and Mr. Lathrop, the Cashier, knowing the gentle hands he would fall into, voluntarily had his own receiver appointed, disappointing Mr. Lamb of placing one of his pets; and Mr. De Wolf, of the City Bank, did the same thing.

This is a brief account of Mr. Lamb's methods. The trouble was avoidable. Had he sent for the officers and said he wanted the Newfane bonds replaced, it would doubtless have been done at once. All the future trouble in Oswego business circles, and lack of confidence by savings depositors, came of Lamb's first error—to put it mildly—and of his want of frankness in making matters right after that.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Insurance Superintendent.

NEW YORK, March 7, 1879.

EDITOR RHODES' JOURNAL.

Sir—It is so easy and so common when resolutions and charges are fulminated against public men to *believe* the worst, and taking the facts to be as set forth, to join in the hue and cry and general denunciation without stopping to inquire or waiting to hear what may be said in reply, that I would fain ask you to suspend your judgment in the matter of the more recent attacks upon Superintendent Smyth of the Insurance Department.

The resolution introduced in the Assembly asking him to resign, because of popular rumors, thus in a sense putting him on trial without the right or opportunity for defense, is so palpably malignant that it ought at once to enlist popular sympathy for the official thus pilloried without the right even to answer or make denial of the allegations upon which this strange request is preferred. The spiteful motive back of this movement is perfectly well understood in Albany and in political circles generally. Mr. Smyth is an active, earnest and zealous partisan. It is unfortunate for him that he could not have dropped politics when he accepted the Superintendency —but he did not. His position gave him even greater prominence than before. He is not moulded on the mild smooth and conciliatory plan at all; his manner more than his feeling is somewhat arrogant and not calculated to win. Indeed he is of the mould whose policy is to dictate rather than to advise. That he by his prominence in politics finds it necessary to oppose the wishes of a great many political friends is inevitable—and in opposing he sometimes exasperates where another would soothe. The controversy over the Speakership, in which Mr. Smyth quite actively engaged, is being fought over again in these resolutions and in the bill to abolish the office. While some honest and fair minded men will perhaps be found to vote for both measures through the conviction that there must be something at the bottom of so much and so positive assertion, yet it is perfectly safe to say that honest and fair minded men would never have had a chance to vote on either but for personal malice and malignity against Mr. Smyth.

The charges of the Governor are off the same piece. In the appointment of so prominent a Republican as Mr. Smyth to the important office of Superintendent of Insurance, the Governor undoubtedly expected to secure highly compensating advantages in return, in the way of the confirmation by the Republican Senate of his Democratic nominees. Whether there was any trade or dicker of that sort or not, nobody knows, and Gov. R. is not the man to tell. But every indication points to the conclusion that his investment in a republican politician has not turned out satisfactorily. And if it is possible for a human being to exemplify the gall of bitterness and the acidity of vinegar in his aspect and visage and conduct, Governor Robinson is that man; relentless as fate, he will follow out a vindictive purpose to the last gasp. Hence his renewal of the very same charges which he preferred against Smyth last winter—and on trial of which he was acquitted—by simply referring to them and proofs submitted thereon. Concerning the new matter, the action of the Superintendent in the case of the Atlantic Mutual Life of Albany—it is somewhat singular that the company having fought the Receiver all the way to the Court of Appeals and back again, and still fighting to get him out, and restore the company—have never been able to obtain redress against the high-handed outrage of Superintendent Smyth, in moving the Attorney General to apply for a Receiver! Why is not some impeachment started of our judiciary for consummating and perpetuating the outrage initiated by Superintendent Smyth?

It is simply a political and personal quarrel, in which the public are compelled to suffer by the necessary suspension of the ordinary and natural functions of an important public officer, whose time is occupied, whose mind is harrassed, whose efficiency and vim are completely destroyed by being compelled to defend himself against these virulent attacks.

OBSERVER.

A hearing of the committee of the depositors of the insolvent Mechanics' and Laborers' Savings Bank of Jersey City, took place before Chancellor Runyon, at Newark, March 5th. Mr. Washington B. Williams, the Examiner, presented his report, after which the Chancellor heard the members of the committee, who asked, first, that a committee of three be appointed to take charge of and wind up the affairs of the bank; or that a receiver be appointed, suggesting that in the latter case Mr. Williams be selected. The Chancellor, after considering the matter, decided upon appointing a Receiver, and named Mr. Williams for the position.

It cannot be said that the leading city of New Jersey is not in good credit. The Controller of Newark opened bids lately for $450,000 6 per cent. bonds, payable in thirty years. The sinking fund took $180,000 at the highest bid made, and the balance was awarded at 106.53.

Co-operation tn Practice.

The figures which represent the sales of one of the London co-operative stores—the "Army and Navy"—as set forth in an article by Mr. J. H. Lawson in the latest number of the *Nineteenth Century,* are as follows: first year's business, $651,-405; third year's, $2,177,260; fifth year's, $4,561,740, and the seventh and last year's, $7,700,000. Mr. Lawson considers various grievances which the shopkeepers have, speaking of one as follows:

"The final and most important plea is the serious injury that is being done to the tradesmen themselves. This is a matter which deserves the fullest sympathy and the most grave consideration. Sorry as all must be, there is no doubt about it that the shopkeepers must suffer from the process, which will gradually lead to their almost total extinction; and how to alleviate that suffering is the point to which public attention should be directed. To attempt to do so by the abolition of co-operative stores would be futile, as they have taken too deep a root. As well might we demand the extinction of railways and the restoration of the old stage coaches. Progress cannot be impeded. Should the electric light prove a success, no consideration for the losses of the gas companies will prevent its adoption."

One of these London societies has become a manufacturer on an extensive and increasing scale, which is thus described:

"A very large number of workingmen are employed on the premises in tailoring, and more than one hundred women are constantly at shirtmaking, receiving good and even liberal wages, in favorable contrast with those exposed in Hood's famous Song of the Shirt; and it must be some satisfaction to the wearers of these garments that, though they get them at reduced prices, that reduction has not been wrung from the misery of the poor workers. It embarks, moreover, in mantlemaking, perfumes, and in the manufacture of portmanteaus, dressing-bags, purses, and other leather goods, tinwork, japanned ware, cabinets, etc., in fancy woods, also in printing and die-sinking. This may be deprecated by many, but the society has in fact been forced into it by the difficulty, and almost in some instances impossibility, of procuring really sound and good articles that could be confidently warranted to its members, owing to the system of scamping and concealing defects. The results have quite kept pace with the most sanguine expectations. The prices have been reduced, the members are satisfied, and the workingmen, many of them the best in their respective trades, are well content."

Mr. Lawson closes with a rose-colored prediction of the future of co-operation:

"It will thus be seen that co-operative societies are likely to prove friends to the workingman, however they may affect the traders; and another beneficial effect, a national one, must follow. By largely reducing the selling prices of these manufactures, they compete more favorably with those of foreign production, and tend, therefore, to keep the trade in our own hands."

A Close Calculator.

Hon. Jonathan A. Lane has addressed a letter to the Treasurer of Massachusetts, which reads: "There is to my credit the sum of $261.30 salary as Councilor of the Fourth District, from the date of my appointment by his Excellency Gov. Rice to the present time. I am not insensible to the great honor of the appointment, and have enjoyed its pleasant associations for this brief period, but I have not been able to render the State any appreciable service, and to receive pro rata the same compensation as my associates, who have done the work of the year, including, of course, the legislative session, would be a marked inequality, disturbing my sense of what is becoming the proprieties of the position. In recalling, however, the time which, in attendance upon the meetings of the Council and visiting public institutions, I have given to the public service, I find it to be, say 20 days in all, which, at the established legislative compensation of $5, makes the even sum of $100, which I have this day received from your cashier, and the balance of $161.30 I pray you to convey into the Treasury of the Commonwealth."

Unlimited Paper.

The great uncertainty and remarkable fluctuations naturally resulting from unlimited paper money, have been well exemplified in Turkey, where fiat money has full sway. Constantinople advices describe the recent panic and confusion there from the rapid and unprecedented fall of caimes, that forced up the gold lira of 100 piasters to 410 and even 420 piasters in paper—more than double what it had been. This seems to have been caused by the mutual action and reaction of the schemes of the Minister of Finance, on one hand, and the Galata Exchange and money-brokers on the other. A standing strife has long existed between the Minister and the Exchange, because the former, as chief holder of the caimes, tried by all means at his command to keep up their value; while the latter, as principal owner of the metallic currency, had exactly opposite interests. As the embarrasments of the Minister continually increased, and as the Exchange and speculators knew by long practice how to profit by such embarrassments, steady depreciation of the caimes could not be hindered. These had gone down in a few hours 25 per cent., and how much further they might go, no one could tell. Transactions almost entirely ceased at the bazaars, and the bakers threatened to close their shops rather than sell bread at the rate fixed, for paper money. At this juncture, therefore, the Minister had recourse to the policy he had frequently adopted before. He bought largely of caimes, on account of the Ministry, on the Exchange, its operations being saved from disturbance by the Police preventtng the money brokers from offering caimes freely for sale. The financial and political combination had the desired effect. In a single day caimes declined from 420 to 176 piasters.

Appreciation of Silver.

If some new and exceptionally rich silver lodes are not discovered in this country within the next two or three years, there is considerable reason for believing that an appreciation will take place in the market price of that metal. It is not likely, for a very long time at least, to get back to the level it held nine years ago, but the decline seems, in a large degree, to have exhausted itself. The drop from sixty-two pence an ounce to forty-seven pence, was chiefly due to the enormous yield of our American mines and the demonetization of silver by Germany. The former put into the market for two or three years not less than $80.000,000 worth of silver per annum, while the latter has added annually to this amount about $25,000,000 worth, this representing the quantity sold during the past six years by the German Government. Now, however, the yield of our mines is falling off, as may be seen by the bullion returns, and also by the price of mining stocks, while the German Empire has but $75,000,000 worth of silver at its disposal. As there is an immense demand for this metal for manufacturing purposes, and as the waste by wear in silver coinage is large, the tendency of time, in the absence of other disturbing agents, will be in the direction of slowly increasing, as the supply lessons, the price of this commodity.—*New York Times.*

Confederate Funds in England.

The joint resolution introduced in Congress by Representative Jorgensen, just before the close of the late Session, authorizing and directing the President to cause an investigation as to the funds belonging to the Confederate States, on deposit in the Bank of England, or in the hands of private citizens in Great Britain, in its preamble recites that it is believed that the so-called Confederate States, while exercising authority, and holding commercial relations with the Government of England, collected large sums of money from certain citizens of the United States, and deposited the same, or some part of the same, in the Bank of England, to the credit of the so-called Confederate States, and that a portion of said sums of money still remains in said bank. The resolution authorizes the President to take action to secure the same wherever it may be found, to the end that it may be refunded and paid to the citizens who served as soldiers, or colored men who worked on the fortifications or served as teamsters, in the so-called Confederate Armies, or who were disabled in such service, and who are now in indigent circumstances, and are dependent upon the charity of the community for a living.

BANKING IN OHIO.

[From the report of Hon. James Williams, Auditor of State, as submitted to the Governor, December 28th, 1878.]

The following is a consolidated report of the condition of the various banking institutions or incorporations engaged in the business of banking, organized under the laws of Ohio, before the commencement of business on the first Monday of October, 1878, as required by the Act of March 31, 1877 (74 O. L., pp. 72–4).

ASHTABULA LOAN ASSOCIATION, ASHTABULA.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$121,828 89	
Due from banks & bankers	3,388 67	
Real estate	18,078 35	
Furniture and fixtures	1,500 00	
Current expenses	508 93	
Cash and cash items	7,402 50	
Capital stock paid		$100,000 00
Surplus & undivided profits		5,264 23
Individual deposits		37,136 62
Due to banks and bankers		5,600 49
Miscellaneous		4,706 00
	$152,707 34	$152,707 34

MUTUAL LOAN ASSOCIATION, CONNEAUT.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$151,078 73	
Due from banks and bankers	9,314 42	
Real estate	3,600 00	
Furniture and fixtures	1,543 86	
Current expenses	7,196 81	
Cash and cash items	4,834 45	
Capital stock paid		$80,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		13,886 14
Individual deposits		82,950 21
Due to banks and bankers		731 92
	$177,568 27	$177,568 27

OHIO CITY BANK, MARTIN'S FERRY.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$56,454 69	
Real estate	6,001 62	
Current Expenses	3,187 68	
Cash and cash items	3,776 84	
Miscellaneous	377 98	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		1,688 70
Individual deposits		17,063 74
Due to banks and bankers		1,046 37
	$69,798 81	$69,798 81

MORGAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, MORGAN.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$79,504 10	
Overdrafts	5,242 27	
Due from banks and bankers	2,059 94	
Real estate	3,644 99	
Furniture and fixtures	1,160 00	
Current expenses	936 39	
Cash and cash items	3,227 26	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		7,603 20
Individual deposits		35,505 09
Due to banks and bankers		2,666 66
	$95,774 95	$95,774 95

BELMONT BANK, SOMERTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$77,843 55	
Due from banks and bankers	10,867 00	
Real estate	3,000 00	
Furniture and fixtures	2,044 09	
Current expenses	3,521 20	
Cash and cash items	5,354 36	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		3,623 01
Individual deposits		49,007 19
	$102,630 20	$102,630 20

BEREA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, BEREA.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$58,188 63	
U. S. bonds, premium, &c	11.675 00	
Due from banks and bankers	12,743 03	
Real estate	4,021 63	
Furniture and fixtures	764 30	
Current expenses	1,448 56	
Cash and cash items	3,588 13	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		2,269 78
Individual deposits		65,159 50
	$92,429 28	$92,429 28

DEFIANCE SAVINGS BANK, DEFIANCE.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$63,035 07	
Due from banks and bankers	17,669 48	
Furniture and fixtures	1,430 40	
Current expenses	1,254 08	
Cash and cash items	8,153 75	
Capital stock paid		$35,234 99
Surplus and undivided profits		3,381 81
Unpaid dividends		516 82
Individual deposits		52,411 16
	$91,544 78	$91,544 78

CAPITAL CITY BANK, COLUMBUS.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$40,696 49	
Due from banks and bankers	3,711 74	
Furniture and fixtures	778 46	
Current expenses	273 84	
Cash items	8,296 50	
Miscellaneous	686,85	
Capital stock paid		$12,500 00
Surplus and undivided profits		647 75
Individual deposits		35,146 15
Miscellaneous		6,149 98
	$54,443 88	$54,443 88

CITIZENS' SAVINGS BANK, COLUMBUS.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$249,440 79	
U. S. and other bonds	74,100 00	
Due from banks and bankers	34,663 72	
Real estate	25,900 00	
Furniture and fixtures	4,705 15	
Current expenses	1,512 30	
Cash items	64,429 77	
Miscellaneous	9,879 45	
Capital stock paid		$100,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		26,429 78
Individual deposits		311,118 16
Due to banks and bankers		4,691 78
Miscellaneous		22,391 46
	$464,631 18	$464,631 18

GEAUGA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CHARDON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$159,008 00	
Overdrafts	14,959 08	
U. S. and other bonds	10,500 00	
Due from banks and bankers	17,142 07	
Real estate	11,339 18	
Furniture and fixtures	1,744 75	
Current expenses	1,835 00	
Cash and cash items	13,686 84	
Capital stock paid		$24,750 00
Surplus and undivided profits		5,454 77
Individual deposits		192,898 08
Due to banks and bankers		7,107 07
	$230,209 92	$230,209 92

FARMERS' BANK, CANTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$121,454 09	
Overdrafts	478 00	
U. S. and State bonds	20,700 00	
Due from banks and bankers	611 67	
Furniture and fixtures	500 00	
Current expenses	8,049 00	
Cash and cash items	19,206 52	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		16,176 70
Individual deposits		126,813 57
Due to banks and bankers		2,598 54
Miscellaneous		405 47
	$170,994 28	$170,994 28

GERMAN BANKING COMPANY, CINCINNATI.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$475,926 10	
Overdrafts	504 34	
U. S. bonds	3,100 00	
Due from banks and bankers	64,917 41	
Real estate	5,835 00	
Furniture and fixtures	3,850 00	
Current expenses	7,248 22	
Cash and cash items	60,404 16	
Capital stock paid		$250,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		17,920 64
Individual deposits		321,607 18
Due to banks and bankers		32,257 41
	$621,785 23	$621,785 23

BANK OF CINCINNATI, CINCINNATI.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$209,948 15	
U. S. and State bonds	6,450 00	
Due from banks and bankers	12,872 66	
Furniture and fixtures	4,141 22	
Current expenses	3,246 82	
Cash and cash items	36,170 33	
Miscellaneous	1,315 98	
Capital stock paid		$100,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		7,136 91
Individual deposits		146,821 26
Due to banks and bankers		142 24
Miscellaneous		20,044 75
	$274,145 16	$274,145 16

WESTERN GERMAN BANK, CINCINNATI.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$263,174 72	
Overdrafts	177 57	
U. S. and other bonds	3,300 00	
Due from banks and bankers	7,327 56	
Furniture and fixtures	2,327 13	
Current expenses	9,593 32	
Cash and cash items	40,173 26	
Capital stock paid		$100,000 00
Undivided profits		16,760 84
Individual deposits		209,192 40
Due to banks and bankers		120 32
	$326,073 56	$326,073 56

KENTON SAVINGS BANK, KENTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$32,846 76	
Due from banks and bankers	6,984 72	
Real estate	6,454 00	
Furniture and fixtures	2,028 50	
Current expenses	1,130 42	
Cash and cash items	9,651 59	
Miscellaneous	10,028 46	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		5,337 31
Individual deposits		37,694 22
Due to banks and bankers		760 49
Miscellaneous		332 43
	$69,124 45	$69,124 45

HARDIN SAVINGS BANK, KENTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$24,964 60	
Overdrafts	9,557 27	
Due from banks and bankers	19,381 48	
Real estate	12,800 00	
Furniture and fixtures	1,000 00	
Current expenses	715 63	
Cash and cash items	7,142 20	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		3,849 02
Individual deposits		45,968 16
Dividends unpaid		744 00
	$75,561 18	$75,561 18

FARMER'S BANK, MT. STERLING.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$78,962 79	
Due from banks and bankers	13,931 36	
Furniture and fixtures	1,348 55	
Current expenses	276 84	
Cash	5,554 59	
Capital stock paid		$56,200 00
Surplus and undivided profits		4,654 21
Individual deposits		38,829 81
Miscellaneous		390 11
	$100,074 13	$100,074 13

FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CADIZ.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$87,289 48	
Overdrafts	198 58	
Due from banks and bankers	17,260 45	
Real estate	2,886 54	
Furniture and fixtures	2,325 00	
Current expenses	562 08	
Cash and cash items	19,526 75	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		3,831 36
Individual deposits		61,466 08
Due to banks and bankers		1,145 38
Bills payable		13,606 01
	$130,048 83	$130,048 83

BELLEVIEW BANK, BELLEVIEW.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$145,744 28	
U. S. and other bonds	51,303 48	
Due from banks and bankers	24,863 55	
Real estate	20,100 00	
Furniture and fixtures	2,815 00	
Current expenses	683 20	
Cash items	14,337 43	
Capital stock paid		$80,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		7,761 01
Individual deposits		157,635 36
Due to banks and bankers		14,450 57
	$259,846 94	$259,846 94

KNOX CO. SAVINGS BANK, MT. VERNON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$52,171 67	
Overdrafts	2,535 83	
U. S. and other stocks	17,488 88	
Due from banks and bankers	14,915 35	
Furniture and fixtures	2,000 00	
Current expenses	961 07	
Cash and cash items	34,922 72	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		15,261 45
Individual deposits		83,425 49
Due to banks and bankers		1,308 08
	$124,995 02	$124,995 02

EXCHANGE BANK, MADISON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$102,589 18	
U. S. bonds	13,700 00	
Due from banks and bankers	12,728 93	
Real estate	4,350 00	
Current expenses	1,607 35	
Cash and cash items	4,476 49	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		5,692 80
Individual deposits		31,274 07
Certificates of deposit		52,485 08
	$139,451 95	$139 451 95

CARDINGTON BANKING CO., CARDINGTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$103,281 81	
Due from banks and bankers	3,772 52	
Real estate	3,700 00	
Furniture and fixtures	2,942 50	
Current expenses	626 07	
Cash and cash items	13,402 59	
Miscellaneous	2,808 36	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		26,581 85
Individual deposits		31,881 42
Due to banks and bankers		9,956 84
Miscellaneous		37,113 74
	$130,533 85	$130,533 85

TOLEDO SAVINGS BANK AND TRUST CO., TOLEDO.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$177,979 76	
U. S. and other bonds	103,049 73	
Due from banks and bankers	6,514 60	
Real estate	36,770 09	
Furniture and fixtures	2,500 00	
Current expenses	6,465 09	
Cash	3,078 23	
Capital stock paid		$70,000 00
Surplus fund		5,651 07
Individual deposits		220,706 43
Bills payable		40,000 00
	$336,357 50	$336,357 50

MONROE BANK, WOODSFIELD.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$73,185 34	
Due from banks and bankers	3,543 42	
Real estate	5,000 00	
Furniture and fixtures	946 00	
Current expenses	4,727 74	
Cash	4,497 64	
Miscellaneous	2,404 42	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		2,731 19
Individual deposits		41,276 24
Due to banks and bankers		297 13
	$94,304 56	$94,304 56

DAYTON SAVINGS BANK, DAYTON.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$115,123 84	
U. S. and other bonds	3,150 00	
Due from banks and bankers	4,314 63	
Furniture and fixtures	2,614 60	
Current expenses	5,867 95	
Cash and cash items	21,435 18	
Miscellaneous	10,955 21	
Capital stock paid		$30,000 00
Undiv'd profits & unp'd div'ds		7,422 67
Individual deposits		125,291 14
Due to banks and bankers		747 60
	$163,461 41	$163,461 41

FARMERS' DEPOSIT & SAVINGS BANK, POLAND.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$100,264 39	
U. S. bonds	5,000 00	
Due from banks and bankers	25,546 83	
Real estate	7,261 44	
Furniture and fixtures	1,834 03	
Current expenses	978 29	
Cash and cash items	13,498 21	
Miscellaneous	1,092 14	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus fund		19,441 14
Individual deposits		45,058 20
Due to banks and bankers		824 21
Time deposits		125,151 78
	$215,475 33	$215,475 33

KENT SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, KENT.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$41,915 81	
Overdrafts	420 29	
Due from banks and bankers	14,844 62	
Furniture and fixtures	1,345 43	
Current expenses	1,281 79	
Cash and cash items	4,194 53	
Capital stock paid		$12,600 00
Surplus and undivided profits		2,507 77
Individual deposits		48,134 83
Miscellaneous		759 87
	$64,002 47	$64,002 47

MANSFIELD SAVINGS BANK, MANSFIELD.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$81,933 28	
Due from banks and bankers	4,742 65	
Real estate	20,400 00	
Current expenses	2,922 15	
Cash and cash items	14,478 77	
Miscellaneous	5,560 65	
Capital stock paid		$32,500 00
Surplus and undivided profits		24,830 66
Individual deposits		70,220 88
Due to banks and bankers		2,485 96
	$130,037 50	$130,037 50

CITIZENS' SAVINGS BANK, PORTSMOUTH.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$79,639 71	
Overdrafts	926 15	
Due from banks and bankers	2,702 66	
Real estate	2,707 05	
Furniture and fixtures	500 00	
Current expenses	560 63	
Cash and cash items	9,586 49	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		2,936 13
Unpaid dividends		250 00
Individual deposits		43,436 56
	$96,622 69	$96,622 69

GIRARD SAVINGS BANK, GIRARD.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$50,404 87	
Due from banks and bankers	1,699 09	
Real estate	8,592 32	
Furniture and fixtures	1,111 68	
Current expenses	1,428 13	
Cash and cash items	6,973 03	
Miscellaneous	349 06	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Individual deposits		18,268 56
Due to banks and bankers		1,591 07
Miscellaneous		25,698 55
	$70,558 18	$70,558 18

COMMERCIAL BANK, DELPHOS.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$83,859 94	
Bonds, mortgages, &c	8,080 05	
Due from banks and bankers	7,529 72	
Furniture and fixtures	3,000 00	
Current expenses	1,594 80	
Cash and cash items	5,330 69	
Capital stock paid		$50,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		4,390 69
Individual deposits		51,241 34
Miscellaneous		3,763 17
	$109,395 20	$109,395 20

CITIZENS' SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, NILES.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$13,985 81	
Due from banks and bankers	4,840 05	
Real estate	10,207 74	
Furniture and fixtures	2,652 88	
Cash and cash items	5,334 37	
Miscellaneous	12,619 63	
Capital stock paid		$37,939 84
Undivided profits		606 11
Individual deposits		9,938 08
Due to banks and bankers		1,156 45
	$49,640 48	$49,640 48

CENTRAL BANK, UPPER SANDUSKY.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$51,304 58	
Due from banks and bankers	996 26	
Real estate	1,705 50	
Furniture and fixtures	1,183 99	
Current expenses	824 65	
Cash and cash items	20,569 33	
Miscellaneous	4,768 94	
Capital stock paid		$25,000 00
Surplus and undivided profits		1,123 68
Unpaid dividends		755 54
Individual deposits		54,474 03
	$81,353 25	$81,353 25

COMMERCIAL BANK, TIFFIN.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans and discounts	$170,270 94	
Due from banks and bankers	19,244 67	
Real estate	16,000 00	

bishop Purcell of Cincinnati is respected and honored by all classes—no matter whether Protestants or Catholics—but his goodness of heart induced him to act as banker for many thousands of his people. But banking is not a natural nor legitimate function of Archepiscopal duties, and hence his good intention brings disaster and misery to the thousands he meant to benefit.

It is a sad mishap, but when we consider the wretched laws governing savings banks in Ohio, it is no wonder the people were glad to make this respected man their banker. (Out of 23 institutions in the State called "Savings Banks," only four or five are such, in fact). But it will not be long before the people will demand that a general law shall govern these institutions, or else there will be no so-called savings banks left to tell the tale of a general banking business being done with the petty savings of hard-working people.

This condition of affairs doubtless tended to increase the sum entrusted to the Archbishop; now come assignments for the benefit of the poor de-

Savings Banks of Ohio Having no Capital Stock.

The following institutions report to the State Auditor, same as the above.

SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS, CLEVELAND.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans on real estate	$3,239,806 50	
Loans on U. S. and State stocks	17,302 00	
Loans on other stocks and bonds	654,615 53	
All other loans	1,980 00	
U. S. bonds	1,052,562 50	
Other stocks and bonds	2,834,198 35	
Real estate	108,000 00	
Expenses	16,466 06	
Due from banks & bankers	673,593 37	
Cash on hand	85,895 74	
Other assets	1,088 34	
Due depositors		$8,108,720 65
Undivided profits		576,787 74
	$8,685,508 39	$8,685,508 39

SPRINGFIELD SAVINGS SOCIETY, SPRINGFIELD.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans on real estate	$95,763 06	
U. S. bonds	15,000 00	
Other stocks and bonds	80,699 00	
Furniture and fixtures	600 00	
Due from banks and bankers	17,400 40	
Cash on hand	2,697 58	
Due depositors		$202,615 86
Undivided profits		9,544 18
	$212,160 04	$212,160 04

CINCINNATI SAVINGS SOCIETY, CINCINNATI.

	Resources.	Liabilities.
Loans on real estate	$263,829 39	
Real estate	28,795 07	
Expenses	3,313 87	
Due from banks and bankers	11,233 99	
Cash on hand	482 27	
Due depositors		$276,470 02
Due to banks and bankers		16,611 15
Undivided profits		14,573 42
	$307,654 59	$307,654 59

Savings banks—no capital stock		4
Total resources		$9,242,320 20
	Liabilities.	
Undivided profits	$600,964 01	
Individual deposits	8,623,245 04	
All other liabilities	18,111 15	
Total liabilities		$9,242,320 20

BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

Savings in England.

Deposits in the Savings Banks in England increased from £73,534,000 in January, 1878, to £74,657,000 in January, 1879, notwithstanding the depression. The increase, however, is considerably less than the legitimate increment from interest at 5 per cent.

Honoring Town Bonds.

Nearly 250 citizens of Cortlandville, Cortland County, New York, have signed a remonstrance against the attempt recently made at a town meeting to induce the repudiation of the outstanding railroad bonds of the town. The *Standard* says that among the signers are some of the heaviest taxpayers in the town, men who do not own a dollar's worth of the bonds, and who prefer by far to pay their share of the taxes made necessary by them rather than have the town disgraced and its credit ruined by an attempt to dishonor its just obligations

The Robbed Manhattan.

There have been issued to the Manhattan Savings Bank of this city, by the First Comptroller of the Treasury, duplicate bonds to the amount of $1,200,000. The aggregate amount stolen from the bank last Fall by burglars was $1,600,000, and the duplicates were issued, in pursuance of an act of Congress, to take the place of those stolen. There are yet to be issued to the bank $400,000. The duplicates are held by the United States Treasurer in trust, in order to secure him against loss. The interest will, of course, be regularly paid to the bank, and when the bonds are called for redemption the principal will be paid to the Manhattan Institution. The possession of the duplicates by the United States in trust precludes the possibility of the original or stolen bonds being redeemed by the Government.

The bank resumed business on the 11th inst., paying in full all depositors who called for their money. A more detailed account appears elsewhere.

The National Treasury.

The receipts of national bank notes for redemption for the week ending March 8, as compared with the corresponding period last year were as follows:

	1878.	1879.
New York	$584,000	$1,765,000
Boston	1,173,000	1,019,000
Philadelphia	94,000	42,000
Miscellaneous	764,000	518,000
	$2,615,000	$3,344,000

At the above date the Treasury held $350,572,400 in U. S. bonds to secure bank circulation.

From the last report issued in February, the Treasury held $349,669,000 in United States bonds to secure bank circulation.

The receipts of national bank notes for redemption for the last week in February, as compared with the corresponding period last year, were as follows:

	1878.	1879.
New York	$723,000	$1,940,000
Boston	1,717,000	1,136,000
Philadelphia	70,000	55,000
Miscellaneous	813,000	866,000
Total	$3,383,000	$3,497,000

Another So-called Pennsylvania Savings Bank Gone.

The Dime Savings Bank of York, Pa., suspended the 6th inst. The following notice was posted on the door to explain matters: "The demand upon the Dime Savings Institution during the past few days having been largely in excess of possible collections the Trustees have been advised by a majority of the stockholders, in justice to all depositors, to proceed as promptly as possible to collect its outstanding maturing paper, in order that there may be the least delay practicable in meeting its liabilities." The liabilities are not yet known, but it is supposed the bank will pay 75 or 80 cents on the dollar.

Honorably Wound Up.

The Emigrant Savings Bank, of Brooklyn, N. Y., having wound up its affairs and paid all its depositors, finally closed its doors February 27th.

Trustees at Work.

The Trustees of the American Trust Company, of Newark, N.J., are endeavoring to raise money by subscriptions among themselves for the purpose of paying the claims of depositors. If the plan does not succeed the Receiver will report to the Chancellor at an early day. Until the matter is decided the company's affairs will remain unchanged.

A Bold Robbery.

The Duval Savings Bank of Jacksonville, Florida, was lately robbed of $3,500, by the latest approved method. A man drove up in front of the bank and called out President Abbott, the only person in the bank. The stranger engaged Mr. Abbott a few minutes in conversation, while a confederate entered by a side door and took the money from a drawer.

Nature and Functions of Banking.

At a recent meeting of the New York Free Trade Club, the subject of "Banking" was presented by Mr. Graham McAdams, the author of "An Alphabet of Finance." The speaker said that he wanted to consider the bank as it exists to-day—to fix its status in the modern mechanism of trade. He marked as current errors (1) the error of the greenback or anti-bank faction in which banking is regarded as identical with the issue of bank notes; (2) the error illustrated in the columns of many reputable newspapers whereby a bank appears as an institution chiefly of convenience—for the safe keeping and distribution of money; (3) the error of certain prominent public men like Senator Blaine, who represent the bank as putting to active work only the scattered savings of industry; and finally the partial but very potent error which is made by professed and recognised economists in presenting the bank as a substitute for money.

Mr. McAdam then contended that the real business of a bank is the receipt of claims for collection, and the lending of the purchasing power to which the claims give title. He said further that the checks, notes, etc., deposited in a bank represent the purchasing power of goods sold, and that the loans made in discount and otherwise are loans of this purchasing power to be used in the buying of other goods. Hence the bank is an institution for facilitating sale and purchase—it is the great medium of exchange.

This view of a bank as a medium of exchange, Mr. McAdam thought might be very potent in dispelling the ignorant hostility to banks now so prevalent. It would reveal the absurdity of the too popular notion that the "money power" can and does "lock up the capital of the country" to screw out a high interest. "It should clear up," he said, "many obscure notions as to the origin of commercial crises—fixing attention on the production and exchange of commodities as the causes of the increase and dimunition of bank capital, and drawing it away from the superficial incidents of banking operations."

The Bankrupt Archbishop.

The system of one-man banking has received a shock which is felt all over the country. Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati is respected and honored by all classes—no matter whether Protestants or Catholics—but his goodness of heart induced him to act as banker for many thousands of his people. But banking is not a natural nor legitimate function of Archepiscopal duties, and hence his good intention brings disaster and misery to the thousands he meant to benefit.

It is a sad mishap, but when we consider the wretched laws governing savings banks in Ohio, it is no wonder the people were glad to make this respected man their banker. (Out of 23 institutions in the State called "Savings Banks," only four or five are such, in fact). But it will not be long before the people will demand that a general law shall govern these institutions, or else there will be no so-called savings banks left to tell the tale of a general banking business being done with the petty savings of hard-working people.

This condition of affairs doubtless tended to increase the sum entrusted to the Archbishop; now come assignments for the benefit of the poor depositors, petitions, remonstrances, and church collections to aid in payment of the debt. There is every prospect of a tangled maze of litigation growing out of the trouble that will furnish business for the courts and lawyers for a long time to come. The feeling among the German Catholics, as expressed in their organ, the *Volksfreund*, is very bitter toward the Archbishop. That paper says that if the church takes hold of the matter, as it should, the whole debt can be paid. "Most Catholics," the article continues, "argue thus: Rome sent the Archbishop here and left him in his office for 45 years. It should now, when something is rotten in Denmark, take an interest in the case and lend a helping hand to atone for this fault." The *Volksfreund* believes the creditors would, in the main, be satisfied with one-fourth of their claims, and suggests that a compromise be arranged on that basis.

School Savings Banks.

In France, Italy, Belgium, and other countries, a savings bank is one of the regular institutions in national schools. The system is excellent, both in its immediate results, and as a training to habits of industry and thrift. No attempt of a systematic kind has been made to associate banks with the Board Schools in England, or the Public Schools in this country. Professor Laurent, who was the first to introduce school savings banks in Belgium, suggested that school prizes might be made to consist of savings bank books, entitling the recipients to sums of money at a fixed date, such as on attaining the age of twenty-one.

A Lady President.

Mr. M. C. Williams, the President of the State National Bank of Raleigh, N. C., died recently, and his wife has been elected to the directory, and has become President of the institution.

Minnesota Legislature.

The upper House of the Minnesota Legislature has passed, by a vote of 23 to 9, "an act to conform all savings banks to uniformity of powers, rights and liabilities, and to provide for the more efficient protection of depositors."

Compromise with Stockholders.

The case of the Receiver of the Charlottesville (Va.) National Bank against the stockholders, upon their individual responsibility, to recover the full value of the stock held by them, was lately called for trial in the United States Circuit Court. After conference, and without coming to trial, a compromise was effected, by which the stockholders are to pay 92 1-2 cents on the dollar.

A New Cuban Bank.

A financial institution has been organized known as the Agricultural bank of Camaguey, to be established at Puerto Principe, Cuba. The capital will be $1,000,000, of which over 3,000 shares of $100 each have been subscribed in this city. The bank has been organized by the consent and under the auspices of Captain-General Martinez Campos. Its object is to aid in the reconstruction of the destroyed properties in the eastern part of Cuba. The bank is authorized by its charter to make loans to landowners to the extent of 60 per cent. of their appraised value, and also to furnish the planters with machinery, agricultural implements, cattle, etc. These loans are to be secured by mortgages and notes.

The Good Credit of Georgia.

City Attorney Newman of Atlanta reports that a bank in New York City offered State Treasurer Renfroe, for the use of the State of Georgia, all the money he needed at 5 per cent. per annum, even if the amount went up to $5,000,000. He also says that a responsible capitalist has offered to take the whole indebtedness of the City of Atlanta (over $2,000,000) at 5 per cent. per annum.

Foundation of the Bank of France.

The 79th anniversary of the foundation of the Bank of France was celebrated Feb. 20th. Three months after the formation of the Government of the eighteenth Brumaire, several bankers, encouraged by the First Consul, and backed by a Councillor of State, M. Cretet, who subsequently became director of the Bank of France and Minister of the Interior, held a meeting and decided upon the creation of a bank on the model of the Bank of England. They fixed the capital at $6,000,000, in 30,000 shares, at $200 each. The Government immediately entrusted to this company its current account, and bought 5,000 shares. The bank has once suspended payment, in 1814, when the allied army entered Paris. The Provisional Governor, the celebrated Lafitte, bricked up the cellars containing bullion and money, burned the notes and broke the plates.

A Southern Bank Closing.

The Bank of Rome, Georgia, closed its doors the latter part of February, on account of the fact, that reasonable profits could not be obtained. All creditors are to be paid in full on presentation of claims.

The Clinton Savings Bank.

This bank transacted business in this city, and was one of the line of small concerns which failed from 1875-8. It failed in July, 1877, and a dividend of 25 per cent. was paid January 12, 1878. The Receiver states that he has now on hand about $23,000 —from which, however, all the expenses must be deducted. It is his intention to dispose of the entire business at an early day, and he hopes to be able to pay an amount somewhat in excess of that paid in January, 1878. On the basis of his present calculations the depositors will receive from 55 to 60 per cent. of the amount of their claims.

Over-issue of Pennsylvania Bonds.

In the annual report of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund they say in regard to the over-issue of the bonds of 1853: "The State Treasurer has redeemed of the loan of April 19, 1853, $226,000 coupon bonds in full for the amount shown by the books to be outstanding and unredeemed. The loan of April 19, 1853, was numbered from 5,001 upward, and by the records of the department it is found that the bonds have been redeemed of said loan varying in their numbers from 5,001 to 5,500 inclusive. This would seem to indicate that 26 bonds in excess of the amount, as shown upon the books of the department as issued, have been presented for payment, and that 59 bonds above the number 5328 have been redeemed, showing conclusively that they were issued. A committee of the Legislature is investigating the matter.

The loan of April 19, 1853, consisted, as authorized, of 500 $1,000 bonds, numbered from 5,001 upward. Of these 328 were issued, as shown by the books. When the loan, however, was called in, the number of bonds presented was 26 in excess of the number supposed to nave been issued, and the numbers of the bonds presented for redemption indicate that the whole $500,000 authorized was issued. While the highest number of the bonds presented ror redemption should not have been over 5,328, the highest one presented was 5,387.

Debts of the various States.

The latest statistics show that the debts of the States of the Union amount in the aggregate to $345,197,000. Massachusetts takes the lead, and is followed in a descending scale by Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina, New York, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana, each of which owes more than $20,000,000. West Virginia, Missouri, Georgia and Arkansas owe materially less, although the amount is over $10,000,000 each, while all the other States fall below the latter figures. Many municipal debts exceed the State debts.

The New Funding Certificates.

The four per centum funding certificates authorized at the late session of Congress will be ready for delivery on the 1st of April. The back of each ten dollar certificate will contain the following announcement: "Interest on this note will accrue as follows: For each nine days, or one-tenth of a quarter, one cent: for each quarter year, ten cents; for each entire year, forty cents."

LAW DEPARTMENT.

Heavy Judgment on a Bond.

SUIT AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE LATE MR. HOYT—A VERDICT FOR NEARLY HALF A MILLION DOLLARS.

A judgment for nearly $500,000 was recovered in the United States Circuit Court February 14th, before Judge Wallace. The action was brought on a bond by the People's Savings Bank of Providence, R. I., and four other banks in that State, against Charles G. Francklyn and William Allen Butler, as Executors of the estate of Evan Hoyt. It appears that in 1873, the plaintiffs loaned Mr. Josiah Chapin the sum of $600,000. The money was borrowed by the latter to pay an indebtedness of the Riverside Mills and another manufacturing corporation to Hoyt, Spragues & Co. This indebtedness Mr. Chapin had guaranteed. To secure the banks on the loan, Mr. Chapin executed a bond and gave a mortgage on certain property in Providence. The payment of the bond was further guaranteed by the members of the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., jointly and severally. The interest on the bond not being paid, the banks elected to consider the entire amount due, or, in other words, determined to foreclose the mortgage and enforce payment of the bond. They notified the Trustees named in the mortgage of that determination, and requested them to sell the mortgaged real estate. The sale took place, but the net amount realized was only $275,000. The banks then presented their claims for the deficiency to the Receiver appointed under the laws of the State of Rhode Island to wind up the affairs of the firm. The claims were resisted on the ground that it was not a firm obligation, but a joint and several obligation of the firm's members. The case came up in the State courts, and the Court of Appeals finally decided that it was a firm obligation, and that the parties were entitled to a dividend from the assets of the firm. In addition to that suit the present action was instituted by the banks as plaintiffs against the Executors of the Hoyt estate. The banks insisted that Mr. Hoyt's bond was not a joint, but a joint and several one, and that the guarantee was therefore joint and several. The case was opened before the court and a jury, Blatchford, Seward, Griswold and Da Costa appearing for the plaintiffs, and Butler, Stillman, and Hubbard for the defendants. There was no material defense offered, the entire case turning on the legal question of liability or non-liability. The Court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for $448,562.50.

Loose Bank Management.

In commenting upon the irregularities of John Bonner, formerly President of the Bankers' and Brokers' Association, Judge Van Vorst says: "I conclude that a system of management of a banking-house in which such conduct of its affairs was permitted a breach of duty, and grossly negligent toward its dealers and persons having stocks and bonds in its keeping. It does not appear that the Trustees took any substantial oversight of the affairs of the Association, or devised any measures for the safe keeping of its property. They did not hold meetings, as required by the by-laws. If summoned to attend, they did not appear. No periodical examination of the securities appears to have been made by any committee. Ordinary circumspection and safeguards were not interposed for the protection of the property of the Association or of its depositors and dealers, and Bonner's license to to as he chose without accountability seemed unlimited. The legitimate outcome of such license was ruin to Bonner and the Association, and loss to depositors and stockholders. It is urged in behalf of the Association and Bonner, in justification of the confidence and power reposed in him, that he was, up to the time of his failure, a man of good character. But it should not be allowed to any man, however good he may seem to be, to be tempted with power and property in this way. The stock and property of the Association so readily acquired was the aliment by which his appetite for speculation was fed, and through which his ruin was probably hastened. A banking association, with the powers and privileges of the one under consideration, is under a duty to adopt rules and regulations, and so to conduct its business as that property intrusted to its safe keeping should be reasonably protected against misapplication by its servants and agents. An omission to adopt and enforce prudent rules in this regard is a failure of duty towards its dealers, and is blamable negligence."

THE FISHKILL SAVINGS BANK SUIT AGAINST THE FISHKILL NATIONAL BANK—TREASURER BARTOW'S TRANSACTIONS.

The suit instituted by the Fishkill (N. Y.) Savings Bank against the National Bank of Fishkill to recover $67,000, the value of certain bonds taken from the former by Treasurer Bartow, and alleged to have been used by him for the benefit of the National Bank, of which he was Cashier, has thus far resulted in disclosing some very queer and complicated transactions. According to the stories told by the officers of the savings bank, it would appear that at the time the National Bank of Fishkill overdrew its account at the Merchants' National of New York, $60,000 worth of the bonds were taken by Bartow without the knowledge of the officers of either the National or the Savings Bank, and deposited by him with the Merchants' Exchange Bank as security for the present and future. Subsequently Bartow opened an account with Wilmerding, Duer & Co., in the name of "A. Bartow, Cashier," notwithstanding which the firm understood that they were doing business with the National Bank of Fishkill. His transactions with them consisted of pledging bonds and borrowing money. Nearly all the money went to the Merchants' Exchange Bank of New York to pay the amounts owing by the National Bank of Fishkill. Just before the time of the examination of the savings bank in 1876, the bonds were returned by Bartow, who 10 days later took them back again to the brokers. When, in 1877, the facts first came to the knowledge of the officers of the savings bank, they demanded the return of their bonds from the officers of the national bank, but the latter were unable to redeem them, and the bonds were sold to pay a loan which Bartow, as Cashier, had made from the brokers. The savings bank officers claim that the money borrowed on the bonds was used by Bartow for the national bank, and that the officers of the latter institution cannot deny that he was their agent, although he might have acted without their being directly cognizant of the fact. They also claim that having refused to redeem and give back the bonds when the facts were made made known, the national bank is now liable for the value of the bonds, which amounts to $67,000, besides interest. The savings bank has also instituted two other suits against the national bank, in which they charge that it received money belonging to the plaintiff for interest on bonds, and for the principal of one bond not credited to the savings bank on the books of the national bank.

A Case of Interest to Property-Owners.

An interesting case was before Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, at Newark, N. J., March 8th, the purpose of which is to determine which is a prior lien on mortgaged property, the mortgage itself, or a tax or assessment subsequently levied. The matter is one of great importance to the adjacent cities of Jersey City and Elizabeth. From the evidence, it appears that in 1869 the owner of certain property in Irvington mortgaged it to the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. The company held the mortgage until 1877, when it was foreclosed and the property sold. After the mortgage was given, but prior to the foreclosure, taxes were levied upon the land by the township of Chester, and assessments by the Public Road Board, and also by the village of Irvington, and the property was sold at various times by the village, the township, and Road Board. The proceedings before the Vice-Chancellor were commenced at the instance of the purchaser at the Sheriff's sale, and are to compel the township, village, and Road Board to pay him the original cost of the property, or, in default thereof, that their liens for assessments be canceled. Another case of similar import in connection with property located in Newark will also come up at an early day.

In the Supreme Court of Boston, March 4th, Judge Morton appointed Emery Grover and Galen Orr Receivers of the Needham Savings Bank, which was recently enjoined from doing further business. The appointments were made at the request of all persons interested. The Receivers are required to furnish bonds of $10,000 each.

Interesting Insurance Case.

A Life Insurance test case awaits settlement in New York which excites considerable interest. The plaintiff is Regina Mansbach, and the defendant the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From the statements made in the argument it appears that a policy of insurance for $3,000 was issued on the life of Simon Mansbach, plaintiff's husband, by the Hildise Bund, as agent for the Metropolitan Company; that he paid premiums for two years and a half through the Bund; that Simon Mansbach had drawn large sums of money from the relief fund; and that in September, 1876, the Hildise Bund, thinking it had discovered that he had made false representations in his application, canceled the policy. Suit was brought to compel the Company to restore the policy, and on the trial in May, 1877, judgment was given by Judge Van Brunt for the plaintiff. The Company appealed, and on the appeal, besides the main question involved, the consideration of a technical question of the tender of premiums was made, on which the court reserved its decision.

A Bank Officer in Trouble.

Information received from Denver, Col., says that Judge Hallett, of the United States District Court, has sentenced Henry A. McIntire, the defaulting President of the First National Bank of Lake City to five years in the Penitentiary. Mr. McIntire boarded at the Aberdeen Hotel in this city, and was arrested last June and taken to Colorado, having previously filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy before Register Allen, which is still pending. He owed $52,000, of which $15,000 was to the bank. Mr. McIntire owned considerable real estate in Colorado Springs, and had a quarter interest in the American Mine.

Check Raising.

Recently a man giving his name as E J. Murphy, of Chicago, purchased three 4 per cent. bonds valued at $2,500 from Messrs. Henry Clews & Co., of this city, and gave in payment a draft of the Commercial National Bank of Chicago for $2,540 on the Bank of New York. The draft bore the certification of the cashier of the Bank of New York, and after being verified by a paying teller was accepted by Henry Clews & Co., and the bonds delivered. It was subsequently discovered that the draft was originally made for $254, and was dated in January, and had been raised by Murphy or some one else after certification by the cashier of the Bank of New York to $2,540, and the date changed to February 27. The draft referred to was written upon what is known as commercial safety paper—a greenish, ruled paper, which was tested in 1877, with others, by a committee of experts appointed by the American Institute of this city, and by the judges was declared to be of no real value as a safeguard or protection against fraud as it had been successfully altered by the committee. The justice of the decision of that committee and the judges has been confirmed by the recent experience of Messrs. Clews & Co.

The "National Safety" paper, the name of which should not be confounded with that above described, it is claimed, is an absolute safeguard against such alterations, as it not only prevents the changing of dates, but protects the indorsement and renders the removal of one name and the insertion of another impossible. It has been in constant use during the past five years, and after the severest tests there has not been a single instance of successful alteration. In view of the foregoing too much care cannot be taken by banks and bankers to protect themselves by all proper means against frauds of the kind mentioned.

District of Columbia 3-65s.

It does not seem to be generally understood that an act was passed by the last Congress providing for a sinking fund sufficient to meet the payment of the District of Columbia 3-65 bonds at maturity. The act, which was approved March 4, 1877, is as follows:

"And there is hereby appropriated, out of the proportional sum which the United States may contribute toward the expenses of the District of Columbia in pursuance of the act of Congress approved June eleventh, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, for the fiscal year ending June 30th eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, and annually thereafter, such sums as will, with the interest thereon at the rate of three and sixty-five hundredths per centum per annum, be sufficient to pay the principal of the three sixty-five bonds of the District of Columbia, issued under the act of Congress, approved June twentieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, at maturity; which said sums the Secretary of the Treasury shall annually invest in said bonds at not exceeding the par value thereof; and all bonds so redeemed shall cease to bear interest, and shall be canceled and destroyed in the same manner that United States bonds are canceled and destroyed."

The Refunding Operations.

The Secretary of the Treasury, on the 12th inst. issued the ninety-second call for the redemption of 5-20 bonds of 1865, consols of 1867. The call is for $10,000,000, of which $7,000,000 are coupon bonds The principal and interest will be paid at the Treasury on and after the 12th of June next, and the interest will cease on that day. The descriptions of the bonds may be found under the head of the "Banker's Index" in another column.

The Treasury Department will probably change the rate of commission proposed to be allowed on the sale of the $10 refunding certificates from 1-4 to 1-8 per cent., as it appears that no greater allowance can be made out of the 1-2 of 1 per cent. allowed by law for paying the expenses of engraving, printing, transporting and converting the certificates into 4 per cent. bonds. The commission offered in the circular will be allowed, however upon subscriptions made prior to this date.

MANHATTAN SAVINGS INSTITUTION.

Resuming after a Great Robbery.

It will be remembered that this institution was entered by burglars on Sunday morning, October 27, 1878, and between $3,000,000 and $4,000,000 in cash and securities, mostly the latter, successfully carried away by the thieves. Among the securities stolen were about $900,000 in New York State and City registered bonds and $1,600,000 of United States bonds, also registered. The officers of the bank immediately took advantage of the general law governing such cases, and required depositors to give 60 days' notice before drawing out their deposits. Before the 60 days had expired (Dec. 20) the officers of the bank adopted a resolution calling upon the Attorney General of the State to take such action as would extend the time of payment of the depositors. This step was a wise one, as the managers of the bank did not desire to negotiate with the thieves for the return of the stolen securities, and there was every prospect of considerable delay in getting relief from Congress and the State Legislature. It was not long, however, before Congress passed an act directing duplicates of the $1,600,000 registered bonds of the United States to be issued in the name of the bank. These were to be handed over to the bank by the Secretary of the Treasury whenever he chose, it being left to his own discretion. Up to this time he has handed over $1,200,000, still retaining $400,000. The State Legislature also ordered a duplicate of the stolen State registered bonds to be issued to the bank, and directed the Comptroller of this city to issue duplicates of the lost City bonds also. These have all been put in the bank's possession.

With these securities in hand, the mortgage loans being in first-class condition, and with over a million dollars cash on hand, the managers found the bank could, if necessary, raise over five million dollars to meet any demand the depositors might make. Steps were at once taken to have the bank resume, and Judge Lawrence granted the required order on the afternoon of the 11th, and the bank was promptly opened for business. The first entire day after resuming (the 12th) the bank paid out something over $100,000, a large part of this being moneys held in trust; not many of the depositors closed their accounts. The following statement shows the financial condition of the institution:

Bonds and mortgages	$2,615,766 67
Banking house and lot	170,000 00
Other real estate	414,030 04
Loans on United States bonds	135,000 00
New York City and State registered bds	970,000 00
United States registered bonds	1,649,000 00
Deposits in trust companies	775,000 00
Cash in banks and vault	273,918 63
Interest due and accrued	70,185 13
Total	$7,072,909 47
Due depositors	6,628,422 76
Surplus	$444,486 71

The Manhattan Savings Institution was incorporated in 1850, and it has always been prudently managed. The following named gentlemen constitute the Board of Officers and Trustees:



The Manhattan Savings Institution, New York.

THE BANKER'S INDEX.

NEW YORK, March 14, 1879.

THE MONEY MARKET.—Foreign Exchange is firm, and rates have approached near to the specie shipping point. The market for sterling bills is about 486¾@487½ for 60-days prime bankers' bills.

The money market is comparatively easy, and borrowers on call can supply their wants at 2½@5 per cent., with the great bulk of the business at 3½@4 per cent. Call loans on Government collaterals have been made at 2@3 per cent. Commercial paper is a shade firmer at 4@5 per cent.

GOVERNMENT BONDS—In regard to the 4 per cent. negotiations the following circular has been issued by Secretary Sherman:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D.C., March 4, 1879.

Notice is given that when the outstanding 5-20 6 per cent. bonds of the United States are covered by subscriptions to the 4 per cent. consols, the latter will be withdrawn from sale upon the terms proposed by the Department circular of January 1, 1879, and upon the terms stated in the contract with the Messrs. Rothschild and others of the date of January 21, 1879. The amount of 5-20 6 per cent. bonds outstanding and embraced in calls to this date is $88,079,800. When this sum is covered by subscriptions under the existing circular and contract, all further sales of 4 per cent. consols to provide for the refunding of the 10-40 5 per cent. bonds will be made upon terms which will probably be less favorable to the purchaser, and in accordance with new proposals and contracts. This notice is given so that all parties wishing to subscribe for consols upon the terms stated in the circular and contract may have an opportunity to do so until the 5-20 bonds are called. JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary.

The recent letter of Secretary Sherman to Assistant Treasurer Hillhouse, which was called forth by various communications addressed to him by bankers and dealers in Government securities, foreshadows the course which the Secretary intends to pursue in completing the refunding operations in connection with the four per cent. loan. The assurance it gives that the Treasury operations will be so timed and conducted as to cause the least possible disturbance in the money market is well received in financial circles, and is likely to allay any fears of stringency in the monetary situation. The Secretary states positively that the "proceeds" of the four per cent. bonds will not be called into the Treasury until necessary to make payments of called bonds.

The latest call for U. S. bonds (the 92d) made March 12th, for the redemption of $10,000,000 5-20s of 1867, makes the total amount of that issue called in since the beginning of the year $270,000,000.

[A table showing the Nos. of all called bonds now outstanding, and the dates when they respectively fall due, will hereafter appear in this Department.]

Subjoined are the prices of Government Securities at the New York Stock Exchange on the dates named:

	March 1.	March 7.	March 14.		March 1.	March 7.	March 14.
6s, 1881 ....reg.	106⅝	106⅛	106¼	5s, 10-40s ....coup.	x02⅛	102⅛	101¾
6s, 1881 ....coup.	106⅝	106⅛	106¼	5s, fund., 1881.......reg.	104⅝	104⅝	104⅝
6s, 5-20s, 1867.......reg.	102	102⅛	102⅛	5s, fund., 1881.....coup.	104⅝	104⅝	104⅝
6s, 5-20s, 1867 .....coup.	102	102⅛	102⅛	4½s, 1891...........reg.	105	105	104½
6s, 5-20s, 1868.. ...reg.	102¼	102⅜	102⅜	4½s, 1891,.........coup.	105¼	105⅛	104¾
6s, 5-20s, 1868 .....coup.	102¼	102⅝	102⅜	4s, 1907..............reg.	x99⅛	99⅛	99
5s, 10-40s ....reg.	101⅞	102	101⅝	4s, 1907............ coup.	100⅛	100	100

NINETY-SECOND CALL FOR BONDS.—On the 12th inst., the Secretary of the Treasury issued the 92d call for the redemption of 5-20 bonds of 1865, consols of 1867. The principal and interest will be paid at the Treasury on and after the 12th day of June next, and the interest will cease on that day. The following are the bonds:

Coupon bonds dated July 1, 1867: $50, No. 105,001 to No. 111,000, both inclusive; $100, No. 195,001 to No. 208,000, both inclusive; $500, No. 104,001 to No. 108,000, both inclusive; $1,000, No. 185,001 to No. 194-000, both inclusive; total coupon, $7,000,000.

Registered bonds, redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after the first day of July, 1872; $100, No. 23,651 to No. 23,700, both inclusive; $500, No. 11,551 to No. 11,560, both inclusive; $1,000, No. 44,501, to 44,550, both inclusive; $5,000, No. 15,101 to No. 15,800, both inclusive; total registered $3,000,000. Aggregate $10,000,000.

Gold Shipments.—The Bank of England reduced its posted discount to 2½ per cent., March 13th, it having of late been 3 per cent. This reduction immediately forced a decline in the rate here for demand sterling bills, so that gold coin exports are no longer imminent. The London money market, according to the accounts of the best authorities, is likely to work toward a still lower rate and even greater ease.

It would have been a misfortune to the reviving trade and industries of the country if in the height of the spring season there had been a stringent money market. The action of the Treasury and the Bank of England have, it is believed, averted such a misfortune.

The National Banks, January 1.—An abstract of reports made to the Controller of the Currency, showing the condition of the 2,051 National banks of the United States at the close of business on Wednesday, January 1, 1879, was completed the 13th inst. These reports were called for by the Controller in order to ascertain the exact condition of the banks on the day resumption began. The abstract shows that the aggregate resources and liabilities balance at $1,800,592,002 25. The details are as follows, comparison being made with the report made December 28, 1877:

RESOURCES.	December 28, 1877.	January 1, 1879.
Loans and discounts	$876,182,534	$820,213,811 33
Overdrafts	3,659,329	3,693,954 35
Bonds for circulation	343,769,550	347,118,300 00
Bonds for deposits	13,438,000	66,501,350 00
U. S. bonds on hand	28,479,800	44,263,250 00
Other stocks, bonds, etc	32,134,233	35,569,400 93
Due from reserve agents	75,863,088	77,916,814 76
Due from National banks	44,030,182	44,170,202 38
Due from State banks	11,384,276	11,881,540 26
Real estate and fixtures	45,406,872	47,091,964 70
Expenses and taxes	8,925,781	4,033,024 67
Premiums	8,834,639	6,366,048 85
Checks and cash items	10,160,134	13,564,550 25
Exchanges for clearing house	64,664,415	100,035,237 82
Bills of other banks	20,280,413	19,535,031 00
Fractional currency	775,059	475,538 50
Specie	32,886,398	41,500,314 32
Legal tender notes	70,463,951	70,561,233 00
U. S. certificates	26,515,000	28,915,000 00
Redemption fund	15,024,804	15,269,625 47
Due from U. S. Treasurer	1,465,236	1,905,809 66
Total	$1,734,344,701	$1,800,592,002 25
LIABILITIES.		
Capital	$476,528,771	$462,031,396 00
Surplus fund	121,543,455	116,200,863 52
Undivided profits	51,450,165	36,836,269 21
National bank notes	299,150,475	303,506,470 00
State bank notes	470,540	386,603 00
Dividends unpaid	1,403,918	5,818,113 82
Individual deposits	603,326,591	643,337,745 26
United States deposits	6,441,620	59,701,222 90
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officer	3,780,759	3,556,801 25
Due to other National banks	115,548,216	118,311,635 60
Due State banks	44,653,940	44,073,882 59
Notes rediscounted	4,293,640	2,888,339 92
Bills payable	5,753,107	3,942,659 18
Total	$1,734,344,701	$1,800,592,002 25

Agents desired for the Four per cent. Certificates.—A circular relating to the four per cent. funding certificates has just been issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, which contains the following: "All collectors of the customs, surveyors of the customs acting also as collectors, receivers of public moneys, postmasters of money order offices, and all other public officers of whatsoever character, are invited to become agents for the sale of these certificates. Any such officer who may request to be thus employed will be promptly designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a depositary for that purpose, under provisions of Section 3,639, Revised Statutes of the United States: and upon his filing a satisfactory bond he will receive from the Department a supply of the certificates for sale, not to exceed in amount at any one time the penalty of the bond, which should be not less than $1,000."

RHODES' JOURNAL

A RECORD OF AMERICAN BANKING.

NEW SERIES. VOLUME VI. | MAY, 1879. | No. 5.

Ex-Secretary McCulloch, who is delivering a series of lectures at Harvard College, made an argument recently in favor of a bi-metallic currency, saying that he had changed his views. It is not pleasant, he said, to be obliged to acknowledge publicly a change of opinion on so important a subject, but he consoled himself with the reflection that it was better to be right than inconsistent. His advice to Congress was that all notes for less than five dollars should within five years be withdrawn from circulation, and in two or three years five dollar notes also; that the coinage of one-dollar gold pieces and of quarter eagles should be discontinued, and that silver coinage, according to the ratio adopted by the bi-metallic countries of Europe, should be continued until the country is fully supplied with silver currency.

The gratifying information is received that the London and Westminster Bank of London has taken $5,000,000 more United States 4 per cent. bonds, making $35,000,000 in all. We understand that the price paid for the last lot was equivalent to 102 here, which was the selling price in this market at the time of the purchase. This information confirms a previous report in New York that London banks were transferring money from British consols to United States bonds. It may not be generally known here that the London and Westminster is the leading joint-stock bank of London. It has a paid-up capital of £2,000,000, and by its last statement for the year ending December 31, 1878, it had a surplus of £975,692 (both sterling). The deposits of this bank range from £22,000,000 to £25,000,000 (or from $110,000,000 to $125,000,000), the exact figures of the last annual statement having been £22,385,767. The same statement showed that it held securities, chiefly British consols, to the amount of £5,108,524 or over $25,000,000. It is a reasonable expectation that other banks will follow the example of the London and Westminster in this matter as they have done in others. It is known that London banks and bankers are now at a loss how to employ their deposits safely and profitably.

In his recent statement before the House Committee on Coinage, Secretary Sherman said that the only effects of the Warner Silver bill would be to bring upon us the surplus silver of other nations, of Germany and of France, where there is supposed to be $400,000,000 of silver, and also to relieve England from her embarrassments about India; and that our gold would flow from us until we would be practically and substantially at the single silver standard upon its bullion value. The result would be that gold would be as thoroughly demonetized as silver was from 1834 until 1873. As for fearing a constant appreciation of gold, all the Treasury operations, which have been very heavy during the last few months, had been conducted without the use of gold or silver. At the end of the first fifteen days in April, after about $80,000,000 for called bonds had been paid, inquiry was made to ascertain how they had paid it, and whether they had used coin, and it turned out that no coin whatever had been used.

Regarding the present law, the Secretary said: "I recommend a change. The coinage of silver dollars at the rate of two millions a month would finally (it might take three or four or five years) so load us down with depreciated silver coin that, by the necessities of the government, it will be forced into circulation and be depreciated to its bullion value. My hope is that you will suspend the coinage of the silver dollar, which now the people refuse to take, or at once return to the Treasury when issued, and await a negotiation for a new ratio; or if that is deemed unadvisable, that it will increase the weight of the silver dollar so as to make it fairly equal in market value to the gold dollar. Then I would be willing to take the risk of the free coinage of both metals."

PROSPECTS OF THE MONEY MARKET.

Under this head the *Chronicle* of this city publishes a very hopeful view of the near future. The reasons are pertinent and the conclusions logical. We do not believe in the practice of magnifying mole-hills into mountains, but when an improvement is before our eyes, and the future gives promise of permanent prosperity, the facts should be honestly set forth; but to quote from our contemporary: "Our money reservoirs always fill up during the inactive seasons. We are approaching such a season now, and consequently the weekly bank returns show a gradually increasing strength. The prevailing opinion, therefore, that a period of prolonged ease can be anticipated is based upon substantial and obvious grounds.

"Of course such a belief eliminates the Government, as an adverse influence, which Mr. Sherman's past management fully justifies. The transfers of money required in settlements of 190 million of bonds could evidently and greatly disturb the market, and would disturb it even in so quiet a month as July, unless managed with care and judgment; but the Secretary has already taken us safely through several periods of no little anxiety, and we may confidently and reasonably trust to the same guidance during coming months. Besides, before the Autumn demand for money overtakes us, all the bond settlements should have been perfected, the new bonds put out and the old taken in, and these large government balances, held in and out of the Treasury, be no longer in existence.

"But the inquiry has been suggested whether, with the scattering of these Treasury deposits now in our banks, money will not be very close. This thought arises from a misconception of the nature and effect of those deposits. Some appear to look upon them as the temporary transfer of an equal amount of capital to the points holding them, whereas they are a mere fiction, having really no existence except in book accounts. A bank subscribes for a million of bonds by crediting the Government on its books with a million of dollars. Clearly there is no capital created by this transaction, nor are the loanable funds of the institution increased by the continuance of that credit or decreased by its loss. The only possible effect on the market would be through a calling in by the Government of these credits (or deposits as they are called), before it pays for the old bonds. This point in the situation we have so often presented that it is not necessary to enlarge upon it again. Mr. Sherman has, as we have stated above, shown the public by his course during past months that he will not allow business to be disturbed by any such unnecessary locking up of capital, but will let the refunding act work out its simple intent, that is, the actual exchange of an old bond for a new one; and hence there is nothing which need be feared in that direction. All this, however, makes plain the fictitious nature of these deposits, and shows that their existence cannot contribute in any degree to give ease to the money market, nor can their erasure from the books of our banks, when the transactions they cover are completed, cause higher rates. In fact, a final settlement with the Government, and an absence of these credits or deposits, would rather tend to lower rates than to raise them, for it would relieve the market, taking away that vague though unnecessary fear of contraction, which will to an extent prevail, notwithstanding the confidence in Mr. Sherman's management, so long as the Government has the power to call in suddenly and lock up in the Sub-Treasury, even for a few days, such large amounts of capital.

"Another undefined influence with regard to the future, is the course of our foreign exchanges and the flow of foreign capital. It is by no means impossible that during the summer months we may, to some extent, ship gold to Europe. For the ten months ending with May 1, the specie movement of the country has nearly balanced itself. That there should be some change the next five months it would not be unreasonable to expect, in view of the smaller shipments of produce during those months, and of the very considerable holdings abroad of called ten-forties. In 1877 we exported over twenty-three millions of specie in excess of specie imports, from May to August inclusive, and the excess of shipments even last year during the same months was nearly three millions. On the other hand, however, there is at least for the moment good reason for the opinion that such shipments, if made, must be very limited. Our total exports still continue largely in excess of our imports. Besides the movement of securities is now toward Europe, and with money barely 1 1-4 per cent. in London, and likely to remain at that figure for the Summer, at least, we see no reason why our 4 per cents., as well as other undoubted securities, should not continue to tend in that direction.

"These considerations evidently confirm the prevailing belief of the continuance of an easy money market. There is, however, another consideration which must soon command more attention—we refer to the evident improvement in business and enterprise which is in progress. How far this revival will be held in abeyance during the Summer months, or what force it will exert in the Autumn on the money market, it would be presumptuous to attempt to state. That greater progress has been made at this centre, than individuals generally believe, is certain. There is scarcely a merchant but will admit some improvement in volume of business and in profits, and many of them very great improvement in both particulars; but even if they did not admit it, our crowded hotels would prove it. Then, again, the manufacturing industries throughout the East are almost universally prosperous and active, and we are feeling that here. But the marked feature of the situation is the vast number of incipient enterprises being favorably discussed by moneyed men. We hear of them everywhere. These are but the whisperings of a wide movement which is speedily to develop itself, until capital finds better remuneration than 4 per cent. for its use.

Counterfeit Money and How to Detect It.

THE WASHINGTON DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW.

How to detect counterfeit money with an accuracy of judgment that may be depended on, is knowledge most persons engaged in business are willing to pay well for. Hence we find professors of the art of detecting counterfeit money peregrinating the country in large numbers, and all anxious to impart their occult wisdom, and doubtless all reap large pecuniary harvests.

Some exhibit a variety of counterfeit notes, and point out certain deficiencies in the engraving, or printing, or the paper, or colored inks, which may be general in the notes exhibited, but may have no existence in later issues of counterfeit notes, for it must not be forgotten that none discover deficiencies in such points sooner nor correct errors more promptly than the counterfeiter himself. To assume also that the workmanship entering into the manufacture of counterfeit issues of National Banks is inferior to that of the genuine may lead into an error, for among the experts it is conceded that late issues of counterfeits, especially the $100 notes, are equal in many points, and even superior in some, to the genuine bills. Hence all points given for detection that are based upon inferior workmanship are confusing and unreliable. When an acknowledged expert of the Treasury Department, whose opinion carries with it the weight of twenty years' experience, consumes one hour of time in the examination of a counterfeit note, and then expresses a doubt as to its real character, a merchant or banker may well hesitate before trusting the peripatetic teacher's knowledge or even his own judgment on such matters. "*What shall we trust?*" the reader asks. We reply, that where no prominent dissimilarity exists between the genuine and the counterfeit note, REFUSE all notes of the denomination and the bank counterfeited. *Trust only dissimilarities.* Whatever may be said to the contrary, there are comparatively *few counterfeit notes in circulation* at the present time, but those few are very dangerous because of their superior workmanship and close imitation of the genuine notes they represent. We herewith give the names of the principal ones, together with one or two points in regard to each by which the merest novice can at once detect their character.

(All Legal Tender and National Bank notes printed on fibre paper may be safely taken, if the dark particles of the fibre are discernible.)

$1000 U. S. Note, Dated March 10, 1862. The terminal letter "n" in the signature of "L. E. Chittenden" has a curl resembling the head of a snake. The utterer discovered this defect, and in several notes captured because counterfeit, that portion has been picked as with a pin. To avoid loss, all notes of this issue should be refused. About every six months one of these notes turns up.

$500 U. S. Note. Series of 1869. The buttons on the coat of Adams are not as round nor as distinct as in the genuine. This issue should be received with great caution, it has not been seen for several years past. The plates are believed to have been thrown in the Hudson River.

$100 SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF WILKESBARRE, PA. In the genuine the word "Liberty" appears on the crown of the head of the female figure in the vignette at the right end of the face of the note. In the counterfeit it is omitted. But two of these notes have been discovered as yet.

$100 NATIONAL REVERE BANK OF BOSTON, MASS. In counterfeit the face of sailor in bow of boat in lower left end of note resembles a skull.

$100 MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK OF NEW BEDFORD, MASS. In the counterfeit, the loop of the "y" in the name of "Colby," comes over the "M" in "Mass." In the genuine it comes over the first "s."

$50 THIRD NATIONAL BANK OF BUFFALO, N. Y. All notes bearing the name of L. E. Chittenden as Register, are counterfeit.

$50 CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. The same remarks apply to this note also. It having been manufactured at the same time and by the same parties issuing the counterfeit $50 note on the Third National Bank of Buffalo.

$50 TRADESMEN'S NATIONAL BANK OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

$50 NATIONAL BROADWAY BANK OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

NOTE.—The four counterfeit $50 notes above enumerated all have one striking peculiarity which should insure their instant detection, namely: at the left end on the back of the note is seen the coat of arms of the State of New York, one of the female figures therein is Justice, having a bandage across her face which should cover the eyes, *but does not. Two small black dots representing the eyes are seen* ABOVE *the bandage.* In the genuine the eyes are covered by the bandage. As large quantities of all these fifties have been printed and are now held by several of the most accomplished scoundrels in the country, and as the merchants of the Middle and Eastern States are thoroughly advised on the matter, it is believed great and simultaneous efforts will be put forth to circulate them in the Western and Southern portions of our country. We trust bankers and merchants generally will be on their guard.

Counterfeit fives on the Traders' National Bank of Chicago, Ill., are again appearing. It is believed that a small lot of them have been resurrected and uttered by one of the originators of the notes recently liberated from the penitentiary. The plates were destroyed in 1877. Refuse all $5 notes purporting to be issued by this bank.

$5 FIRST NATIONAL BANK, TAMAQUA, PA.

$5 FIRST NATIONAL BANK, HANOVER, PA. On the lower right hand corner of the back of the counterfeit notes will be found the word thousa*u*d instead of thousand.

A press dispatch from London, May 7, says the trustees of the Atlantic & Great Western Railway have published a statement that an overwhelming majority of first, second and third mortgage bonds, have been deposited with them in favor of the 1875 scheme.

The St. Joseph City Council voted, May 5, to compromise and refund the city bonded indebtedness, amounting to $1,500,000, at 60 cents, reducing the interest to 5 per cent., and the bonds to run thirty years.

A BOLD BANK ROBBERY.

A CASHIER'S FIGHT FOR HIS CHARGE.

A desperate attempt to rob the Workingmen's Savings Bank, of Allegheny City, Pa., was made about noon on April 30th. The bank is in the part of the city chiefly occupied by Germans, and its stockholders are principally of that nationality. It owns a bank building, a conspicuous feature of which is the very large plate-glass window in front, through which people on the sidewalk can see nearly everything in the banking room. It is supposed that the thieves took observations through this window and laid their plans accordingly.

An account of the affair was published in the *Times* of this city, from which the details herein are taken: Charles W. Dahlinger, the book-keeper, left the bank a few minutes before noon, to go to dinner, leaving no one in the bank but George L. Walter, the Cashier. The messenger of the bank, Frederick Fleck, who was out, was momentarily expected to return. Mr. Dahlinger had been gone only a few minutes, when Mr. Walter, who was sitting at his desk at the window in the front part of the bank, saw two men of very suspicious appearance enter the building. One of them stopped at the front end of the counter, while the other passed on to the small opening in the glass partition, on the top of the counter, about fifteen feet from the door. As Mr. Walter walked down to the opening to attend to the visitor's wants, he observed that he had his right hand in the pocket of his sack coat. His suspicions were at once aroused. The man laid down a dollar bill, and asked to be given silver for it. Mr. Walter concluded to keep his eyes on him. He carefully watched him while getting the silver. When he placed it on the small shelf at the opening, the man quickly drew his right hand out of his coat pocket, and, leveling a revolver at Mr. Walter's head through the opening in the partition, exclaimed, "If you make any noise, or stir, I will blow your brains out." Mr. Walter, instead of recoiling, quick as thought caught hold of the revolver with both hands, and in a moment wrenched it out of the man's hand. The robber then called to his companion near the door, and he drew a revolver and came toward Mr. Walter. The latter, fearing that they wanted to enter the vault at the rear of the bank, the door of which stood open, ran to the rear end of the counter, where he faced about. He was just in time to see his first assailant climbing over the glass partition on the counter, and the second one getting up on the outside of it. Mr. Walter instantly fired at the man who had first assailed him, with the revolver he had taken from him and still had, but the robber jumped down behind the counter in time to dodge the ball, which passed through the plate-glass window in the front part of the bank. The first thief then caught up the largest pile of bank-notes on the table and started to climb over the counter again. Before he got on the counter Mr. Walter again fired at him, and as he climbed up on the counter fired again. The man then got over the partition and fell to the floor, dropping a large portion of the money he had under his arm. Quickly regaining his feet, he ran out of the door.

While this was going on the second robber had climbed over the partition and stood on the open account-books of the bank, on the desk of the book-keeper, but as soon as he saw his companion climbing back over the partition he followed after him. It appears that there was still a third man and a boy standing outside of the door. A moment after the first two men entered, the boy followed with a large market-basket, which he quickly dropped and ran out when Mr. Walter began shooting. The basket, no doubt, was intended to place the money in by the thieves. The three men and the boy then darted around the corner and ran down Madison avenue. Before the men ran away, however, one of them fired into the bank, the ball lodging in the wall near the door. By this time, some people having heard the shooting, ran into the bank, and, finding what had happened, gave chase to the thieves. The latter ran down Madison avenue to the West Pennsylvania Railroad track, where they separated. At this point one of them snapped a pistol at the railroad flagman, who attempted to stop them. He then leaped over the wall and ran down Bell's alley to the Allegheny River, into which he jumped. He floated and swam down a short distance to a coal-float, where he pointed his revolver at a couple of boys in a skiff, and compelled them to take him aboard and row him down and across the river. They landed him on the tug-boat Samuel Miller, moored at the Pittsburg wharf, below the suspension bridge, when he disappeared for a short time, but presently reappeared, running up Ffth street. By this time information of the affair had reached the Pittsburg side, and when the man made his appearance, he was immediately pursued by two or three officers, and a crowd of people crying, "Stop thief!" He ran up Fifth street to Decatur alley, and being extremely fleet-footed, disappeared entirely, and although the search for him was continued for several hours he could not be found.

The other thieves eluded their pursuers in Allegheny, and it is not known what became of them. The chase gave rise to all kinds of stories, as few persons knew what had occurred, yet witnessed the flight of the thieves. The excitement in the vicinity of the bank was intense, and the police had to be summoned to keep out the crowds that gathered. A package of money was found on the pavement near the bank door, where it had been dropped by the thief. It was at first thought that no money had been taken whatever, but had all been dropped by the thief when he fell off the counter. As soon as the excitement was somewhat allayed, Mr. Walter made a careful examination and found that the thief had picked up about $2,400, but had dropped $900 of it when he fell on the sidewalk, thus carrying off $1,500. The loss might have been heavier had the thief taken one of the other piles of money, as the others, although not so large in appearance, were far more valuable. The piles taken contained only the $1 and $2 notes, while the other piles contained the notes of a larger denomination.

Search was made for the two bullets from the second and third shots fired by Mr. Walter, but no trace of them could be found. The hole and long crack made in the plate-glass window by the first shot could easily be seen, and the hole in the wall from the shot fired by the thieves as they were running out of the door, but no other marks could be found anywhere. Mr. Walter is a pretty good shot with the revolver, and he confidently believes that he lodged the two missing bullets in the man who stole the money. This belief is strengthened by persons who saw the man running, who say he appeared very much fatigued, and when near the river was running very slowly. No blood marks, however, could be found in the bank or on the pavement. George L. Walter, the Cashier, is a young man, and has been connected with the bank for several years, first as book-keeper, but during the last three or four years as cashier. It was owing to his quickness and bravery that the bank did not sustain a heavy loss, as there were from $12,000 to $15,000 on the table within the reach of the thief.

A Pardon that has Cost One-quarter Million of Dollars.

The counterfeiter, Charles Ulrich, was by pardon released from the Columbus, Ohio, penitentiary in June, 1876. Upon being released he promised to lead a good life. It is believed he kept his promise just four weeks, after which he went to Philadelphia, and engraved plates from which he printed false notes of the denomination of $50 on the Central National Bank, the Tradesmen's National Bank, National Broadway Bank, all of the City of New York, and the Third National Bank of Buffalo, N. Y. He also engraved the plates and printed counterfeit notes of the denomination of $5 on the First National Bank of Tamaqua, Pa., and the First National Bank of Hanover, Pa. All this he did prior to June, 1878, and within two years from the date of his pardon.

Various estimates have been given as to the total face value of all the counterfeit notes printed by him on the six banks herein named, but a moderate estimate cannot place it below $150,000.

Probably the most villainous feature of this transaction, was that of sending $50,000 of this base stuff to the Continent of Europe, and then having the worthless trash passed upon the poor emigrants in exchange for their gold.

The pardon of Ulrich has been the cause of sending over one hundred persons who passed these counterfeit notes, to the penitentiary.

It has cost the United States Government $100,000 to prosecute the cases in their various stages. It will cost an additional $50,000 to maintain these convicts. And a loss of not less than $100,000 has incurred to persons upon whom the notes have been passed.

From the Washington *Review* we learn that previous to his arrest, Ulrich engraved title plates for counterfeit issues of $5 notes on the following banks: National Mohawk River Bank, Mohawk, N. Y.; Niagara County National Bank, Lockport, N. Y.; National Bank of Pawling, Pawling, N. Y., and delivered them to his employer, Henry C. Cole (now serving twelve years in the New Jersey State Prison), to be used in connection with the plates from which were printed the Tamaqua, and Hanover, Pa., counterfeit $5 notes. These plates have not been captured yet, and the holders may print issues on the above banks from them. They can, however, be readily detected by observing the word thousa*u*d and two dots above the word *owing*, on the back of the note. We do not believe they will be used, but "to be forewarned is to be forearmed."

Revival in the Iron Trade.

FROM THE PUBLIC.

An important feature in the financial situation is the rapid improvement in the iron manufacture, that very branch of business which has for some years been most depressed. At Altoona and Johnstown the works are again in full operation. At Newark, N. J., every manufactory is busier than at any period for several years. At Pittsburg the only point of complaint is the very high wages still paid to workmen. At Cleveland the manufacture is rapidly extending. In the Hanging Rock region, Ohio, the Ætna Iron Works, whose great and disastrous failure will be remembered, has satisfactorily settled with creditors and is about to put its magnificent furnaces in blast again as soon as possible. Ten charcoal furnaces and five stone coal furnaces have recently been put in blast and the number of unemployed hands has been greatly diminished. The rail and nail mills are also doing a large business. At St. Louis there has been a marked improvement in manufactures of late. Nearly all the furnaces at Carondelet have been idle for some years. At present, the shipments of iron and ore by the Iron Mountain road average over eighty tons a day, and it is understood that arrangements are making to start several furnaces which are still idle. The Vulcan, or Bessemer Steel Works, on account of its special agreement with the steel rail combination, under which it receives full interest on the entire cost of the works for lying idle, is at present doing nothing, but the steel rail mills throughout the country are now so fully employed that it is doubtful whether any portion of the machinery at present available can long be held in inactivity. The annual production of these mills, if all fully employed, exceeds 500,000 tons.

BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

Suspension of the Cork Bank.—The old established bank of Swann, Clough & Company, in Cork, Ireland, known as the Cork Bank, has suspended. The amount of the note circulation of the bank is £46,387.

New Hampshire Savings Banks.—By the report of the Bank Commissioners it appears that there are sixty-six savings institutions in the State of New Hampshire, with 87,387, depositors, a decrease during the past year of 4,294. The total amount of deposits is $26,282,136.09, a falling off in a year of $2,507,412.91.

Connecticut.—The valuations of the leading cities and towns of Connecticut are: Hartford, $49,752,062; New Haven, $49,209,049; Norwich, $14,602,901; Bridgeport, $12,-704,616; Meriden, $8,783,839; Stamford, $8,065,820; Waterbury, $7,958,728; New London, $6,746,167; Norwalk, $6,482,966; Middletown, $6,422,275; Danbury, $5,233,337; Stonington. $5,083,533; New Britain, $4,687,841.

Mr. Chittenden on Silver.—In the House of Representatives, May 8th, Mr. Chittenden, Member from New York, made a speech on the silver question. The *Post* says, "he ridiculed Mr. De La Matyr as the 'beloved apostle and high priest of the Greenbackers,' and as having prayed recently from the clerk's desk that the good Lord would take them all to heaven, and then straightway made a frantic effort from his own seat to make it warm for 'infamous and hell-born hondholders.' He was glad to see that 'unique quasi-divine' in his seat, for he belonged to a class who rarely heard preaching, and who suffered severely for the want of it."

Newspaper Lying.—"The earnings of the Erie for the first half of April were about $200 000 in excess of those of the same period last year. The increase in the earnings for March was about $235,000, and there was also some increase of earnings in February. In view of these facts, it does not seem very creditable in a daily journal to publish editorially, as the latest information obtainable, the earnings in January, which showed a large loss in consequence of the snow blockade. Men soon cease to look for news in a journal which resorts to such methods."—*The Public*.

Why does not *The Public* call things by their proper names? "Does not seem very creditable," is a mild way to put it; why not say malicious newspaper lying—what it is. Cliques and purely selfish motives are in many instances rendering the financial articles of the New York dailies valuless, so far as the public are concerned.

The Real Estate of the defunct Sixpenny Savings Bank, of this city, was recently put up at auction in the Exchange Sales-room, by order of the Receiver, but was stopped owing to the small prices realized, after the following parcels had been disposed of: No. 236 East Forty-ninth street, three-story brown-stone, 19 by 45 feet, $9,500; Third avenue, one lot, East Side, 100 feet south of One Hundred and Seventh street, $3,000; East One Hundred and Fourth street, 183.4 feet east of Fourth avenue, two-story frame, lot 16.8 by 100.11, $2,600; East One Hundred and Eleventh street, north side, 225 feet east of Fifth avenue, three-story brick, 20 by 40 feet, lot 100.11 feet deep. $6,000; East One Hundred and Nineteenth street, lot, with stable, north side, 198 feet east of Avenue A, 25 by 100.10 feet, $1,700.

The President of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention, in his opening address, quoted from the original Constitution of Massachusetts, the declaration that "The people of this commonwealth are not controllable by any other laws than those to which their constitutional representative body have given their consent" and the declaration of the original Constitution of New York, that "This convention, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, doth ordain, determine and declare that no authority shall, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the people or members of this State but shall be derived from and granted by them," and then said: "These declarations have lost none of their deep significance. They teach us how to estimate the value of state independence and state sovereignty as the strong fortress of political liberty, and at the same time the only sure guaranty of a stable union of our states."

A Michigan Bank in Trouble.—About the 20th of April, Joseph Wilson, of the banking firm of Page & Wilson, at Ionia, Michigan, died. The bank was at once closed, and so remained, without attracting especial comment, until after his funeral.

The cashier was then sick, and the institution did not open, this fact being given as an excuse. Within a day or two a local panic occurred, of which a Detroit paper gives these details: "Monday came, and Mr. Page, though ill, was besieged by depositors before he had time to eat his breakfast. He assured them that he intended to pay them every cent due. Some of the heavier depositors clamored for security, and failing to be satisfied, writs of attachment were issued upon the firm's property. The deposits of the bank amount to $45,000, but the other liabilities are not known. There are 17,000 bushels of wheat in store with them belonging to farmers, most of which is in an elevator here. The firm have been operating heavily in grain and it is believed they have suffered great loss. Mr. Page says they have sufficient property to pay all their debts, and that they only want time to convert it into money."

They are putting locks on the stable doors in Massachusetts, says the N. Y. *Tribune*, "now that so many of the steeds have been stolen. The Legislature is considering a law providing that no assignment, transfer or lease held by a savings bank shall be valid unless signed by the President, Treasurer and two of the Trustees, and acknowledged before a justice of the peace. This action has been occasioned by the frauds of the Treasurer of the Reading Savings Bank. The wonder is that some such provision, simple enough certainly, has not been before adopted. Such assignments are substantially deeds, and convey the fee of real estate; and that a treasurer, of his own motion, should ever have been permitted to convey such fee in land held by a corporation is another evidence of human fatuity, and, in these times, quite a superfluous one. And speaking of the said Reading Savings Bank, it may be mentioned that the expert commissioned to examine into its affairs reports the books in an extraordinary condition. Thirty pages have been torn out of the cash book, while alterations and erasures are found on every page. We suppose that it will be hardly necessary for the Legislature to pass a law making it a criminal offence for the treasurer of a savings bank to tear thirty pages out of the cash book; but perhaps, for greater caution, it might be as well to cook up some such statute."

[The Massachusetts Legislature has passed a law to remedy the evil referred to above.—Ed.]

U. S. Treasury Circular.—The following circular was issued April 28:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 28, 1879.

The attention of all officers of the United States charged with the sale of refunding certificates is called to the manifest purpose of the act of Feb. 26, 1879, providing for the issue of such certificates, that they shall be issued only to enable persons to invest small savings in Government securities. In the circular of April 18, it was announced that all the 4 per cent. bonds offered for sale had been sold, and that these certificates would be reserved for sale in sums not to exceed $100 at one time. The Department is advised that, in consequence of the rise in the value of 4 per cent. bonds, this intention of the law has been evaded in some places for speculative purposes, with a view to the immediate conversion of the certificates in large sums into bonds for sale. Where such evasion is manifest, or where any one person claims more than $100, either for himself or others, the certificates will be refused, and the authority of any designated depository who fails to enforce this circular will be withdrawn, and commissions will not be allowed on sales made by him. The Treasurer and Assistant Treasurers of the United States will be required to strictly observe this circular. Hereafter, commissions on sales will be allowed at the rate of one-eighth of 1 per cent., as heretofore, but only to designated depositories for the sale of refunding certificates. When the average sales, however, are in excess of $10,000 per day and less $50,000, the rates of commission on such excess shall be $1 per $1,000; and when in excess of $50,000 per day it shall be 50 cents per $1,000 on the excess. Owing to the great pressure upon the Department in the issue of 4 per cent. bonds already subscribed for, and the redemption of called 5-20 and 10-40 bonds, the conversion of refunding certificates into bonds will necessarily be postponed until on and after July 1, next.

JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary.

The tricks of mining speculators are shown up after this fashion by a San Francisco correspondent: "The market here only goes up on anticipations. So long as a development is promised, a big strike expected, or a low level in a mine being prospected, the bull side will find sufficient supporters to make a market. But as soon as the reality has come, as soon as the delicious uncertainty of doubt has disappeared, then prices start on the down grade. So long as the Sutro compromise was pending the water stocks were well maintained. The moment the compromise had become an accomplished fact, down they went. Chippers here are very apt to sell their stocks the instant that the papers publish news of a mine having struck ore. Thus, a dispatch from Virginia city announces that Sierra Nevada is in quartz formation and looking better than ever. As a consequence, that "security" has gone down from $43.50 to $42, with downward tendency. Who knows but what some of the operators may have received despatches to precisely the contrary effect from their confidential agents engaging in conversation with some one of the night shift on his exit from the mine! These things are of everyday occurrence, although in Virginia a sharper watch is kept over the men than at Bodie. The break last year in Bodie was brought about through a despatch from one of these confidential agents, who had given a miner $100 to feign sickness and allow him (the agent) to fill the vacancy in the shift for that night. The most extraordinary devices are resorted to in order keep secret the names of the individuals giving telegraphic information from the mines, men being paid as much as $50 a week simply to put their names to and receive cipher despatches, of the contents of which they are as ignorant as babes. Notwithstanding all the precautions, the Nevada Block magnates generally find out what is taking place."

The Laconia Bank Robbery.—A brief account of this affair appeared in the April number of RHODES' JOURNAL. A correspondent furnishes the following details: "The town of Laconia, N. H., was thrown into great excitement between 3 and 4 o'clock, on the morning of April 25, by a terrific explosion in the vicinity of Main Street Bridge. The citizens were aroused and soon learned that the Laconia National Bank had been entered by burglars. The fire alarm was immediately sounded and bells were rung, causing a general alarm throughout the village. The bank is in Main street, in the Post Office Block, one of the most exposed parts of the town. The entrance was effected through the front door of the bank-room, which must have been forced with a jack. On entering the bank it was found that the vault robbed was that which contained the funds and the papers used in the daily transactions of the bank, the greater part of the bank's valuable property being in another safe, which was untouched. Of the $3,900 in bills stolen, bills amounting to $800 were signed by the President, but not signed by the Cashier. Sheriff Everett and the officers of the bank are making every effort to capture the burglars, and are telegraphing through the State. The robbers evidently proceeded in a systematic manner to force the bank safe, which appears to have been done by cutting through the outer surface of the right-hand door sufficiently to allow the bolts to be thrown back. The explosion wrenched the door to one vault only, demolishing the front entrance to the bank and doing much damage to other parts of the building. The work of securing the funds contained in the vault was evidently the work of a few moments, as the clock in the bank stopped at 2:47, and a person who resides near the bank was on the spot a few minutes before 3, when no one was to be seen in the vicinity.

A prominent banking firm of New York, who secured $25,000,000 of the 4 per cent. bonds, recently sold by the Treasury, have issued a circular respecting these bonds, in which among other things they say:

"That there has been within the last twenty years an enormous increase in the investment capital of this country of that class which permanently avoids the ordinary risks of business and seeks absolute security at reduced rates of interest, and that this accumulation is rapidly going on, the financial history of the last few years and the quotations of the New York Stock Exchange for all first-class investment stocks and bonds abundantly show; while the large and constantly increasing army of small investors, who throng the offices of the dealers in government bonds bears witness to the fact that whatever effect the depression of the past few years may still have upon large business enterprises, the masses of the people are earning and saving money, and filling the vaults of Safe Deposit Companies and innumerable private hidden receptacles with government bonds, which will never make their reappearance in the market until they are in their turn called for redemption.

"The suggestion that a 4 per cent. bond of the United States may, at no distant day, sell at a large premium, which in view of the higher rates to which we became accustomed through the exigencies of the war the public mind has been slow to accept, will be received with less reluctance and incredulity when it is remembered that 3 per cent. British consols are selling at about 98; that a 4 per cent. bond having still twenty-seven years to run is at 118.42, the equivalent of a 3 per cent. bond at par, as shown by the tables of stock values; and that the United States government has vindicated its claim to a financial rank and a credit second to those of no other nation on the globe. It will also be remembered that during 1877, the 4 per cent. bonds sold as high as 106."

Since the above circular was issued British consols have advanced about one per cent.

A New Telegraph Company.—The articles of incorporation of a new Telegraph Company have been filed in the County Clerk's office and at the same time in the office of the Secretary of State, at Albany. According to the New York *Tribune* report, "the company is organized with a capital of $10,000,000 in shares of $100. The corporators named are Jay Gould, of New York, whose subscription is for 50,000 shares; David H. Bates, of New York, and Charles A. Tinker, of Baltimore, Md., whose subscriptions are for 25,000 shares each. By the terms of incorporation the company is authorized to run lines through all the States and many of the Territories. This enterprise is understood to be part of a vast scheme that may extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coast. The nucleus in this State is the Central Union Telegraph Company, which began operations about six months ago. The charter of this company has been bought recently by the organizers of the present company. Work has been begun not only in this but in other States, and the line from Boston to Baltimore is under contract."

The Central Union Company has a line completed through this city to High Bridge, and is in actual operation from Syracuse to Oswego. From this city the poles have been distributed along the route to Albany, and are in position as far as Schenectady. The line extends from Albany to Buffalo, at which point connection will be made with the West. The line of the new company will be in operation to Chicago, by two independent routes, within three months. One of these routes will be by the way of the Albany and Buffalo line, connecting at Buffalo with the Canada line. The other will be by the way of Baltimore and the present line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. In order to complete the proposed connections, it is necessary for the new Company to build lines to Baltimore and Oswego, and from Chicago to Detroit. The line from Boston to this city and from here to Baltimore is already under construction, and will be completed, it is expected, about the last of July. Work was begun May 1st on the lines east and south of this city.

Financial Aspect of the Country.—The statement of the number of failures in the United States during the quarter ending on March 31 last, as compiled by Messrs. Dun, Barlow & Co., shows a notable decrease in comparison with the same period last year. A much greater reduction is shown in the proportion of liabilities, the amount in the last three months being little more than one-half of the sum of the liabilities in the three months ending March 31, 1878. Following is a table showing the difference at a glance:

QUARTER ENDING MARCH 31, 1879.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Number of Failures.	Amount of Liabilities.
Eastern States	343	$6,840,842
Middle States	831	14,314,647
Southern States	495	8,717,908
Western States	648	8,380,221
Pacific States and Territories	207	4,859,047
Total	2,524	$43,112,665
Dominion of Canada	634	$11,648,697

QUARTER ENDING MARCH 31, 1878.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Number of Failures.	Amount of Liabilities.
Eastern States	539	$11,016,974
Middle States	950	32,274,606
Southern States	483	11,699,029
Western States	1,218	25,014,081
Pacific States and Territories	165	2,074,136
Total:	3,355	$82,078,826
Dominion of Canada	555	$9,100,929

LAW DEPARTMENT.

A Celebrated Railroad Case.

Justice Harlan, of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered his decision April 28th in the suit of the Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis and the Pennsylvania Companies against the Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Railroad Company for the abrogation of the lease of the lines of the latter to the former. This case was argued before Justice Harlan, at Newport, R. I., last Summer, Senator McDonald and ex-Senators Scott, Matthews and Hendricks appearing as counsel in the case.

After reviewing at great length the history of the companies which were parties to the suit, and setting forth the terms of the contracts under which the lease in question was effected, Mr. Justice Harlan decided:

First—That the lease by the C. C. and I. C. Railroad Company of its lines to the Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis, and the Pennsylvania Companies was not in conflict with the laws of Indiana, and was not therefore void *ab initio*, as was claimed by the plaintiffs, nor was it contrary to public policy.

Second—That it was not essential to the validity of the lease that its execution or subsequent ratification should have been effected by the C., C. and I. C. Company in its corporate capacity in the State of Indiana.

Third—That the lease was not forbidden by the laws of Ohio.

Fourth—That if the lease in question was originally valid, it has not been fatally vitiated by any decrees of eviction by the courts. The effect of the decrees referred to was known at the time the contract was made, and was provided for by the parties.

Fifth—While it is true that the C., C. and I. C. Company has failed to arrange, provide for and classify all its indebtedness—so as to bring it within $15,000,000—that failure had not yet gone far enough to invalidate the contract. At the same time it was not to be expected that the lessee corporations should be required to wait an indefinite length of time for the C., C. and I. C. Company to comply with this clause of the contract, and the Court therefore ordered that it do so before the 1st of January, 1880. After that time the plaintiff corporations will have permission to move for the cancellation of the lease if the order of the Court is not complied with.

Regarding this case the *Post*, of this city, says: " Reduce to a simple statement the decision of Justice Harlan in the suit involving the guaranty of interest by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on the bonds of the Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central corporation amounts to a general declaration that when a railroad company leases a line formally and deliberately the equities of the suit, so far as they are to count at all, will count upon the side of the company that resists the repudiation of the contract. A railroad lease in its essential characteristics, so far as they relate to public policy, is like the lease by an individual of a house, or a hotel, or a piece of land in all respects save two. When a lease is made by an individual he has immediate cognizance of the proceeding, and is usually himself the personal and supervising agent. But in the case of a railroad lease the contract is made through outside and remote agents, who are the representatives of a scattered and disorganized body of bond or stockholders, who, in turn, are almost incapable, by virtue of their position, of deciding whether their property should be leased or not, and who have to depend upon their agents' judgment. Moreover, after a railroad lease has been consummated the act enters as a factor into the value of securities that are constantly on sale in the stock market, and are liable on the mere credentials of the guaranty to sanction the confidence of even sagacious buyers, who take the guaranty on its face. Hence the broad and imperative demand of public policy that railroad corporations shall be bound as rigidly as possible by the terms of their contract, shall not be allowed to take advantage of minor defects or of technicalities of law that they were aware of when the lease was drawn, and shall be checked when they undertake the familiar trick of leasing a railroad, "squeezing " it and throwing it up on a moment's notice when its profits are impaired. These are the general principles substantially asserted by Justice Harlan. By earlier decisions in the suits of towns to repudiate their bonded debts he has dealt some vigorous blows in the cause of public honesty, and by his recent decision he expands the application of honesty as a law, and declares that while towns and cities and individuals must conform to the obligations of contract, corporations are not to be allowed to escape."

Law Briefs.

It is stated that over 700 claims have been pre-empted in Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming and Utah under the ruling of Secretary Schurz.

The Bond Street savings Bank property, in this city, consisting of the bank building and the lot upon which it stands, was sold recently at the Real Estate Exchange. The building cost $125,000 and the lot $99,500; total cost, $224,000. At the Receiver's sale the property was knocked down for $55,000.

The suit brought by the Union Pacific Railroad Company against Henry S. McComb, one of its former directors, to recover about $4,000,000, which sum the defendant is alleged to have improperly obtained from the plaintiff corporation's treasury through the operations of the Credit Mobilier, has been removed from the Supreme Court of this State to the United States Circuit Court, where proceedings of a similar character have been pending for some months. The order of removal was recently made by Judge Barrett, in the New York Supreme Court, Chambers, on the petition of McComb, and on a bond of $500, signed by him and William Calhoun, of this city

A very important suit against the Atlantic & Great Western Company has been removed from the courts by a satisfactory settlement. J. H. Devereux, the Receiver, undertakes to pay to the United States Rolling Stock Company, on or before the 15th of May, $100,000 on account of claims, and not less than $7,500 per month after Jan. 18, 1880. These payments the Rolling Stock Company agrees to receive in full settlement of the claims. The Receiver is authorized to borrow $100,000 at 8 per cent. The whole amount claimed by the Rolling Stock Company was $300,000. This adjustment settles a suit which threatened to be exceedingly vexatious to the company, and to embarrass materially pending arrangements for the lease of the road.

The case of W. H. Platt against the Union Pacific Railroad Company, involving the right of settlers to pre-empt lands granted by Congress to the railroad company under section 3 of the act of July 1, 1862, has been decided in the United States Supreme Court. The act referred to provided that all the lands granted to the company should be liable to pre-emption if not "sold or otherwise disposed of" within three years after the completion of the entire road. On the 3d of September, 1878, the Secretary of the Interior decided that the mortgage executed by the company upon the lands in 1867 was not a "disposal" of the same within the meaning of that statute. This court, however, reverses the decision of the Interior Department last Summer in the Dudymot case against the Kansas Pacific, when Secretary Schurz decided that Pacific Railroad lands could be pre-empted at $1.25 an acre, and holds that the mortgage was such a disposal, and that, consequently, the tract of land claimed by the complainant was not open to pre-emption when he undertook to pre-empt it, and he has no equitable title. Decree affirmed. Justice Strong delivered the opinion, Justices Bradley, Clifford and Miller dissenting.

THE BANKER'S INDEX.

NEW YORK, May 12, 1879

GOVERNMENT BONDS.—The bankers selling the United States 4 per cent. bonds report a continued large demand, principally from the holders of called 5-20s and 10-40s. They also report a good many exchanges of 5s and 6s for 4 per cents.; also, purchases by those who are not holders of any of the older bonds of the government. The price of the 4 per cents. is up to 102.

Aside from the exchanges of called bonds for new fours, the only feature is in the transactions made by holders of fives and sixes of 1881, some of whom are already exchanging their bonds, as the rate of interest paid on the 4 per cents. is nearly the same, if the fives and sixes should be called in at the date of their maturity in 1881.

THE MONEY MARKET.—The New York money market remains quite easy, and an abundance of money is offered on call at 2 per cent. on government collaterals, and at 2½@4 per cent. on stock collaterals. Prime commercial paper is readily taken at 4@5 per cent., and there is but a small supply offering.

EXCHANGE.—The market for exchange is firm though dull, the rates charged by leading drawers on actual business being 4.87 for long bills, and 4.88½ for demand bills. The asking rates are ½@¾ higher.

In domestic bills the following were the rates of exchange on New York at the undermentioned cities: Savannah—selling 5-16, buying, nominal, 3-16. Charleston—easy, selling 3-16, buying ¼. New Orleans—commercial ⅛ premium, bank ¼ premium. St. Louis—50 premium. Chicago—firm, buying 1-10 discount, selling 1-10 premium; and Boston 9d. to 1s. discount.

EXCHANGES IN APRIL.—Respecting the Clearing-House movement for the month just passed, the *Public* has made a careful compilation from which we extract as follows:

The exchanges for the month of April are decidedly more encouraging than those of any previous month for a long time. The increase is so general, and at the chief cities so large, that there can be no doubt as to the general improvement in the volume of business. San Francisco, New Orleans and Millwaukee are exceptions, for reasons which do not at all affect the evidence as to the enlargement of business in the aggregate. At some of the cities, and particularly at Chicago, which excels all the other commercial centres in proportion of increase, at Louisville and at St. Louis, the gain in comparison with April of last year is so large as to suggest a transfer of some traffic from other cities than a mere participation in a general improvement. The following shows the amount of exchanges for the month of April at the cities marked thus*, and for five weeks ending May 3 at other cities, the returns from San Francisco having been obtained by telegraph:

	1879.	1878.
New York	$2,422,190,522	$2,107,763,685
Boston*	209,141,067	194,186,833
Philadelphia	169,560,076	156,892,836
Chicago	110,058,571	85,979,254
St. Louis*	44,393,369	37,501,607
San Francisco	42,940,396	54,127,149
Baltimore*	42,523,348	41,954,066
Cincinnati*	42,113,583	40,447,762

New Orleans	35,902,496	37,564,956
Louisville*	21,199,837	17,288,027
Pittsburg*	18,756,338	17,190,683
Milwaukee	16,871,916	21,167,497
Providence	14,180,800	16,018,300
Indianapolis	6,084,212	5,592,267
Cleveland	5,308,748	5,320,915
Kansas City*	4,092,101	2,299,513
New Haven	3,398,842	3,172,192
Columbus*	2,336,663	2,095,194
Worcester*	2,088,137	2,126,571
Springfield*	1,998,704	1,878,790
Syracuse	1,374,108	1,321,559
Lowell	1,233,427	1,230,260
Total	$3,217,747,261	$2,853,119,916
Outside New York	795,556,739	745,356,231

OFFICE OF FISK & HATCH, NO. 5 NASSAU STREET,
NEW YORK, May 2, 1879.

To Answer Inquiries from all Parts of the Land:

During the past week our office has been thronged with friends and customers, our mail pouch has been crammed with letters, telegraph boys have been going to and fro in a steady stream, and so many inquiries have poured in upon us as to make it almost impossible to find time to answer them.

Many are not aware that the Four per cents are untaxable in any form; that the interest is paid every quarter; that no other Government bonds, at their present cost, will pay as good interest in the long run. Holders of called bonds do not know that by exchanging at once for "Fours," they can do so upon terms that will give them interest at the rate of six per cent. for the next three months. Holders of fives and sixes of 1881 are exchanging largely for "Fours," and are thereby making their income—by taking into account the difference received—fully equal to five per cent. per annum for the coming two years, and at the same time escaping the contingency that the Government may be able to sell "Fours" at a premium in 1881, while calling in and paying off their bonds at par, or to negotiate a bond bearing not over three-and-a-half per cent. interest. Every five and six per cent. bond held in Europe will be returned to this country before 1881, as the last coupon will be cut off by that time, and European holders do not take registered bonds, while Four per cent. bonds will go to Europe to take their place, to a large extent. All these facts show that the amount of the "Fours" remaining available for the re-investment of over $250,000,000 of all called bonds will be rapidly diminished, and that under the combined demand for this purpose and for new investments at home and abroad, they will soon become scarce in the market.

It should be remembered that the Fives of 1881 at 102, if redeemed at the maturity of the option, will pay but four per cent., and that the Sixes of 1881 at 104 for the principal will barely do the same.

It must not be lost sight of that National Banks will not be likely hereafter to deposit in Washington any bonds but the "Fours," and that with increased activity in business they will need more and more bonds for that purpose; also, that if a National Bank can loan its money at only three or four per cent., it can, by taking out circulation on Four per cent. bonds, increase the rate to about six per cent., while if the loaning rate of money is six and seven, circulation becomes still more profitable; that the Savings Banks can find absolutely nothing in large amounts in which to invest their money but the "Fours;" that they will ere long be compelled to reduce their rate to depositors to four per cent.; that the great Life, Fire and Marine Insurance companies have fared so badly with real estate security, town and city bonds, and other miscellaneous investments, during the past few years, that they are now putting the bulk of all their accumulations into Government "Fours;" that estates and trust funds absorb enormous amounts; that the people North, East, South and West are putting away the registered United States Government Four per cent. bonds as a sure thing; that Europe is now commencing with daily-increasing rapidity to buy back in the "Fours" the five to six hundred millions it has sold to us in fives and sixes during the past three or four years; that we are the safe asylum not only for the peoples but for the moneys of all nations; that our Four per cent. Government bonds are dealt in on every bourse and stock exchange in the world. All the foregoing suggestions are designed to answer some of the numerous questions which are put to us every hour of each day.

We will only add that during the past week, of the $121,000,000 Four per cents. recently subscribed for, over $38,000,000 have already been taken up by permanent investors, one life insurance company having taken $2,000,000, another $1,000,000, one savings bank $2,000,000, another $1,000,000, one merchant banker for his clients $1,000,000, while large amounts have been taken by National Banks to be substituted for their other securities in the Bank Department. and at least $5,000,000 have gone to Europe. It would not be surprising if the London and Continental markets should, during the present year, absorb at least *one hundred millions.*

No country or nation ever became great and prosperous that permanently paid a large rate of interest on its public debt.

A dishonest country or nation pays no interest at all.

A country or nation in bad credit pays the highest rates.

A country or nation honest, upright and jealous of its credit, borrows money on its own terms. Capital and enterprise seek that land and its securities.

The reduction of the rate of interest on our public debt to three-and-a-half and four per cent., is a permanent benefit to every person and enterprise in the country, and is the surest sign of returning national wealth and sound prosperity.

Respectfully, FISK & HATCH.

Treasury Refunding Operations—Bonds to be Redeemed July 1.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 12, 1879.

Notice is hereby given that the following described 5-20 registered and coupon bonds, consols of 1867 and 1868, embraced in the ninety-fourth, ninety-fifth, and ninety-sixth calls, on which interest will cease on the 3d and 4th days of July next, will be redeemed at the Treasury Department, in Washington, on the 1st day of July next, with interest to the date of maturity of the bonds, viz.: Consols of 1867, coupon bonds—$50, No. 112,001 to No. 128,833, both inclusive; $100, No. 220,001 to No. 245,000, both inclusive; $500, No. 112,001 to No. 118,580, both inclusive; $1,000, 203,001 to No. 227,249, both inclusive. Registered bonds—$50, No. 3,251 to No. 3,279, both inclusive; $100, No. 23,701 to No. 23,829, both inclusive; $500, No. 11,561 to No. 11,588, both inclusive; $1,000, No. 44,601 to No. 44,732, both inclusive; $5,000, No. 16,451 to No. 19,266, both inclusive. Consols of 1868, coupon bonds—$50, No. 1 to No. 15,902, both inclusive; $100, No. 1 to No. 36,779 both inclusive; $500, No. 1 to No. 13,111, both inclusive; $1,000, No. 1 to No. 26,455, both inclusive. Registered bonds—$500, No. 1 to No 2,087, both inclusive; $1,000, No. 1 to No. 7,088, both inclusive; $5,000, No. 1 to No. 1,816, both inclusive; $19,000, No. 1 to No. 2,613, both inclusive.

The usual semi-annual schedules for the payment of interest on the above-named registered bonds will not be prepared as heretofore, but in lieu thereof the six months' interest due July 1, together with the interest from that date to the maturity of the bonds will be paid, with the principal, to the holders of the bonds at the time of presentation. All United States bonds forwarded for redemption should be addressed to the "Loan Division, Secretary's Office," and all registered bonds should be assigned to "The Secretary of the Treasury for redemption," and if bonds are transmitted several days prior to July 1, the necessary examination will be made at once and payment promply made on the date mentioned. Where parties desire checks in payment for registered bonds, drawn to the order of any one but the payee, they should assign them to the Secretary of the Treasury for redemption for account of ——. [Here insert name of person or persons to whose order the checks had been made payable.]

JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary.

The following statement of the funding operations since March 1, 1877, has been issued by the Treasury Department:

Amount of 4½ per cent. bonds sold in 1877, after Marh 1, for refunding 5-20s.	$95,000,000
Annual interest saved	1,425,000
Amount of 4 per cent. bonds sold in 1877 for refunding 5-20s	50,000,000
Annual interest saved	1,000,000
Amount of 4 per cent. bonds sold in 1878 for refunding 5-20s	90,000,000
Annual interest saved	1,800,000
Amount of 4 per cent. bonds sold in 1879 for refunding 5-20s	373,269,400
Annual interest saved	7,465,388
Amount for refunding 10-40s	194,566,300
Annual interest saved	1,945,663
Amount for refunding 5 per cent. loan, 1858	260,000
Annual interest saved	2,600
Total bonds sold since March 1, 1877, for refunding purposes	803,095,700
Total annual interest saved	13,638,651

United States registered 1880s were called for the first time at the Stock Exchange May 12th. These bonds, which mature on December 31, 1880, have hitherto been regarded in the dealings as virtually identical with 1881s, and the distinction is now made owing to the fact that considerable amounts of the bonds have recently been received from Europe.

The statement of the New York City Clearing-House banks, issued May 3, showed an increase of $2,049,725 in the excess above their 25 per cent. legal reserve, the whole of such excess being $14,373,775, against $12,324,050 the previous report.

The Sinking Fund Commissioners of this city have awarded the Loan of $500,000 of New York Bridge bonds to the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank at 105.76—the latter being the highest rate offered.

The Bank of England statement on Thursday, the 8th, showed a decline in specie of £18,000 for the week, and the reserve was 51 1-16 per cent of liabilities, against 50⅝ per cent. the previous week.

[OFFICIAL QUOTATIONS MAY 9, 1879.]

STOCKS AND BONDS—PRICES IN NEW YORK AND OTHER CITIES.

The following tables give the latest bid and asked prices at the New York Stock Exchange; also Southern securities, a full list of general stocks not called at the Exchange, and correct quotations from other cities.

The prices named represent the percentage upon a par basis.

*** Indicates ex-interest. § With interest added.**

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
STATE STOCK.		
Alabama 5s, 1883	47	48¼
do 5s, 1886	47	......
do 8s, 1886	47	......
do 8s, 1888	47	......
do 8s M & Eufala R R	......	......
do 8s Ala & Chat R R	......	......
do 8s of 1892	20	......
do 8s of 1893	20	......
do consols class A	47¾	48¼
do do do B	72	......
do do do C	55	......
Arkansas 6s funded	5	......
do 7s L Rk & Ft S iss	2	......
do 7s Memp & L R	2	......
do 7s L Rk P B & N O	2	......
do 7s Miss O & R Riv	2	......
do 7s Ark Cent R R	2	......
Connecticut 6s	105	......
Georgia 6s	101½	......
do 7s new bonds	111½	......
do 7s endorsed	111	......
do 7s gold bonds	111¼	......
Illinois coupon 6s, 1879	101½	......
do war loan	101½	......
Kentucky 6s	105	......
Louisiana 6s	30	......
do new bonds	30	......
do 6s new floating debt	30	......
do 7s penitentiary	30	......
do 5s levee bonds	30	......
do 8s do	30	......
do 8s do of 1875	30	......
do 8s do of 1910	......	20
do 7s Consolidated	49⅜	50¾
do 7s Small Bonds	......	50
Michigan 6s 1878-1879	101	......
do 6s, 1883	105	......
do 7s, 1890	111	......
Missouri 6s due in 1878	......	......
do do in 1882 or 1883	......	......
do do 1886	105	......
do do 1887	105⅛	......
do do 1888	105⅜	......
do do in 1889 or 1890	105¾	......
Asyl or Univs'y due 1892	105	......
Fund'g bds due in 1894-5	107	......
Han & St. Jos. due 1886	104½	106
do do 1887	104½	......
New York 6s canal loan, 1878	......	......
do 6s gold reg'd, 1887	110	......
do 6s do coup., 1887	110	......
do 6s do loan, 1883	107	110
do 6s do do 1891	120	......
do 6s do do 1892	120	......
do 6s do do 1893	120	......
N Carolina 6s old Jan & July	22½	23
do Apr & Oct	22½	......
do N. C. R., Jan & July	104	......
do do Apr & Oct	104	......
do do cp off Jan & July	84	......
do do cp off Apr & Oct	84	......
do funding act, 1866	8¼	9
do do 1868	8¼	......
do new bonds Jan & July	13¾	14½

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
N. C. new bonds, April & Oct	13¾	14½
do special tax, class 1	1	......
do do class 2	1	......
do do class 3	1	......
Ohio 6s, 1881	104½	......
do 1886	110	......
Rhode Island 6s	112	..
South Carolina 6s	25	......
do Jan & July	10	......
do April & Oct	10	......
do funding act 1866	10	......
do land C 1889 Jan & J	10	......
do land C 1889 Apr & O	10	......
do 7s of 1888	10	......
Non-fundable bonds	1⅛	2
Tennessee 6s, old	34	35¼
do 6s, new	30⅝	32
do new series	31⅛	31½
Virginia 6s, old	33½	....
do 6s, new bonds, 1866	34	......
do 6s, do 1867	34	......
do 6s, consol. bonds	77	......
do 6s, ex-mat'd coup	56⅝	57
do 6s, do 2d series	40	......
do 6s, defer'd do	7½	......
Dist. of Col. 3-65's 1924	83¼	83¾
do Small Bonds	..	......
do Registered	83	......
CITY AND COUNTY.		
Brooklyn 6s	......	......
do 6s, water loan	....	......
do 6s, imp'm't stock	....	......
do 7s, do	......	..
do 6s, pub, p'k loan	......	......
do 7s. do do	......	......
Jersey City 6s, water loan	......	......
do 7s, do	......	......
do 7s, improvement	......	......
Kings county 6s	......	......
New York City 6s, 20-50's, 1876	......	......
do do 6s, 1877	......	......
do do 6s, 1878	......	......
do do 6s, 1887	......	......
do do G'd 6s, Con. 1902	......	......
do do 6s, ..1896	......	......
do do 6s Dock b'ds	......	......
do do 6s co. b'ds	......	......
do do 6s Cen. Park	......	......
do 5s, ...1890	......	......
do 5s, ...1898	......	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Boston, H. & E. 1st m	37	40
Boston, H. & E. 1st m guar	......	......
B., Cedar Rap. & N. 1s 5s g	82⅝	82¾
Chesapeake & Ohio 6s 1st mtg.	98	......
do do ex-coupon	......	......
Chicago & Alton 1st mortgage.	......	......
do income	......	......
Joliet & Chicago 1st mortgage.	......	......
La. & Mo., 1st guaranteed	......	... .
St. L Jacksonville & Chic 1st	......	......
Chic. Bur. & Qu. 8 per ct. 1st m	112¼	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Chic. Bur. & Qu. cons......M 7s	118¾	
do do 5s Sinking Fund		
Chic. R. I. & Pacific 1st M 7s...		
do 6s 1917, coupon...		
do 6s 1917, registered		115
Keokuk & Des Moin. 1st 5s.....	94	95
Central R R of New Jersey....		
Cen. R of N. J. 1st m. new..	116¼	
do 1st consolidated		
do convertible		
L. & W. B'c. con. guaranteed	77	
Am' Dock & Imp. bonds	69	
Chic. Mil. & St. Paul R. R		
M. & St. P. 1st mtg 8s P. D...	124½	125
do 2d 7 3-10 P. D.....	110	
do 1st 7s $ gold R. D	111½	
do 1st 7s £ do		
do 1st M. LaC. D.....	111¼	
do 1st M. I. & M. D.	109	111
do 1st M. I. & D......	104½	
do 1st M. H & D. ...	104½	
do 1st M. C. & M.....	111	112
do consolidated s f..	106¾	106⅞
do 2d mortgage.	100	
Chic. & N. W. sinking fund....		
do do int. bonds.......		
do do cons. bonds.....	118	
do do exten. bonds....		110
do do 1st mortgage...	109½	
do do coup gd bonds..	113½	114
do do reg'd do	113	
Iowa Midland 1st m. 8s.....	108	
Galena & Chicago extension.	106½	
Peninsula 1st m. conv........	110	
Chicago & Mil. 1st m.....	116½	120
Winona & St. P. 1st mort.....		
do do 2d mort.....	101¾	102½
C. C. C. & Ind's 1s m. 7s s. f.....	114	
do consol, M. bonds.	102⅛	102½
Del., Lack. & W. 2d m..........		
do do 7s conv.......		
Morris & Essex 1st mor.......	121½	121⅞
do 2d do	111½	
do bonds, 1900...		
do constr'n	86	90
do 7s of 1871.....		109
do 1s con. gd....	98½	100
Del. & Hud. Can. 1s m. 1884....	99¾	100
do do 1891 ...	100	100¼
do Coup. 7s 1894...	100½	102
do Regis'd 7s 1894 ...		100½
Albany & Susq. 1st m'ge.......		
do do 2d do....		
do do 3d do.......	100	
do do 1st c gua'd....	98	100
Rens'r & Sara. 1st Coup......	124	
do do 1st reg'd	124	
Erie 1st mort. extended.		
do 1st do endorsed...		
do 2d do 7s, 1879........		
do 3d do 7s, 1883....... ...	107½	108
do 4th do 7s, 1880...........	103⅜	103½
do 5th do 7s, 1888..........	112	
do 7's cons. m'ge gd bds.....		
Long Dock Bonds	116½	
B., N. Y., & E. 1st m 1916.....	115	
Han. & St. J. 8s convertible m.	106½	106¾
Illinois Central,		
Dub. & Sioux City 1st m......		
do do 2d div....		
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st m....	98	
Indp's Bloomn & W'n 1st m...		
do do 2d m...	5	
Lake Shore Bonds		

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
RAILROAD BONDS.		
M. So & N. I. Sink. fd 7 p c.....	108¾	109⅛
Cleve. & Tol. sink. fd		
Cleve. & Tol. new bonds.......		
Cleve. Painesv & A old bonds..		
do do new do....	112	
Buff. & Erie, new bonds...	115	
Buff. and State Line 7s...		
Kala. & W. Pigeon 1st m.......	100	
Det. Mon & Tol 1st 7s 1906......		
Lake Shore div. bonds..........	115	117½
do con c'p 1st bds.....		
do con reg 1st bds.....		
do con coup 2d m......	110	
do con re'gd 2d m.....		
Marietta & Cin. 1st m..	90	
Mich. Cent. consol. 7s 1902.....	116⅛	120
do 1st m. 8s '82 s f		
do equipment bds....		
New Jersey So. 1st m. 7s........	40	
do consol 7s.......		
N. Y. Cent. 6s, 1883............	105	105¼
do do 6s, 1887...........	108¼	
do do 6s, real estate.....	104½	105
do do 6s, subscription...	104⅛	
do do & Hud 1st m c.....	124	124⅝
do do do 1st m reg....	124	
Hud. Riv. 7s 2d m s f 1885.....	111	
Harlem 1st m 7s coupon......	121	
do do reg'd.......	121	121½
North Missouri, 1st mort.		
Ohio & Miss cons s f...........	112	
do consolidated......		
do 2d do..........		93⅜
do 1st Springfield div.		
Pacific R R bonds.......		
Cent Pacific gold bonds......	111½	112
do San Joaquin branch....	99½	100
do Cal & Oregon 1st........	100½	
do State aid bonds		
do land grant bonds........	103	105
Western Pacific bonds........	106⅞	107½
Union Pacific 1st m bds... ...	111⅛	111¼
do land grants. 7s...	112¾	112⅞
do sinking fund.....	114⅜	114½
Pacific R of Mo. 1st m..........	106¼	
do 2d m.............	108	110
do Income 7s.......		
do 1st Carnod't B....		
Pennsylvania R R		
Pitts, Ft W & C 1st m	124	124½
do do 2d m.........	122	
do do 3d m.........	115	
Cleve & Pitts con s f....		116½
do 4th do..........	109½	110½
Col. Chic & Ind 1st m.........	75½	
do do 2d m.........	29	
Rome, Water'n & Og con 1....	38	
St. L. & Iron M 1st m............		117
do do 2d m..........	89½	89⅞
St. L. Alton & Terre Haute....		
Alton & Terre Haute 1st m..		
do 2d do pref....	82	84
do 2d do inc.......		
Bell & S. Ill R. 1st m 8s.......	106½	
Tol, Peo & War, 1st E D........		
do do do W D.......		
do do do Burl div.....		
do do do 2d m.........		
do do do consol 7s....		
Toledo, Wabash & Western....		
Tol & Wab 1st m ex..........		
do Ex coupon...	108⅛	
do 1st m St L div.......		
do Ex mat'd coup. ..	93½	94

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Tol & Wab 2d m	109	......
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	......	85⅝
do equipment bonds	......	40
do cons conv'ble	......	......
do Ex Aug 78 & priv's.	76½	77
Gt West'n 1st m 1888	......	......
do Ex coupon	107⅞	108
do 2d m 1893	......	......
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	......	86
Quincy & Tol 1st m, 1890	......	......
do Ex M & Nov 77 c p.	90⅞	92
Illinois & S Iowa 1st m	......	......
do Ex coupon	96	100
Han & Cent Mo 1st m.	......	......
Pekin, Lnc'n & Decat'r 1st m.	......	......
West'n Un bds, 1900, c'pon	111	......
do do do reg	......	......
MISCELLANEOUS LIST.		
Arkansas Levee 7s	1	3
Atchison & P Pk 6s gold	100	105
Atchison, Top & S Fe 7s, g	112¼	112½
Cairo & Fulton 1st 7s	90	93
California & Oregon 6s g'd	100½	101
California Pac R R 7s gold	105	108
do 6s 2d m gold	91	95
Central Pac 7s gold, conv	104	106
do land grant	103½	105
Cent of Iowa 1st M 7s gold	48	55
Chi & Southwestern R R 8s	105	110
Chi & Eastern Ill. 1st 6s	84	85
do do income 7s	25	30
Chi & Mich Lake Shore 8s.	......	......
Chi & Can South 1st m'g 7s	61½	62½
Chi, St. P. & Min 1st M 6s	100	101
do land grant 6s	71	72
Cin, Rich & F W 1 m g 7s	67	69
Cleve, Mt V & Del 7s gold	34	40
Connecticut Valley 7s gold	50	70
Connecticut Western 1st 7s	20	25
Col & Hock Val 1st 7s 30 ys	105	108
Dan, Urb, Bl & P 1st m 7s g	50	60
Denver Pacific 7 gold	60	65
Denv and Rio Grande 7s g	92½	93½
Det, Hillsdale & Ind R R 8s	......	......
Dixon, Peoria & Han 8s	......	......
Erie & Pittsburg 1st 7s	100	102½
Evans & Crawfordsville 7s	100	105
Evans, Hend. & Nashville 7s	......	......
Evansville, T & H Chic 7s g	47	52
Flint & Pere M 7s land grant	90	100
do 7s consol	26	35
Fort W, Jackson & Sag 8s	......	......
Grand River Valley 8s	102	106
G'd Rapids & Ind 1 guar 7 g	104¾	106
G'd Rapids & Ind 1st 7s g	90	93
Houst, & Gt N. 1st m g 7s	82	84
Houst. & Tex. C. 1st M L	104	106
do 1st W D	98	99
do Con. 8s	95	96
Ill Grand Trunk 8s	......	......
Ind, Bl & W Ext 1st m g 7s	7	10
Indianapolis & Mad. 1st m 7s	100	103
Int'national R R Tex 1 m g 7s	84	85
Indianapolis & Vinc's 1st 7s gr.	92	100
Indianapolis & St. Louis 7s	70	80
Io Falls & Sioux City 1st 7s	95	100
Jack. Lansing & Sag. 1st m	......	......
Jeff'ville, Mad & Ind 1st m 7s	110	112
Kala'zoo & South H 8s guar	......	......
Kal, Alleghan & G R 8s gr	102	105
Kal & White Pigeon 7s	100	105
Kansas City & Cameron 10s	112	116

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Kan Pac 7s ex Ma & No g	112½	113
do 7s land gr Ja & Jy g	118	120
Kan Pac 7s do 2d m	88	92
do 6s gold June & Dec	117	118
do 6s do Feb & Aug	117	119
do 7s Leaven Branch	70	80
do Income No 11	67	75
do do No 16	70	75
do stock	53	54
Michigan Air Line 8s	......	......
Mil & North 1st m 8s	50	60
Mo, Kan & Tex assent'd bds	67½	68
N. J. Midland 1st 7s gold	40	45
N. Y. & Osw Mid 1st 7s gold	13	15
North Pac 1st m g 7 3-10s	50	60
do land warrants	......	
Omaha & S West'n R R 8s	113	115
Oregon & Cal 7s gold	35	40
Oswego & Rome 7s guar	90	95
Ott, Oswego & Fox R V 8s	......	......
Pitts, Cin & St Louis 1st 7s	106½	107
Pt Huron & L M 7s g end	20	25
Quincy & Warsaw 8s	......	......
Rome, W & Ogdensburg 7s	38	39
Sand, Mans & Newark 7s	100	102
Sioux City & Pacific 6s	......	......
South Side (L I) 7s	86	90
Southern Central N Y 7s	50	70
Steubenville & Indiana 6s	99	102
Southern Minn construc 8s	90	91
St. Jo & C Bl 1st m 10s	......	......
St. Louis, Vanda & T H 1st	105	108
do do 2d	75	85
St L & S Eastern 1st 7s gold	55	60
Union Pacific So br 6s gold	84	84½
Union & Logansport 7s	80	86
Texas & Pacific L G 7s	33	32
CI CINNATI.		
STATE, CO. AND CITY BONDS.		
Ohio State 6s	109	112
Hamilton County 6s	100	.....
do do 7s	100	103
do do 7 3-10	104	108
City of Cincinnati 6s	100	......
do do 7s	109	......
do do 7 3-10	111	112
City of Covington, Ky 6s '81	98	......
do do 7 3-10, '81	101	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
L Miami & I & C con 6s	55	75
do do 1st 6s '83	100	102
Cin, Ham & Day 1 m 7s '80	100	101
do do 2 m 7s '85	......	101
do do 3 m 8s	......	......
Dayton & Mich, 1 m 7s '80	101	102½
Dayton and Mich, 2 m 7s '84	97	100½
do do 3 m 7s '88	93	95
Cin, Rich & Chi, 1 m 7s '95	......	85
Cin, Han & Ind 1st m gr 7s	50	60
Marietta & Cin 1st m 7s '91.	87	90
do do 2d m 7s '96	30	32
Indianap & Cin 1st m 7s '88	102	......
Cin & In guar 1st m 7s '92	102½	105
do 2d m 7s '77 '82	72	75
Indianap C & L 1st m 7s '97	65	......
Day & W 1 m, 1881	100	......
do 2 m, 1905	87	90
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Columbus & Xenia 50	110	......
Cin, Ham & Dayton 100	18	20
Dayton & Mich 3½ guar 50	20	23
Little Miami 50	......	105½

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Marietta & Cin 1st pref.......50	......	5
do do 2d do.........50	......	3
Cin Gas Light & Coke Co....100	145	150
SOUTHERN SECURITIES.		
CITIES.		
Atlanta, Ga 7s	100	103
do 8s	104	106
Augusta, Ga 7s bonds	103	105
Charleston stock, 6s	50	55
Charleston, S. C. 7s F L bonds	80	90
Columbia, S. C. 6s	55	70
Columbia, Ga. 7s bonds	60	70
Lynchburg 6s	95	100
Macon 7s bonds	50	60
Memphis bonds 6s	15	25
do new consols	30	40
do end, M & C R R	20	......
Mobile 5s	15	20
do 8s	15	20
Montgomery 8s	22	25
Nashville 6s old	75	85
do 6s new	75	85
New Orleans 5s	25	26
do consol, 6s	30	32
do bonds, 7s	25	27
do to railroads 6s	26	30
Norfolk 6s	95	100
Petersburg 6s	90	95
Richmond 6s	103	104
Savannah 7s	74	77
RAILROADS.		
Atlantic & Gul, consol	102	105
Central Georgia cons, 7s	110	112
do do stock	77	80
Charlotte Col & A, 1 m 7s	90	95
do do stock	6	10
E Tenn & Georgia 6s	95	100
East Tenn, Va & Geo 1st m 7s	100	101
do do stock	38	45
Georgia R R 7s	110	112
do stock	85	87
Greenville & Col 7s guar	39	42
do do 7s certiff	35	40
Macon & Western Stock	100	105
Macon & Augusta bonds	85	90
do do endorsed	95	100
Memphis & Charleston 1st 7s	97	100
do do 2d 7s	78	80
do do stock	3	7
Mississippi Central 1st m 7s	102	105
do do 2d m 8s	97	99
Mississippi & Tenn 1 m	112	114
do do cons, 8s	89	92
Motg'y and West P, 1st 8s	107	108
do do 1st end	......	......
Mobile and Ohio Sterling	70	75
do do do ex ctfs	70	75
do do 8s interest	27	35
N Orleans and Jackson 1st m	109	112
do do 2d m	101	103
Nash and Chattanooga 6s	97	100
Norfolk and Petersb 1st m 8s	100½	103
do do 2d do	98	100
Northeastern, S C, 1st m 7s	105	110
do do 2d do	84	90
Orange and Alex 1st 6s	90	95
do do 2d 6s	78	85
do do 3d 8s	39	41
do do 4th 8s	12	18
Rich and Peters'b 1st m 7s	......	......
do do 2d m 6s	......	......
do do 3d m 8s	102½	105
Rich and Fred'b and Pot 6s	97	100
do do do con 7s	97	102

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Rich and Danv 1st con 6	85	87
do Piedmont 8s	100	106
do 1st 8s	......	90
Southside Va 1st m 8s	107	108
do 2d m guar 6s	78	80
do 3d m 6s	56	60
do 4th m 8s	......	......
Southwest R R, Ga 1st m	104	106
do do stock	90	97
S. Caro R R, 1st m 7s, new	95	100
S. Caro R R 6s	......	......
do 7s 2d	30	33
Virginia and Tenn 2d 6s	90	92
do do 3d 8s	101	102
West Ala, 8s guar	111	114
Wilmington and Weldon 7s	100	103
PAST DUE COUPONS.		
Tennessee State coupons	15	25
Virginia consol coupons	79	81
Memphis city coupons	20	......
South Carolina consols	......	......
BOSTON.		
STATE BONDS.		
Maine 6s 1889	......	......
N. Hampshire 6s 1876–84	......	......
Vermont 6s, 1874–78	......	......
Massachusetts 5s, 1883, g	......	......
CITY BONDS.		
Boston 5s, 1880–86, gold	......	......
do 6s, currency	......	......
Chic 7s, 1890–95, riv. impr	......	......
do 1884	......	......
RAILROAD STOCKS AND BONDS.		
A T and Santa Fe, 1st m 7s	112¼	112½
do do L G	......	......
do do stock	109	109¼
Bost and Alb'y 6s, '75 (W RR)	......	......
do 7s, 1892	118	......
do stock	133	......
Boston and Lowell 7s, 1892	......	......
do stock (par 500)	69	69¼
Boston and Maine, stock	111	......
Boston and Providence, stock	110½	......
Bur & Mo R 7s, '93, land grant	115	......
do do 8s, 94, conv	......	......
do do 8s, 83 (in Neb)	......	......
Chicago, Bur and Quincy	113½	114
Bur & Mo Riv stock (in Neb)	125¾	126
Cheshire 6s, 1898	103	......
do preferred stock	28½	30
Cin, San, and Cleve, 7s, 1890	......	......
do do com stk (par 50)	7⅝	7⅞
Concord stock (par 50)	......	......
Conn and Pass Rivs 6s, 1876	......	......
do do 7s, '76, notes	......	......
do do pref. stock	40	......
Connecticut River, stock	......	......
Eastern stock	13¾	14
Fitchburg, stock	116	117
Manch and Lawrence stock	......	......
Nashua and Lowell, stock	97½	......
Northern (N. H.) stock	87¾	88
Norwich and Worcester stock	119	......
Ogdenburg and L Champ stock	19⅜	19½
do do pref stock	65	......
Old Colony stock	100	100⅛
Phil, Wil & Balt stock (par 50)	66½	......
Portl, Saco & Portsmouth st'k	96	......
Portsmouth, Gt F & Con'y s	6	7
Rutland pref. stock	15	15½
Vermont and Canada stock	......	12½
Vt. Ct. 1st m 7s, 1886 cons	......	......
do do 8s, '91	......	......
Vermont and Mass. 6s, 1883	......	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Vermont and Mass stock	115	116
Worcester and Nashua	33	......
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Boston Land Co	5	5¼
Boston Water Power	2⅜	2⅝
Pullman Palace Car	82	82¼
PHILADELPHIA.		
STATE AND CITY BONDS.		
Penn. 5s, new 5-10, 1st	112½	113½
do do 10-15, 2d	102	102
do do 15-25, 3d	109	109½
Philadelphia 6s, old	......	......
do 6s, new	119	119½
Pittsburg 5s	......	......
do 7s	......	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Allegheny V R R 7 3-10, '96	113	114
Bel & Del R R, 1st m 6s, '77	109	......
do 2d do '85	104	......
do 3d do '87	100	103
Cam & Amboy R R 6s, 1875	104	......
do do do 1883	105	......
do do do 1889	109	110¼
Cam & A. T. 1st m 7s 1873	108	......
do do 2d do 1880	102	102½
Cam & Burl No R R, 6s, '97	101	......
Cataw R R 1st m, convs, '82	......	......
do new 7s, 1900	109	......
Connecting R R 6s. 1900-4	108	108½
E. Penn R R, 1st m, 7s, '88	......	......
El. & Wmsp't R R, 1 m, 7s, '80	109	109⅝
Harrisburg 1st m 6s, 1883	......	......
H. & B. T. 1st m 7s, 1890	111	......
do 2d do 1875	......	......
Ithaca and Athens, g, 7s, 1890	......	......
Junction, 1st m, 6s, 1883	......	......
do 2d do 1900	......	......
Lehigh Valley, new 6s, '93	114	......
do do reg	115	116
do new 7s, reg 1910	118	......
Little Schuyl, 1st m 7s, '77	......	......
Northern Cent. 2d m. 6s, '85	......	......
do 3d m do 1900	......	......
North Penn, 1st m 6s, 1885	109¼	109½
Oil Creek 1st m 7s, coup '82	80	82
Pittsb'h Titus & Buff 7s 1896	25	30
P. & N. Y. C. & R. R. 7s 1896	119	121
Penna. 1st mort 6s 1880	......	105
do gen do 1910	113	113¼
do do do reg 1910	113	......
Phila & Erie 1st mort 6s 1881	106	108
do 2d mort 7s, '88	107	107½
Phila & Reading 6s, 1880	103½	......
do 7s, 18 3	116	120
do conv 7s, 1890	......	65
do deb bds 1893	......	......
do cons 7s c 1911	109	109½
do do reg	108½	109½
do Scrip	59	61
Pa & Rd'g C & I Co deb bonds	......	......
do do mort bds	......	......
Phila. Wil. & Balt. 6s, 1884	......	......
Pittsb'gh, Cinn. & St. Louis	106¾	107
War. & F. 1st mort. 7s, 1896	80	86
West Chester cons. 7s, 1891	112	......
West Jersey 6s, 1883	92	100
West Jersey 1st mort 6s, 1896	108	......
do do 7s, 1897	108	......

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
CANAL BONDS.		
Ches. & Del. Canal 6s reg 1886	75	......
Lehigh Nav. 6s, 1884	......	106½
do R. R. 1897	107	107
do deb reg 1877	70	......
do 1882	......	......
do conv g. 1894	93	97
do gold, 1897	96½	......
Schuyl. Nav. 1st mort 6s, 1872	93½	100
do 2d do 1882	65	70
do 6s, 1895	33	43
do 6s, imp. 1881	18	......
do 6s, boat, 1888	......	......
do 7s, boat, 1889	......	......
RAILROAD STOCK.		
United Cos. of N. J. 100	141½	142
Camden & Atlantic 50	35	40
do do pref 50	45	......
Catawissa 50	9¾	10½
do pref 50	40	......
do new pref 50	40	40
Elmira & Williamsport 50	26	......
do do pref 50	41	......
East Pennsylvania 50	......	......
Harrisb'g Lancas. & C 50	......	......
Huntgt'n & Broad Top 50	3	3¼
do do pref. 50	5¾	6¼
Lehigh Valley 50	37⅝	38
Liltle Schuylkill 50	44½	......
Norristown 50	......	103
Northern Central R. W 50	19¼	20
North Pennsylvania 50	41	......
Oil Creek & Allegh'y River 50	5½	5⅝
Pennsylvania 50	37½	*37⅝
Philadelphia & Erie 50	......	......
Philadelphia & Reading 50	16⅞	17
Philadelphia & Trenton 100	......	......
Phila. Wil. & Balt 50	......	......
CANAL STOCKS.		
Chesapeake & Delaware 50	......	......
Delaware Division 50	......	......
Lehigh Navigation 50	18	18¼
Morris 100	......	......
do preferred 100	......	......
Pennsylvania 50	......	......
BALTIMORE.		
Maryland 6s, defence, J. & J	109¼	110
Virginia 6s, J. & J., old	......	......
do deferred, J. & J	7⅝	8
do consol. do	56½	56¾
do do 2d s do	40	41⅛
N. Carolina 6s, Jan. & J., old	22¾	23
Tennessee 6s, do old	35	......
do 6s, do new	30	......
do 6s, do n. s.	30	......
Balt. 6s, J., A., J., O., 1890	114¾	115⅛
do 5s, M. & N., ex., 1916	108	109
do 6s, J. & J., 1902	115	......
Memphis City 6s, J. & J., n	30	......
Balt. & Ohio, May & N 100	98	97¾
do 1st preferred	106	110
do 2d do	100	......
Northern Central, M. & N 50	18½	......
Central Ohio, June & Dec 50	27	30
do preferred 50	42	43
City Passenger R'y, J. & J 25	34	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Balt. & Ohio 6s, 1880, J. & J.	102¼	102½
do 1885. A. & O.	106½	107½
Pitts. & C. 1st 7s, 1898, J. & J.	107	108
N. Cent. 6s, 1885, J. & J.	107½	108½
do 6s, 1900, A. & O.	104½	105½
do 6s, gold, 1900, J. & J.	102¼	......
Cen. O. 6s, 1st m., 1900, M. & S.	105⅛	105¼
W. M. 1st m 5s gu. 1890, J. & J.	110	......
do 1896. J. & J.	103	......
W. Maryland 2d m (pref)	92	......
W. M. 2d m. 6s gu. by W. Co.	106	110
M. & Cin. 1st m 7s F and A 1892	90¼	90¾
do 2d m 7s M. and N.	37	37¼
M. & Cin. 3d m 8s 1900 J. and J.	14½	15
Rich. & Dan. 1st m. M. and N.	88½	......
Union R. R., End. Cant. Co.	107½	......
Canton Co., 1st 6, gold, J and J.	102	102¼
Orange, Alex. and Mn's 7s do.	56½	59
Orange & A. 1st 6s, M. and N.	90	......
do 2d 6s, J. and J.	84	84½
do 3d 8s, M. and N.	44	46
do 4th 8s, M. and S	13	15
Virginia & Tenn 6s 2d J. and J.	94	96
do 8s. J. and J.	104¾	105½
W. & W. 7s gold 1900 J. and J.	101	......
W. and Columbia and Aug. 7s.	30	35
Santa Clara Bonds	......	......
Academy of Music Bonds	......	......
Balt. Gas, J. and Dec. 100	100	......
do gold certif. 100	98	100
People's Gas, J. and J. 25	12¾	13
Virginia consol. coupons	81⅛	81¼
Chesapeake and O. Canal bonds	40	......
Indianapolis Water 1sts	......	......
Indianapolis Water 2ds	......	......
Cincinnati 7-30s, J. and J	......	......
do May and Nov.	......	......
Norfolk Water, 8s	114⅛	......
LOUISVILLE.		
CITY AND CANAL BONDS.		
City improvement 6s	$99½	$100¼
do bounty 6s	$100	......
do school 6s	$99½	$100¼
do wharf (old) 6s	$99½	$100¼
do do (new) 6s	$100	$101
do water works (old) 6s	*100	101½
do do (new) 6s	*100	101½
do L. and N. R. R. (M. S.) 6s	$100	$101
do L. and N. R. R. (L. E.) 6s	*101	102
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (old)	103½	*104½
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (new)	*106	107
do old liabilities due 1880	*101	......
do St. Louis A. L. R. R.	*100	*102½
Canal bonds, 3d issue, 6s	$102	$103
do 4th issue, 6s	*105	*106
Louisville Bridge Co. 7s	*110½	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Louis. and Nash. Leb. Br.	*101	102

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Louis. and Nash. Cons	$109	......
L. and N. 2d mort	100	......
Louis., Cin. and Lex. 1 m 7s.	*108	108¾
do do 2 m 7s.	*91	......
Jefferson. M. and I. 1st m 7s.	*111½	......
do do 2d m 7s.	*99½	*100
Eliz. and Paduc. 1st m. 8s	12	......
E. and P. Louisville Br'ch 7s.	......	30
Shelby, 1st mortgage 8s	100	......
Owensboro and Russel' 1 m 8s.	......	10
MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.		
Kentuc. State bonds (old) 6s	$105	......
do do (new) 6s	$105	......
New Albany City	*105	......
Water Works bonds, 6s	*104	105
Louisville Transfer Co. 8s	$99	$100
STOCKS.		
Louisville and Nashville R. R.	62	64
Gas Company stock	105½	106
Louisville Bridge Co. stock	108½	109
ST. LOUIS.		
CITY AND COUNTY BONDS.		
City water (is. '67) 6s gold	$105	106
City water (is. '70) 6s gold	$105	106½
City water (is. '72) 6s gold	$105¼	106½
City sewer (is. '73) 6s gold	$105¼	......
City park 6s gold	$105¼	......
City bdg approach 6s gold	$105¼	......
City 6s Currency	$104	......
County 6s, gold various	$105	......
County 6s, gold of 1892	$105	......
do do 1893	$105	......
County 7s, Currency	$105	......
RAILROAD BONDS		
At. & Pac. 1st Cent. div.	25	......
do 2d Mo. div	......	......
do land grant guar	......	......
do land grant cen. div.	2	......
Denver Pacific and Telegraph	......	......
Kan. Pac. 1st m. F. and A	117½	......
do 1st m. J. and D	117	118
do 1st m. (Lea. br.)	......	......
do income No. 11	70	...
do income No. 16	70	...
do (Den. ext.) 1 m	111½	112½
Kan. Pac., 1st m. L. G. 7s	117	118½
Missouri Pacific 1st mort	106	......
do do 2d do	106½	......
North Missouri, 1st mort	113	......
RAILROAD STOCKS.		
At. and Pac., pref. Mo. div	......	......
do do cent div	......	......
Kansas Pacific	......	......
Pacific of Missouri	1	......
St. L. Kan. C. and Nort. ptef.	41½	......
do do commom	15¼	......

SUPPLEMENT—Continued from page 234.

PUBLISHER'S NOTICES.

Any standard work on Finance, published in this country or in Europe, will be promptly furnished at publisher's prices, through the office of RHODES' JOURNAL. Correspondence solicited.

The Department entitled "The Bankers' Index," will be continued, and constantly improved, in order to make it simply what the title indicates as regards money matters, prices, and reliable financial information.

A great deal of information can be gathered by a careful perusal of the advertisements and special notices in this issue, and to be continued regularly hereafter.

No advertisements are solicited but the cards of Banks, Bankers and Banking Institutions, or such as are of direct and practical interest to the officers and managers of these institutions, and to investors.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Attention is directed to explanatory cards of the following companies in this number. In a majority of these the statement of Capital, Assets, Surplus, names of Officers, Directors, &c., is such as to commend them to the confidence of mortgagees and property owners:

CONTINENTAL, 100 and 102 Broadway, New York, and corner Court and Montague streets, Brooklyn.

PACIFIC, 470 Broadway, New York; branch office, 173 Broadway.

FRANKLIN AND EMPORIUM, 237 Broadway, New York.

HOME, 135 Broadway, New York.

STAR, 141 Broadway, New York.

HANOVER, 120 Broadway, New York; Branch offices, 1322 Broadway, and 215 Montague street, Brooklyn.

WESTCHESTER, 141 Broadway, New York.

LYCOMING, of Muncy, Penn., 161 Broadway, New York; A. E. Moore, Manager Eastern Department.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

KEYES' HISTORY OF SAVINGS BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES.—The New York *Herald* says: "Mr. Keyes must have expended a vast amount of labor on the two volumes, which are crowded with interesting and valuable information. But in addition to its statistical merit, the work treats the subject to which it is devoted in all its aspects, and affords useful hints for the management of savings institutions, based on practical experience, as well as on the lessons conveyed by the history of the past half century. It will be of great value as a work of reference for the banks themselves, as well as for all who feel an interest in such institutions. The Savings Banks will advance their own interest by aiding the circulation of the book among all classes."

By Emerson W. Keyes, late of the Banking Department, State of New York. Octavo, 2 vols. of 480 pp. and 636 pp., respectively, $5 per vol.

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HANOVER

Fire Insurance Company,

120 Broadway, Cor. Cedar St.

FIFTY-THIRD SEMI-ANNUAL STATEMENT, SHOWING THE CONDITION OF THE COMPANY JANUARY 1, 1879.

Cash Capital	$500.000 00
Re-Insurance Fund	419,741 18
Outstanding Liabilities	88,156 80
Net Surplus	675,898 84
Total Assets	$1,683,796 82

SUMMARY OF ASSETS.

Cash in Bank and Office	$77,617 75
United States Bonds (market value)	1,106,987 50
Bonds and Mortgages being first lien on Improved Real Estate in the cities of New York and Brooklyn	199,750 00
Loans on call	44,550 00
Brooklyn City Bonds	58,000 00
Connecticut State Bonds	21,200 00
Bank and Trust Company's Stocks	34,850 00
Railroad First Mortgage Bonds	61,525 00
Balances in hands of Agents, and uncollected Office Premiums	72,136 55
Accrued interest not included in market value of Securities	4,454 07
Real Estate	2,725 95
Total	$1,683,796 82

BENJ. S. WALCOTT, President.
I. REMSEN LANE, Vice President and Secretary.
CHAS. L. ROE, Assistant Secretary.
THOMAS JAMES, Actuary.

WESTCHESTER

Fire Insurance Company

No. 141 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.

ABSTRACT FROM STATEMENT, JANUARY 1, 1879.

Capital Paid Up	$300,000 00

All invested in United States Reg. Bonds at Par.

ASSETS.

United States Registered Bonds	$510,793 75
Bonds and Mortgages	165,450 00
Collateral Loans	8,600 00
Real Estate	33,707 43
Stocks and Bonds	6,225 00
Uncollected Premiums at Home Office	6,819 40
Agency Balances in course of transmission	55,961 61
Cash on hand and in bank	38,982 02
Interest and Rent due	6,226 40
Total	$832,765 61

LIABILITIES (Real and Contingent.)

Losses in process of adjustment	$47,753 00
Reserve for Unearned Premiums	302,959 50
Reserve for other Claims	6,434 24
Net Surplus as regards Policy-Holders	475,618 87
Total	$832,765 61

JOHN Q. UNDERHILL, Sec'y.
W. H. BOWNE, Treas.
GEO. R. CRAWFORD, President.
JOHN E. MARSHALL, Vice Pres't.

SAVINGS BANK CARDS.

[A list of well-known Savings Banks in the United States, showing date of organization or charter, when open for business, and officers' names.]

CALIFORNIA.

SAN FRANCISCO SAVINGS UNION, 532 California st., corner of Webb st., San Francisco, 1862, JAMES DE FREMERY, Prest., LOVELL WHITE, Cashier.

STOCKTON SAVINGS AND LOAN SOCIETY, cor. Main and Hunter sts., Stockton, San Joaquin Co. Aug. 12, 1867. 9 a. m. to 3 p. m., daily. L. U. SHIPPEE, Prest., JAMES LITTLEHALE, Cashier.

GEORGIA.

THE AUGUSTA SAVINGS INSTITUTION, 42 Broad st., Augusta. Feb. 16, 1875. 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. ALFRED BAKER, Prest., JOSEPH S. BEAN, JR., Sec'y and Treas.

MARYLAND.

THE SAVINGS BANK OF BALTIMORE, cor. Gay and Second sts., Baltimore. 1818. ARCHIBALD STIRLING, Prest., DAVID BALDWIN, Treas.

MASSACHUSETTS.

BOSTON FIVE CENTS SAVINGS BANK, Nos. 36 and 38 School st., Boston. April, 1854. ALONZO H. EVANS, Prest., Curtis C. Nichols, Treas.

MICHIGAN.

WAYNE COUNTY SAVINGS BANK, 32 and 34 Congress Street, near Griswold, Detroit. Bank open 9 o'clock a. m. till 4 o'clock p. m. Monday and Saturday Evenings, until 8 o'clock. WM. B. WESSON, President; H. KIEFER, M. D., Vice-Prest; S. D. ELWOOD, Sec'y and Treas.

MINNESOTA.

FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' SAVINGS BANK, Minneapolis. October 10, 1874. WINTHROP YOUNG, Prest., E. H. MOULTON, Treas.

MISSOURI.

LAFAYETTE SAVINGS BANK, 1601 Carondelet ave., St. Louis. M. HELMBACHER, Prest., WM. KOSSAK, Cashier.

SEDALIA AVINGS BANK, SEDALIA. Feb., 1868. 9 a. m. to 3 p. m. T. W. CLONEY, Cashier, R. T. GENTRY, Asst. Cashier.

STATE SAVINGS BANK, ST. JOSEPH. 1857. 9 a. m. to 3 p. m. A. M. SAXTON, Prest., C. B. FRANCE, Cashier.

NEW JERSEY.

NEWARK SAVINGS INSTITUTION, cor. Broad and Mechanic sts., Newark. Open daily from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. DANIEL DODD, Prest., IRA M. HARRISON, Vice Prest., WM. D. CARTER, Treas.

HOWARD SAVINGS INSTITUTION, 742 Broad st., Newark. March 1, 1857. 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. BEACH VANDERPOOL, Prest., JOSEPH N. TUTTLE, Treas., HORACE T. BRUMLEY, Secretary.

NEW YORK.

NEW YORK CITY.

BANK FOR SAVINGS, 67 Bleecker st., 1819. Daily from 10 to 2; Wednesdays and Fridays from 4 to 6 p. m. ROB'T LENOX KENNEDY, Prest., GEORGE CABOT WARD, Secretary.

BOWERY SAVINGS BANK, 128 and 130 Bowery. 1834. Daily from 10 to 3; Mondays from 10 a. m. to 7 p. m. HENRY LYLES, JR., Prest., GILES H. COGGESHALL, Secretary.

CITIZENS' SAVINGS BANK, s. w. cor. Bowery and Canal st. 1860. Open every day from 10 to 3; also Mondays and Saturdays from 10 a. m. to 7 p. m. EDWARD A. QUINTARD, Prest., SEYMOUR A. BUNCE, Sec'y.

EAST RIVER SAVINGS INSTITUTION, No. 3 Chambers st., 1848. Daily from 10 to 3: Thursdays from 10 to 7. WILLIAM H. SLOCUM, Prest., CHARLES A. WHITNEY, Secretary.

GREENWICH SAVINGS BANK. 73 Sixth ave. 1833. Daily from 10 to 3. J. HARSEN RHOADES, Prest., CLINTON GILBERT, Treas.

HARLEM SAVINGS BANK, 2281 Third ave. 1863. THOMAS B. TAPPEN, Prest., JOHN S. KENYON, Secretary.

IRVING SAVINGS INSTITUTION. 96 Warren st. 1851. Daily from 10 to 3. JOHN CASTREE, Prest. CLARENCE D. HEATON, Secretary.

MANHATTAN SAVINGS INSTITUTION. 648 Broadway. 1850. From 10 to 4; Saturday from 10 to 3. EDWARD SCHELL, Prest., C. F. ALVORD, Secretary.

NORTH RIVER SAVINGS BANK, 478 Eighth ave. 1866. From 10 to 3; Monday and Saturday evenings from 6 to 8. WILLIAM B. STAFFORD, Prest., HENRY V. PARSELL, Secretary.

SEAMENS' BANK FOR SAVINGS, 74 and 76 Wall st. 1829. From 10 to 2. WM. H. MACY, Prest., HENRY P. MARSHALL, Cashier, S. F. JENKINS, Treas.

BROOKLYN.

BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK, 217 Fulton st. 1827. Daily from 10 to 3; Monday and Saturday evenings from 5 to 7. HOSEA WEBSTER, Prest., JOHN A. LATIMER, Treasurer.

DIME SAVINGS BANK OF BROOKLYN, 367 Fulton st. 1859. Daily from 10 to 3; Mondays and Saturdays from 5 to 8. SEYMOUR L. HUSTED, Prest., JOHN W. HUNTER, Treas.

EAST BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK, Myrtle ave., cor. Franklin. April 13, 1861. From 9 to 3; Monday and Saturday evenings from 7 to 9. STEPHEN CROWELL, Prest., EUGENE F. BARNES, Treas.

GERMANIA SAVINGS BANK OF KINGS COUNTY, 375 Fulton st. 1867. From 9 to 3; also Mondays and Saturdays from 5 to 7 in the evening. F. A. SCHROEDER, Prest., HERM. GEILING, Cashier.

GERMAN SAVINGS BANK OF BROOKLYN, Broadway and Boerum st. 1866. Daily from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m.; also Monday and Saturday evenings from 5 to 8. WILLIAM DICK, Prest., GEORGE S. BISHOP, Cashier.

THE WILLIAMSBURGH SAVINGS BANK, Broadway and Fifth st., Brooklyn, E. D. 1851. Daily from 10 to 3; Mondays and Saturdays from 4 to 7 p. m. GEORGE RICARD, Prest., JOHN BROACH, Cashier.

STATE OF NEW YORK.

COLLEGE POINT SAVINGS BANK, College Point, L. I. 1872. JOHN H. RAUCH, Prest., THOS. DALEY, Secretary.

EASTCHESTER SAVINGS BANK, Mount Vernon. March 8, 1871. Daily, 10 a. m. to 3 p. m. JOHN M. MASTERTON, Prest., H. D. BISSELL, Sec'y and Treas.

OSWEGO CITY SAVING BANK, West First st. March 4, 1859. Daily from 10 to 3, and Saturday evenings from 6 to 8. BYRON DE WITT, Pres't., JOHN P. PHELPS, Treas. and Sec'y.

ROME SAVINGS BANK, ROME. 1851. 9 a. m. to 12:30 p. m.; 2 to 4 p. m. GORDON N. BISSEL, Prest., BLOOMFIELD J. BEACH, Treas.

SING SING SAVINGS BANK, Sing Sing. 1854. Daily, 10 to 3. GAYLORD B. HUBBELL, Prest., ISAAC B. NOXON, Sec'y.

THE BINGHAMTON SAVINGS BANK, Binghamton. April 18, 1867. 9 a. m. to 4:30 p. m., and Saturdays from 6 to 8 p. m. CHAS. W. SANFORD, Prest., HARRIS G. RODGERS, Treas., CHAS. W. GENNET, Teller.

TROY SAVINGS BANK, Troy. 1823. CHAS. B. RUSSELL, Prest., CHAS. N. LOCKWOOD, Treas.

WARWICK SAVINGS BANKS, WARWICK. 1876. THOMAS G. PIERSON, First Vice Prest., THOMAS BURT, Treas and Sec'y.

YONKERS SAVINGS BANK, YONKERS. 1854. ETHAN FLAGG, Prest., LYMAN COBB, JR., Cashier.

OHIO.

SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS, No. 91, on the Park, Cleveland. Chartered 1849. S. WILLIAMSON, Prest., S. H. MATHER, Treas.

TOLEDO SAVINGS BANK AND TRUST CO., Toledo, Lucas Co. May, 1868. 9 a. m. to 3 p. m.; Monday and Saturday evenings 6 to 8. RICHARD MOTT, Prest., JOHN J. BARKER, Cashier.

PENNSYLVANIA.

DOLLAR SAVINGS BANK, 124 Fourth ave., Pittsburg. 1855. 9 to 3 daily. JAMES HERDMAN, Prest., CHAS. A. COLTON, Treas., JAMES D. MEEDS, Sec'y.

GERMANTOWN SAVINGS FUND, GERMANTOWN. T. C. HENRY, Prest., GEO. A. WARDER, Treas.

JOHNSTOWN SAVINGS BANK, 120 Clinton st., Johnstown. Sept. 12, 1870. Open daily from 9 a. m. to 3 p. m.; Wednesday and Saturday evenings 6 to 7:30 p. m. DANIEL J. MORRELL, Prest., W. C. LEWIS, Treas., CYRUS ELDER, Solicitor.

THE PHILADELPHIA SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, s. w. cor. Washington Square and Walnut st. Mondays and Thursdays 9 a. m. to 7 p. m.; other days 9 a. m. to 3 p. m. CALEB COPE, Prest., WM. PURVES, Treas.

THE WESTERN SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, 1000 Walnut st., Philadelphia. FREDERICK FRALEY, Prest., WM. B. ROGERS, JR., Vice Prest. and Treas.

THE BENEFICIAL SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, 1200 Chestnut st., Philadelphia. April 23, 1853. Daily from 9 to 3. CHAS. A. REPPLIER, Pres't., PATRICK QUINN, Treasurer.

THE PITTSBURG BANK FOR SAVINGS, No. 61 4th ave., Pittsburg. 1862. Open daily from 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. GEORGE A. BERRY, Prest., JOHN SCOTT and JOSEPH PARK, JR., Vice Prests., CHAS. G. MILNOR, Sec'y and Treas.

RHODE ISLAND.

SAVINGS BANK OF NEWPORT, Thames st., Newport. 1819. 9 a. m. to 2 p. m. BENJAMIN FINCH, Prest., WM. H. SHERMAN, Treas., THOS. A. LAWTON, Asst. Treas.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

GERMANIA SAVINGS BANK, 54 Broad st., Charleston. 1874. JACOB SMALL, Prest., CHARLES LITSCHGI, Cashier.

VIRGINIA.

HOME SAVINGS BANK, NOKFOLK, VA. 1874. GEO. E. BCWDEN, Prest., H. C. PERCY, Cashier.

CHATHAM SAVINGS BANK, CHATHAM. I. D. BLAIR, Prest., RICHARD WHITE, Cashier, W. W. LUCKE, Sec'y.

WISCONSIN.

SECOND WARD SAVINGS BANK, MILWAUKEE. VALENTINE BLATZ, Prest., WM. H. JACOBS, Cashier.

RHODES' JOURNAL

A RECORD OF AMERICAN BANKING.

NEW SERIES. VOLUME VI. NOVEMBER, 1879. No. 11.

BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW, as treated in this issue, introduces Mr. Edward B. Cowles, editor of our Law Department. His work will commend itself to bankers and all others interested in a clear exposition of banking law.

The law of certification, considered in this number of the JOURNAL, completes a carefully prepared review of the subject; the editor presenting (1.), certification defined; (2.), its elements; (3.), relation of drawer to holder of check after certification; (4.), relation of bank to holder; (5.), liability in case of forgery; (6.), who may certify, and, (7.), the doctrine of *ultra vires* as applied to this subject.

PUBLISHER'S NOTICES.—The editor of RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING respectfully solicits the co-operation of bankers, and others interested in financial matters, in maintaining its character as a worthy representative of the banking system. Inquiries to be answered herein, brief correspondence, news items, or suggestions, will be gratefully received.

The new and correct list of banks and bankers, to appear in our forthcoming work, "The Banker's Year-Book," will be kept in type and will undergo constant revision. Please report promptly to Bradford Rhodes & Co., New York, any changes that may occur in your bank, or others in your vicinity; also, the titles and officers of new banks or bankers.

The wild stock speculation which has held high carnival in Wall Street for some weeks past, has developed the old practice of the banks certifying brokers' overdrawn checks. It is plain that one or two newspapers have sought to magnify it into a wonderful discovery, but the facts will not warrant the statements which have appeared with reference to the magnitude of the practice. (It may be known that certain daily papers take more delight in making mountains out of mole-hills than in telling the truth.) But no one denies that over-certification has been lately practiced by a few New York banks having dealings with stock brokers, and it would also be difficult to find an intelligent banker who approves of such a transaction *per se*. The business from the Stock Exchange must be done through business banks, it gives a good margin of profit, and the managers of certain institutions used their discretion in furnishing such accomodation as their customers required. The action is certainly ill-advised in any bank, and is unlawful so far as national banks are concerned.

Section 5,208 of the U. S. Revised Statutes says: "It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk, or agent of any national banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check."

We are glad to see that Controller Knox has been quoting the law to the New York banks, and hope that he will be able to enforce its observance. Aside from the illegality of over-certification, it is not right for the banks to lend their credit to the undue speculation which has been rampant in New York for some time past. All the money of the country, made available through the machinery of the banks, is needed in our rapidly widening channels of trade. The banks cannot afford to let the business of the country suffer while the various cliques of speculators seek to bring their plans to a successful issue.

A Superintendent of Banks Wanted.

Before this issue reaches our readers the result of the election in the State of New York will be known. Without indicating our own personal or political preferences, we may say that the signs seems to indicate a change in the executive administration of the State, and our suggestions will be based upon that idea.

Amongst the important duties which will devolve upon the Executive, if there be a Senate of like political views, will be the nomination to the latter of a Superintendent of the Bank Department. We only desire that the Governor should prove himself to be so broad-minded and practical as not to be deceived by any specious or seeming popularity of a candidate founded wholly upon the ground of a petty and inquisitorial activity which he has been at great pains to make known through the newspapers. The theory that a public official is efficient and trustworthy in proportion as he manages to place himself in antagonism with those with whom he has official dealings, is too narrow and impracticable, we believe, to deceive so clear-headed a man as Mr. Cornell. It is not a sign of inefficiency, or of any neglect of public duty that the administration of a public officer is approved by those with whom he is brought in contact officially. Mr. Cornell's administration of public office is itself testimony upon this point. We only ask, therefore, that the Governor will carefully scan the character and claims of candidates who will be presented for his consideration, and not regard any candidate as having a mortgage upon the office by virtue of an assumed superior fidelity, based chiefly upon official pronunciamentos, which can easily be shown to be mischievous and not salutary.

The Status of American Workingmen.

A glance at the following table shows that the rates of wages in the United States, roughly estimated, are more than twice those in Belgium; and the reports from which these facts are gleaned show that the wages of our tradesmen are nearly three times those in Denmark, France, and Germany; once and a half those in England and Scotland; and more than three times those in Italy and Spain. Some time ago the Secretary of State requested the Consuls to gather full information regarding the rate of wages and the cost of living in foreign countries. The report compiled from these returns has been issued from the State Department, and shows that the cost of living is less in the United States than in any of the countries reported. Europe cannot purchase the necessaries of life, which are common to the American working people, so low as the same can be purchased in the United States. For example, the price of food in Great Britain is fully 25 per cent. higher than at New York, and 50 per cent. higher than in many western cities and towns. Fresh meat in England is put down at 15 to 26 cents per pound, against 12 to 16 cents at New York, and 8 to 13 at Chicago. Perhaps the most striking picture of the comparative condition of the American working-man and of his fellow-laborer abroad may be had by a comparison of his condition in New York City and in the city of Brussels. The following table will show the weekly wages paid in Belgium compared with those paid in New York:

Trade.	Brussels.	New York.
Bricklayers	$6.00	$12.00 to $15.00
Masons	6.00	12.00 to 18.00
Carpenters	5.40	9.00 to 12.00
Gas-fitters	5.40	10.00 to 14.00
Painters	4.20	10.00 to 16.00
Plasterers	5.40	10.00 to 15.00
Plumbers	6.00	12.00 to 18.00
Bakers	4.40	5.00 to 8.00
Blacksmiths	4.40	10.00 to 14.00
Cabinet-makers	4.80	9.00 to 13.00
Saddlers and harness-makers	4.80	12.00 to 15.00
Tinsmiths	4.80	10.00 to 14.00
Laborers	3.00	6.00 to 9.00

And now, as in every country wages have so close a connection with the cost of living, let us see from the following tabulated statement the comparative prices of the necessaries of life in Brussels and New York:

Aticles.	Brussels. Per lb., cts.	New York. Per lb., cts.
Bread	4 to 5	4½
Beef	16 to 20	8 to 16
Veal	16 to 20	8 to 24
Mutton	16 to 20	9 to 16
Pork	16 to 20	8 to 16
Lard	.. to 20	10 to 12
Butter	20 to 50	25 to 32
Cheese	20 to 25	12 to 15
Coffee	30 to 40	20 to 30
Sugar	15 to 20	8 to 10

It would seem from these facts that the country is fairly launched upon a period of better times,—a period in which we may fairly look for less failures, a greater demand for iron, renewed activity in the cotton industries, a more prosperous time for railroads, a fair return for banking capital, continued increase of exports, and a rush for the millions of unoccupied acres in the great West. As soon as these lands are turned to good account, America's coffers will begin to fill up. The banker, merchant, or clerk cannot be of much service in making acres produce dollars, but the working farmer can. And surely there is no better opening for willing workers than in this country. The return for labor is certain, bringing comfort to the laborer and revenue to the country.

The French Bank Speculation.

The present is a time of extraordinary financial activity in Paris. The reasons for this sudden revival of speculation are mainly two: the great plethora of capital, and the consequent low rate of interest. That there is a decided tendency to a lower rate of interest in all countries whose industrial *materiel* is complete is well-known. Interest is high in Russia, in Austria and in this country, because there are great fields for capital. China is an exception, in this, as usual, for there interest is high, and combinations of merchants give to each other in turns the control of large sums. The vast possessions of England have hitherto absorbed her excess of capital, but never was interest so low as during last year in London. France would now be experiencing a similar dullness of the money market were it not for the many new enterprises which have lately been launched, and which have absorbed large sums of money. M. Paul Leroy Beaulieu estimates that the annual savings in France amount to the enormous sum of $600,000,000, and that no more than two-thirds of this amount can be profitably employed in manufacture and commercial enteprises. There is thus a sum of two hundred million dollars which finds its way to the banks. But the old established banks make little now-a-days, the bank of France included. Loans are made even at three per cent. This condition of banking affairs has produced the joint-stock bank, but which is in most cases a euphonious title for some industrial speculation, but there is no field for legitimate banking enterprises. Some of the older credits have established branches in various countries, and we are informed that should the New York branch of the Credit Lyonnais prove a profitable undertaking that other Paris houses will establish branches here. The Messrs. Pereire are to found a Transatlantic Bank in connection with their French line of steamers. That German and Dutch capital, which has been kept away for years owing to the railroad collapse, will also seek employment here admits of little doubt. The Banque Europeenne has lately increased its capital to 100,000,000 francs, and so have several other institutions of a like nature in almost equal proportion. The funding of the French National and the Municipal debts at lower rates of interest will necessarily still further add to the stock of money seeking higher rates of interest.

The Indiana Bankers' Association.

The banks and bankers of the State of Indiana have made a move in the right direction, by forming a State Association. It is intended to exercise supervision over banking affairs in their own State as well as to furnish efficient co-operation with the work of the American Bankers' Association.

The organization was effected by a meeting of representative bankers of the State held at Indianapolis, October 1. Mr. F. A. W. Davis, of the Indiana Banking Company, called the meeting to order, and stated its object. A constitution was adopted of which the following is the

DECLARATION:

In order to promote the general welfare and usefulness of banks and banking institutions, and to secure uniformity of action, together with the practical benefits to be derived from personal acquaintance, and from the discussion of subjects of importance to the banking and commercial interests of the country, and especially in order to secure the proper consideration of questions regarding the financial and commercial usages, customs, and laws which affect the banking interests of the entire country, we have to submit the following Constitution and By-Laws for "The Bankers' Association of the State of Indiana:"

The constitution is very similar to that of the American Bankers' Association. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Judge J. B. Howe, of Lima; *Vice-President*, M. L. Pierce, of Lafayette; *Secretary*, F. A. W. Davis, of Indianapolis; *Treasurer*, T. P. Haughey, Indianapolis. *Executive Council:* F. M. Churchman, W. W. Woollen and A. D. Lynch, of Indianapolis; Jesse J. Brown, of New Albany, and Hugh Daugherty, of Bluffton.

The Indiana Association is doing earnest work towards abolishing the tax on deposits, and also that unmitigated nuisance, the two-cent revenue stamp on checks. Mr. Davis, the Secretary, is sending petitions throughout the State, and the following note has been sent to the various banks, and through them to their customers:

DEAR SIR—There being no longer any necessity for the continuance of the war tax upon money deposited in banks, and the two-cent stamp upon checks drawn upon banks, we have decided to ask the repeal of the law, and respectfully request your signature to a petition which will be presented you in a few days.

INDIANAPOLIS NATIONAL BANK,	CENTRAL BANK,
INDIANA BANKING COMPANY,	BANK OF COMMERCE,
MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK,	MERIDIAN NATIONAL BANK,
FLETCHER'S BANK,	FLETCHER & SHARPE,
WOOLLEN, WEBB & CO.,	INDIANA NATIONAL BANK,
CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK,	HARRISON'S BANK,
FIRST NATIONAL BANK,	RITSINGER'S BANK.

The petition, which is being signed by the best men in the State, irrespective of party, is as follows:

"*To our Senators and Representatives in Congress:*

We, the undersigned, citizens of Indiana, engaged in trade and commerce, respectfully ask you to vote to repeal the law taxing money deposited in banks, and requiring a two-cent stamp to be placed upon bank checks. We also request you to use your influence in favor of a prompt repeal of said laws."

There should be but one opinion as to the need and justice of this movement. Now, if the bankers in other States will follow the example set in Indiana, there can be no doubt of the success of the measure at the next session of Congress. But to make success certain, it will require prompt and effective associated effort from each State.

American Trade from the English Standpoint.

We extract the following from an editorial in the London "Economist" of October 4th, on the "Revival of Trade in America:"

"A ten years' retrospect, and a consideration of things as they now are, show that the commercial affairs of the United States again deserve careful attention. The country has suffered much; is it once more on the high road to development and prosperity? Looking back to the close of the civil war, with the redundant paper circulation and consequent inflation of values, we have seen the United States, as it were, first taking breath, then suffering from the inevitable decline of values—a shrinkage the most trying and severe within the memory of living men—until at last a return to specie payments, involuntarily brought about, is accepted by general consent as the bottom or hard-pan from which to make a new departure, and on which to build a future prosperity. The change for the better, although very indistinctly foreshadowed at the close of 1878, gave indications of solid existence at the commencement of the present year—the immediate consequence of the return to specie payments, which was practically a modified, though disguised inflation, inasmuch as the paper currency was not replaced by metallic money. No destruction of paper took place, and very little was exchanged for gold, and such little was still accepted as legal-tender by the Treasury, and was used as such. However this may be, the people of the United States are agreed among themselves that they are now on a specie basis, and as such we in Europe must accept them, though perhaps in some minds with a little reservation. Since January the general movement, with occasional exceptions, has been all in one direction—the direction of increasing business, rising values and substantial progress; until at the present time it would appear as though doubts are subsiding, and the country generally is preparing itself for one of those onward movements that may astonish themselves as well as others."

POST-OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS.

FROM A PAPER READ BY ROBERT P. PORTER BEFORE THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

[Hardly a Winter passes but there is more or less talk in Congress about establishing post-office savings banks. RHODES' JOURNAL is opposed to the plan, for the various reasons which have been stated in these pages; the practical failure of the U. S. 4 per cent. certificates, considered as a plan to benefit the common people, seems to point out what would become of a postal savings bank plan. It is idle to hold up the success of the English system as in any way indicative of what might be done in this country, as the extent of our country and conditions of government control are in no degree comparable. We are glad, however, to present Mr. Porter's views to our readers; he offers commendable arguments in favor of sound banks for savings. The value of such institutions fully commanding the confidence of the people do more for the safety and elevation of American society than any other system of beneficence now in operation.]

The doctrine of thrift did not begin with Jeremy Bentham's "Frugality Banks," but the first principles of prudent economy were clearly inculcated by Him who practised it when He said, "Gather up the fragments, that nothing be lost." The important question now before the American people is how best to encourage habits of prudent economy and thrift, especially among the vast masses of the people who either spend their entire income or hoard it in the secret drawer, the buried pot, the old stocking, or the bed-tick. To do this successfully an absolutely safe place must be found for the deposit of money, and at the same time the depositor must reap a fair and reasonable interest for the use of it. The serious check the progress of education in thrift had had in England,

THROUGH THE SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS,

led those interested to look round for the establishment of a system of savings banks in which those who invest their hard-gained savings as provision against a rainy day, may find absolute security against loss. As a result of this, on the 17th day of May, 1861, the post-office savings banks act for "affording additional facilities for depositing small savings at interest, with the security of the government for the due repayment thereof," was duly enacted. Like all new schemes, objections were raised to it, both in and out of Parliament, and various discouraging prognostications to the effect that, if practicable at all, it could never be self-supporting: that the nation must always be at some loss in transacting savings banks business, and that such would be especially the case with the post-office savings banks.

THE FIRST POST-OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS WERE OPENED

in the United Kingdom, Sept. 16, 1861. On that day 300 offices were opened for the receipt of deposits, and on that day 435 deposits, amounting to $4,555, were received. Fifteen months from that date the system had been so successful that 2,535 offices were open, and the deposits amounted to $8,491,105.

The 300 offices that were opened on that September morning have now increased to 5,500 and the little band of 435 persons who deposited their few pounds on that day have increased to an immense army of 1,702,374, whose aggregate deposits amount in round figures to $135,-000,000. * * * * * * * * * * * *

The slowness of the United States in adopting this system may be explained by the confidence felt in its savings banks until within the last few years. But

THE RECENT WIDESPREAD FAILURES

among these institutions makes the establishment of postal savings banks not merely a popular necessity, but a burning question.

Mr Porter then goes on to say that in the savings banks of the United States with total deposits of nearly one thousand millions ($900,000,000) "no less than $369,770,878 is invested in mortgages, or over one-half of the entire deposits are invested in mortgages and personal security. Add to this the amount invested in railroad bonds, and State, municipal and County bonds, we have a total of $692,948,-146 of the people's money invested in loans, the security of which is in many cases doubtful. A considerable share of this money loaned on real estate is in the shape of mortgages on land and buildings, vacant lots in cities, etc., made during the years of inflation that immediately followed the war. The amount loaned did not at the time, perhaps exceed more than 50 per cent. of the market value of the property, but now that the value of such property all over the country has decreased, many of these loans are extremely doubtful. The

IMPOSSIBILITY OF REALIZING QUICKLY

on such security in a time of trial has been clearly shown in the recent failures of savings banks. Should an unusual demand come for money, bankruptcy and ruin would stare in the face every savings bank whose funds were invested in this way, unless the State Legislatures came to the rescue, as was done in Massachusetts, by the passage of the stay law."

POSTAL SAVINGS DEPOSITORIES FOR ONE YEAR.

Estimate on 500 offices, with possible current balance of $20,000,-000 due depositors:

	Number	Amount.
Depositories	500	
Accounts	200,000	
Transactions, deposits	400,000	
Transactions, withdrawn	200,000	
Amount of deposits drawing interest		$20,000,000.00
Average accounts at each depository	400	
Average transactions at do	1,200	
Average amount of each account		100.00
Average amount of each deposit		35.00
Average amount of each withdrawal		60.00
Average cost of each transaction		.29 1-6
Estimated percentage of cost of management to balance due depositors		⅞ of 1 per cent.

EXPENSES.

	Dr.
Office rent	$15,000
Fuel, Lights, etc	1,200
Printing, stationery, etc	20,000
Clerk hire, central offices	68,000
Clerk hire at depositories	52,500
Miscellaneous	5,000
Estimated net revenue	13,300
	$175,000
	Cr.
Allow for one-eighth of funds to be in transit or in hands of postmasters, balance ($17,500,000) to be drawing 1 per cent. interest from February	$175,000
	$175,000

This estimate shows that during the first and second years, especially if the balance on interest should not reach $20,000,000, the expenses might range at a higher percentage than named in the estimate. The expenses of management of the money-order business is about 7-8 of one per cent. upon the aggregate amount of the orders sold to remitters. It is estimated in the above tables, that the cost of management of the postal saving business will be less. We have already shown that in England the cost is less than 1-2 per cent. or 47.100 per cent. upon the total current and balance due depositors. In Canada it is 57.100 of one per cent. In the United States the difference in wages and other expenses would slightly increase this percentage. During the first and second year, especially if the balance on interest should not reach $20,000,000, the expenses would range at a higher percentage than named in the table. On the other hand, it is fair to presume that by the second year the amount on deposit will far exceed this. We have shown that when the postal savings banks began business in England the deposits in savings banks amounted in round figures to $200,000,000, against nearly $900,000,000 held by private savings banks in the United States at the end of 1877. The first year, upward of $10,000,000 was received, and yet the old savings banks of England are, comparatively speaking, far more secure than the private savings banks of this country.

THE EFFECT ON SAVINGS BANKS.

The average amount standing to the credit of each depositor in the English post-office savings banks was at the close of last year $76, the lowest average to each depositor in the United States savings banks, was in the State of Pennsylvania, and amounted to upward of $259, while the highest in the State of California was $732. Let a convenient and secure savings bank be established and savings will flow in. The old savings banks in England have over $10,000,000 more savings on deposit to-day than they had when the postal banks started, and the influence which has been exercised by the post-office banks on the saving habits of the people in England is strikingly proved by the fact that the total capital of the savings banks, which in 1860 under the old system was about $205,000,000, amounted in eight years to $255,000,000, showing a total increase of actual savings of $55,000,000.

THE POSTAL BANK AS A TEACHER.

The gin shop is near at hand, its door is open by day and flaring by night, dissipation has her nets drawn across every street in every town and hamlet. Yet how many thousand cities and towns have no savings banks, no doors open to economy and thrift. And yet it is the savings bank that has taught the workman how he can become a capitalist, in moderating his consumption below his production, and in amassing the excess called savings in a fruitful place in complete security; he learns how capital is formed and how it can be at first prudently employed. It has been truly said that it is a school which seems to be created for the apprenticeship of industrial business managing. It teaches man the habit to govern himself, to resist bad or useless impulses, and so aid to build up a sound discretion, which is the first condition of success in undertakings. Let the United States no longer delay the adoption of this great boon to the people. Let the postal savings bank

BECOME AN ELEMENT OF EDUCATION,

the bank-books become the text-books of thrift, and the object lesson of economy. Should the plan be carried out, it will soon be doing a glorious work whenever a bank is opened and a deposit received; self-reliance will, to some extent, be aroused, and with many a nobler life will be begun. They will gradually discern how ruthless an enemy is improvidence to workingmen, and how truly his friends are economy and forethought. Under their guidance the home could be enriched with comforts until it is enjoyed and prized by all. From such firesides go forth those inheriting the right spirit, loving industry, loving thrift, and loving home. Emulous of a good example, they in their day and generation would nobly endeavor to lay by a portion of their income, and if the plan were adopted in the United States, remembering that it would at once give us nearly 5,000 savings banks. I trust that it is not taking to sanguine a view to anticipate that it would render aid in ultimately winning over the vast masses of the industrial classes of the United States, the loyal citizens and not the capitalists, to those habits of forethought and self-denial which bring enduring reward to the individual, and materially add to the safety of the State.

The opinion is entertained at Washington among some who are regarded as good authority on such matters that the receipts of gold from Europe, between November 1 and the 1st of January, will be over $25,000,000, and may possibly reach $30,000,000. The imports of coin and bullion (mostly gold) for September were $28,360,000.

The Dawn of Better Times.

[Re-published from the "International Review" for November.]

The general stimulus in foreign trade has its bearing in an inquiry of this sort, and cannot be overlooked. For more than four-score years the excess of imports over exports has kept drawing out a long balance of our national account against us, until in 1875 the total reached $1,728,637,547. Within the last three years the tide has turned, and the balance is now $488,582,539 in our favor. It would seem from this, that, with the return of prosperous times at home, we have entered on a new era in our export trade. It is a well known fact that American cutlery is sold in Sheffield ten per cent. cheaper than it can be manufactured there. It has been shown that our cotton goods are sold in Manchester, a city which has held the supremacy of the world in cottons, for half a cent a pound cheaper than the same quality can be produced in that city. Our coals are sold in Newcastle, and one enterprising American gives away a stove with every ton of American Coal. American street-cars are sold in New Zealand, and our locomotives find a ready market in Italy. The English war-office uses American locks, while Continental post-offices have introduced the Yale lock-box. Russia has declared American scales the standard scales of the Empire. We have invaded the German markets with our nickel plating, and the Prince of Wales, in purchasing American plate for his own use, reminded the British dealer that in at least one "high industrial art" he had found a new competitor. Bottled products of St. Louis and Milwaukee distilleries triumphed over Bass, McGuinness, and one hundred brewers of Austria and Bavaria at Paris, while a Philadelphia firm captured the grand prize for lager beer in casks. All these statements are supported by the best authorities, and may afford some explanation of the enormous increase in our export trade. The total amount of domestic merchandise exported during the year ending June 30, 1878, was $580,683,798; the amount of foreign merchandise exported for the same period was $14,154,698: total, foreign and domestic, $594,838,496. This shows an increase since 1875 of $488,582,539. The domestic exports consist of about eighty per cent. of raw materials and agricultural products, and about twenty per cent. ($136,000,000 worth) of manufactured goods.

With these facts before them, well may those in high official position publicly declare that for the first time our manufactures are assuming international proportions. At a time of universal depression we have met those nations which held a monopoly of the world's markets, met them in their strongholds, and established the fact that American manufactures are second to the manufactures of no other nation; and that, with a proper and patriotic understanding between capitalists and laborers, we can command a fair share of the buying world's patronage, and command that patronage with larger profits to the capitalists and higher wages to the laborer than can be made or paid in any other country. It is the improved methods, increase of capital, and greater resources that will give the United States the advantage over foreign competitors. The item of cheap labor is by itself an inpediment to our success. For economic as well as moral and political reasons, we cannot afford to have our labor as poorly paid as is the labor of England. Degrade labor, and the prosperity of the country is interrupted; the injury is greater than the gain. Fair wages are conducive to prosperity; low wages mean poor food, scanty clothing, impoverished homes. No true American desires to compete with foreign countries at such a cost.

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The past five years of depression, from which the figures show that the country is just recovering, have taught the lesson of economy, and we are ready to begin again with renewed energy. There are dangers on all sides which will make our onward march difficult, and which can only be overcome by the most vigorous and persevering efforts. England, our greatest manufacturing rival, is not going to give up the contest without a desperate struggle; and unless our international carrying trade receives early and firm treatment to restore its departed strength, we shall find ourselves excluded from some of the most profitable markets, if not actually handicapped in the race. In the iron trade, the most we can hope to do is to hold the home markets. There are some important foreign markets that the United States ought to and will supply with cotton goods; but here again our future success is largely dependent upon the facilities which the next ten years will develop for carrying our manufactured goods to distant ports. We may have to rest upon the laurels of having deprived England of forty millions of customers without seeking to invade, to any great extent, her foreign markets. If a tidal wave of emigration is likely to roll over the country, an extension of railroads may be looked for; but past experience will guard against the enthusiasm which prompts the building of railroads far in advance of the needs of population. There is abundant proof that a change in the tide of our affairs has set in. We can see the coming of better times by the extraordinary decrease in commercial failures; by the light of the furnaces of our iron-producing States. It is echoed through the land by the hum of busy machinery, and by the clatter of the looms; it is heralded by the keen ring of the hammer as it binds down the iron rail; by the increasing balance of our exports; by the demand for our products, and by the opening up of vast areas of our country. Standing as we do, to-day, on the firm ground of a sound currency, surrounded by all the evidences of returning prosperity, the United States may reasonably look forward to a continued and healthful growth of population, and a more permanent development of its resources.

Depositors Not to be Hoodwinked.

[From "The Safeguard and Savings Bank Reporter."]

The depositors in New York savings banks are not likely to be misled by the most mischievous operations of Mr. Lamb, the Acting Superintendent of Banks in this State. His eleven questions to the officers and trustees of savings banks may be found in another column.* If a single dollar of depositors' money has been wrongfully used, no matter whether by saint or sinner, the SAFEGUARD condemns the action as most unjust. and meriting the severest criticism. That in a few isolated cases such use of depositors' money can be clearly traced, there seems no reason to doubt. Take it for granted, if you please, that some time in the past, certain sums of money had been wrongfully expended, if Mr. Lamb was a true and conscientious public servant, he would at once set to work to have that money repaid into the savings bank where it belonged; but no, this will not do for H. L. Lamb. The whole system must be degraded in order that the petty official may be brought into notice. But that Lamb's mischievous zeal is a hollow mockery for his own self-aggrandizement is evident to all who have given the matter any attention. For some months past hardly a day has passed but the New York papers have had something like this from the Bank Department: "*what Lamb is about to do*"—"*astounding revelations*," *etc.*, *ad infinitum*, but somehow the public are not in the least disturbed by these effusions.

We venture the opinion if a worthy *man* was in the Bank Department—one whose supervision entitled him to even fair respect—and these wholesale charges against the management of savings banks were fed into the mouth of a hungry press, as they are now, the people whose hard-earned savings are entrusted to these banks, would raise such a cry of indignation, and start such runs on the banks that they would be shaken to their very foundations. But not so in this case; the depositors are not to be caught with such chaff, because they can look between the lines of his every interview, attack, or manifesto, and read something like the heading to an article in a daily paper lately: "*A Foolish Lamb!*"

The simple fact is, the depositor class have faith in the men who stand as savings bank trustees, because the banks' record entitles them to this feeling of confidence and respect.

The following from the New York "Herald," Sept. 21, after referring to Lamb's latest circular, is to the point:

"How the public may regard the whole thing is perhaps an entirely different matter, but no one who remembers the suffering and loss entailed upon the poorer and thriftier classes of the people by the panic of four years ago, in which the weaker savings banks all perished, can fail to deprecate anything which may tend to shake public confidence in the sound surviving banks."

* These questions appeared in the JOURNAL for October.

The following from the financial paper, the "Daily Indicator," is of interest:

"Mr. Lamb again makes general charges without specifying the delinquents; thus, by implication, doing a serious injustice to many gentlemen of spotless reputation, personally and officially, without even the poor compensation that possible good may result to any person from the very unusual and injudicious course he has adopted."

Then after referring to the "charges," says:

"If Mr. Lamb had designed to injure to the utmost those who are innocent of them, to impair confidence in the whole system, and do all the damage he could to depositors, he scarcely could have used his information to better advantage than he has by the mischievous and unbusiness-like method he has chosen to adopt.

It is impossible to misunderstand Mr. Lamb's object in this proceeding. Any person who has the slightest knowledge of the ways of the average politician (and we are not aware that Mr. Lamb has any claim to greater distinction) can appreciate the meaning of these covert attacks."

Our Foreign Trade.

The Chief of the Bureau of Statistics reports (October 1) that the excess of the exports over imports of merchandise in the United States has been as follows:

Month ended August 31, 1879	$15,786,976
Month ended August 31, 1878	22,287,938
Eight months ended August 31, 1879	140,459,050
Eight months ended August 31, 1878	188,605,224
Twelve months ended August 31, 1879	257,133,416
Twelve months ended August 31, 1878	289,709,341

The exports and imports of gold and silver coin and bullion were as follows:

Month ended August 31, 1879, excess of imports	$5,921,307
Month ended August 31, 1878, excess of exports	300.688
Eight months ended August 31, 1879, excess of exports	1,663,025
Eight months ended August 31, 1878, excess of exports	601,743
Twelve months ended August 31, 1879, excess of imports	941,261
Twelve months ended August 31, 1878, excess of imports	313,466

The weekly returns of the Collector of Customs at the port of New York show that during the four weeks from Monday, September 1st, to Saturday, September 27th, the imports of gold and silver at this port exceeded the exports by $26,586,056. Adding this to the excess of such imports into the country during the months of July and Aug., we observe an excess of imports amounting to the sum of $32,567,287.

Of the total imports of gold and silver at New York since July 1, 95 1-2 per centum consisted of gold, and 4 1-2 per centum of silver. Of the total imports of gold and silver at New York, since July 1, 30 per centum was from Great Britain, 24 per centum from France, 32 per centum from Germany, and 14 per centum from all other countries.

INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCES OF PROSPERITY.

[There is much practical information in the following address of President Hayes delivered in Detroit, Michigan, during his recent vacation trip. The watchful banker and intelligent merchant can find valuable aid in the facts, figures and suggestions contained therein. As the address deals only with business affairs, and entirely ignores politics, it is presented in full to the readers of the JOURNAL.]

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF MICHIGAN: Reaching Detroit only a few hours ago, I cannot, from personal observation, speak of the condition of your agriculture, or of your mining, manufacturing and other large business interests. The information which I get, however, from the newspapers and from conversations with intelligent citizens, leads me to suppose that the outlook for the laborer, the capitalist, and the people generally, is, in this State, at least as favorable as that of the people of the country at large. This is what one would expect from its well-known advantages. Your State is almost surrounded by the navigable waters of inland seas, which communicate with many markets in different States, and in countries beyond the ocean. It is midway, by the best of railway routes of travel and trade, between the old and the new States. It has mines of copper and iron, it has manufactures, salt and lumber, and raises in abundance the most valuable crops and animals which are produced in the North Temperate Zone. It possesses a climate which is healthful and friendly to labor, and which gives vigor and character to men and women. Satisfactory as the material resources of Michigan unquestionably are, they do not constitute that excellence which perhaps chiefly atttracts the admiration, and possibly excites the envy, of your less fortunate neighbors. All the world knows that when the list is made up of the most favored States of this country, and of the most favored countries of the Old World, with respect to education—either general education or the higher education—an honored and very conspicuous place on that list must be given to the State of Michigan.

A year ago, making a visit of two or three weeks to the West and Northwest, I thought it might be useful to speak of the financial condition of the country, and to present a hopeful view of the situation and prospects. The business depression which followed the panic of 1873 had then lasted five years; but there were indications of improvement, and it seemed to me what was most needed was confidence, and that a presentation of encouraging facts and figures would tend to inspire confidence. It was my opinion, also, that there could be no permanent revival of business prosperity until the currency was placed upon a sound basis, and was exchangeable at its par value in the universally-recognized money of the world. The friends of the constitutional currency generally believed that this end could only be reached by the faithful execution of the Resumption act; that there was no need of further legislation; and that the true policy was to stop tinkering with the currency. Accordingly, the pith of what I wished to say last year to audiences like this was, that we ought to "let well enough alone." Now the resumption of specie payments has come, and with it have come also better times.

EVIDENCES OF PROSPERITY.

The evidences of good times are numerous, palpable and cheering. One bright day in June last more steamers—more shiping of all sorts—gathered in New York harbor than was ever before seen in that great mart of commerce, and their tonnage was in greater excess, comparatively, than the number of vessels. The lines of the Pennsylvania Railroad east of Pittsburg and Erie, for the first seven months of this year, as compared with the same period in 1878, show an increase of gross earnings of $1,208,294, an increase of expenses of $759,985, and an increase in net earnings of $448,309; the lines of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad (the great anthracite coal road) a net increase of $1,340,000 for the same period. The latest published statement of the Erie Railway Company shows a net increase of $561,000. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shows a net increase of $532,000 for the first ten months of its current fiscal year, beginning in October last. It is estimated that more than a thousand miles of railroad track have already been laid this year in the United States—a greater mileage than in the same period in any year since 1873. Workers in iron and steel find their business recovering so rapidly from its great depression that they are unable to fill their orders and their annual production is likely soon to surpass the highest figures ever reached. The building of iron steamships in successful competition with Europe is fully established on the Delaware. Our cotton factories are again all at work and running on full time. Our mines of precious metals are increasing their product, and it mainly stays at home. Our manufactures go abroad more than ever before; our currency is exchangeable at par in the markets of the world with the money of the world; and, finally, and most important, the demand for labor has increased and is increasing. It extends to cotton mills, iron and glass works, machine shops, brick-making, building, the clothing trade, and nearly all branches of industry. *The Philadelphia Record*, on the authority of a well-known statistician, states that there are 20,000 more laborers employed in that city than there were a year ago. Our exports for the year 1878 amounted to $710,439,441, and the excess of exports over imports $264,661,661, both sums being greater than in any previous year.

The following tables show the rapid advance our farmers and manufacturers are making in supplying both the foreign and the home markets. They were prepared by Mr. Joseph Nimmo, jr., the able Chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department:

DOMESTIC EXPORTS.

Values of the principal commodities of domestic production the exportation of which greatly increased from June 30, 1868, to June 30, 1879:

COMMODITIES.	Value exported during year ending June 30. 1868.	1879.	Increase in 1879 over 1868.
Agricultural implements	$673,381	$2,933,388	$2,260,007
Animals, living	733,395	11,487,754	10,754,359
Bread and breadstuffs	69,024,059	210,355,528	141,331,469
Coal	1,516,220	2,319,398	803,178
Copper and brass manufactures, not including copper ore	496,329	3,031,924	2,535,595
Cotton, manufactures	4,871,054	10,853,950	5,982,896
Fruit	406,512	1,916,382	1,509,870
Iron, steel, and manufactures of, exclusive of firearms, but including scales, balances, sewing machines, fire-engines	5,491,306	12,766,294	7,274,988
Leather of all kinds	697,105	6,800,070	6,192,965
Mineral oil, illuminating	19,752,143	35,999,862	16,247,719
Provisions	30,436,642	116,858,650	86,422,008
Sugar, refined	313,378	6,164,024	5,850,646
Tallow	2,540,227	6,934,940	4,394,713
Total	$138,861,751	$428,422,164	$291,560,413

VALUES OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC EXPORTS.

Comparative statement of the values of certain articles of domestic production exported from the United States during the fiscal years ending June 30, 1873, 1876 and 1879.

ARTICLES.	Fiscal year ending June 30. 1873.	1876.	1879.	Increase in 1879 over 1876.	Per ct. of increase.
Indian corn	$23,794,694	$33,265,280	$40,655,120	$7,389,840	22.2
Wheat	51,452 253	68,382,899	130,701.079	62,318,180	91.1
Wheat flour	19,381,664	24,433,470	29,567,713	5,134,243	21.
Coton, manufactured, colored and uncolored	2,252,028	6,770,200	9,497,416	2,727,216	40.3
Railroad bars	104,054	57,109	233,514	176,405	308.9
Locomotives	952,655	561,559	567,302	5,743	1.0
Mineral oil, illuminating	37,195,735	28,755,638	35,999,862	7,244,224	25.2
Bacon and hams	35,022,137	39,664,456	51,074,433	11,409,977	28.8
Beef, fresh and salted	2,447,481	3,186,304	7,219,458	4,033,154	126.6
Butter	952,919	1,109,496	5,421,205	4,311,709	388.6
Cheese	10,498,010	12,270,083	12,579,968	309,885	2.5
Lard	21,245,815	22,429,485	22,856,673	427,188	1.9
Sugar, refined	1,142,824	5,552,587	6,164,024	611,437	11.0
Tobacco leaf	22,689,135	22,737,383	25,157,364	2,419,981	10.6

QUANTITIES OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC EXPORTS.

Comparative statement of the quantities of certain articles of domestic production exported from the United States during the fiscal years ending June 30, 1873, 1876 and 1879.

ARTICLES.	Fiscal year ending June 30. 1873.	1876.	1879.	Increase in 1879 over 1876.	Per ct. of increase.
Indian corn, bush	38,541,930	49,493,572	86,296,252	36,802,680	74.4
Wheat, bush	39,204,285	55,073,122	122,353,936	67,280,814	122.2
Wheat flour, bbls	2,562,086	3 935,512	5,629,714	1,694,202	43.0
Cotton, manufact'r'd, colored and uncolored, yds.	13,772,774	75,807,481	129,197,377	53,389,886	70.4
Locomotives, number	58	44	73	29	65.9
Railroad bars	2,832,592	2,244,794	14,097,583	11,852,879	528.0
Mineral oil, illuminating, gallons	158,102.414	204,814,673	331,586,442	126,771,769	61.9
Bacon and hams, pounds	395,381,737	327,730,172	732,249,576	404,519,404	123.4
Beef, fresh and salted, lbs.	31.605,186	36,596,150	90,976,395	54,380,245	148.6
Butter, pounds	4,518,844	4,644,894	38,248,016	33,603,122	723.4
Cheese, pounds	80,366,540	97,676.264	141,654,474	43,978,210	45.0
Lard, pounds	230,534,207	168,405,839	326,658,686	158,252,847	94.0
Sugar, refined, pounds	9,870,738	51.840,977	72,309,009	20,468,032	39.5
Tobacco, leaf, pounds	213,995,176	218,310,265	322,279,540	103,969,275	47.6

C

IMPORTS.

Values of the principal commodities of foreign production the importation of which greatly decreased from June 30, 1873, to June 30, 1879:

COMMODITIES.	Value imported during the year ended June 30.			Decrease of 1879, as compared with 1873.
	1873.	1878.	1879.	
Watches and watch movements and materials........	$3,274,825	$812,582	$920,599	$2,354,226
Textiles:				
Cotton, manuf. of (not including hosiery, shirts, drawers).	$29,752,116	$14,398,791	$14,930,975	$14,821,141
Flax, manufactures of.......	20,428,391	14,413,600	14,693,842	5,734,549
Silk, manufactures of........	29,890,035	19,837,772	24,013,398	5,876,637
Cloth (includ'g hosiery, shirts & drawers of cot'n & wool).	8,490,993	6,540,587	6,560,456	1,936,537
Wool and manufactures of:				
Unmanufactured...........	20,433,938	8,363,015	5,034,555	15,399,383
Carpets.....................	4,388,257	398,389	367,105	4,021,152
Dress goods.................	19,447,797	12,055,806	12,436,861	7,010,936
Other manufactures of (not including hosiery, shirts and drawers)..............	26,626,721	12,193,037	11,158,030	15,468,691
Total Textiles..............	159,464,248	88,201,197	89,195,222	70,269,026
Iron & steel and manufs. of:				
Pig iron.................. ...	$7,203,769	$1,250,057	$1,924,128	$5,279,641
Bar, boiler, band, hoop, scroll and sheet-iron.....	7,477,556	1,627,052	1,378,976	6,098,580
Anchors, cables, chains, castings, hardware, machinery, old & scrap iron..	9,416,293	920,790	845,366	8.570,927
Railroad bars or rails.........	19,740,702	530	78,257	19,662,445
Steel ingots, bars, sheets, wire	4,155,234	1,220,637	1,281,942	2,873,292
Fire-arms, files, cutlery, saws and tools..................	4,093,097	1,629,061	1,846,626	2,246,471
All other manufactures of...	7,221,801	2,410.105	2,091.853	5,129,048
Total iron and steel.......	59,308,452	9,057,632	9,447,148	49,861,304
Copper and maufactures of (not including copper ore).	$3,687,096	$371,518	$294,707	$3,392,389
Lead and manufactures of...	3.247,153	361,894	64,340	3,182,813
Leather of all kinds..........	6,766,202	3,784,729	3,667,564	3,098,638
India rubber and gutta percha, manufactures of	900,187	242,564	174,137	726,050
Tea...........................	24,466,170	15,660,168	14,577,618	9,888,552
Grand total...............	$261,114,333	$118,492,284	$118,341,335	$142,772,998

MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS.

With these authentic and significant facts and figures before us, we may reasonably assume that the country has entered again upon a period of business prosperity. The interesting questions now are. Have the good times come to stay? What can we do in private and in public affairs to prolong the period of prosperity and to mitigate the severity of hard times when they again return? The prospects are now bright, but all experience teaches that the wheel of human affairs, always turning, brings around those tremendous events called financial panics, if not with regularity, at any rate with certainty. The writer of an intelligent article in one of the monthlies says: "Panics, it has been observed, recur about every twenty years in this country, and almost every ten years in England." The explanation of this is not difficult to discover. In good times the tendency is to extravagance, to speculation, and to running into debt. Many spend more than they earn.

And the balance of trade soon begins to run against communities and individuals. When this has continued until the business of the country is loaded down with debts, a financial crisis is inevitable, and only waits for "the last straw." If this view is correct, the way to meet the dangerous tendencies of flush times is plain. Let two of Dr. Franklin's homely proverbs be strictly observed by individuals and by communities. One is: "Never live beyond your means;" and the other is like unto it, namely—"Pay as you go."

It is easy to see that, if these old maxims of the philosophy of common sense could have general practical acceptance, the period of good times would be greatly prolonged, and the calamities of hard times would be vastly diminished. There can be no great financial crisis without large indebtedness, and the distress which it brings is in proportion to the extent of the extravagance, speculation, and consequent indebtedness which have caused it. Those who are out of debt suffer least. Where the debts are heaviest the calamity is heaviest. But it is of public indebtedness, and especially of the debts of towns and cities, that I wish to say a few words.

The practice of creating public debts, as it prevails in this country, especially in municipal government, has long attracted very serious attention. It is a great and growing evil. States, whose good name and credit have been hitherto untarnished, are threatened with repudiation. Many towns and cities have reached a point where they must soon face the same peril. I do not wish to discuss the mischiefs of repudiation. My purpose is merely to make a few suggestions as to the best way to avoid repudiation. But in passing, let me observe: Experience in this country has shown that no State or community can, under any circumstances, gain by repudiation. The repudiators themselves cannot afford it. The community that deliberately refuses to provide for its honest debts loses its good name and shuts the door to all hope of future prosperity. It demoralizes and degrades all classes of its citizens. Capital and labor and good people will not go to such communities, but will surely leave them. If I thought my words could influence any of my countrymen who are so unfortunate as to be compelled to consider this question, I would say, let no good citizen be induced by any prospect of advantage to himself or to his party to take a single step toward repudiation. Let him set his face like flint against the first dawning of an attempt to enter upon that downward pathway. It has been well said that the most expensive way for a community to get rid of its honest debts is repudiation.

Returning to the subject of municipal debts, it is not alone those that live in towns and cities who are interested in their wise and economical government. All who trade with their citizens, all who buy of them, all who sell to them—in a word, the whole of the laboring and producing classes—must bear a share of their burdens. The taxes collected in the city find their way into the price-lists of what is bought of and sold to the farmers and laborers in the country. On the questions of debt and taxation the dwellers of the city and those who habitually deal with them form together one community and have a common interest.

The usual argument in favor of creating a city debt is that the proposed building or improvement is not for this generation alone, but is also for the benefit of posterity, and therefore posterity ought to help to pay for it. This reasoning will not bear examination. Each generation has its own demands upon its purse. It should not be called on to pay for the cast-off garments of its ancestors.

The appliances and structures which our ancestors provided for water, light, streets, parks, cemeteries, for putting out fires, for police, for locomotion, for education, and for the thousand other necessities of city life, would not be well suited to the tastes, habits and wants of our day. This generation must have steam fire-engines and water-works, and its taxpayers do not want to be called upon to pay for the cisterns, the fire-buckets and the pumps of thirty years ago.

Municipal borrowing is the parent of waste, profligacy and corruption. Money that comes easily goes easily. In this career of reckless extravagance cities build and buy what they do not need, and pay for what they get far more than it is worth. I adopt the words of the valuable report of the Pennsylvania Commission appointed to devise a plan for the government of cities. To sum it up, it too often happens that "the men who authorize the contracts are substantially the men who profess to perform them. The men who fix the prices are substantially the men who receive the pay for performing the labor, and the men who issue the bonds are the men who receive the money."

The magnitude and the growth of this evil are shown by statistics with which the public is familiar. I do not choose to detain you by repeating them in detail.

A few weeks ago "The New York Tribune" called attention to an excellent article on this subject in "The Princeton Review," by Robert P. Porter, in which it is shown that the local debts have, since the war, increased out of all proportion to the increase of property and population. Mr. Porter shows that in 130 cities the debt increased from $221,312,009 in 1866, to $644,378,663 in 1876. The percentage of increase is about 200 per cent. in ten years, while the property of these cities increased but 75 per cent. and their population only 33 per cent. The total local indebtedness of all the States, omitting the Territories, it is estimated in the article referred to, at the close of 1878, was $1,051,106,112. In many instances it is shown that the annual amount of interest paid by cities on their debts is almost equal to the total annual expenses for carrying on their local governments. The volume of the local indebtedness of the country already exceeds one-half the great war debt of the Nation, and the interest upon them from the high rates usually paid, will soon equal the total interest upon the National debt.

A RADICAL CURE SUGGESTED.

The urgent question that is now pressing for consideration is, how to deal with these large and increasing local debts. The best answer, it seems to me, is simple, ready at hand and sufficient. Do not have any local debts. Let it be embodied in the laws and constitutions of every State that local authorities shall create no debts; that they shall make no appropriations of money until it is collected and on hand; that all appropriations shall be for specific objects, and that as to existing debts suitable provision shall be made for their extinguishment. To pay off the old debts—to create no new ones—will be difficult and embarrassing. Valuable reforms always are difficult, and thorough work often is embarrassing. If we would be rid of the peril of approaching bankruptcy and repudiation which now threatens so many towns and cities, there must be a halt to this dangerous downward march. If the remedies I have suggested are too radical, let others be proposed and acted on, and that promptly.

The policy of preventing the creation of local debts by positive Constitutional prohibition is fully sustained by the experience of the States with respect to State debts. Constitutions in many of the old, and in all of the new States have been adopted within the last thirty or forty years, and almost all of them contain provisions denying to State Legislatures the authority to create debts except in case of war, insurrection or extraordinary emergency. Under the operation of these prohibitory provisions, the debts existing at the time of their adoption have been greatly reduced, and the only States now embarrassed by debt are those whose Constitutions do not contain this wise prohibiton.

THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

The general policy of the National Government on the subject of debt has always been sound. It may be summed up in a few words. No debts to be created in time of peace, and war debts to be paid off as rapidly as possible when the war ends.

The Revolutionary War debt, at the inauguration of the present form of government, March 4, 1789, amounted to $76,000,000, and after successive refundings in long-time bonds, was paid by their redemption, finally, in 1835.

The debt created by the war of 1812, after refunding in 4 1-2 per cent. bonds, was also paid in 1835, and at the close of that year the Nation was practically free from debt.

The debt incurred on account of the Mexican War amounted to $83,552,698, the bonded debt bearing 6 per cent interest, running from five to twenty years, and Treasury notes at various rates of interest, from 1 mill to 5 2-5 per cent. All of this debt was redeemed prior to

1870, excepting a very small amount not yet presented for redemption.

As a marked evidence of the fidelity with which our National obligations of this desciption have heretofore been met, it is worthy of note that, during the War of 1812, the interest on the portion of the debt held by British subjects was regularly paid, the agents of the holders in this country, owing to the interruption of direct commercial intercourse, being [sometimes obliged to resort to circuitous and extremely difficult routes for the transmission of payment. I find the fact remarked upon by Mr. Alexander Trotter, the British author of a standard work published in 1839, upon our National financial position and credit at that time. The author also notes the fact that the act of Congress passed by the first Congress that assembled after the adoption of the Constitution to make provision for the payment of all the outstanding engagements of the Government, "with a degree of integrity which is rare in the history of the financial embarrassments of States." postponed the claims of creditors at home until those of the foreign creditor were provided for.

THE NATIONAL DEBT.

Our war debt resulting from the War for the Union amounted to about $3,000,000,000, and has been reduced to about $2,000,000,000. During the last year there has been no reduction of the aggregate amount, but there has been a reduction of the amount of the interest-bearing debt of $13,760,900, and the rates of interest have been so reduced by refunding within the past year that there is an annual saving of $13,760,900 in interest. The annual interest on the national debt reached its highest point about fourteen years ago, when it was $150,-977,697.87. It is now reduced to $83,744,710.50, a yearly saving of $67,232,987.37, or about 45 per cent. of what was payable in 1865. The policy of paying off the national debt, which, at the close of the war, was urged upon the country with so much force by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, has borne good fruit. Young men of this audience can remember when the Government of the United States found great difficulty in borrowing so small a sum as $25,000,000, and for a considerable part of it was compelled to pay as high as 12 per cent. Last Spring, by reason of improved and strengthened credit, the Government had no trouble in borrowing in the single month of April $225,000,000 at 4 per cent. interest. The amount offered in that month exceeded $500,000,000, and there was one day when the amount offered was $159,000,000.

Let the policy of extinguishing the national debt be adhered to. Let it be the fixed purpose of the people and all who administer the government to pay off the debt within thirty-three years. It can be done by economy and prudence without a material increase of the burdens of the people. The payment of $33,000,000 a year upon the principal of the debt, or into a sinking fund for that purpose, will, within thirty-three years, leave us free from debt as a nation.

That which is sound policy in National or State affairs, in regard to public debts, is, I believe, also wise policy in local affairs and in private affairs. Let it be everywhere adopted in public and private, and we may welcome the advancing tide of better times, confident that we have found the secret that will prolong their stay, and will go far to make us independent in that, I trust, distant day when a financial panic may again strike down the general prosperity.

CALIFORNIA BANKS.

REPORT OF EVAN J. COLEMAN, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF BANK COMMISSIONERS.

The following is a comparative table, showing the resources and deposits of the banks of the State of California, including the four foreign branches at San Francisco, as reported to the Bank Commissioners, on the 1st of July, 1878, 1st of January, 1879, and 1st of July, 1879; also, the decrease in the same:

First Report, July 1, 1878.	Resources.	Deposits.
23 Savings banks	$67,466,828	$59,739,054
5 Savings banks (since suspended)	12,781,860	11,729,527
28 Savings banks	$80,248,688	$71,468,581
56 Commercial banks	71,683,742	28,659,850
84 Banks	$151,932,430	$100,128,431
Second Report, January 1, 1879.		
23 Savings banks	$65,229,312	$57,846,025
60 Commercial banks	68,103,950	25,091,960
83 Banks	$132,333,262	$82,937,985
Third Report, July 1, 1879.		
23 Savings banks	$60,168,711	$53,226,618
60 Commercial banks	65,986,707	23,503,684
83 Banks	$126,155,418	$76,730,302
SAVINGS BANKS.		
Decrease—July 1, 1878, to January 1, 1879	$15,019,376	$13,622,556
Less 5 suspended banks (as above, July 1, 1878)	12,781,860	11,729,527
Decrease in 23 banks, July 1, 1878, to January 1, 1879	$2,237,516	$1,893,029
Decrease in 23 banks, January 1, 1879, to July 1, 1879	5,060,600	4,619,407
Decrease in 23 banks, July 1, 1878, to July 1, 1879	$7,298,116	$6,512,436
COMMERCIAL BANKS.		
Decrease, July 1, 1878, to July 1, 1879	5,697,035	5,156,166
Decrease in live banks, July 1, 1878, to July 1, 1879	$12,995,151	$11,668,602
Add 5 suspended banks, as above	12,781,860	11,729,527
Total decrease in banks reporting July 1, '78 and July 1, '79	$25,777,011	$23,398,129

The accompanying table furnishes considerable food for reflection. It appears therefrom that the total resources of the banks and savings banks reporting to the Bank Commissioners, fell off $25,777,011, and the deposits $23,398,129. during the year ending July 1, 1879.

But of this enormous decrease, $12,781,860 resources, and $11,729,527 deposits, resulted from the elimination of the five savings banks, which closed after the examinations of the Commissioners be- began, in August, 1878.

SAVINGS BANKS

Many events occurred during the past year to test the strength and endurance of the savings institutions of California, and, on the whole, they stood the ordeal well. The depositors of savings banks are, as a rule, predisposed to nervousness, excitement and suspicion. To them "trifles light as air, are confirmations strong as proofs of Holy writ." They are easily panic stricken, and "runs" are, in consequence, often brought about from slight causes. This ought not to excite surprise when it is remembered that, in the case of many depositors, all the economies of years of toil depend on the good management and solvency of savings banks. The earlier investigations of the Bank Commissioners revealed the insolvency of several savings banks at San Francisco, and resulted in the suspension of four in that city and one in Sacramento during the first six months. The minds of many depositors of other savings institutions were filled with alarm and distrust thereby, and a heavy withdrawal of deposits ensued. For the six months ending December 31, 1878, the total amount of deposits withdrawn from the savings banks of the State (exclusive of the five suspended ones), was $1,893,029.

After the publication of favorable reports from the Bank Commissioners concerning nearly all the remaining banks, it was to be expected that confidence would be restored and much of the money withdrawn be re-deposited. But about this time other disturbing influences arose, and the record of the next six months (from January 1 to July 1, 1879) shows, on the contrary, a much heavier falling off in the amount on deposit with the savings banks. There cannot be any difference of opinion as to the causes of this unfortunate result. They were as follows:

First—The protracted session of the Convention to frame a new Constitution, and the apprehension that the new instrument would be fraught with danger to the prosperity of the State.

Second—The bitter contest that preceded the adoption of the new Constitution; a battle between the giants—Labor and Capital.

During the whole of this acrimonious struggle an unfortunate prominence was given by writers and speakers to the effect which the new Constitution would have on savings banks. These institutions, very unwisely, were too conspicuous in their hostility to the new Constitution, and supplied arguments which they should have known would be weapons likely to injure themselves in the recoil. It is matter for surprise and congratulation that they were not "hoist with their own petard." In the heat of discussion the writers and orators who favored the old Constitution, expecting to array the thousands who are depositors in savings banks on their side, demonstrated by figures of speech that the result of the new Constitution would be to so seriously reduce the dividends of savings banks that United States 4 per cent. bonds would be preferable as an investment.

Is it to be wondered at that the feverish feeling excited by all these circumstances caused the withdrawal of $4,619,407 by the depositors of the active savings banks during the six months ending June 30, 1879? The decrease in deposits of the live savings banks, as shown for the six months ending December 31, 1878, was 3.17 per cent. of the total deposits, July 1, 1878, and for the next six months was 7.98 per cent. of the amount due depositors on the 1st of January, 1879.

The five suspended savings banks owed depositors on the 1st of July, 1878, the sum of $11,729,527, and on the 1st of July, 1879, about $8,452,657, having repaid during the year some $3,276,870.

The following is a recapitulation of the year's reduction in the amount of deposits:

Decrease in 23 savings banks (July 1 to December 31, 1878)	$1,893,029
Decrease in 23 savings banks (January 1, 1879, to June 30, 1879)	4,619,407
Decrease in 5 suspended banks (July 1, 1878, to June 30, 1879)	3,276,870
Total decrease in deposits for 1 year	$9,779,306

This is 13.68 per cent. of the total amount ($71,468,581) on deposit with the Savings Banks of California on the 1st day of July, 1878.

COMMERCIAL BANKS.

By reference to the table it will be observed that the resources of the commercial banks have decreased $5,697,035, and the deposits $5,156,166 during the year ending June 30, 1879. The resources of the Nevada Bank of San Francisco during this period fell off $5,545,391, and its deposits $5,206,023, which verifies the remark in the Bank Commissioners' Annual Report, that "the changes in this bank are on so large a scale that a comparison of the aggregate items of the commercial banks is practically useless unless it be excluded."

TOTAL DECREASE IN DEPOSITS.

The total withdrawal of deposits during the year ending June 30, 1879, from all the banks of the State (exclusive of national banks and private bankers) was nearly $15,000,000, to wit:

From the savings banks	$9,779,306
From the commercial banks	5,156,166
Grand total	$14,935,472

WHAT HAS BECOME OF THIS MONEY?

It is not possible to answer this question with any accuracy, or even to approximate with any degree of certainty the disposition made of this large sum. But "guessing" is one of an American's inherent privileges, and is the only thing one can do in this case.

It is estimated by well informed persons on this subject that during the year referred to about $15,000,000 was invested here in U. S. 4 per cent. bonds, namely:

For first six months, July 1, 1878, to January 1, 1879	$5,000,000
For second six months, January 1, 1879, to July 1, 1879	10,000,000
Total	$15,000,00

Of this, the Assistant United States Treasurer estimates the amount issued from his office at $10,000,000, and dealers estimate the amount invested outside at about $5,000,000. The latter estimate is regarded as too high by some, but the weight of authority is on the side of its correctness.

The similarity between these estimates and the amounts withdrawn from the banks by depositors during the corresponding periods of time is certainly of significance, and not a mere chance coincidence.

It seems perfectly reasonable, under the circumstances, to estimate that two-thirds ($10,000,000) of the amount withdrawn by depositors has gone into United States 4 per cent. bonds. The other one-third ($5,000,000) has no doubt been absorbed in various ways. There is nothing upon which to base an estimate as to the proportions, but it is probable that some of it has been invested in real estate; much of it used in mining stock investments and in the payment of assessments; a good deal buried in the ground or hidden in old stockings, trunks, etc.; and, unfortunately, a considerable portion has, during the recent depression in business, been required for the daily support of persons out of employment for whom the "rainy day" had arrived.

CONCLUSION.

The result of the late election in this State is generally regarded as a decided victory of conservatism, and no improper or dangerous legislation is now anticipated from the next legislature. The evidences of restored confidence and faith in the future are already abundant in financial and political circles. Croaking, lately so common, is now, thank God! hardly heard at all. The glad tidings come daily from nearly every part of the Union that a new era of business prosperity has begun. Capital, regaining courage, is seeking remunerative investments, and the great 4 per cent. "boom" is over. For the first six months of this year a gain of nearly nine million dollars ($8,860,000) in the deposits of the New York savings banks is reported. If the furore for United States 4 per cent. bonds is over, and stockings, trunks and mattresses are giving up their hidden treasures at this rate in New York, where the maximum rate of dividends by savings banks is 5 per cent., how much more reason to expect such a result in California, where the average rate of dividends on the part of savings banks is not likely to be less than six and one-half per cent. per annum. The banks that have weathered the late financial storms, and stood the test of impartial investigation, should be entitled to confidence, and if present appearances are not very deceptive, the coming year will show a great improvement in banking statistics compared with the one just past.

EVAN J. COLEMAN.

SAN FRANCISCO, September, 1879.

THE DELUSION OF FIATISM IN FINANCE.

[From an address of Col. Josph L. Stephens of Boonville, Mo.. before the Missouri Bankers' Association Convention of 1879. The address was mainly in reply to certain "Delusions in regard to Finance and Banking," and the section published herein treats of the following]:

"*That the substitution of absolute or fiat money, in amount sufficiently large to pay off the National Debt, as it shall mature, and meet the wants of trade, in place of all other paper money, would promote the best interest of the people.*"

The dogma of human fiatism in finance has taken such deep hold upon many of our best people, and its teachings are so seductive that those infatuated with it, should not be trifled with. On all subjects about which honest men differ they should respect the conscientious convictions of others.

* * * * The greenback dollar is a promise to pay the holder one hundred cents, on demand. It is a sacred debt the United States owes, and it must be redeemed in cash, on presentation. The absolute dollar, so-called, is merely a piece of paper falsely naming itself "a dollar," but payable no where or by any one. * * * * * Our government needs, and must have, twenty to thirty million dollars per month, say three hundred and fifty millions, annually, to pay its current expenses, its income must be eqully large; then, it can maintain the amount of its income in greenbacks, and always be ready to redeem in cash when required. Beyond its actual income our great government, even, cannot venture to create and owe a sight demand debt, without the danger of suspension, bankruptcy and ruin that an indiscreet individual would encounter, were he to issue his demand notes beyond his receipts. I believe the government can legally maintain its present issue of greenbacks, and, as a matter of economy it ought to do so, so long as the effects of the war that created the necessity for them may last, and this is my definition of the true and only Greenbacker.

"Let there be light and there was light." This sentence, the grandest, most sublime and most eloquent in the human language, was uttered by Him, who doeth all things well, and it was the first act of fiatism. Our God who ruleth the Heavens and the Earth has wisely reserved unto Himself the sole right to create and to destroy. The laws of nature and of nature's God cannot be altered or amended by any efforts of puny, insignificant man. Our Congress and President could come no nearer imparting intrinsic value to the so-called fiat dollar, than they could in running our rivers up stream, converting our days into nights, or in turning our dogs into horses, or stones into bread. In all history we do not find so grave an effort to alter the laws of nature since the remarkable performance of old King

Canute, on the seashore, about eight hundred years ago. The proposition is a gross absurdity, and I will not waste your time upon it.

There are other grave errors in regard to finance, to which, at present, I can make but little else than a passing reference, viz: "That there is a conflict, or antagonism between capital and labor." "That bankers are the recipients of large interests and dividends, which are an unfair burden upon labor, and pay no adequate portion of the taxes;" and, also, that "Repudiation is the short road to prosperity," etc.

I insist, that all the material industrial interests, agriculture, commerce, mechanics, and mining, are blended together in one harmonious whole. The success of either one adds to the prosperity of all the others, and the injury of any one reflects its evil upon the whole. There is in fact, no conflict. As to taxes, the banks, National, State and private, are the highest taxed property in the State. After paying the largest assessments, they are made to levy, collect and send to Washington City, at their own expense, an additional tax not attached to any other species of property. This additional tax alone, upon banks has amounted to nearly one hundred million of dollars in the past fifteen years.

That the stockholders in banks are the capitalists of the country is another great mistake. In the National Banks, over one half own $1,000, or less, of the stock, and the exact average amount held by each one is, $3,100. The same ratio will apply to State and private banks. The aggregate amount of all bank stock is, say eight hundred million dollars. Now, these stockholders for the last ten years have received less than six per cent. per annum, interest. The present year I doubt much, if they will receive four per cent., as little, perhaps, as the average annual incomes upon any other branch of legitimate business, taking the risks into account.

Notwithstanding these well ascertained and indisputable facts, we hardly ever heard a stump speech from one of our *politico-financial* (?) orators, wherein he did not lash himself into a rage and tear passions to tatters, by the hour, in denunciation of bankers and bondholders: calling them by such pet names as, "shylocks," "bloated bondholders," etc., etc. I must do this class of orators the justice to say, that most of them are not intentional mischief-makers, in perpetuating a prejudice of one class against another, but they have little or no knowledge of the facts about which they speak, and less in regard to the fundamental principles of the subject.

Suppose it were possible to bring all the owners of bank stock into our audience, what would we find? Over one-half the entire number, poor property holders, widows and orphans, whose annual income is less than $50 per annum; and take the whole number, large and small, and their average annual income is under $175. Yet, these are the persons against whom the maledictions of our fledgling fiscal orators, and the deluded press, are hurled, and against whom they would poison the minds of the farmers, mechanics and laborers.

On the subject of the "repudiation of honest debts," I have recently contributed an article which has been extensively published in the papers of the State, and copied in the money columns of the eastern press. I tried to show the blighting and ruinous effects of the infamous doctrine upon the material industries of the State. I maintained that the riches of the people of our State in honor, integrity and virtue are of far greater consequence than a wealth in property, however honestly obtained. The views expressed I am happy to say, have since received the approval of both the District and Circuit Court of the United States.

And some object to the national system "because its continued existence contemplates the permanency of the national debt." I hope the day will come when this objection will be opportune; at present it is "far fetched," and untenable.

Our bonded debt is now, say, eighteen hundred million dollars, and say, fourteen hundred million in excess of that portion held by the banks. It is not the part of wise statemanship to impose the burden of the payment of this enormous debt upon the present generation. As it is being refunded at an easy interest, and our country is growing in population and wealth, rather let the future take the responsibility of a portion of it.

England, we have seen, is utilizing the bonds issued during the Napoleonic wars and the war with this country, over sixty-five years ago, as security for the circulation of her principal bank, and is likely to continue the same for the next century. Then, what can be the possible objection to our utilizing our necessarily outstanding bonds, for, say, the next sixty years, by making them the factor to secure the bill-holders; an office they have so well filled the past fifteen years? But, when the time does come, be it sooner or later, for the payment of our debt, I would not keep a dollar outstanding a day for the mere purpose of making a basis for a secure circulation. Then will be the time to hunt for a new, and, if possible, better basis for bank note security. We will then, perhaps, further imitate the Bank of England by an issue, in part, if not the whole, upon gold and silver coin and bullion.

And we sometimes hear it said, that "the tendency of the national system is toward centralization," &c. The reverse of this assertion is the truth. The way to avoid centralization is, to have banks wherever business demands them, in all portions of our country, regardless of political or other considerations controlled by their stockholders. Under the national system, as free to all as farming or merchandise, we now have over two thousand banks, and there is nothing, in law, to prevent there being more than double that number. Each bank is controlled for itself, and in the interest of its immediate patrons, without a connection with any other national, closer than that with a private or State bank, and all governed by very similar laws. This is diversity. This is extending the benefits of our resources to all parts of the country, placing means within easy reach of deserving borrowers. Whereas, if we abolish all these small fiscal agencies, and erect upon their ruins, one huge, soulless political corporation at Washington City, to do the work of the whole country, we will then, indeed, "centralize" the money power of the country. In such a case, not only would the masses of the people be cut off from direct communication with such mammoth bank, but whole States and sections of our country, for supplies, would be at the mercy of one man, and he, most probably, a political demagogue. Such "centralization," the product of such a monstrosity the people do not want. Centralization is bad enough as it is, without adding the cap-sheaf that would shade all others. To destroy the very agencies that prevent centralization, is worse than a delusion, it is a snare.

As stated in the outset, I have advocated no special or general system of banking, nor am I wedded to any. Have only attempted to show the popular fallacies in regard to existing systems. Those who would destroy three hundred and sixty millions of the--to the masses of the people—cheapest and best circulation this country ever enjoyed, ought, before the fatal blow is inflicted. to plainly show us with what character of money they will fill its place. On so momentous a question, our country should not take a leap in the dark.

Since I have taken the negative of all the theories advanced for "financial reform," and attempted to explain their futility; you may ask, what then, is the remedy for the man involved in debt? and that, I may venture, at least, an affirmative answer.

There is no royal road to wealth. The decree of the Almighty God, that, "in the sweat of thy face," etc., was not intended as a punishment, but as a duty, in which all should take pleasure. There is no happiness on earth exceeding that of congenial labor well and dutifully performed. It cannot, nor, if it could, ought not to be avoided. There is no patent substitute for labor. There is no way to make a short cut on a straight line.

I will answer by repeating, as well as I can remember it, the advice of that eminent philosopher: Old Ben Franklin.

"ADVICE TO THOSE IN DEBT."

"Make a full estimate of all you owe and of all that is owing to you. Reduce the same to a note. As fast as you can collect, pay over to those you owe. If you cannot pay, renew your notes every year, giving the best security you can. Go to business diligently and be industrious; waste no idle moments; be very economical in all things; discard all pride; be faithful in your duty to God, by regular and hearty prayer, morning and night; attend church Sunday, and do unto all men as you would they should do unto you.

"If you are too needy in circumstances to give to the poor, do whatever else is in your power, cheerfully; but, if you can do so, help the poor and unfortunate.

'Pursue this course diligently for seven years, and if you are not happy, comfortable and independent in your circumstances, then come to me and I will pay your debts."

These popular errors have taken such deep root upon the mass of the people, that we cannot expect to remove them rapidly. If I have contributed, the least in that direction, I shall feel more than compensated for the little labor the effort has cost me. And I have an abiding faith that truth is powerful and will prevail in the end. As the poet beautifully expresses it:—

"Truth Crushed to earth shall rise again;
The eternal years of God are hers;
But error wounded writhes with pain,
And dies among his worshipers."

THE FREEDMAN'S BANK.

A PLEA FOR THE DEPOSITORS.

A prominent journal has revived the log rolling and fraud which attended the organization and administration of the Freedman's Savings Bank and Trust Company.

Another journal has stated that "this bank was a case where Congress should go outside the letter and grant relief to the depositors," but Congress went outside the letter when it ignored and repudiated this claim, for records exist which prove that this institution was directly fathered and fostered by the Government, and each pass-book of the first series, acknowledged and avowed itself a government indebtedness. The original charter was a government charter, the bank and its branch offices were established in the government's name, its claims were indorsed and guaranteed by the government, its highest officer was the highest government official in the Freedman's Bureau, and the bank declared itself directly under government management.

In proof of this, at each branch office the influential freedmen were enlisted and advertised as local directors, and they affirm that when they protested against all their funds being shipped away to Washington, they were reassured by the intelligence, "that these funds were under government security, were being applied for government use, or invested in United States bonds."

If the present Commissioners have not destroyed them, a number of pass-books are still extant which announce in flaring type the unselfish and godly love of the government to its colored children, and exhibit the benevolent features of President Lincoln smiling over such a pass-book as the horn of plenty, whilst his hand rests confidingly on that safe which was so soon to close on its hard-saved earnings forever.

The government cannot deny that the bank received its deposits as a government institution, and the only excuse and plea that can be urged for not paying this claim, is that the charter was afterwards changed, and the government relieved itself of its responsibility by converting the bank into a—well we know not what, except a terrible swindling concern.

The whole plea, then, for non-payment is on this shifting or throwing off responsibility; but here arises the question, because an indorser should happen to be the custodian of his own obligation, can he expunge his name and responsibility without the full knowledge and consent of the owner, and in this matter did the government acquaint its creditors with this fact, that its indorsement and responsibility had been removed?

It did not, it could not. Most of those depositors were ignorant, unlearned people unable to discern between debit and credit, only trusting blindly in their government infatuation, while that government was smuggling out its protection, and consigning its deluded victims to political vampires and Judas Iscariots.

It is an important consideration that freedmen are eligible to our national councils and conventions, and for this reason, it is said, they should be educated and developed to a proper standard of judgment and discernment; and here the consistency of the colored race was commendable. They realized their responsibility and prepared to meet it, and severe and desperate is the story of their struggles, to save a small pittance for the maintenance and education of their children, and fitness for becoming useful and enlightened citizens.

The evil results and tendencies of this swindling robbery can never be known or appreciated. Many freedmen have told me that they would never again trust humanity, and with such an example of deceit and fraud before them, from men they considered their friends, what blame can be attached to an ignorant and deluded people when they, in a small manner, follow this example. Besides contemplating the fact that many persons, after one such terrible reverse, never regain confidence or make another effort, the immediate effect of this swindle upon the freedmen's condition was desperate and distressing. Many of them had every cent they could rake and scrape together in its custody, and depended on it for their next day's subsistence. With sensational pictures and alluring pamphlets about President Lincoln, the Freedman's Bureau and government protection, many freedmen worked for this bank with a zeal and energy almost fanatical, and when its failure was announced, some lost their reason, some pined away and died, while others perished through lingering starvation.

There was never a more just claim, and this cause should be agitated until effected, for the government responsibility can be clearly proved, but can the government as clearly establish the right of repudiation?

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BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW.

The Law of Certification.

The office of a bank certification as the derivation of the word (from *facio* to make, *certus* certain) implies, is to assure to the payee and his assigns certain facts. It is a warranty and a promise.

A warranty that the drawer of the check has funds to the amount specified, and that the signature is genuine, and a promise that out of these funds the bank will reserve sufficient to, and will pay the check.[1]

The amount of the check so certified is usually charged immediately to the customer's account, and then carried to a "certified check account," upon which the bank credits itself with the amount, making a corresponding debit on that account when the check is finally paid.[2] Parties who are strangers are thus enabled to deal confidently with one another, the risk of transferring large sums of money is obviated, as is also the labor of counting. When it is remembered that in the City of New York alone, it is estimated that certified checks to the amount of one hundred millions are used daily,[3] the importance of being intelligently informed as to their exact meaning is seen.

In the first place the drawer of the check, as between himself and the payee, is absolutely acquitted of the debt for which the check is drawn to pay, when the holder has caused it to be certified. The reason of this rule is obvious. Checks have no days of grace, and should be presented not later than the next day, or within a reasonable time.[4] Laches on the part of the payee will, in cases where it causes injury, exonerate the drawer.[5]

No certification is contemplated by the check itself; that is the

1. Cook *vs.* State National Bank of Boston, 52 N. Y., 96.
2. First National Bank of Jersey City *vs.* Leach, id.. 350.
3. Merchants' Bank *vs.* State Bank, 10 Wall. (604), 647.
4. Morse on Banking, p. 280. As to there being no days of grace allowed upon checks in New York, see vol. 2 Rev. Statutes 6th Ed., p. 1,163.
5. Merchants' Bank *vs.* State Bank, supra.

*The editor of the Law Department of RHODES' JOURNAL will be pleased to furnish, on application of subscribers, detailed information regarding any case referred to herein, or will answer questions in banking law. Address: *Law Department*, RHODES' JOURNAL, 13 *Spruce Street, New York.*

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vehicle to effect payment. Certification is a subsequent contract between the holder of the check and the bank.[1]

Any check which a bank certifies it could with equal propriety pay on the spot, and here the duty of the drawer to his former creditor ends. He has afforded him an opportunity to be paid from his funds, and the holder of the check has substituted a new contract in place of his, and thenceforth takes the risk of the solvency of the bank which certifies.

No analogy can be drawn from the rules governing bills of exchange, for there the drawer contracts that the bill shall be accepted *and* paid. Here the contract is that the check shall be paid *on presentation*. The holder cannot demand certification nor can the bank force him to take it, and upon refusal to do anything but pay, the former can resort immediately to the drawer.

A single case will illustrate the operation of this rule. The firm of I & M, doing business at Nashville, drew their checks on the Bank of Tennessee to pay for $1,600 worth of sugar sold them by the plaintiffs. The latter promptly presented them to the bank by which the checks were thereupon certified. On the approach of the U. S. troops the bank was removed South, and did not return until after the war, and then had become insolvent. This removal took place almost immediately after the certification of the checks. After presentment to and refusal of the bank to pay, the payees sued the drawers, and the Court held the latter to be discharged, saying: "We think both in principle and all modern authority, the Court below charged correctly, that plaintiffs, by having the checks certified, thereby made them their own, and held them at their own risk, and could not after this recover either on the check or original consideration."[2]

It remains, therefore, to consider the new relations which the bank, upon certifying, enter into with the holder of the check.

It is an absolute guaranty of the genuineness of the drawer's signature. As to that the rules governing acceptance of bills of exchange and certification of checks are alike. And this has been rigidly held to be the rule ever since about the middle of the last century, when Lord Mansfield decided the leading case of Price *vs.* Neale.[3]

It was there said that the question did not admit of argument, and it has since been regarded as well settled law, and followed in hundreds of cases.

There are two other elements which complete the effect of the certification. (1.) A representation that the drawer has funds to that amount in bank to meet the check; and, (2). A promise that they shall be reserved and the check paid.

1. Oddie *vs.* National City Bank, 45 N. Y., 735.
2. French *vs.* Irwin, 27 American Reports, 770.
3. 3 Burr, 1355. In that case the forgery had been committed by one Lee, whom it incidentally appears by the report, "has since been hung for his forgery."

Great efforts have been made to attach additional qualities to it, but it is believed that there is no well-considered authority which so holds. With the body of the check the bank has nothing to do, and if before or after certification the check is fraudulently raised and passed into the hands of an innocent holder for value, the bank is not liable for the overplus, and some authorities go the length of holding that the fraudulent alteration makes the instrument absolutely void so that the holder is entitled to no credit by reason of it.

Even where the bank has paid the check, under such circumstances, it may still recover back the amount from the person to whom it has paid it, always assuming that the bank is not at fault and notifies the party to whom it has paid immediately upon discovering the mistake. In this State one of the most recent and authoritative decisions covering all the points above discussed, is that of the Marine Bank *vs.* The National City Bank[1] which owing to the industry of the counsel for the defendant in obtaining and making an elaborate re-argument called out one of the clearest opinions on this subject from the late Judge Allen which is in the books.

A per curiam opinion had been rendered in which the law was held to be as above stated.

On the re-argument the affidavits of a number of the most eminent bankers and merchants of the City of New York were presented to the Court setting forth that in their opinion the certification estopped the plaintiff bank from claiming a return of the money.[2] Lunt Brothers had drawn a check on the plaintiff bank for $25 to the order of Henry Smith and delivered it. The date, payee, and amount were changed, the last to $4,079.96 and the check then tendered to Derippe & Co. in payment for gold. Upon sending to the Marine Bank and receiving a certification of the check, D. & Co. delivered the gold and deposited the check in the National City Bank which received the $4,079.96

1. 59 N. Y., 67.

2. Nothing can exceed the courtesy and sound sense with which the Court passes upon these affidavits. "While the opinion of any one of the gentlemen with whose opinions we are favored, adverse to our conclusions, might lead us to hesitate, we cannot yield our convictions as to the legal meaning and effect of the transaction. If perchance we have unduly limited the liability of the certifying bank, and have not given to the certification all the potency which those dealing in certified checks think it should have, for the convenience of commerce and the ready transaction of business, a slight modification in the form of the certificate will fully express the enlarged obligation and meet the views of those who differ with the Court in the interpretation of the contract in the form now made. If the counsel for the respondent is not in error in his views, very earnestly pressed upon us, banks and bankers will at once conform to the necessities of the case, and adopt a form of certification which will meet the views of those interested, and make the certifying bank not only a voucher and liable for the genuineness of the signature of the drawer of the check, and the sufficiency of the account to meet it when it shall be presented for payment, but also for the genuineness of the body of the instrument, the indorsement of the payee, and every other indorser, and the title of the holder. There is no legal objection to banks assuming a liability to this extent if they please to do so, but the intent should be plainly manifested by the terms of the undertaking." Id., p. 74.

from the Marine Bank, credited D. & Co. and allowed them to draw it out. The Marine Bank discovered the mistake the same day, offered to return the check, and requested repayment and then sued for the return of the money which it was allowed to recover. The exhaustive opinion which was rendered upon the re-argument accorded rather to meet "the views and opinions of the distinguished bankers and merchants expressed, than to any intrinsic difficulties or any doubts entertained by the Court," has probably set the question as to the exact meaning of the ordinary bank certification forever at rest.

The result of this reasoning leads to the conclusion which appears a trifle singular upon examination for the first time, that where all of the check but the signature is a forgery the bank which certifies is not liable, where signature and all is forged it must stand the loss.

A case sustaining the latter proposition is that of Hagen *vs.* Bowery National Bank,[1] which was argued for the plaintiff by the father of the writer. There the check, signature and all was a forgery. The Bowery Bank certified it. The forger procured another bank to certify his indorsement and then presented it to the plaintiff to pay for gold. Plaintiff sent the check to his bank to ascertain if the certification was genuine, and as the Teller had gone home, the matter went over until the next morning. Meantime the Bowery Bank had discovered the forgery, and advertised the fact in four newspapers published in the City of New York. The plaintiff did not see this notice, and as the Teller of his bank in the morning expressed the opinion that the certification was correct, plaintiff delivered the gold and took the check in good faith. The Court held as follows: "Whether the indorsement purporting to be that of the payee named in the check was genuine or not, or whether the person so named was a fictitious person, imperfectly appears. But it was immaterial whether it was one or the other. There can be no real payee of a forged instrument. As between the plaintiff and the bank, the liability of the latter attached upon the check being certified. And as it is impossible to make title to money payable upon a forged check, through an indorsement thereof, proof of the genuineness of the indorsement is unnecessary for that purpose. The evidence shows that the person from whom the plaintiff received the check went by the name endorsed thereon, and that the indorsement was made by him. This is quite sufficient to protect the plaintiff against any imputation of bad faith or negligence in taking the check. The advertisement of the forgery not having been brought home to the plaintiff, can have no effect whatever upon his right to recover."[2]

The case of the Security Bank *vs.* National Bank of the Republic,[3] presented a state of facts similar to that of the Marine Bank *vs.*

1. 64 Barb., 198.
2. See Raphael *vs.* Bank of England, 17 C. B., 161.
3. 67 N. Y., 458.

National City Bank, supra, and in addition an offer on the part of the defendant to show, 1st. That a bank certification was understood by the business community to import an engagement on the part of the bank that the check was genuine in all its parts, and 2d. That when the check was presented for certification the holder thereof stated to the Teller that he did not like the looks of the messenger who brought him the check, and had doubts about it, and wanted to be assured that it was right in every particular, and that the Teller replied that he need not have the slightest doubt about the check, and that it was correct in every particular.

These offers were ruled out on the trial, and this ruling was sustained by the N. Y. Court of Appeals, which held that the contract of certification had a settled legal construction, and that an offer to prove that by the understanding of business men it had a more extended meaning was inadmissible,[1] and as to the second point, that such declarations as the Teller made were expressions of his opinion, that his authority was limited to making the customary certification, and any attempt to do more would be in excess of that authority and would not bind the bank.

This leads us to the last point which will be considered, namely: Who is the proper officer to certify, and what is the extent of his authority to bind the bank? These inquiries will be treated together. Undoubted power is lodged in the Cashier to make the certification. The bank speaks through and by him in the performance of all its banking functions, and his authority is necessarily very broad. But owing to the multiplicity of the business of the bank, it is convenient and necessary that he should delegate certain of his functions, and so the duty of certifying is by most banks confided to their paying tellers. And appropriately enough, they, more than all others of the bank officials, are conversant with the exact state of the accounts of the various depositors, and can therefore more readily decide upon the propriety of certifying checks when presented. None should be certified save such as might then be paid, and the paying teller is able instantly to pass upon such as might be paid.

But as we have seen, certification having an accepted legal and commercial meaning the effect of it is limited, and declarations or certificates of the teller as to matters not comprehended within the well-settled scope and meaning of the act, will be without force. Knowledge is imputed to every one who takes a certified check of the law that the certification relates to and is a guaranty to the holder of the three facts above noted, and these alone. Suppose, however, these facts do not actnally exist. Is the bank then bound?

1. Four cases are cited to sustain this ruling.
Burgett *vs.* Oriental Mututal Ins. Co., 3 Bos., 385.
Higgins *vs.* Moore, 34 N. Y., 417.
Lawrence *vs.* Maxwell, 53 id., 19.
Wheeler *vs.* Newbould, 16 id., 392.

It has been contended that a teller is the agent of the bank to certify in cases where there are funds, not where there are not, and that a bank as ordinarily constituted, is entirely without authority to certify in the absence of sufficient funds, as it thus becomes mere accommodation surety for the benefit of another. Such a contract could not be enforced by any person who was conscious of the fact that the bank, through its officer, was exceeding its corporate powers. It would be *ultra vires.*

But principals are bound in frequent instances by the misrepresentations of their agents, and such would be the rule in this case as applied to the warranty of any fact which the certification is understood to mean. The reason of the rule cannot be given in better language than that of a portion of the opinion in the case of the Farmers' *vs.* Butcher's Bank,[1] which is a leading authority on this question. "It is conceded that every one taking the checks would be presumed to know that the teller had no authority to certify without funds. But this knowledge alone would not apprise him that the certificate was defective and unauthorized. To discover that, he must not only have notice of the limitations upon the powers of the teller, but of the extrinsic fact that the bank had no funds; and as to this extrinsic fact which he cannot justly be presumed to know, he may act upon the representation of the agent. There is a plain distinction between the terms of a power and facts entirely extraneous, upon which the right to exercise the authority conferred may depend. One who deals with an agent has no right to confide in the representation of the agent as to the extent of his powers. If therefore a person knowing that the bank has no funds of the drawers should take a certified check, upon the representation of the cashier or other officer by whom the certificate is given, that he was authorized to certify without funds, the bank would not be liable. But in regard to the extrinsic fact, whether the bank has funds or not, the case is different. That is a fact which a stranger who takes a check certified by the teller cannot be supposed to have any means of knowing. Were he held bound to ascertain it, the teller would be the most direct and reliable source of knowledge, and he already has his written representation upon the check. If, therefore, one who deals with an agent can be permitted to rely upon the representation of the agent as to the existence of a fact, and to hold the principal responsible in case the representation is false, this would seem to be such a case."[2]

This is undoubtedly the law, and has been since followed, although there is an earlier Massachusetts case to the contrary.[3]

1. 16 N. Y., 125.

2. See also Stoney *vs.* American Life Insurance Company, 11 Paige, 635. Where it is held that a negotiable security of a corporation in the hands of a bona fide holder, in all respects valid upon its face, is good, although issued at a place and for a purpose not covered by its charter.

3. Mussey *vs.* Eagle Bank, 9 Metcalf, 306.

Another case in point which excited peculiar interest on account of the magnitude of the amount involved, arose in Massachusetts, and is that of Merchants' National Bank *vs.* State National Bank, supra.[1]

The checks certified by the cashier of the defendant in that case amounted in the aggregate to $600,000. He went personally with a member of the Boston firm of Mellen, Ward & Co., which soon after failed, to the banking-house of the plaintiff and there effected the transaction. His authority was denied by defendant.

The U. S. Supreme Court decided that when a party deals with a corporation in good faith, the transaction is not *ultra vires* if he is unaware of the defect of authority and there is nothing to excite suspicion, although such defect in fact exists, and (to use the language of the Court), "estoppel *in pais* presupposes an error or a fault, and implies an act in itself invalid. The rule proceeds upon the consideration that the author of the misfortune shall not himself escape the consequences and cast the burden on another. Smith was the cashier of the State Bank. The plaintiff did not approach him. Upon the faith of his acts and declarations it parted with its property. The misfortune occurred through him, and as the case appears in the record upon the plainest principles of justice, the loss should fall upon the defendant. The ethics and the law of the case alike require this result.

Those who created the trust, appointed the trustee and clothed him with the powers that enabled him to mislead—if there were any misleading—ought to suffer rather than the other party."

From this imperfect sketch it will be seen that the rules governing this branch of the law merchant are to be found in an admirable state of certainty, and that a resort to the books containing the cases already adjudicated will readily settle, either by direct authority or by analogy, almost any question which may arise under it.

1. Reported also in Redfield and Bigelow's leading cases upon Bills of Exchange, page 739.

FINANCIAL LAW—RECENT DECISIONS.

[COMPILED FROM THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL.]

NATIONAL BANK—STATE COURT MAY ENJOIN AND APPOINT RECEIVER OF.—Where judgment has been rendered in a State Court against a national bank, and upon the execution based thereon a return of *nulla bona* has been made by the sheriff of the county where the bank is located, and the bank has ceased to discharge its functions as a fiscal agent of the United States, and is disposing of its assets which cannot be reached by levy and sale under the common law execution among its stockholders, thereby endangering the safety of those assets and the judgment debt of the creditor, equity will relieve by the grant of an injunction and appointment of a receiver. Until a receiver has been appointed by a Federal Court, neither law nor comity requires the State Court to suspend its equitable remedy to reach the assets of the bank and enforce its own final process until the Federal Court shall act; especially where in the Federal Court the case is made by the stockholders of the bank and the judgment creditor is not made a party thereto. Georgia Sup. Ct., Sept. 23 1879. Merchants' and Planters' National Bank *vs.* Trustees of Masonic Hall. Opinion by Jackson, J.

PROMISSORY NOTES—ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION—INNOCENT PURCHASER—NOTICE.—The statutes of Iowa require that notes given for insurance in any company doing business in the State shall state upon their face that they have been taken for insurance, and shall not be collectable unless the company or its agents have fully complied with the laws of the State relative to insurance. Defendant, in payment for a lightning rod put on his house, made his negotiable note in the ordinary form without any statement as to what it was given for, the payee of the note at the same time in writing warranting the house for ten years against damage from lightning. This note was discounted by plaintiff at twenty five per cent. discount. *Held*, that even if the contract of warranty should be considered in the light of an insurance on the house so as to require the note to state on its face that it was given for insurance, the fact that the note did not so state would not render it void in the hands of an innocent purchaser without notice. *Held*, also that the amount of discount at which the note was purchased by plaintiff was not a circumstance to put him on inquiry. The Court remarked that "it should not be inferred that we deem the law to be, that the purchaser of a negotiable promissory note for value, before maturity, will not, if he purchased under circumstances which would have excited the suspicion of a prudent man, be regarded as an innocent purchaser. It was, it is true, so held in Gill *vs.* Cubitt, 3 Barn. & Cress. 466; but the rule in England now appears to be that even gross negligence will not necessarily defeat a recovery, and do so only where it is such as to evince actual bad faith. In this country the decisions have not been entirely uniform, but the weight of authority is probably in accord with the latter English rule. Gage *vs.* Sharpe, 24 Iowa, 15; Lake *vs.* Reed, 29 id. 258. See, also, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, §§ 774 and 775." Iowa Sup. Ct., Sept. 17, 1879. Cook *vs.* Weirman. Opinion by Adams, J.

USURY—WHEN NOTE TAINTED BY, VALID IN HANDS OF INNOCENT HOLDER.—The principle is now well settled that if a note is not declared void by statute, mere illegality in its consideration will not affect the rights of a *bona fide* purchaser for value. Norris *vs.* Langly, 19 N. H. 423; State Bank *vs.* Thompson, 42 id. 369; Converse *vs.* Foster, 32 Vt. 828; Paton *vs.* Coit, 5 Mich. 505; Sistermans *vs.* Field, 9 Gray, 331. But where the illegal consideration is proved, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that he is a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice. Accordingly, when a statute forbidding usury declared that "if a greater rate of interest than is hereinbefore allowed shall be contracted for, or received, or reserved, the contract shall not therefore be void; but if in any action on such contract proof be made that illegal interest has been directly or indirectly contracted for, or taken, or reserved, the plaintiff shall only recover the principal without interest, and the defendant shall recover costs." *Held*, that the defense of usury would not be available against a *bona fide* holder for value without notice before maturity. Nebraska Sup. Ct., Sept., 1879. Wortendyke *vs.* Meehan. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

Assessing Town Bonds.—The Attorney-General of the State of New York says town bonds which have been deposited by their owners in certain banks for safe-keeping, should be assessed in the town or ward where they reside, when the assessment is made for all personal estate owned by them.

Bank of England Rate.—The London "Standard," of Oct. 21st in its financial article, says it is rumored in well-informed circles that a rise in the minimum rate of discount of the Bank of France is imminent. If this prediction is verified, an advance in the official quotation of the rate of the Bank of England, which is now two per cent., could not be long deferred.

A Quick Transit from Bank to Prison.—Frank Boynton, the Receiving Teller of the North National Bank, Boston, arrested for embezzling funds to the amount of $23,751, was sentenced, October 25, to five years at hard labor in the jail at Dedham. A little more such prompt work with this class of bank thieves, and the business will not be heard of so frequently in the future.

A Dividend to be Paid.—On petition and motion of Charles E. Patterson, Receiver of the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Bank of Troy, it was ordered (October 10) that the Receiver pay a dividend of ten per cent. to the creditors of the bank; that money to pay the dividend be transferred from the Trust Company at New York to the credit of the Receiver of the Union National Bank of Troy, and that the Receiver compromise several small claims, and sell the judgments which he has not been able to collect.

One City where Gold Abounds.—It was mid-month payday in the Treasury Department at Washington Oct. 15th, and the clerks accordingly received their semi-monthly salaries. Every dollar was paid in specie, 10 per cent. in silver dollars, and 90 per cent. in gold coin. Some of the clerks objected, but the order to pay in coin was obligatory for that time at least. The consequence was that a considerable quanity of gold was in circulation there for some few days, and the banks cashed a good many checks in that coin.

New Gold Mines Discovered.—A dispatch from Fort McKinney, Wyoming Territory, dated October 14, says: "Great excitement prevails in this vicinity on account of the recent rich discoveries of gold-bearing quartz in the Big Horn Mountains, about 75 miles northwest of this post, at the head of the Tongue River. Large numbers of miners are passing through this place on the way to the mines. Nearly all the citizens of this region are starting for the mountains. Ore has been assayed with the following results: Lowest, $4; highest, $70 per tun."

The Pittsburg Embezzlers Guilty.—James H. Riddle, head of the firm of Riddle, Coleman & Co., and President of the Franklin Savings Institution, and his son George D. Riddle, Cashier of the Savings Institution, who have heretofore been looked upon as solid and substantial business men, have been found guilty on four counts for embezzlement and two for conspiracy. The account of Riddle, Coleman & Co. was overdrawn to the amount of $86,496.07. The account of Frantz & Co., of which firm the Cashier is a member, was overdrawn $2,457.04 Besides these irregularities $5,847.71 was embezzled from the Savings Institution.

Not a New Counterfeit.—A week or so ago the announcement was made in some of the daily papers that a Philadelphia counterfeit detective firm had just discovered a new counterfeit of the twenty-dollar legal-tender Treasury note series of 1875. The discovery was a decided mare's nest, for the same identical counterfeit was fully described in RHODES' JOURNAL last May. But four of the notes have been either seen or heard of by the Secret Service Department, and all of them have undoubtedly been executed manually with a pen and ink, so that it is not at all likely that any large number of them will be palmed on the public.

The Wheat Crop.—E. H. Walker, statistician of the Produce Exchange, after a careful estimate from authoritative reports, places the wheat crop of the United States for 1879 at about 425,000,000 bushels. The Spring wheat crop will not be so large as was at first expected, that of Minnesota being no more than 28,000,000 bushels, instead of 40,000,000 as estimated early in the season. The amount consumed by 48,000,000 persons, plus the amount required for seed and other purposes, is placed at 250,000,000 bushels, leaving 175,000,000 bushels for export, 160,000,000 bushels for Europe, and 15,000,000 for other ports.

How Jay Gould Astonished the Dutch.—During Mr. Gould's recent trip in Europe he had some railroad matters to attend to which is thus referred to in the "London Railway News:" "We hear from Amsterdam that Mr. Jay Gould rather astonished the Dutch financiers. It appears that he was negotiating with bankers there about a Kansas railroad whose affairs have been in litigation for several years. He finally offered $1,300,000 for the first mortgage bonds held by the syndicate, which they accepted, with the proviso that interest should be added to the date of payment. Gould agreed, but created a sensation by immediately writing a check on Messrs. J. S. Morgan & Co., of London, for the full amount."

A Business-like Receiver.—Richard M. Bent, receiver of the New Amsterdam Savings Bank of New York City, filed his supplemental report in the County Clerk's office Sept. 26. He was appointed receiver about two and a half years ago, during which time he has paid three dividends to the depositors amounting to $392,135.81, or 77 per cent. The total assets in the hands of the receiver for the dividend fund were $393,000 and the small balance of $565.63 remains in his hands unexpended. The sum of $420.39 is required for unclaimed dividends.

This is a remarkable exception to the general rule of receivers in this city, as well as elsewhere. The usual plan is to keep on *receiving*, but the paying out is the difficult part for them to perform; it takes an interminable time to pay out even a small sum of money.

The Treasury Department's Clearances.—The Treasury Department became a member of the New York Clearing House on Jan. 1 last. Up to the 1st of October all the government balances through the Clearing House have been settled in United States notes. During the first half of the month the balances paid by the Sub-Treasury at New York, through the Clearing House, amounted to $15,241,000. Of this sum $5,000,000 and all checks for called bonds—$2,500,000—were paid in gold at that point, which makes the total amount of gold paid out at New York in the period named $7,500,000. This payment of gold, it is said by Treasury officers, will last as long as the heavy receipts of gold from abroad and the scarcity of notes continue. While the $7,500,000 was being paid out, about $4,000,000 in gold was received at the Treasury Department, making an actual increase in the gold circulation of more than $3,000,000.

Chicago Banks.—The condition of the banks of Chicago, according to the return made to the Controller of the Currency, Oct. 2, is very different from that of our own City banks. As compared with their return of June 14, they have increased their cash on hand by over $2,000,000 and their deposits by over $3,900,000, while their loans have decreased nearly one million, ($968,982). The reserve instead of being barely the 25 per cent. required by law, as is the case here, is about 47 per cent. of their deposits, and, including United States bonds, is 56 per cent. of their liabilities. The Chicago banks are reported to have acted in a very conservative manner with reference to produce speculation, and to have advanced their margins as the tendency to speculation has grown more pronounced. It is unfortunate that the general statement of the New York banks shows that a similar course has not been followed with entire uniformity here.—*N. Y. Times*.

Wall Street Operations.—The New York "Times" of Oct. 25, thus refers to one of the ways resorted to in Wall street to affect prices: "The stock market was very excited yesterday and the fluctuations were frequent and violent. Several of the more wealthy gamblers deliberately set to work early in the morning to manipulate matters They called in simultaneously all the loans they had put out, and borrowed all the money they could lay their hands upon, and, having accumulated in this way between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000, locked it up out of the reach of the smaller speculators. At the same time they sent their brokers into the Exchange to offer high rates for money and sell stocks down. All this had the effect of frightening the immense crowd of petty outsiders who have been gambling on small margins, and they rushed to sell, too, before they should be cleaned out. The consequence was a decline in prices ranging from ⅛ to 5⅛ per cent. Subsequently there was a sharp recovery of ⅛ to 3⅛ per cent., but at the close another tumble took place in which the improvement was partially lost. The recorded transactions exceeded 500,000 shares."

Ohio & Mississippi, Springfield Division.—The bond holders of the Springfield Division of the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company have filed their bill of foreclosure in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and have brought a suit at law for $1,000,000. The hearing in the case has been set for October 21. The suit of the preferred stockholders has been postponed to October 31

Allegheny County (Pa.)—The Pittsburgh "Commercial Gazette" thinks that $2,750,0000 will settle all the claims against Allegheny County for damages to property resulting from the railroad riots. This is putting the losses of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at $1,300,000. The Company claims, however, about $5,000,000, so the entire bill will be about $7,000,000, which the tax-payers will have to pay under the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The present debt of Allegheny County is $1,750,000.

Not in the Failed Bank.—A bucolic tale of financial innocence and ignorance s related by "The Troy Times." A stranger entered the Merchants' and Mechanics' Bank and throwing upon the paying teller's desk two certificates of deposit of $5,000 each, exclaimed: "There you can give me my little ten per cent. on them. I've held 'em some time and have kept it all to myself, but I guess they are good for $1,000 today." "I guess not," replied the clerk, "they are not good here. You have made a mistake." "No mistake at all," said the stranger, "I paid $10,000 for 'em when I thought this 'ere bank was solid, but I never expected to get a cent. I'll take my $1,000 now, however." The clerk reiterated his former statement, that they were not good there, and, to the surprise of the unfortunate stranger, informed him that his $10,000 were safe and sound in the Manufacturers' Bank, upon which the certificates were drawn. "Well I swan," the happy man was heard to mutter as he left the bank, "I'm $9,000 better off than I thought I was."

Money in a Chicken-Coop.—A Baltimore paper states that on a recent Saturday night a provision house in that city sold to a market-man four coops of chickens, which had been received from the West by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. When the coops were being delivered, one of the firm discovered a roll of paper in the bottom of one of them, and on opening the roll it was found to contain $5,000 in bills. On a further search in the same coop another roll was found, which contained $2,500. It is now stated that these packages were misplaced by a careless express agent at Benwood, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; that during the transfer of express matter by the agents at that point, the agent coming east took the packages, receipted for them, and temporarily placed them on the coop. In the hurry of the moment they were forgotten, and when the coop was moved the two bundles of money fell inside. The chickens were consigned to and sold by Stewart & Co., by whom the money was found as above stated and returned to the Baltimore and Ohio Express Company. The express agent was promptly discharged.

The Case of Sir Francis Hincks.—The trial of Sir Francis Hincks, one of the Directors of the Consolidated Bank of Montreal, charged with signing false returns to the Government, was concluded October 20th. Mr. Kerr, counsel for Sir Francis, in addressing the jury, said the form supplied by the Government was correctly filled by the executive officers. This was shown by the evidence of Mr. Angus, General Manager of the Bank of Montreal; Mr. Grindley, of the Bank of British North America, and Mr. Ingram, of the Merchants' Bank. It was also shown that it was the general custom of the banks to place loans on time under the head of deposits, and he maintained that the demand notes were placed under their proper heading. Mr. Ritchie, for the Crown, withdrew the charge in the indictment that it was possible for a bank President to check all returns in the time allowed by the Government. He urged that the accused Director knew of the money being borrowed from other banks to keep the doors of the Consolidated open, and also had a knowledge of the demand notes and bonds, and, consequently, Sir Francis was guilty of making false returns to deceive the government and the public. Justice Monk, after dwelling upon the deplorable nature of the case, charged strongly against the accused man. The jury, after an absence of an hour and a quarter, returned a verdict of guilty.

Western Union Telegraph.—Mr Norvin Green, President, has recently received the following cable from Manager Weaver, of the Anglo-American Cable Company: "The directors of this company have resolved that from the day of the opening for traffic of the new French transatlantic cable laid down by 'La Compagnie Francaise du Telegraphe de Paris a New York,' to reduce the tariff of the Anglo-American Telegraph Company via Valentia or via Brest for messages between the United Kingdom and France and New York and Canada to sixpence and sixty centimes per word respectively. In order to provide for the large increase of business which, it is anticipated, will be the result of this reduction, a new cable will be laid by this company in 1880. Due notice will be given of the exact date upon which this new tariff will come into force, but it is considered desrirable to send you this preliminary notice as similar lones have been forwarded to various telegraph administrations and other official public bodies."

Europe's Reviving Trade.—The London "Times" of October 24th in its financial article says: "The reports from the industrial centres are each day more eagerly scanned for fresh signs of revival in the activity which has already appeared in many quarters where stagnation prevailed so long. Whether the improvement is due, as some persons maintain, more to speculation than to a bona fide demand, remains to be seen. In the meantime, prices are rising, and orders are coming in, and as long as manufacturers take care to deal with responsible buyers, the speculators may be left to take care of themselves. The iron industry led the way, and the revival is now spreading to textile fabrics, among which our chief interests centre. In cotton the Messrs. Ellison & Co., of Liverpool, estimate the probable available supplies for imports to Europe from all sources, at 5,235,000 bales, against 4,857,000 bales in 1878-9. This estimate places the total supply of American at 5,100,000 bales, of which 3,370,000 will be for Europe. They conclude that should these estimates be realized, there will be enough cotton to allow of increased deliveries to the point touched in 1877-8, but no more. That the consumption of 1879-80 will exceed that of 1878-9 is scarcely doubtful. Beyond that point they cannot pretend to forecast the course of trade, but, in the absence of any new financial or political disturbances, it is only reasonable to expect a higher average of prices than those of the past season."

Commerce of Three Cities.—The total value of exports from the port of Boston during the week ending October 17 was $1,393,735, of which $44,539 represented re-exports. Some of the principal articles were 125,352 bushels of corn, 2,958 barrels of corn meal, 86,805 bushels of wheat, 26,144 barrels of wheat flour, 9,849 bales of cotton, 2,299,604 pounds of bacon, 509,734 pounds of butter and 516,520 pounds of tobacco. The The total value of exports since January 1 is $42,816,303, against $42,075,056 and $34,015,307 in 1878 and 1877, respectively. The imports at the same port for the week ended October 10 were valued at $809,636, against $953,552 for the corresponding week last year. The value of imports for the year to same date were $34,631,863, against $29,775,194 for the corresponding period last year, showing an increase the present year of $4,856,669.

The shipments of grain from Philadelphia for the week ending October 17 amounted to 666,697 bushels, and the total exports since the commencement of the year comprise 15,515,018 bushels of wheat, 12,425,009 bushels of corn, and 109,619 bushels of rye. The exports of petroleum amounted to 2,644,965 gallons, making a total since January 1 of 59,814,223 gallons, against 50,026,930 gallons during the same period in 1878.

The value of domestic produce cleared from Baltimore for foreign countries in the week ending October 16 amounted to $1,694,663, against $2,619,122 in the previous week, and $1,344,205 in the corresponding week last year. The principal articles exported were 8,835 barrels of flour, 883,720 bushels of wheat, 328,473 bushels of corn, 494,316 gallons of petroleum, 1,311 hogsheads of tobacco, and 1,265 bales of cotton. The total value of the exports since January 1 amounts to $52,402,084, against $44,458,913 in the corresponding period of 1878, an increase this year of $7,943,171.

The New York Clearing-House.—The New York Clearing-House Association held its annual meeting the 8th of October, and the report of the Board of Managers has subsequently been given out. It gives the transactions for the last fiscal year as aggregating $26,578,881,753.36, an average per day of $86,576,162.05. The report showed the following deaths of bank officers since the last annual meeting: President Denton Pearsall, of the Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, who died April 6, 1879, aged 68 years; President James L. Worth, of National Park Bank, who died August 29, 1879, aged 67 years, and Cashier Anthony Halsey, of the Tradesmen's National Bank, who died September 8, 1879, at the age of 60 years. During the year the Sub-Treasury and the Chase National Bank were admitted into the association. An arrangement was made at the meeting to renew with the Bank of America an old agreement, by which the latter will become a special depository for gold, for which it will issue certicates available in the settlement of balances at the Clearing-House. Such an arrangement was in existence from 1854 to 1861, but was dropped on the issue of legal-tenders. A handsome testimonial address, signed by the Presidents of 58 banks, was presented to Mr. James M. Morrison, who lately retired from the Presidency of the Bank of the Manhattan Company, after a banking experience of forty years. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: Chairman, James Dowd; Secretary Francis M. Harris; Clearing-House Committee—Frederick D. Tappen, Benjamin B. Sherman, Jacob D. Vermilye, Charles F. Hunter, and George Montague; Conference Committee—William L. Jenkins, Charles M. Fry, Sylvester R. Comstock, Washington A. Hall, and William A. Wheelock; Nominating Committee—James D. Fish, George F. Baker, Robert Buck, Francis Leland, and Robert Bayles; Committee on Admissions—M. F. Reading, E. D. Randolph, George W. Perkins, George M. Mard, A. S. Apgar; Arbitration Committee—J. L. Everitt, Isaac Odell, William A. Booth, Henry W. Ford, and John Parker.

Business Again Prosperous.—Dun, Barlow & Co.'s circular for the quarter ending Sept. 30, 1879, exhibits a gratifying state of business throughout the country.

The following shows the number of failures in the United States and Canada for the quarter ending Sept. 30, 1879, compared with the same quarter in 1878, together with the amount of liabilities:

	Third Quarter in 1879.		Third Quarter in 1878.	
STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Number of Failures.	Amount of Liabilities.	Number of Failures.	Amount of Liabilities.
Eastern States	250	$2,055,925	535	$9,777,016
Middle States	430	5,195,446	879	27,732,811
Southern States	151	2,736,341	253	4,310,783
Western States	302	3,265,852	950	18,479,783
Pacific States and Territories	129	1,451,986	236	6,077,970
Total	1,262	$15,275,550	2,853	$66,378,363
Dominion of Canada	417	$6,998,617	295	$4,629,592

The circular says: "The foregoing figures indicate that for the third quarter of 1879 the failures in the United States have been less than one-half than for the third quarter of 1878, the precise decrease being 1,591. The liabilities show even a much larger proportionate reduction, being less than one-quarter of what they were in the same period of last year—the figures showing the liabilities for 1879 to be $15,000,000, as against $66,000,000 for the third quarter of 1878. It will, of course, be remembered that for the first two months of the third quarter of 1878 the failures were unusually numerous, owing to the prospective repeal of the bankruptcy law in September of that year; but, even taking that circumstance into consideration, the decrease in the last quarter is almost phenomenal, in view of the fact, that the average number of failures for third quarter of the preceding four years was 2,223, or nearly double the number of the first quarter's failures, while the average liabilities for the third quarter of the four years was $52,000,000, exceeding by three times the amount of liabilities of the third quarter of 1879. The figures for the quarter just ended, therefore, add another to the many indications of the wonderfully improved condition of trade throughout the country. For the nine months of the two years the comparison is almost as favorable as for the quarter just closed—the failures for the first three-quarters in 1879 being 5,320 in number, as against 8,678 for the nine months of 1878. The liabilities are $81,000,000 for the first nine months of 1879, as against $197,000,000 for the same period of 1878—a reduction in liabilities of more than one-half. Within a short year these failure figures have done duty toward illustrating a condition of trade as completely reversed as it is possible to conceive. For the quarter preceding October, 1878, they showed mercantile disasters more numerous and more calamitous than ever before in a similar period. In October, 1879, they photograph a condition for the preceding three months apparently as prosperous, and certainly as profitable, as ever before experienced in the ordinary history of the country. The suddenness of the change is most significant. It may be argued that, while values advance with unusual rapidity, failures must necessarily be few, and that if this advance is more regulated by speculation than by the inexorable laws of demand and supply, then there is danger that these figures may be misleading, as affording another indication that the recovery they illustrate is too rapid to be permanent."

Soiled Bank Notes Must be Redeemed.—A singular suit was recently brought in the St. John City Court. A party who had in his posession a Bank of New Brunswick five dollar note, placed it for safe keeping in one of his boots. Having got his feet wet, the note was stained and damaged, and he could not pass it off. He then presented it at the bank counter, but payment was refused. He next appealed to the President, who laid the matter before the Directors, who decided not to redeem it. The holder sued the bank in the City Court, the bank defended, and the court gave judgment in favor of the holder.—*Quebec (Canada) Mercury.*

Getting a Check Cashed in Paris.—To one accustomed to our quick business movements in New York, and the especial rapidity with which banking operations are performed, it is quite ludicrous to enter a Paris bank and watch the performances there. If you present a check for payment, instead of handing it directly to the Teller and getting your money instantly, or in two or three minutes at the latest (as in a New York bank), you walk up to an officer in uniform, of whom there are a dozen walking about the counting-room, in large banks like the Credit Lyonnais, outside the space reserved for the clerks. He conducts you to one of the places constructed like cells, in which the book-keepers are serving out a sentence of solitary confinement. You hand your check to the prisoner's assistant, who hands it to his "boss." The latter consults a big ledger. If there is sufficient "spondulix" to the credit of the drawer, and the signature has all its i's crossed and t's dotted, he returns it to the boy, who in turn hands it to you, with the request that you pay 2 sous for a revenue stamp. This being gummed on the back, the deputy prisoner asks your address, then indorses it on the back of the draft, and you write your name across the revenue stamp with date, etc., and then a second time under your address. This done, you are presented with a bronze medal the size of a saucer with a numeral upon it. You accept it modestly, believing it to be a sort of Legion d'Honneur arrangement, or a reward of merit. You then are requested to seat yourself on one of the numerous long settees ranged around the room, which you do, and wait prayerfully till your turn arrives. After meditating in this position for a half-hour on the transitory nature of life, the slowness of French bank officers, and kindred topics, after reading the morning papers through twice, including the advertisements, you begin counting the panes of glass in the roof, or study the countenances of your neighbors, all patient creatures (like yourself), who have become quite resigned to this mode of transacting business, and would be alarmed if they should enter an American bank and draw their money in five minutes instead of half an hour. They would think there was something the matter with the coin—bogus, perhaps, or something of that sort.

After exhausting all your patience and the window panes and floor-tiles likewise, an officer in another little den, dressed in a uniform composed chiefly of brass buttons and a big "plaque," the size of a dinner-plate, on his left breast, yells out: *Quatre cent quatre-vingt-treize!*" Of course, you don't know what he means, and sit stupidly wondering, but on a repetition of the cry you consult your brass door-plate and find you hold "No. 493." So up you march to the crier and present your medal, and in return he hands you out a little bowl which contains your lucre. I timed the operation. There were just five persons ahead of me when I entered, and it took 25½ minutes by the clock for me to draw my little check of 100 francs!—*From the American Register.*

The Gold Importation.—In referring to the notable fact that over four and a half millions of foreign gold lately arrived at the port of New York in the space of four days, the "Evening Post" says: "The total imports of foreign specie from Jan. 1 to last Saturday morning (October 18), were $50,135,202, so that it can now be said that nearly $55,000,000 of specie has come into the country since the resumption of specie payments; and nearly nine-tenths of the whole have arrived since August 1. If legal-tender notes, which should be destroyed when paid the same as the notes of an individual or a corporation, excepting a bank whose business it is to issue circulating notes, had been cancelled to the extent of the gold imports the volume of the currency would not have been contracted, for value legal-tender would have been substituted for credit legal-tender; the present reckless speculation would not have been possible at least to the extent to which it has gone, and the currency of the country would have been greatly improved."

The same paper, in its money article, in referring to the money market (Oct. 22), says: "Money on call is 6@7 per cent. to the best borrowers. On inferior collaterals rates are not quotable; by "inferior collateral" we mean stocks the value of which is doubtful and for which there is not at all hours of the day a ready market at the Stock Exchange. Some of the stocks which are delt in by the tens of thousands of shares are probably worth little or nothing, although selling at prices which imply value, but they are a safe enough collateral for at least private money-lenders so long as they can be sold at any moment at the Stock Exchange for enough to cover the money lent on them. Respecting the currency movement, the banks which have sent the largest amounts to the West report a decided falling-off in the demand from that section. It is notable that a good part of the demand that remains is being supplied by the Boston banks, which take this way of working off national bank notes. A New York bank gets an order from Chicago for say $100,000 currency. It sends to Boston to its correspondent there to start the currency from there. To the extent that this is done is New York relieved; and bankers here inform us that it is being done now to a considerable extent."

New York City Five Per Cent. Loan.—Controller Kelly of the City of New York, made the following awards to the lowest bidders for the 5 per cent. $6,000,000 loan, for which proposals were opened October 23d, and the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund have approved of his action:

Williamburgh Savings Bank	$200,000 at 102.27
" " "	200,000 at 102.07
H. F. Spaulding, Trustee	40,000 at 102.21
Newburgh Savings Bank	100,000 at 102.26
" "	100,000 at 101.76
Robert Copley	18,000 at 102.07
Charles H. Judson	20,000 at 102.00
William and John O'Brien	200,000 at 102.16
" "	100,000 at 101.96
East River Savings Institution	200,000 at 102.01
" " "	400,000 at 101.90
" " "	400,000 at 101.80
" " "	400,000 at 101.69
Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn	150,000 at 101.66
Port Chester Savings Bank.	20,000 at 101.75
" " "	20,000 at 101.62½
" " "	40,000 at 101.50
Citizens' Savings Bank	200,000 at 102.00
" "	200,000 at 101.75
" "	200,000 at 101.50
Irving Savings Institution	100,000 at 101.48
John Stillwell	13,000 at 101.50
Morton, Bliss & Co., & J. & W. Seligman & Co	2,647,000 at 101.41
Germania Savings Bank of Kings County, Brooklyn	30,000 at 101.53

Redemption of Destroyed Bonds.—The following regulations concerning relief in cases of bonds of the United States which have been defaced, destroyed, or lost, were published by the Treasury Department October 17: "Persons presenting claims on account of coupon or registered bonds of the United States which have been destroyed, wholly or in part, or on account of registered bonds which have been lost, will be required to present evidence showing, first, the number, denomination, date of authorizing act, and series of each bond, whether coupon or registered, and, if registered, the name of the payee. In the case of registered bonds, it should also be stated whether they had been assigned or not previous to their alleged loss or destruction, and, if assigned, by whom, and whether assigned in blank or to some person specifically by name, and if assigned in the latter manner, the name of the assignee should be given; second, the time and place of purchase, of whom purchased, and the consideration paid; third, the material facts and circumstances connected with the loss or destruction of the bonds. In all cases the evidence should be as full and clear as possible, that there may be no doubt of the good faith of the claimant. Proofs may be made by affidavit, duly authenticated, and by such other competent evidence as may be in the possession of the claimant. Affidavits and evidence pertaining to the claim should be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the receipt of which they will be referred to the First Controller of the Treasury for his decision as to their sufficiency, and, as soon as a decision is reached, the applicant will be advised of the result, and, if favorable to him, a blank indemnity bond will be transmitted for execution, and, when returned and approved by the Controller and the Secretary, the relief desired will be granted. Duplicates in lieu of lost registered bonds will not be issued within six months from the time of the alleged loss. The interest on uncalled registered bonds will be paid to the payees thereof notwithstanding the alleged loss or destruction of the bonds. These regulations do not apply in any way to coupons lost or destroyed which have been detached from the bonds to which they belonged, as no relief in such cases can be granted under existing laws."

Coming to New York.—It appears that one of the leading bankers of the Pacific Coast intends to make New York his home, at least during part of the year. Mr. D. P. Morgan, the banker, has sold to Mr. D. O. Mills, the California millionaire, his mansion on Fifth avenue, opposite the Cathedral, fully furnished, for $375,000.

Some months ago the publishers of RHODES' JOURNAL made a proposition to send the publication on trial, up to Jan. 1, 1880, at reduced rates. The result has been highly gratifying in every respect. We take this method of thanking the many subscribers who have commended the JOURNAL. It will be our constant aim to make it invaluable to the banking community of the entire country.

A prominent banking firm in Pennsylvania sends the following note with their remittance:

"GENTLEMEN—Find our check No. —— to pay for your JOURNAL OF BANKING to January 1, 1880. We appreciate the JOURNAL as the best we have ever read. Wishing you abundant success, Yours truly,

* * *."

The Cape Ann "Advertiser," published at Gloucester, Mass., says: "RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING for October contains much valuable information concerning the currency, banking, savings institutions, and kindred themes."

Attention is respectfully directed to the special notice on another page referring to "The Banker's Year-Book." *Illustrations of Bank Buildings* to appear in advertisements are engraved *at our expense.* We guarantee first-class illustrations. Proofs submitted for approval. Can be engraved from a photograph, print, drawing, or outline sketch.

This rule also applies to illustrations of bank buildings to appear in the advertising pages of RHODES' JOURNAL.

RHODES' JOURNAL RECORD OF DEATHS.

HENRY H. FARNUM, President of the National Bank, of Port Jervis, New York, died October 14, 1879, aged seventy-one years.

He was favorably known in financial circles as a conservative business man, and was one of the wealthiest men in Orange County, leaving a fortune estimated at $1,000,000 to his widow, to whom he was married only six days before his death.

T. C. S. FERGUSON, President of the Lynchburgh National Bank, of Lynchburgh, Virginia, died October 27th, 1879.

He was also senior member of the large tobacco-manufacturing establishment of Ferguson, Lacy & Co., and was recognized as the leading business man of Lynchburgh, having filled many positions of public trust.

CHARLES P. WILLIAMS, the founder and for many years President of the First National Bank of Stonington, Conn., died October 28, 1879, aged seventy-five years.

Mr. Williams was a native of Stonington, and has always been identified with the commercial and financial interests of the borough. He was a thorough financier, of superior judgment, and a strict economist, yet kind and liberal in giving. In the State of Connecticut can hardly be found the record of so successful a business career, and few men, if any, that amassed a like estate, estimated to be several millions.

DR. RUDOLPH REUL, President of the First National Bank of Delphos, Ohio, died August 20th, 1879, aged fifty-two years.

He was a most estimable citizen, and his loss is severely felt in the community.

Bank Changes, New Banks, Etc.

CALIFORNIA.—Bank of California, San Francisco; capital reduced to $3,000,000.

National Gold Bank and Trust Co., San Francisco; W. S. Bartlett, Cashier, in place of W. P. Willard.

COLORADO.—Brown & Manzanares and Otero, Sellar & Co., El Moro; removed to Las Vegas, New Mexico.

DAKOTA TERRITORY.—First National Bank, Deadwood; M. C. Thum, Cashier, in place of S. N. Wood.

GEORGIA.—Barnesville Savings Bank; H. P. Powell, Cashier, in place of E. H. Bloodworth.

ILLINOIS.—City National Bank of Cairo; J. H. Smith, Acting Cashier, in place of W. Hyslop, resigned.

First National Bank, Batavia; succeeded by Coffin & Young.

D. Gardner & Co., Champaign; succeeded by Bailey, Maxwell & Miller.

Wall, Taylor & Co., Staunton; closing banking business.

INDIANA.—Bedford National Bank, Bedford; now Bedford Bank. Same officers.

Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, Lineville; now Bank of Lineville. Same officers.

IOWA.—Dunlap Bank, Dunlap; L. S. Amsden, Cashier, in place of G. W. Thompson.

Chas. Hammond and Wm. H. Tuthill, Tipton; consolidated as Cedar County Bank.

KANSAS.—Washington County Bank (Fred. A. Head), Washington; now Head Brothers.

KENTUCKY.—First National Bank of Louisville; A. L. Schmidt, Cashier, in place of F. P. Schmitt.

Logan Co. National Bank of Russellville: Hugh Barclay, Jr., President, in place of W. F. Browder; Wilbur F. Barclay, Cashier, in place of H. Barclay, Jr.

MAINE.—Merchants' National Bank of Bangor; Jonathan R. Holt, Cashier, in place of M. F. Stickney.

MASSACHUSETTS.—First National Bank of Barre; Frank A. Rich, Cashier, in place of C. G. Scott.

National Exchange Bank of Salem; Nathan Nichols, President, in place of H. L. Williams.

Rockport National Bank; Eli Golt, Cashier, in place of H. H. Paul.

MISSOURI.—Shelby County Savings Bank, Shelbyville; succeeded by Cooper & Dimmitt.

NEBRASKA.—Fred. L. Harris & Co., Friend; now L. E. Southwick.

NEW YORK CITY.—Manhattan Company Bank; J. T. Baldwin, Cashier, in place of J. S. Harberger.

NEW YORK.—First National Bank, Seneca Falls; W. P. Elwell, Cashier, in place of D. E. Partridge, deceased.

National Bank of Port Jervis; Chas. St. John, President, in place of H. H. Farnum.

Citizens' Bank, Waverly; R. L. Manning, Cashier, in place of H. Hallet.

Mechanics' Bank, Syracuse; winding up.

OHIO.—First National Bank, Monroeville, No. 2438, Capital $50,000. O. W. Head, President, H. P. Stentz, Cashier. Organized during week ending Nov. 1.

Commercial National Bank, Cleveland; capital reduced to $1,000,000.

PENNSYLVANIA.—Hyde-Park Bank, Scranton; assigned.

TEXAS.—Bank of Texarkana; succeeded by L. C. DeMorse & Co.

VIRGINIA.—Agency Lynchburg Fire Ins. Co., Liberty; succeeded by Bank of Bedford.

WISCONSIN.—Judge & King, Darlington; now Judge, King & Co.

THE BANKER'S INDEX.

The Money Market and Financial Situation.

NEW YORK, November 1, 1879.

The events in financial and commercial circles during the month of October were of unusual interest, in fact, in many respects, remarkable. On the Stock Exchange the wildest speculation chronicled since the memorable panic of 1873, has held full sway, and capitalists have been discounting, to a mad extent, whatever benefits will accrue from the really substantial revival in many of the legitimate interests of the country. This is not surprising in view of the fact that for years no opportunities have offered for a prolonged bull campaign in Wall Street, and that values were unduly depressed. Thus far the year of 1879 has been full of encouragement, and the revival in business has undoubtedly come to stay unless speculation carries values to a bursting point.

The coal trade is a fair criterion of the improvement in the manufacturing industries of the country. The increase in railroad construction and the revival in real estate operations, are plainly evidenced in the great demand for iron and steel, which in turn accounts in part for the enormous consumption of coal, the total output of which thus far this year is about 21,000,000 tons, showing the enormous increase of 7,500,000 tons over the same time in 1878. Furthermore the supply of coal on hand is quite small, and the probabilities are that the demand will be fully equal to the supply for months to come, and perhaps even for a longer period.

The great yield of cereals in this country and the short crops in Europe account, to a great extent, for the improvement in trade, having had the effect of bringing to America enormous amounts of foreign gold. We mention the coal and agricultural interests particularly because they have directly influenced the extraordinary movements on our Stock Exchange for some time past.

The money market has reflected the great activity in legitimate business and speculation. The active employment of capital has led to much higher rates of interest than usually prevail at this season of the year. The ruling quotation for call loans was 7 per cent., but at intervals borrowers well-known, offering good collaterals have been compelled to pay a commission in addition to legal interest. On pledge of miscellaneous securities as high as ¼@½ per cent. per diem was paid quite frequently. These figures were unquestionably due to some extent to artificial manipulation, but on the other hand, natural causes sufficiently account for the hardening in the rates for money. Thus the aggregate of exchanges at New York for the four weeks ending October 25th was $3,048,965,449, against $1,753,291,497 for the same period last year, showing clearly the great increase in the employment of capital for legitimate and speculative purposes. The course of the money market is all the more remarkable for the reason that since the first day of August over $50,000,000 of specie, nearly all gold, has arrived from foreign shores. It is this specie that has prevented a revulsion in the money market and saved the country from, perhaps, experiencing a panic. Large amounts of specie are still on the way from Europe, and it is confidently expected that the imports of the precious metals for the year 1879 will aggregate $100,000,000.

To-day the United States Treasury will begin the payment of something over $7,000,000 of interest. This money is not now in the market, and will therefore be a clear gain to it. The other November payments will probably amount to about $20,000,000, a large part of them being for the account of the city.

The movement of the cotton crop has necessitated heavy remittances of currency to the South, but the return flow will soon begin, and large sums will also be received shortly from the interior. From this time forth it is therefore reasonable to expect that the monetary situation will be free from any serious disturbances. The banks are increasing their circulation, and are likely to continue to do so as the advance in the rates of interest make the operation a profitable one. The statements of the New York City Associated Banks showed a gain in specie for the month of about $6,500,000, but on the other hand, the loss in legal-tenders reached about $8,000,000. The surplus reserve of the banks which on September 27 was $2,569,350, ran down to $261,425 on October 4th. From this point there was an increase to $1,279,975, while to-day's statement shows a deficiency in the legal reserve of $311,800. In this connection the Controller of the Currency has written to the national banks of this city, whose average reserve for the week ending October 25 was shown by the Clearing-House statement to have been below the legal requirement, to report to him the present state of their reserve, and directing them, if it is still deficient, to make it good as required by law. This we believe gives a delinquent bank thirty days in which to make good its reserve before the Controller can take any other action, but it also provides that delinquent banks shall make no new loans while the reserve is below the legal limit.

The following shows the averages reported by the banks for the past four weeks, and the amount of reserve held above and below legal requirements for the same period:

	Oct. 4.	Oct. 11.	Oct. 18.	Oct. 25.	Nov. 1.
Loans	$266,364,300	$268,701,800	$267,505,500	$269,433,800	$271,238,600
Specie	20,149,100	22,566,300	26,383,600	27,682,600	29,675,300
Legal-tenders	38,093,500	36,438,500	33,097,700	30,151,700	28,615,900
Deposits	231,920,700	232,780,500	232,805,300	231,668,000	234,412,000
Circulation	21,932,400	22,080,100	22,286,800	22,448,700	22,600,500
Surplus reserve	261,425	809,675	1,279,975	.....	......
Deficiency in legal reserve				$82,700	$311,800

There was a good demand for mercantile paper throughout, and prime names were scarce. The market closed as follows:

CURRENCY PAPER.

	Sixty days.	Four months.
Double-named—		
First-class	5½@ 6	6 @ 6½
Good	6 @ 7	6½@ 7
Single-named—		
First-class	6 @ 7	6 @ 7
Good	8 @ 9	8 @ 9
Not so well known	9 @10	9 @10

Toward the close of the month considerable comment was caused by the announcement that the Controller of the Currency had called upon Bank Examiner Meigs to enforce the following section of the National Bank Act in regard to the certification of checks:

"It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk, or agent of any national banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association at the time such check is certified an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check."

The merits of this question are treated of elsewhere. Certain it is, however, that the low condition of the reserves of some of the banks, taken in connection with the current speculation on the Stock Exchange, which has made the wholesale certification of checks by the banks somewhat dangerous, called for some action on the part of the authorities, but it is also proper to add that the law has been a dead letter since its enactment, and hence the motive for the sudden change of front on the part of the Controller is questioned.

THE GOVERNMENT BOND market presented no noteworthy features, the volume of business having been very moderate in extent, and the changes in prices comparatively insignificant. The demand came chiefly from the national banks, which have increased their circulation about $3,500,000 during the month. Washington dispatches state that the increase in bank circulation during November will probably be greater than for any preceding month in several years. The demand for bonds from the banks more than neutralized the effect on the market of the high rates for money. It was freely reported that one of the banks was buying bonds for the account of the sinking fund of the United States Government, but nothing definite could be learned in regard to the matter.

The following table shows the highest and lowest prices for the month, and the closing quotations yesterday as compared with those on September 30:

	Int. Periods.	Closing Sept. 30.	Highest for Oct.	Lowest for Oct.	Clos'g Oct. 31.
6s, 1880, reg	J. & J.	104	104½	104⅛	104⅝
6s, 1880, coup	J. & J.	104	104½	104¼	104½
6s, 1881, reg	J. & J.	105¼	105½	105	105⅝
6s, 1881, coup	J. & J.	105¼	105½	105	105¼
5s, 1881, reg	Q.—Feb.	103⅛	102¼	101⅝	102¼
5s, 1881, coup	Q.—Feb.	103⅛	103½	102¾	103⅝
4½s, 1891, reg	Q.—Mar.	105½	105⅞	105⅜	105⅞
4½s, 1891, coup	Q.—Mar.	105½	105⅞	105¼	105¾
4s, 1907, reg	Q.—Jan.	101⅛	102½	101⅞	102¼
4s, 1907, coup	Q.—Jan.	102¾	102⅝	101⅞	102½
6s, currency, 1895, reg*	J. & J.	121½	122	121	122
6s, currency, 1896, reg*	J. & J.	122	122½	121	122¼
6s, currency, 1897, reg*	J. & J.	122¼	123	121	122½
6s. currency, 1898, reg*	J. & J.	122¾	123½	121	123
6s, currency, 1899, reg*	J. & J.	123	124	121	123½

*Bid.

State Bonds.—The business in State Bonds was rather more active than usual with a general advance in prices early in the month. Speculation ran chiefly to Tennessees, Louisianas and North Carolinas. Toward the close a reaction from the highest point took place. Some amounts of Louisiana consols were taken for Amsterdam account. North and South Carolinas were higher on the improvement in trade at the South, but the movement is, of course, wholly speculative. District Columbia 3-65s ranged between 83¾ and 84½, and closed at the latter figure. Tennessees, old, rose from 31 to 41¾; do., new, from 26½ to 34, and do., new series, from 26½ to 33¾, with closing sales at 38, 32⅞ and 33¼ respectively. Louisiana consols advanced from 39½ to 46½, and closed at 43½.

Railroad Bonds.—In railroad mortgages the dealings were on a scale of great magnitude, and at intervals were attended with a degree of excitement to which this department has long been a stranger. Taking the entire list into consideration, a much higher range of prices prevailed, the advance being partly in sympathy with the improvement in the share list. Better reasons, however, are advanced for the remarkable rise which has taken place in railroad mortgages. Many of the old established and regular interest paying roads have long been selling below the figures warranted by the amount of income afforded on these investments, while the low-priced issues are improving on the increase of their business and the steady development of the railroad system at the West, which is bringing about the consolidation of lines, thus enabling the companies to earn interest where separately they could not. The principal activity was in the Erie, Kansas & Texas, Iron Mountain and the Coal Roads' issues. The transactions in Erie consol 2nds amounted for the month to nearly $22,000,000, at prices ranging from 80¾ to 86¾, with final sales at 84⅝. Kansas & Texas 2nds rose from 33 to 47, and do., consol assented, from 78 to 90, with closing transactions at a reaction of 4 and 2 per cent., respectively.

The Foreign Exchanges were characterized by a weak tone throughout, and the nominal asking rates for bankers' bills were reduced from 4.82½ and 4.84½ to 4.81½ and 4.83½ for sixty day and demand bills respectively. The weakness of the market was due to the free supply of cotton bills, the stringency in money, and the fact that the demand was confined almost exclusively to the gold importers. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that rates have continued below the specie importing point, and unless the Bank of England should advance its rate of discount, no change of importance need be looked for.

The market closed dull and weak. We quote:

	60 days.	Demand.
Prime bankers' sterling bills on London	4.80 @4.81½	4.82¼@4.83½
Good bankers' and prime commercial	4.79½@4.80½	4.82 @4.83
Good commercial	4.79 @4.80	4.81 @4.82
Documentary commercial	4.78½@4.79½	4.80 @4.81
Paris (francs)	5.25⅝@5.24⅜	5.23¾@5.21⅞
Antwerp (francs)	5.26¼@5.25	5.23¾@5.21⅞
Swiss (francs)	5.25 @5.23¾	5.22¾@5.21⅞
Amsterdam (guilders)	39¾@ 39⅞	40 @ 40⅛
Hamburg (reichsmark)	94 @ 94¼	94¾@ 95
Frankfort (reichsmark)	94 @ 94¼	94¾@ 95
Bremen (reichsmark)	94 @ 94¼	94¾@ 95
Berlin (reichsmark)	94 @ 94¼	94¾@ 95

THE STOCK MARKET has absorbed the chief interest in financial circles during the past month. Never before in the history of the Stock Exchange have the dealings reached such enormous proportions, and the really extraordinary changes which have taken place since our last review will be seen at a glance by the tables which follow. Taken altogether the speculation exhibited unexampled buoyancy, and notwithstanding that several sharp reactions occurred, the quotations in the final dealings were very close on to the highest figures of the year. The inherent strength of the market was best shown by the advance in prices at intervals in the face of "tight" money. For instance, yesterday, with call loans at ⅜ of 1 per cent. per diem and interest, Pacific Mail recorded an advance of over 4 per cent., and the general market followed close in the wake of this stock. It cannot be denied that the enhancement in values is to a certain extent based on solid grounds.

To enumerate only a few of the favorable elements at the back of the current movement in stocks, we may cite the immense addition to the circulating medium of the country by the resumption of specie payments, previous to which gold was so much merchandise; the largest imports of specie for any ten months in the history of the nation; the active demand for our crops, which has given to the railroads a tremendous traffic, and the revival in the iron and coal interests. Minor reasons exist for the improvement in securities generally, but those given above have been the backbone of the advance. During the greater portion of the month speculation ran wild on the coal stocks, which advanced 8¾ to 19¼ per cent. on immense purchases. Toward the close there was a reaction of 2 to 5 per cent., but the decline was partially recovered in the final dealings. All the coal companies advanced the prices for their product early in the month, and to-day a still further advance will go into effect. It is highly probable that as higher prices can now be had for the mere asking, the companies will, from time to time, make the public pay dearer figures for coal, and it is calculated by the believers in the shares, that the managers of the corporations now intend to pay dividends as soon as possible. Confidence is so strongly felt in the future of the trade that Mr. Packer's refusal to join a combination is regarded of little importance.

The Granger stocks sold at the highest figures ever attained. These roads are benefitting from the transportation of grain, which is certain to continue large for months to come. The trunk lines shares advanced first on account of the immense traffic offering, and second, to the fact that rates on grain have been advanced with the prospect of still higher charges when navigation closes. The rise in Erie was stimulated by reports that a contest was in progress between Vanderbilt and Gould for the control of the road. Toward the close the stock declined on statements by Mr. Vanderbilt, that he had no interest whatever in the property. It is pretty generally believed, however, that the gentleman referred to has been a large buyer of the shares, and that he has an understanding with Gould in the matter. To give color to this view it was reported on good authority, late in the month, that an arrangement had been made which will secure to the New York Central and the Lake Shore all the business, or the bulk of it, which the Wabash system of roads can collect and bring to Toledo, and on the other hand will secure to the Wabash and its tributaries and connections all the

Southwestern business of the New York Central and Vanderbilt roads. The Southwestern shares assumed a prominent position in the dealings, and there was a great advance in Wabash, Kansas City and Northern and others.

The telegraph shares were buoyant, especially for Western Union, which advanced about 18 per cent. Reports were current that this company had secured control of the opposition line, but these were denied. The advance in the shares can be traced to the great increase in the telegraph business, resulting from the activity in general trade and the speculation in stocks, grain and provisions at the leading cities of the country. Toward the close Pacific Mail took a sharp upward turn. The rise was attributed to the increase in the company's business, which is fast enabling it to liquidate its indebtedness to the Panama Railroad, and enabling the managers to make vast improvements in the service. It is believed that the company will shortly enter into a pooling arrangement with the Pacific railroads. The month of October closed with a cheerful feeling in stock circles, and a belief that the advance in prices will make further progress.

The fluctuations are shown in the table annexed, which gives the highest and lowest prices for the month, and the closing quotations for September and October:

	Closing Sept. 30.	Highest for Oct.	Lowest for Oct.	Closing Oct. 31.
B. C. R. & North'n.	56	70	55	65
Canada Southern	69¾	77⅜	68¾	73⅛
C., C., C. & Ind	67¼	71	56	69
C., C. & Ind. Cen	11¾	20	11¾	13⅜
Chic. B. & Quincy	114⅜	124	113⅞	119¾
Chic., & Alton	97	100	94½	99½
Chic., R. Island	141½	148½	138½	147
Del. Lack. & West'n	67¼	90	67⅝	88¾
Del. & Hud., Canal Co	59¼	81¾	59½	79
Erie Railway	32⅞	43½	32¼	40½
Erie Railway pref	58	67½	56½	65
Hannibal & St. Jo	24¾	37½	24⅜	36¾
Han. & St. Jo. pref	53¼	61⅝	53	60¾
Harlem	156	165	155	164
Illinois Central	92	98¾	92	98
Kansas Pacific	70	85¼	70	84¾
Louisville & Nash	62½	76½	62⅛	76½
Lake Shore	94⅞	101¾	92⅝	101
Michigan Central	89½	95¼	87	93½
Mil. & St. Paul	67⅞	75⅛	67⅜	74⅛
Mil. & St. Paul pref	98	99½	97½	98¼
Mo., Kan. & Tex	20¼	30½	19	28½
Morris & Essex	93½	102¼	93⅛	100¾
New Jersey Cen	60½	80¼	60	77¾
N. Y. Elevated	121	136	120½	131
N. Y. & N. Haven	163	165	161	162
N. Y. Cent. & Hud	119	133	119	130
Northwestern	83⅜	90⅛	82⅛	90
Northwestern pref	100¼	104¼	99⅞	104¼
Ohio & Mississippi	19⅞	24⅞	19	23¾
Ohio & Miss. pref	52¾	54¾	49½	53½
Panama	170	182	166	180
Pittsburgh	104	104¾	103	104
St. L., Kan. C. & N	24¾	46	24	44½
St. L. Kan. C. & N. p'd	59⅞	71¼	58¼	69½
St. L. & S. Francisco	19½	29	18½	27
San Francisco pref	21½	33½	21½	33½
San Francisco 1st p'd	47	56	45½	54
St. L. I. M. & South	44	52¼	42½	49¼
Union Pacific	84½	95	84⅝	91½
Wabash	43½	60⅝	43	59½

Western Union Tel	94⅜	106¾	92¼	105¼
Atlantic & Pac. Tel	36	43⅛	35	41⅞
Am. Dist. Tel	67	73¼	65	71
Pacific Mail	28⅝	38¾	29⅛	38¾
Adams Express	103	107	102⅞	105⅛
American Express	51	65	51	57⅝
U. S. Express	45	60⅛	45	54
Wells-Fargo Ex	99⅛	106	99⅞	103⅛
Canton	51	59⅛	48	56¾
Quicksilver	14	20¾	13⅛	18
Quicksilver pref	51	59	49⅛	53¼

The following tables taken from the "American Exchange" give the number of shares of stock and the amount of Government, State and railroad bonds dealt in at the New York Stock Exchange for each month from January 1 to November 1 of the current year, except railroad bonds, which are given only since February 1, the average daily sales for each month, and the total average for the past nine months, as officially reported:

RAILROAD AND OTHER STOCK.

Month.	Business days.	Amount of shares.	Daily average.
January	26	6,615,648	254,448
February	23	4,729,691	205,639
March	26	3,945,117	151,735
April	25	4,566,083	182,643
May	26	5,546,808	213,339
June	25	3,288,592	131,544
July	25	3,656,367	146,255
August	26	5,398,268	207,626
September	26	7,136,020	274,462
October	27	11,526,009	426,889
Total	255	56,408,603	221,210

GOVERNMENT BONDS.

Month.	Days.	Amount.	Daily average.
January	26	$9,026,600	$347,177
February	23	6,727,050	292,480
March	26	4,845,150	186,352
April	25	15,822,850	632,914
May	26	11,371,300	437,358
June	25	9,223,300	368,932
July	25	13,216,200	528,648
August	26	12,634,400	485,939
September	26	6,918,500	266,096
October	27	8,300,500	307,426
Total	255	$98,085,850	$384,647

STATE BONDS (INCLUDING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 3-65s).

Month.	Business days.	Amount.	Daily average.
January	26	$1,977,650	$76,063
February	23	2,546,500	110,711
March	26	2,382,000	91,615
April	25	1,849,500	73,980
May	26	3,858,200	148,392
June	25	2,934,500	117,380
July	25	1,682,300	67,292
August	26	967,500	37,211
September	26	641,500	24,634
October	27	1,976,500	73,204
Total	255	$20,816,150	$81,632

CITY BANK STOCKS.

Month.	Business days.	No. of shares.	Daily average.
January	26	1,892	73
February	23	1,718	75
March	26	1,657	64
April	25	1,191	48
May	26	1,216	47
June	25	1,176	47
July	25	1,150	46
August	26	876	34
September	26	903	35
October	27	2,132	79
Total	255	13,911	54

RAILROAD AND OTHER BONDS (FROM FEBUARY 1).

Month.	Business days.	Amount.	Daily average.
February	23	$21,831,500	$949,196
March	26	19,476,750	749,106
April	25	39,997,000	1,599,880
May	26	42,927,500	1,651,958
June	25	31,053,000	1,250,120
July	25	16,887,700	675,508
August	26	31,011,500	1,192,750
September	26	33,386,450	1,284,094
October	27	60,471,500	2,239,685
Total	229	297,242,900	1,298,004

[From our general Southern Correspondent.]

AUGUSTA, GA., November 1st, 1879.

The South—Financial Epitome.—Since our last report the Georgia Legislature has closed its session, and as we apprehended, the impeachment cases ended largely in political pettifogging, for while one officer was disgraced, the offences of another were compromised, while others still were ignored.

Again, while certain necessary and responsible officials (among them the State Treasurer, giving bond in the sum of $200,000, receiving salary of $2,000 per annum) get compensations contemptibly small in a great commonwealth, a railroad commission, entirely unnecessary and arbitrary, was established at an outlay of seventy-five hundred dollars a year.

The Georgia Solons invaded the domain of finance, and retaining the legal rate of interest at 7 per cent., restricted the rate by contract at 8 per cent., and made any charge in excess of 8 per cent. usury, entailing a forfeiture of all interest and excess of interest involved in the transaction. The law is drawn very strongly, to prevent evasions, and country editors seem to think the golden era has arrived when money will flow into their control at their own rates, when in reality, as far as legislation could avail, the vaults are locked against the weaker class of borrowers.

Georgia, as is known, is a State of vast natural resources, seeking and undergoing development, so that not only could our own capital be advantageously absorbed, but money was being drawn here through the banks from other sections, to move our crops and advance our industries and manufacturing interests. As we have stated in reports, money could be handled advantageously here at 10 per cent. interest, but as the legislators have declared that the people cannot pay what it is worth, the markets will, it is feared, cease in great measure to attract it here, and many applicants must go without it, unless, as results largely prove, debtors and creditors unite in ignoring an arbitrary statute.

One feature of improvement over the South is from the people studying the development of means and letting politics alone, and as planters are gradually freeing themselves from old encumbrances and factors, and the present crop is bringing paying prices, this section is settling down upon a firm and progressive basis.

Merchants are doing a quiet but healthy and increasing business, but our statement that trade is drifting away from old centres and diffusing itself, becomes more and more manifest. Charleston, the old mistress of the Southern coast, recently advertised thirteen hundred pieces of property for sale for back taxes, while the other old representative city of New Orleans assesses its tax returns at twenty million dollars less than last year.

As an instance of the improvement felt from the advance of cotton prices, it is said that this city derives one hundred thousand dollars more each week from sales than at the same period last year.

Manufactories are all running at their full capacity, and the active demand for their goods is leading to the erection of new mills.

The iron interests are looking up wherever the ore can be produced with facilities for transportation, and numbers of closed furnaces are being put into operation.

Securities are in active demand, and there is a manifest determination to reach the true status of all obligations through the courts.

Although it is unlawful, we must quote money in fair demand at ten per cent., with exchange quoting at ⅜ to 5-16 premium on New York.

STOCKS AND BONDS—PRICES IN NEW YORK AND OTHER CITIES.

The following tables give the latest bid and asked prices at the New York Stock Exchange; also Southern securities, a full list of general stocks not called at the Exchange, and correct quotations from other cities.

Quotations in New York are to Thursday, Oct. 30; latest mail advices from other cities.

The prices named represent the percentage upon a par basis.

*** Indicates ex-interest. § With interest added. x Dividend.**

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
STATE STOCK.		
Alabama 5s, 1883	50	
do 5s, 1886	50	
do 8s, 1886	50	
do 8s, 1888	50	
do 8s M & Eufala R R	3	
do 8s Ala & Chat R R	20	
do 8s of 1892	30	
do 8s of 1893	30	
do consols class A	48⅜	50
do do do B	78	
do do do C	55	
Arkansas 6s funded	10	
do 7s L Rk & Ft S iss	7½	
do 7s Memp & L R	7	
do 7s L Rk P B & N O	6¼	10
do 7s Miss O & R Riv	6	
do 7s Ark Cent R R	6	
Connecticut 6s	107	
Georgia 6s	100½	
do 7s new bonds	110	111
do 7s endorsed	109	
do 7s gold bonds	110½	112
Illinois coupon 6s, 1879		
do war loan		
Kentucky 6s	100	
Louisiana 6s	20	
do new bonds	20	
do 6s new floating debt	20	
do 7s penitentiary	20	
do 5s levee bonds	20	
do 8s do	20	
do 8s do of 1875	20	
do 8s do of 1910		15
do 7s Consolidated	43½	43¾
do 7s Small Bonds		43
Michigan 6s 1878-1879		
do 6s, 1883		
do 7s, 1890		
Missouri 6s due in 1883	102	
do do in 1886		105
do do 1887		106
do do 1888	105½	
do do in 1889 or 1890		
Asyl or Univs'y due 1892		
Fund'g bds due in 1894-5		
Han & St. Jos. due 1886	104	
do do 1887	104¼	
New York 6s gold reg'd, 1887	108	
do 6s do coup., 1887	108	
do 6s do loan, 1883	106	
do 6s do do 1891	117	
do 6s do do 1892	117	
do 6s do do 1893	117	
N Carolina 6s old Jan & July	25½	26
do Apr & Oct	25½	26
do N. C. R., Jan & July	108	
do do Apr & Oct	108	
do do cp off Jan & July	89	
do do cp off Apr & Oct		
do funding act, 1866	9	10
do do 1868	9	
do new bonds Jan & July	15	

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
N. C. new bonds, April & Oct	15	
do special tax, class 1	5	
do do class 2	4¼	
do do class 3	4½	5¼
Ohio 6s. 1881	104	
do 1886		
Rhode Island 6s	114	..
South Carolina 6s	60	
do Jan & July	30	
do April & Oct		
do funding act 1866	30	
do land C 1889 Jan & J	50	
do land C 1889 Apr & O	50	
do 7s of 1888	10	
Non-fundable bonds	4	4½
Tennessee 6s, old	38	40
do 6s, new		32⅞
do new series	32	
Virginia 6s, old	27	
do 6s, new bonds, 1866	28	
do 6s, do 1867	28	
do 6s, consol. bonds	86	
do 6s, ex-mat'd coup	64¼	66
do 6s, do 2d series	33	
do 6s, defer'd do	7¼	7¾
Dist. of Col. 3-65's 1924	84½	85
do Small Bonds		
do Registered		85
CITY AND COUNTY.		
Brooklyn 6s		
do 6s, water loan		
do 6s, imp'm't stock		
do 7s, do		
do 6s, pub, p'k loan		
do 7s. do do		
Jersey City 6s, water loan		
do 7s, do		
do 7s, improvement		
Kings county 6s		
New York City 6s, 20-50's, 1876		
do do 6s, 1877		
do do 6s, 1878		
do do 6s, 1887		
do do G'd 6s, Con. 1902		
do do 6s, 1896		
do do 6s Dock b'ds		
do do 6s co. b'ds		
do do 6s Cen. Park		
do 5s, 1890		
do 5s, 1898		
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Boston, H. & E. 1st m	45½	45⅝
Boston, H. & E. 1st m guar	41½	43½
B., Cedar Rap. & N. 1s 5s g	89⅛	89½
Chesapeake & Ohio 6s 1st mtg.	101¼	
do do ex-coupon		
Chicago & Alton 1st mortgage		
do income		
Joliet & Chicago 1st mortgage		
La. & Mo., 1st guaranteed		110
St. L Jacksonville & Chic 1st		
Chic. Bur. & Qu. 8 per ct. 1st m		

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid.	Askd
Chic. Bur. & Qu. cons......M 7s	......	121
do do 5s Sinking Fund	......	......
Chic. R. I. & Pacific 1st M 7s...		
do 6s 1917, coupon...	114½	114¾
do 6s 1917, registered	114	114½
Keokuk & Des Moin. 1st 5s.....	92½	93½
Central R R of New Jersey....		
Cen. R of N. J. 1st m. new..	114½	......
do 1st consolidated	......	......
do convertible	......	......
L. & W. B'e. con. guaranteed	......	......
Am' Dock & Imp. bonds	101¼	101½
Chic. Mil. & St. Paul R. R	......	......
M. & St. P. 1st mtg 8s P. D...	124½	......
do 2d 7 3-10 P. D.....	110	113
do 1st 7s $ gold R. D	112	113
do 1st 7s £ do	.....	......
do 1st M. LaC. D.....	111	......
do 1st M. I. & M. D..	110½	....
do 1st M. I. & D......	......	......
do 1st M. H. & D.....	105	......
do 1st M. C. & M.....	112	113
do consolidated s f..	109	109⅛
do 2d mortgage.....	100	......
Chic. & N. W. sinking fund....	109	......
do do int. bonds.......	107½	109
do do cons. bonds.....	118¼	......
do do exten. bonds...	103	......
do do 1st mortgage...	108	109
do do coup gd bonds..	114	114⅝
do do reg'd do	113	113¾
Iowa Midland 1st m. 8s.....	......	......
Galena & Chicago extension.	104¾	......
Peninsula 1st m. conv........	......	......
Chicago & Mil. 1st m..........	114	116
Winona & St. P. 1st mort.....	.....	109
do do 2d mort.....	111	......
C. C. C. & Ind's 1s m. 7s s. f.....	117½	......
do consol, M. bonds.	111	......
Del., Lack. & W. 2d m..........	103¾	104¼
do do 7s conv.......	107	......
Morris & Essex 1st mor.......	124	......
do 2d do	114	... ..
do bonds, 1900...	......	......
do constr'n	98	......
do 7s of 1871.....	109½	110
do 1s con. gd....	105	106
Del. & Hud. Can. 1s m. 1884....	103	105
do do 1891....	107½	......
do Coup. 7s 1894...	105	107½
do Regis'd 7s 1894 ...	106½	......
Albany & Susq. 1st m'ge.......	112	113½
do do 2d do.......	......	......
do do 3d do.......	......	......
do do 1st c gua'd....	103¼	106
Rens'r & Sara. 1st Coup......	......	......
do do 1st reg'd	......	......
Erie 1st mort. extended.	122	......
do 1st do endorsed........	......	......
do 2d do 7s, 1879...........	......	......
do 3d do 7s, 1883....... ...	105½	106
do 4th do 7s, 1880...........	......	......
do 5th do 7s, 1888...........	110½	112½
do 7's cons. m'ge gd bds.....	113¼	113½
Long Dock Bonds............	115	......
B., N. Y., & E. 1st m 1916.....	117⅛	118
Han. & St. J. 8s convertible m.	106¼	106½
Illinois Central,	......	......
Dub. & Sioux City 1st m......	......	......
do do 2d div....	......	......
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st m....	103	......
Indp's Bloomn & W'n 1st m...	. ..	.. ..
do do 2d m...	......	......
Lake Shore Bonds	......	......

Securities.	Bid	Askd
RAILROAD BONDS.		
M. So & N. I. Sink. fd 7 p c.....	111	.....
Cleve. & Tol. sink. fd	110½	111
Cleve. & Tol. new bonds........	109	......
Cleve. Painesv & A old bonds..	102	102½
do do new do....	......	......
Buff. & Erie, new bonds...	114	115
Buff. and State Line 7s.........	......	......
Kala. & W. Pigeon 1st m.......	......	......
Det. Mon & Tol 1st 7s 1906......	112	......
Lake Shore div. bonds..........	......	......
do con c'p 1st bds.....	119½	......
do con reg 1st bds.....	117	118
do con coup 2d m......	115½	116
do con re'gd 2d m.....	113	......
Marietta & Cin. 1st m..	103	......
Mich. Cent. consol. 7s 1902.......	......	......
do 1st m. 8s '82 s f	107	......
do equipment bds.....	......	......
New Jersey So. 1st m. 7s.......	......	......
do consol 7s.......	......	......
N. Y. Cent. 6s, 1883.............	107½	108
do do 6s, 1887.............	......	......
do do 6s, real estate......	......	......
do do 6s, subscription...	......	......
do do & Hud 1st m c.....	125	......
do do do 1st m reg....	....	124½
Hud. Riv. 7s 2d m s f 1885.....	112	......
Harlem 1st m 7s coupon......	125	......
do do reg'd.........	......	......
North Missouri, 1st mort.	......	......
Ohio & Miss cons s f............	112	......
do consolidated.......	... ..	111⅞
do 2d do...........	111	111½
do 1st Springfield div.	60	63
Pacific R R bonds........	......	......
Cent Pacific gold bonds......	110½	111
do San Joaquin branch....	99⅞	......
do Cal & Oregon 1st........	101½	......
do State aid bonds	......	......
do land grant bonds........	101½	......
Western Pacific bonds........	......	......
Union Pacific 1st m bds.......	110	110½
do land grants. 7s...	112½	112½
do sinking fund.....	113⅞	114¼
Pacific R of Mo. 1st m..........	104	104⅛
do 2d m...............	106	.....
do Income 7s........	......	......
do 1st Carnod't B....	......	......
Pennsylvania R R		
Pitts, Ft W & C 1st m	......	128
do do 2d m........	......	......
do do 3d m........	......	......
Cleve & Pitts con s f....	116	119
do 4th do..........	106¾	110
Col. Chic & Ind 1st m.........	78⅝	80
do do 2d m.........	37⅜	......
Rome, Water'n & Og con 1.....	65	67
St. L. & Iron M 1st m...........	112	......
do do 2d m...........	98½	100
St. L. Alton & Terre Haute....		
Alton & Terre Haute 1st m..	112	115
do 2d do pref....	95	96
do 2d do inc......	73	73
Bell & S. Ill R. 1st m 8s........	105	......
Tol, Peo & War, 1st E D........	116	......
do do do W D........	116	......
do do do Burl div.....	... ..	......
do do do 2d m........	......	......
do do do consol 7s....	.....	......
Toledo, Wabash & Western....		
Tol & Wab 1st m ex..........	......	......
do Ex coupon...	108	......
do 1st m St L div.......	......	......
do Ex mat'd coup. ..	99¾	100½

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Tol & Wab 2d m		
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	98¾	99¾
do equipment bonds		40
do cons conv'ble		
do Ex Aug 78 & priv's.	94	95
Gt West'n 1st m 1888		
do Ex coupon	106½	
do 2d m 1893		
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	98⅝	98¾
Quincy & Tol 1st m, 1890		
do Ex M & Nov 77 c p.	96	100
Illinois & S Iowa 1st m		
do Ex coupon	95	98
Han & Cent Mo 1st m.		
Pekin, Lnc'n & Decat'r 1st m.		
West'n Un bds, 1900, c'pon	116	
do do do reg	113½	
MISCELLANEOUS LIST.		
Arkansas Levee 7s	3	6
Atchison & P Pk 6s gold		
Atchison, Top & S Fe 7s, g	112¾	113½
Cairo & Fulton 1st 7s	102½	103
California & Oregon 6s g'd	100	100½
California Pac R R 7s gold	105	110
do 6s 2d m gold	95	100
Central Pac 7s gold, conv	105½	108
do land grant	102	105
Cent of Iowa 1st M 7s gold	97	100
Chi & Southwestern R R 8s	110	115
Chi & Eastern Ill. 1st 6s	90	92
do do income 7s	55	60
Chi & Mich Lake Shore 8s		
Chi & Can South 1st m'g 7s	55	60
Chi, St. P. & Min 1st M 6s	103	103¾
do land grant 6s	92	93
Cin, Rich & F W 1 m g 7s	70	80
Cleve, Mt V & Del 7s gold		
Connecticut Valley 7s gold	50	70
Connecticut Western 1st 7s		
Col & Hock Val 1st 7s 30 ys	105	108
Dan, Urb, Bl & P 1st m 7s g		
Denver Pacific 7 gold	88	89
Denv and Rio Grande 7s g	97¼	97½
Det, Hillsdale & Ind R R 8s		
Dixon, Peoria & Han 8s		
Erie & Pittsburg 1st 7s	100	102½
Evans & Crawfordsville 7s	100	105
Evans, Hend. & Nashville 7s		
Evansville, T & H Chic 7s g	50	70
Flint & Pere M 7s land grant	100	105
do 7s consol	46	50
Fort W, Jackson & Sag 8s		
Grand River Valley 8s	105	110
G'd Rapids & Ind 1 guar 7 g	106	109
G'd Rapids & Ind 1st 7s g	90	93
Houst, & Gt N. 1st m g 7s	92	93
Houst. & Tex. C. 1st M L	107	109
do 1st W D	105	107
do Con. 8s	110	112
Ill Grand Trunk 8s	113	115
Ind, Bl & W Ext 1st m g 7s	18	25
Indianapolis & Mad. 1st m 7s	100	103
Int'national R R Tex 1 m g 7s	92	94
Ind. Bl. & W., 1st 7s, pref	105	110
do 1st	67	70
do 2ds	50	55
do Income	30	35
do stock	20	25
Indianapolis & Vinc's 1st 7s gr.	102	104
Indianapolis & St. Louis 7s	75	85
Io Falls & Sioux City 1st 7s	104	107
Jack. Lansing & Sag. 1st m		
Jeff'ville, Mad & Ind 1st m 7s	111	115
Kala'zoo & South H 8s guar		

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Kal, Alleghan & G R 8s gr	102	105
Kal & White Pigeon 7s	100	105
Kansas City & Cameron 10s	112	116
Kan Pac 7s ex Ma & No g	108	108½
do 7s land gr Ja & Jy g	121	123
Kan Pac 7s do 2d m	100	101
do 6s gold June & Dec	113½	114
do 6s do Feb & Aug	116	117¾
do 7s Leaven Branch	95	100
do Income No 11	74	79
do do No 16	73	76
do stock	84	85
Michigan Air Line 8s		
Mil & North 1st m 8s	60	70
Mo. Kan & Tex assent'd bds	88½	89
do 2d inc	42½	43
N. J. Midland 1st 7s gold	59	61
N. Y. & Osw Mid 1st 7s gold	27	28
North Pac 1st m g 7 3-10s		
Omaha & S West'n R R 8s	113	115
Oregon & Cal 7s gold	28	30
Oswego & Rome 7s guar	100	110
Ott, Oswego & Fox R V 8s		
Pitts, Cin & St Louis 1st 7s	108¼	108½
Pt Huron & L M 7s g end	20	40
Quincy & Warsaw 8s		
Rome, W & Ogdensburg 7s	65	67
Sand, Mans & Newark 7s	100	105
Sioux City & Pacific 6s		
South Side (L I) 7s	90	100
Southern Central N Y 7s	60	80
Steubenville & Indiana 6s	103	105
Southern Minn construc 8s	107	110
St. Jo & C Bl 1st m 10s		
St. Louis, Vanda & T H 1st	110	115
do do 2d	95	100
St L & S Eastern 1st 7s gold	70	75
Union Pacific So br 6s gold	93	96
Union & Logansport 7s	90	95
Texas & Pacific L G 7s	54¼	54⅜
CINCINNATI.		
STATE, CO. AND CITY BONDS.		
Ohio State 6s	111	112
Hamilton County 6s	100	
do do 7s	101	105
City of Cincinnati 6s	104½	
do do 7s	110	
do do 7 3-10	114	115
City of Covington, Ky 6s '81	102	
do do 7 3-10, '81	102	104
RAILROAD BONDS.		
L Miami & I & C con 6s	80	
do do 1st 6s '83	102	
Cin, Ham & Day 1 m 7s '80	100½	
do do 2 m 7s '85	102	105
do do 3 m 8s		
Dayton & Mich, 1 m 7s '81	102½	104
Dayton and Mich, 2 m 7s '84	101	101½
do do 3 m 7s '88	93	95
Cin, Rich & Chi, 1 m 7s '95	92	
Cin, Han & Ind 1st m gr 7s	82½	
Marietta & Cin 1st m 7s '91	87	90
do do 2d m 7s '96	30	33
Indianap & Cin 1st m 7s '88	102	
Cin & In guar 1st m 7s '92	102½	105
do 2d m 7s '77 '82	75	75
Indianap C & L 1st m 7s '97	65	
Day & W 1 m, 1881	100	
do 2 m, 1905	87	90
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Columbus & Xenia 50	118	
Cin, Ham & Dayton 100	50	51
Dayton & Mich 3½ guar 50	45	
Little Miami 50	112	

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Marietta & Cin 1st pref.......50	......	5
do do 2d do........50		3
Cin Gas Light & Coke Co....100	165	166
SOUTHERN SECURITIES.		
CITIES.		
Atlanta, Ga 7s..................	100	103
do 8s..................	106	110
Augusta, Ga 7s bonds..........	102	105
Charleston stock, 6s............	58	61
Charleston, S. C. 7s F L bonds..	80	90
Columbia, S. C. 6s.............	55	70
Columbia, Ga. 7s bonds........	70	80
Lynchburg 6s..................	100	103
Macon 7s bonds...	70	80
Memphis bonds 6s..	15	25
do new consols..........	20	35
do end, M & C R R......	15	......
Mobile 5s......................	15	20
do 8s......................	15	20
Montgomery 8s.................	22	27
Nashville 6s old	80	90
do 6s new....	85	91
New Orleans 5s.................	26	28
do consol, 6s.......... ...	30	33
do bonds, 7s............	27	31
do to railroads 6s........	27	31
Norfolk 6s.....	98	......
Petersburg 6s..................	100	102
Richmond 6s...	106	110
Savannah 5s	70	74
RAILROADS.		
Atlantic & Gul, consol.........	100	102
Central Georgia cons, 7s... ...	109½	111
do do stock...........	71	74
Charlotte Col & A, 1 m 7s......	95½	96
do do stock...	20	25
E Tenn & Georgia 6s...........	90	100
East Tenn, Va & Geo 1st m 7s..	100	102
do do stock..........	45	50
Georgia R R 7s.................	107	110
do stock.............	80	85
Greenville & Col 7s guar.......	55	60
do do 7s certiff.......	50	55
Macon & Western Stock.......	98	101
Macon & Augusta bonds.......	85	90
do do endorsed....	95	100
Memphis & Charleston 1st 7s...	95	100
do do 2d 7s.....	75	85
do do stock....	10	12
Mississippi Central 1st m 7s....	101	104
do do 2d m 8s.....	100	104
Mississippi & Tenn 1 m.........	110	113
do do cons, 8s....	90	......
Motg'y and West P, 1st 8s.... .	107	108
do do 1st end.......	......	......
Mobile and Ohio Sterling..	80	......
do do do ex ctfs.....	80	......
do do 8s interest...	27	35
N Orleans and Jackson 1st m..	110	112
do do 2d m....	105	110
Nash and Chattanooga 6s......	100	102
Norfolk and Petersb 1st m 8s...	106	108
do do 2d do..	102	104
Northeastern, S C, 1st m 7s.....	105	110
do do 2d do.....	84	90
Orange and Alex 1st 6s.........	99	102
do do 2d 6s.........	84	90
do do 3d 8s.........	83	90
do do 4th 8s........	......	......
Rich and Peters'b 1st m 7s.....	......	......
do do 2d m 6s.....	......	......
do do 3d m 8s.......	102½	105
Rich and Fred'b and Pot 6s....	97	100
do do do con 7s.	97	102

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Rich and Danv 1st con 6......	95	98
do Piedmont 8s......	103	.....
do 1st 8s.....	......	90
Southside Va 1st m 8s	109	111
do 2d m guar 6s......	90	100
do 3d m 6s..........	80	90
do 4th m 8s..........	......	......
Southwest R R, Ga 1st m.......	104	106
do do stock.......	99	102
S. Caro R R, 1st m 7s, new.....	97	100
S. Caro R R 6s.................	......	......
do 7s 2d	52	60
Virginia and Tenn 2d 6s.......	100	103
do do 3d 8s........	110	......
West Ala, 8s guar..............	108	110
Wilmington and Weldon 7s.....	100	103
PAST DUE COUPONS.		
Tennessee State coupons.. ...	10	20
Virginia consol coupons.......	81	83
Memphis city coupons...	20	......
South Carolina consols.........	......	......
BOSTON.		
STATE BONDS.		
Maine 6s 1889..................	......	......
N. Hampshire 6s 1876-84...... .	......	......
Vermont 6s, 1874-78............	......	......
Massachusetts 5s, 1883, g.......	......	......
CITY BONDS.		
Boston 5s, 1880-86, gold..... ...	......	.. ..
do 6s, currency...........	......	......
Chic 7s, 1890-95, riv. impr.......	......	114
do 1884....................	......	......
RAILROAD STOCKS AND BONDS.		
A T and Santa Fe, 1st m 7s.....	112⅝	113
do do L G.......	113⅛	......
do do stock......	105¾	106
Bost and Alb'y 6s, '75 (W RR)..	......	111½
do 7s, 1892	121	121½
do stock...............	139	139¾
Boston and Lowell 7s, 1892.....	114	117
do stock (par 500)......	79	80
Boston and Maine, stock	118	120
Boston and Providence, stock.	......	128
Bur & Mo R 7s, '93, land grant.	116	117
do do 8s, 94, conv........	106¾	107
do do 8s, 83 (in Neb) ...	100¾	101
Chicago, Bur and Quincy... ..	121¼	121⅛
Bur & Mo Riv stock (in Neb).	126½	......
Cheshire 6s, 1898...........	......	105
do preferred stock......	......	46
Cin, San, and Cleve, 7s, 1890....	75½	......
do do com stk (par 50)..	16¼	16⅝
Concord stock (par 50).........	80½	......
Conn and Pass Rivs 6s, 1876....	......	......
do do 7s, '76, notes...	......	......
do do pref. stock........	49¾	50
Connecticut River, stock	142½	143
Eastern stock.......	22½	22¾
Fitchburg, stock	......	......
Manch and Lawrence stock...	......	......
Nashua and Lowell, stock......	106	110
Northern (N. H.) stock...	......	......
Norwich and Worcester stock.	124⅛	......
Ogdenburg and L Champ stock	18⅞	19
do do pref stock....	64	65
Old Colony stock.......... ..	......	109½
Phil, Wil & Balt stock (par 50).	64¾	69
Portl, Saco & Portsmouth st'k	100½	......
Portsmouth, Gt F & Con'y s...	......	......
Rutland pref. stock............	28⅝	28¾
Vermont and Canada stock....	......	12
Vt. Ct. 1st m 7s, 1886 cons......	......	......
do do 8s, '91..............	... ..	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Vermont and Mass.	......	......
do do stock	112	......
Worcester and Nashua	49⅛	50
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Boston Land Co	8⅞	9
Boston Water Power	11⅝	11¾
Pullman Palace Car	99⅛	100
PHILADELPHIA.		
STATE AND CITY BONDS.		
Penn. 5s, new, reg, '92 1902	112	112⅜
do 6s, 10-15, reg, '77 1882	101¼	102
do 6s, 15-25, reg, '82 1892	107⅛	109
Philadelphia 6s, old	104	......
do 6s, new, over 1895	120	121
Pittsburg 5s, reg, 1913	......	......
do 7s, water loan	112⅛	......
do 7s, street improv	102	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Allegheny V R R 7 3-10, '96	115	......
Bel & Del R R, 1st m 6s, 1902	109	......
do 2d do '85	106	......
do 3d do '87	103	......
Cam & Amboy R R 6s, 1883	105	......
do do do 6s, 1889	105	......
do do do m 6s, 1889	......	115
Cam & A. T. 1st m 7s, gold, 1893	116	......
do do 2d do cur, 1879	102¾	103
Cataw R R new 7s, 1900	110	......
Connecting R R 6s. cp. 1900	108	112
Del & B B R 1st m. 7s, 1905	113	113⅛
El. & Wmsp't R R, 1 m, 7s, '80	109	111
do do 5s c. perpe'l	83	90
H. & B. T. 2d m 7s, gld 1895	111	113
do 3d do cur. 1895	......	......
Lehigh Valley, 1st m, 6s, c,'98	115⅛	......
do do reg '98	116	......
do 2d m, 7s, reg 1910	122	......
do cons. m, 6s reg, 1923	109	109¾
do do 6s, coup. 1923	108¾	......
N Cent. 2d gd. m. 5s, cp'n 1926	75	76
North Penn, 1st m 6s, c. 1885	109⅛	111
do 2d m 7s, c. 1896	119	......
do gen. m 7s, c. 1906	111½	......
do do reg., 1906	111½	......
Oil Creek 1st m 7s, coup '82	85	88
Pittsb'h Titus & Buff 7s, c, 1896	33	......
P & N Y C. & H. R. 7s, r&c 1896	118¾	120
Penna. 1st mort 6s, c, 1880	104¼	106
do gen do 6s, c, 1910	115⅛	116¼
do do do 6s reg 1910	......	111
do cons m, 6s reg. 1905	......	111
Phila & Erie 1st mort 6s c 1881	103	103⅛
do 2d mort 7s, c 1888	110	111
Phila & Reading 1st m 6s, 1880	103	103¼
do 2d m 7s, c 1893	113	115½
do cons m 7s c 1911	......	111⅝
do do m 7s r 1911	111	112
do do 6s, g r & c 1911	101½	102
Pitts, Cinn. & St. L 7s c 1900	108¼	......
Tex & Pac 1st m, 6s, g 1905	......	99¾
do cons m, 6s, g 1905	80	......
Un & Titus 1st m, 7s, 1890	50	53
War. & F. 1st mort. 7s, c 1896	88	......
West Jersey 6s, d coup 1883	101	105
West Jersey 1st mort 6s, c 1896	108	......
do do 7s, r & c '99	110	......

Securities.	Bid.	Askd
West Penn 6s, coup, 1893	102	103
do 6s. p b c, 1896	......	......
CANAL BONDS.		
Lehigh Nav. m 6s, r 1884	107	108
do M.R. R. r, 1897	109	109⅛
do M conv g. r. 1894	102	......
do M. gold, r. c, 1897	103⅛	105¼
do cons m 7s r, 1911	100	100
Schuyl. Nav. 1st m 6s, reg 1897	98	......
do 2d do r. 1907	74	75
do m 6s, coup. 1895	50	......
do 6s, bt&car r 1913	63	......
do 7s, bt&car r 1915	72	......
RAILROAD STOCK.		
Camden & Atlantic pref.... 50	......	44
Catawissa.... 50	13	......
do pref.... 50	48	50
do new pref.... 50	......	48
Elmira & Williamsport.... 50	30⅛	......
do do pref.. 50	48	......
Lehigh Valley.... 50	49⅛	49¾
Liltle Schuylkill.... 50	49	49⅛
Minehill	55	......
Nesquehoning Valley	......	56
Norristown.... 50	......	101⅛
Northern Pacific	36½	36⅝
do pref	60½	60⅞
North Pennsylvania.... 50	49	......
Pennsylvania.... 50	48⅛	48⅛
Philadelphia & Reading.... 50	30	30½
Pitts. Titus. & Buffalo	6⅝	6⅞
St. Paul & Duluth	26	......
do pref	57	58
United Cos. of N. J....100	......	149⅛
CANAL STOCKS.		
Lehigh Navigation.... 50	35⅝	35⅞
Morris Canal grd 4 p c....100	53	60
do preferred 10 p c....100	135	......
Schuylkill Navigation	......	......
do do pref	......	......
BALTIMORE.		
Maryland 6s, defence, J. & J	108	109
Virginia 10-40s, J. & J	53¾	54
do deferred, J. & J	6½	7
do consol. do	65⅝	65¾
do do 2ds do	30	31½
do consol coup, p due	83⅛	83¾
N. Carolina 6s, Jan. & J., old	24	26¼
Tennessee 6s, do old	35	42
do 6s, do new	30	34
do 6s, do n. s.	30	34
Balt. 6s, J., A., J., O., 1890	113⅞	114¼
do 6s, J. & J., 1902	116	......
do 5s, M. & N., ex., 1916	108¼	108¾
Memphis City 6s, J. & J., n	......	......
Balt. & Ohio, May & N....100	155	156
do 1st preferred	111	112
do 2d do	105	107
Northern Central, M. & N....50	25⅛	25¾
Central Ohio, June & Dec....50	37	40
do preferred....50	48	50
City Passenger R'y, J. & J....25	39	40

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid.	Askd
Balt. & Ohio 6s, 1880, J. & J.	101½	102
do 1885 A. & O.	106½	107
Pitts. & C. 1st 7s, 1898, J. & J.	111¾	112½
N. Cent. 6s, 1885, J. & J.	108	109
do 6s, 1900, A. & O.	108	109
do 6s, gold, 1900, J. & J.	105½	106½
Cen. O. 6s, 1st m., 1890, M. & S.	106¾	107¼
South Side, 1st 8s, J & J	108	110
do 2d 6s, do	90	95
do 3d 6s, do	87	92
Cin. & Baltimore 1st 7s.	100	105
W. M. 1st m 6s gu. 1890, J. & J.	115	116
do 1890, J. & J.	104	......
W. Maryland 2d m (pref)	83	90
W. M. 2d m. 6s gu. by W. Co.	108	110
M. & Cin. 1st m 7s F and A 1892	102⅛	102½
do 2d m 7s M. and N.	71½	72
M. & Cin. 3d m 8s 1900 J. and J.	34⅞	35
Rich. & Dan. 1st m. M. and N.	96	......
Union R. R., End. Cant. Co.	109	111
Canton Co., 1st 6, gold, J and J.	105	106
Orange, Alex. and Mn's 7s do.	67½	68
Orange & A. 1st 6s, M. and N.	96	100
do 2d 6s, J. and J.	95	98
do 3d 8s, M. and N.	66	70
do 4th 8s, M. and S	32	33
Virginia & Tenn 6s 2d J. and J.	100	103
do 8s, J. and J.	114	116
W. & W. 7s gold 1900 J. and J.	108	112½
W. and Columbia and Aug. 7s.	40	45
Ohio & Miss, 2d 7s, A & O.	111	112
Balt. Gas, J. and Dec. 100	110	125
do gold certif. 100	103	105
People's Gas, J. and J. 25	15¾	16
Consumer's Gas	4⅜	4½
do gold 6s, J & J, 1892	98	100
Georges Creek Coal, J & J	95	105
Chesapeake and O. Canal bonds	35	50
Balt. Warehouse Co, J & J.	19	20
Cincinnati 7-30s, J. and J.	......	......
Norfolk Water, 8s	117	......
LOUISVILLE.		
CITY AND CANAL BONDS.		
City improvement 6s	*101½	*102½
do bounty 6s	*101½	*102½
do school 6s	*101½	*102½
do wharf (old) 6s	*101½	*102½
do do (new) 6s	*101½	*102½
do water works (old) 6s	*101½	*102½
do do (new) 6s	*101½	*102½
do L. and N. R. R. (M. S.) 6s	*101½	*102½
do L. and N. R. R. (L. E.) 6s	*102	*103
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (old)	*104	*105
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (new)	*106	107
do old liabilities due 1880	*101	......
do St. Louis A. L. R. R.	*102	*103
Canal bonds, 3d issue, 6s	*102	*103
do 4th issue, 6s	*106	*107

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Louisville Bridge Co. 7s	*112	113
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Louis. and Nash. Leb. Br	*101	102
Louis. and Nash. Cons	*110	111
L. and N. 2d mort	*102	*103
Louis., Cin. and Lex. 1 m 7s	*110	110½
do do 2 m 7s	*99	99½
Jefferson. M. and I. 1st m 7s	*112½	113½
do do 2d m 7s	102	*103
Eliz. and Paduc. 1st m. 8s	......	......
E. and P. Louisville Br'ch 7s.	......	......
Shelby, 1st mortgage 8s	101	102
Owensboro and Russel, 1 m 8s.	......	......
MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.		
Kentuc. State bonds (old) 6s	§105	......
do do (new) 6s	§105	......
New Albany City	*104	105
Water Works bonds, 6s	*106	......
Louisville Transfer Co. 8s	*100	......
STOCKS.		
Louisville and Nashville R. R.	71	72
Gas Company stock	107	108
Louisville Bridge Co. stock	109	110
ST. LOUIS.		
CITY AND COUNTY BONDS.		
City water (is. '67) 6s gold	§106	107½
City water (is. '70) 6s gold	§106	107½
City water (is. '72) 6s gold	§106	107½
City sewer (is. '73) 6s gold	§106	......
City park 6s gold	§106	......
City bdg approach 6s gold	§106	......
City 6s Currency	§104	......
County 6s, gold various	§105½	......
County 6s, gold of 1892	§105½	......
do do 1893	§105½	......
County 7s, Currency	§106½	......
RAILROAD BONDS		
At. & Pac. 1st Cent. div.	53	......
Denver Pacific and Telegraph.	......	......
Kan. Pac. 1st m. F. and A	116	118
do 1st m. J. and D	113	114½
do 1st m. (Lea. br.)	87	90
do income No. 11	75	......
do income No. 16	75	......
do (Den. ext.) 1 m	107	108
Kan. Pac., 1st m. L. G. 7s	120	122
Missouri Pacific 1st mort	104	......
do do 2d do	105½	......
North Missouri, 1st mort	112	114
RAILROAD STOCKS.		
St. Louis & San Francisco	28	......
do do pref	34	......
do do 1st do	53	......
Kansas Pacific	83½	......
Pacific of Missouri	7	......
St. L. Kan. C. and Nort. pref.	67½	......
do do commom	44½	......

RHODES' JOURNAL

A RECORD OF AMERICAN BANKING.

NEW SERIES. VOLUME VI. DECEMBER, 1879. No. 12.

ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE on another page of our intention to publish the (weekly) *Financial News-Letter*, supplemental to RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, one subscription of $5, covering the cost of both publications. It is our purpose that the JOURNAL, supplemented by the Weekly *News-Letter*, shall be so comprehensive that they will supply all the banking information that is wanted by any bank or banker, either for future reference or in daily business transactions.

The JOURNAL will contain in an attractive form all that is worth preserving in the field of banking and finance; the discussion of current topics, together with a complete record of interesting events—in fact a complete magazine of information of permanent value to the banker, and all interested in the financial affairs of the country. It will be indexed for binding, on the completion of each succeeding volume.

The *Financial News-Letter* will be prepared especially for reference in the usual banking transactions from day to day. It will contain nothing but what is of practical value for that purpose.

In connection with this announcement for 1880, the publishers respectfully solicit the patronage of banks and bankers generally. It is desirable that subscription orders be sent in before the first of the year. Bills will be mailed in the January number.

Unless advised to the contrary before the close of the year, subscriptions expiring with 1879 will be entered in our books for the year 1880 without further notice. The publishers, while having the laudable ambition necessary to success in any business, wish it to be distinctly understood that the JOURNAL depends solely on its merits for continued and increased patronage. No importuning is tolerated, nor is it sent unless expressly ordered. This rule is necessary to distinguish it from the numerous publications which are sent in hope of future payment, under the protection of an existing postal law. It is our ambition that RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING shall always be sought for.

The circulation of RHODES' JOURNAL warrants us in commending it as a medium of calling attention to any department of banking; banks soliciting collections, or the general business of banks, bankers, corporations, mercantile firms, and individuals, will find it profitable to use the advertising pages of this journal.

During the year 1880 a number of illustrations, having direct reference to banking, will appear in RHODES' JOURNAL. These will be engraved especially for this publication. Among those already decided on, are:

THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.
THE ROYAL EXCHANGE, LONDON.
EXTERIOR VIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.
INTERIOR VIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.
THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, WASHINGTON.
EXAMPLES OF BANKING BUILDINGS IN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY.

B

The influence which prompted Mr. W. H. Vanderbilt to part with a large interest, and possibly the control of the New York Central Railroad, is nothing more or less than the general tendency of the times toward concentration. It means harmony in the management of a great system of railways, where strife and ruinous competition has heretofore existed. The public will not be slow to see the real purpose of the new movement. Some, of course, will shrug their shoulders and say that it places too much power in the hands of one combination, and that the people will surely be oppressed in order that it may reap large profits. It does not seem possible, however, that aught but good results will be the outcome from having one head for a great system of roads, in place of a disjointed system in a constant turmoil of jealousies and disputes. The needs of our internal trade will be better met, and at the same time by bringing order out of chaos, all the roads will be benefitted in the matter of rates and distribution of traffic.

It was to be expected that the usual amount of romancing should be indulged in by the city papers during the progress of the negotiations between Mr. Vanderbilt and the syndicate. As soon as it was reported that such a huge transaction was pending, every financial writer for the New York press had a clear insight into its deepest mysteries. A number proclaimed it as nothing more than a stock-jobbing rumor, and by watering their stock of virtue, found themselves able to denounce the dishonorable conduct of every person who credited the report as well-founded. But when the sale was finally consummated, every man of them cried "I told you so"—and rested from his labors.

The syndicate which made the purchase is composed of London and New York bankers and the managers of the Wabash system of railways. This syndicate take outright $15,000,000 of New York Central stock at 120, of which 20 per cent. is to be paid immediately, and the balance in equal instalments of 20 per cent. on the first of each month till all is paid. The stock is to be delivered in similar proportions as each payment is made. There is an option, understood to be for one year, to take another $10,000,000 of the stock on the same terms, and Mr. Vanderbilt agrees not to sell his other Central stock in the market during the period in which the syndicate are taking the $15,000,000 absolutely, as above stated. Though no part of the contract, it is the understanding that Mr. Vanderbilt will buy and hold stocks of the Wabash system of roads to the extent that the managers of the Wabash system of roads have by the recent negotiation become owners of New York Central stock. It is also a part of the programme that none of the New York Central sold by Mr. Vanderbilt will come upon the market. That part of it which is owned here will be held, and the only part that will be sold will be in the London market.

Here is a news item recently telegraphed from Boston to the New York papers;

"The Supreme Judicial Court has removed the injunction issued several months ago against the Broadway Savings Bank, of Lawrence, the bank now being perfectly solvent."

This simple announcement shows (1.) that Massachusetts has a wise general savings bank law, and (2.) that the administration of the law is in safe hands. These are two essential points in the strength and good name of the savings bank system in any State.

Considering the first point, the day of special charters for savings banks is fast passing away. The people who use these institutions will have great cause for rejoicing when the last State wheels into line, and savings banks over the length and breadth of the land will be under the salutary restrictions of general laws adapted to the requirements of these banks in the several States. Then the hundreds of so-called savings banks, in various sections of the country, will be obliged to either go out of business or else sail under their true colors. Under this head it will be observed that the Massachusetts law, referred to above, has an excellent provision governing banks which have suffered loss, from any cause whatever. As soon as the bank commissioners ascertain that a bank's assets are not sufficient to pay off its depositors in full, the concern is at once placed under jurisdiction of the Court, and by discontinuing the interest due depositors for a time, and judiciously caring for the affairs of the bank in co-operation with its officers and trustees, in many cases the bank is thus saved from the ruinous policy of turning it over to the tender mercies of a receiver. Then again, in other Eastern States, when the assets of a bank become impaired it is lawful to scale down each depositor's account, *pro rata*, to make the impairment good. This is infinitly better for the depositors than allowing the average receiver to step in and eat up a large share of the resources in fat fees for himself and the lawyers.

The second point under consideration must necessarily be brief. It is only reasonable to expect that the administration of laws governing savings banks shall fall into judicious hands. If there is one position more than another that requires a clear head added to the greater virtue of an honest heart, that one is the executive officer of a State department charged with the duty of guarding savings banks. No one will deny this. That these powers may, in the course of human events, fall into injudicious hands, the recent experience in New York furnishes the most prominent example. The lesson drawn from Mr. Lamb's conduct of the banking department of this State should not be used, however, as an argument against general laws for savings banks. This is an isolated case. It simply raises the question, guarding against such a contingency, whether it is wise in these general enactments to clothe an officer with such wide and varied powers.

It is interesting to note the effect of Controller Knox's recent effort to stop the over-certification of brokers' checks by certain New York banks. No one questions the wisdom of the controller's action; in fact it was a simple duty he had to perform. The banks doing the largest share of this Stock Exchange business, however, have adopted a plan something like this; brokers are allowed discounts or loans for the day, the same as merchants procure them for thirty days to four months; and against the deposits of these credits checks can be lawfully certified. Sure enough this is "whipping the devil around the stump," but the devious paths marked out by that personage are not entirely unknown in Wall street.

That ultimate good will come from the controller's course is evident. The sagacious banker will use his action as a pretext for refusing accomodation to persons or firms unworthy of credit. But the banks should not have waited for such a pretext, but should have had the courage to treat their broker customers precisely as they treat all other customers.

An important question in banking has been decided by the suit in equity brought by Max Rosenthal, a citizen of New York, against the Mastin Bank and Kersey Coates of Missouri, and the Metropolitan National Bank of New York. The suit was begun in the Supreme Court of the United States and afterward removed to the United States Circuit Court, where Judge Blatchford has given a decision in which he allowed the "demurrer with costs to the defendant to be taxed, with leave to the plaintiff to move, on notice of payment of such costs within twenty days after the service of a copy of the order to be entered on this decision to amend."

On the 1st of August, 1878, Mr. Rosenthal, at Kansas City, paid to the Mastin Bank of Kansas City, Mo., the sum of $2,000, in exchange for which the bank delivered to him a draft dated at Kansas City and signed by its cashier, addressed to the Metropolitan Bank, and containing this direction: "Pay to order Max Rosenthal $1,998." At that time the Metropolitan Bank had in its hands $2,000 belonging to the Mastin Bank. The draft was presented at the Metropolitan Bank on the 5th of August, when the bank refused payment and the draft went to protest. Mr. Rosenthal attached all the money in the Metropolitan Bank belonging to the Mastin Bank in a suit in the New York Supreme Court, which suit went to judgment. The present suit is to determine the claims of the respective persons to the money.

Judge Blatchford decides that the check or draft did not operate as an assignment of the funds in the Metropolitan Bank, but that the general assignment made by the Mastin Bank for the benefit of its creditors on the 3d of August, 1878, conveyed a superior title to the funds to the assignee, and that the telegraphic despatch to the Metropolitan Bank announcing the failure of the Mastin Bank, which was received by the Metropolitan Bank August 5, was sufficient notice to warrant the Metropolitan Bank in withholding payment of the draft. The defendants demurred to the bill because it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

CONTROLLER KNOX'S ANNUAL REPORT.

NATIONAL BANK STATISTICS—REFUNDING—COIN INFLATION.

It is a well known fact that the annual reports of Hon. John Jay Knox, Controller of the Currency, are always readable and instructive, and give evidence of the immense amount of labor involved in their preparation. The forthcoming report is even more interesting than any previous one issued of this important branch of the Treasury Department. From an advance copy obtained for RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, we are enabled to present our readers with the most valuable portions. Perhaps the fact of most interest in the new report is that of the enormous amount of currency now in this country. On the 1st day of November it was $1,165,553.504—or "$380,000,000 in excess of the highest point reached between the suspension and the resumption of specie payment." That is to say, there is about fifty per centum more currency than there was when prices were highest and speculation and other business were most extravagantly active during and after the war.

The first part of the report gives the statistics of banking operations in the entire country:

"The total number of national banks organized from the establishment of the national banking system, February 25, 1863, to November 1 of the present year, is 2,438. Of these 307 have gone into voluntary liquidation by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of their respective capitals, and eighty-one have been placed in the hands of receivers, for the purpose of closing up their affairs, leaving 2,050 in operation at the date last named. * * *

Since my last annual report thirty-eight banks have been organized with an aggregate authorized capital of $3.595,000, to which $2,390,-449 in circulating notes have been issued. Thirty-eight banks, with an aggregate capital of $4,450,000, voluntarily discontinued business within the same period, and eight banks have failed, having a total capital of $1,030,000. The insolvent banks include two, with a capital of $700,000, which failed after having previously gone into voluntary liquidation.

The table below exhibits the aggregate average capital and deposits on May 31, 1879, of all classes of banks other than national, and the capital and deposits of the national banks on June 14 following:

	State b'ks, savings b'ks, private b'k'rs, etc.			National banks.			Total.		
Geographical Divisions	No.	Cap'tl	Dep's's	No.	Cap'tl	Dep's's	No.	Cap'tl	Dep's's
		Millions.			Millions.			Millions.	
New England States......	536	10.83	384.17	544	164.43	126.72	1,080	175.26	510.89
Middle States..............	1,280	75.77	532.56	640	170.21	393.12	1,920	245.98	925.68
Southern States	494	33.92	47.02	176	30.40	37.93	670	64.32	84.95
Western States and Ter's.	2,002	80.72	216.37	688	90.20	155.63	2,690	170.92	372.00
United States..........	4,312	201.24	1,180.12	2,048	455.24	713.40	6,360	656.48	1,893.52

The following table exhibits, for corresponding dates in each of the last four years, the aggregate amounts of the capital and deposits of each of the classes of banks given in the foregoing table:

Years.	National Banks.			State banks, private bankers, etc.		
	Nnmber.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.
1876	2,091	500.4	713.5	3,803	214.0	480.0
1877	2,078	481.0	768.2	3,799	218.6	470.5
1878	2,056	470.4	677.2	3,709	202.2	413.3
1879	2,048	455.3	713.4	3.639	197.0	397.0

Years.	Savings banks with capital.			Savings banks without capital.		Total.		
	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.
1876	26	5.0	37.2	691	844.6	6,611	719.4	2,075.3
1877	26	4.9	38.2	676	843.2	6,579	704.5	2,120.1
1878	23	3.2	26.2	668	803.3	6,456	675.8	1,920.0
1879	29	4.2	36.1	644	747.1	6,360	656.5	1,893.5

The aggregate capital of the various classes of banks shown by the foregoing table, has diminished from $719,400,000 in 1876, to $656,500,000 in 1879, and the aggregate deposits have fallen off from $2,075,300,000 in 1876, to $1,893,500,000 in 1879—a reduction of $62,900,000 in capital and $181,800,000 in deposits during the last four years. The national banking capital has diminished $45,100,000, but the deposits of the national banks are almost precisely the same that they were in 1876. Savings banks with capital show a reduction of about one million in capital and the same amount in deposits. The capital and deposits of State banks and private bankers are less by seventeen millions and eighty-three millions, respectively. The greatest reduction, however, is in the deposits of savings banks without capital, which have diminished $97,500,000.

REFUNDING THE NATIONAL DEBT.

Of the recent operations of the Government in refunding, the Controller says:

"The great war debt of the United States was contracted in less than four and a half years. In 1835 the country was entirely out of debt, and on January 1, 1861, the whole debt of the Union amounted to but $66,243,721. During the next six months it increased at the rate of about four millions a month, being on the first day of July, 1861, $90,580,873. During the next year it increased at the rate of more than thirty-six millions per month, and at the close of the fiscal year ending July 1, 1862, it had reached $524,176,412. At the end of the succeeding year it was considerably more than twice that amount, being on July 1, 1863, $1,119,772,138. During the following year it increased nearly seven hundred millions, reaching on July 1, 1864, the sum of $1,815,784,370. During the next nine months, to the close of the war, April 1, 1865, the debt increased at the rate of about two millions a day, or about sixty millions a month, and for the five months next thereafter, at the rate of about three millions a day, or about ninety millions a month, reaching its maximum on August 31, 1865, at which date it amounted to $2,845,907,626.

There was an aggregate of more than $1,276,000,000 of temporary obligations of the Government, of which $830,000,000 bore interest at 7.30 per cent.

This immense amount of temporary obligations was funded within the three years which followed the close of the war, and the skill and good judgment displayed in so doing can only be fully appreciated by those who are familiar with the difficulties of and delicate conditions under which this great work was accomplished. * * *

The whole amount of the funded debt on the 1st of July, 1871, was $1,935,342,700, of which $1,437,097,300 consisted of five-twenty bonds and $194,567,300 of ten-forty bonds. On the 1st day of August, 1871, nearly sixty-six millions ($65,775,550) of new five per cent. bonds had been subscribed for, chiefly by the national banks. During the same month an agreement was entered into by the Secretary [Secretary Boutwell's Report, 1871, p. 17] with Jay Cooke & Co. for the sale of the remainder of two hundred millions of said bonds, and in the month of January, 1873, similar arrangements were made for the sale of a large additional amount. The remainder of the five hundred millions ($178,548,300) was sold during the next three years, the Secretary of the Treasury stating in his report of December 6, 1875, that he had "the pleasure of announcing to Congress that the funding of five hundred millions six per cent. bonds into those bearing 5 per cent. interest has been accomplished." [Secretary Bristow's Report, 1875, p. 12.]

On August 24, 1876, a new contract was made by the Secretary [Secretary Morrill's Report, 1876, p. 11] with A. Belmont & Co. and associates for the sale of the three hundred millions of four and a half per cent. bonds authorized. In this contract the Secretary reserved the right to terminate it by giving ten days' notice to the contractors, and under this contract, calls were made prior to March 4, 1877, for the redemption of one hundred millions of six per cents. In May, 1877, the present Secretary availing himself of the privilege secured in this contract, gave notice that he would limit the sale of four and a half per cents. to one hundred millions, and additional subscriptions were rapidly made until that amount was taken. The avails of eighty-five millions of these bonds were applied to the redemption of five-twenties, the remaining fifteen millions being held for resumption purposes. On the 9th of June, 1877, a contract was made with a syndicate for the sale, at par, in coin, of the four per cent. bonds, authorized to be issued by the Refunding act, with the right to terminate the contract at any time after December 31, 1877, by giving ten

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Balt. & Ohio 6s, 1880, J. & J.....	101½	102
do 1885 A. & O....	106½	107
Pitts. & C. 1st 7s, 1898, J. & J....	111¾	112½
N. Cent. 6s, 1885, J. & J.........	108	109
do 6s, 1900,, A. & O... ...	108	109
do 6s, gold, 1900, J. & J..	105½	106½
Cen. O. 6s, 1st m., 1890, M. & S..	106¾	107¼
South Side, 1st 8s, J & J........	108	110
do 2d 6s, do	90	95
do 3d 6s, do	87	92
Cin, & Baltimore 1st 7s..........	100	105
W. M. 1st m 6s gu. 1890, J. & J..	115	116
do 1890, J. & J..	104	......
W. Maryland 2d m (pref).......	83	90
W. M. 2d m. 6s gu. by W. Co....	108	110
M. & Cin. 1st m 7s F and A 1892	102⅛	102½
do 2d m 7s M. and N....	71½	72
M. & Cin. 3d m 8s 1900 J. and J..	34⅞	35
Rich. & Dan. 1st m. M. and N...	96	......
Union R. R., End. Cant. Co.....	109	111
Canton Co., 1st 6, gold, J and J.	105	106
Orange, Alex. and Mn's 7s do..	67½	68
Orange & A. 1st 6s, M. and N...	96	100
do 2d 6s, J. and J.....	95	98
do 3d 8s, M. and N.. .	66	70
do 4th 8s, M. and S ...	32	33
Virginia & Tenn 6s 2d J. and J.	100	103
do 8s, J. and J..	114	116
W. & W. 7s gold 1900 J. and J..	108	112½
W. and Columbia and Aug. 7s.	40	45
Ohio & Miss, 2d 7s, A & O.......	111	112
Balt. Gas, J. and Dec....... 100	110	125
do gold certif.....100	103	105
People's Gas, J. and J....... 25	15¾	16
Consumer's Gas...............	4⅜	4½
do gold 6s, J & J, 1892...	98	100
Georges Creek Coal, J & J.....	95	105
Chesapeake and O. Canal bonds	35	50
Balt. Warehouse Co, J & J. ...	19	20
Cincinnati 7-30s, J. and J.......	......	......
Norfolk Water, 8s...............	117	......
LOUISVILLE.		
CITY AND CANAL BONDS.		
City improvement 6s..........	*101½	*102½
do bounty 6s................	*101½	*102½
do school 6s............	*101½	*102½
do wharf (old) 6s.............	*101½	*102½
do do (new) 6s...	*101½	*102½
do water works (old) 6s......	*101½	*102½
do do (new) 6s.....	*101½	*102½
do L. and N. R. R. (M. S.) 6s...	*101½	*102½
do L. and N. R. R. (L. E) 6s...	*102	*103
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (old).....	*104	*105
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (new)....	*106	107
do old liabilities due 1880......	*101	......
do St. Louis A. L. R. R.... ...	*102	*103
Canal bonds, 3d issue, 6s.......	*102	*103
do 4th issue, 6s......	*106	*107

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Louisville Bridge Co. 7s........	*112	113
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Louis. and Nash. Leb. Br.......	*101	102
Louis. and Nash. Cons..........	*110	111
L. and N. 2d mort..............	*102	*103
Louis., Cin. and Lex. 1 m 7s....	*110	110½
do do 2 m 7s....	*99	99½
Jefferson. M. and I. 1st m 7s....	*112½	113½
do do 2d m 7s....	102	*103
Eliz. and Paduc. 1st m. 8s	......	......
E. and P. Louisville Br'ch 7s...	......	......
Shelby, 1st mortgage 8s........	101	102
Owensboro and Russel, 1 m 8s.	......	......
MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.		
Kentuc. State bonds (old) 6s...	§105	......
do do (new) 6s..	§105	......
New Albany City..............	*104	105
Water Works bonds, 6s.........	*106	......
Louisville Transfer Co. 8s......	*100	......
STOCKS.		
Louisville and Nashville R. R..	71	72
Gas Company stock.......... .	107	108
Louisville Bridge Co. stock....	109	110
ST. LOUIS.		
CITY AND COUNTY BONDS.		
City water (is. '67) 6s gold......	§106	107½
City water (is. '70) 6s gold.......	§106	107½
City water (is. '72) 6s gold......	§106	107½
City sewer (is. '73) 6s gold......	§106	......
City park 6s gold.......	§106	......
City bdg approach 6s gold.....	§106	......
City 6s Currency..............	§104	......
County 6s, gold various.........	§105½	......
County 6s, gold of 1892.........	§105½	......
do do 1893.........	§105½	......
County 7s, Currency...........	§106½	......
RAILROAD BONDS		
At. & Pac. 1st Cent. div.	53	......
Denver Pacific and Telegraph.	......	......
Kan. Pac. 1st m. F. and A......	116	118
do 1st m. J. and D	113	114½
do 1st m. (Lea. br.).....	87	90
do income No. 11.......	75	...
do income No. 16.......	75	...
do (Den. ext.) 1 m......	107	108
Kan. Pac., 1st m. L. G. 7s.......	120	122
Missouri Pacific 1st mort.......	104	......
do do 2d do	105½	......
North Missouri, 1st mort.......	112	114
RAILROAD STOCKS.		
St. Louis & San Francisco......	28	......
do do pref......	34	......
do do 1st do	53	......
Kansas Pacific.................	83½	......
Pacific of Missouri............	7	......
St. L. Kan. C. and Nort. pref..	67½	......
do do commom..	44½	......

RHODES' JOURNAL

A RECORD OF AMERICAN BANKING.

NEW SERIES. VOLUME VI. DECEMBER, 1879. No. 12.

ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE on another page of our intention to publish the (weekly) *Financial News-Letter*, supplemental to RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, one subscription of $5, covering the cost of both publications. It is our purpose that the JOURNAL, supplemented by the Weekly *News-Letter*, shall be so comprehensive that they will supply all the banking information that is wanted by any bank or banker, either for future reference or in daily business transactions.

The JOURNAL will contain in an attractive form all that is worth preserving in the field of banking and finance; the discussion of current topics, together with a complete record of interesting events—in fact a complete magazine of information of permanent value to the banker, and all interested in the financial affairs of the country. It will be indexed for binding, on the completion of each succeeding volume.

The *Financial News-Letter* will be prepared especially for reference in the usual banking transactions from day to day. It will contain nothing but what is of practical value for that purpose.

In connection with this announcement for 1880, the publishers respectfully solicit the patronage of banks and bankers generally. It is desirable that subscription orders be sent in before the first of the year. Bills will be mailed in the January number.

Unless advised to the contrary before the close of the year, subscriptions expiring with 1879 will be entered in our books for the year 1880 without further notice. The publishers, while having the laudable ambition necessary to success in any business, wish it to be distinctly understood that the JOURNAL depends solely on its merits for continued and increased patronage. No importuning is tolerated, nor is it sent unless expressly ordered. This rule is necessary to distinguish it from the numerous publications which are sent in hope of future payment, under the protection of an existing postal law. It is our ambition that RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING shall always be sought for.

The circulation of RHODES' JOURNAL warrants us in commending it as a medium of calling attention to any department of banking; banks soliciting collections, or the general business of banks, bankers, corporations, mercantile firms, and individuals, will find it profitable to use the advertising pages of this journal.

During the year 1880 a number of illustrations, having direct reference to banking, will appear in RHODES' JOURNAL. These will be engraved especially for this publication. Among those already decided on, are:

THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.
THE ROYAL EXCHANGE, LONDON.
EXTERIOR VIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.
INTERIOR VIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.
THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, WASHINGTON.
EXAMPLES OF BANKING BUILDINGS IN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY.

The influence which prompted Mr. W. H. Vanderbilt to part with a large interest, and possibly the control of the New York Central Railroad, is nothing more or less than the general tendency of the times toward concentration. It means harmony in the management of a great system of railways, where strife and ruinous competition has heretofore existed. The public will not be slow to see the real purpose of the new movement. Some, of course, will shrug their shoulders and say that it places too much power in the hands of one combination, and that the people will surely be oppressed in order that it may reap large profits. It does not seem possible, however, that aught but good results will be the outcome from having one head for a great system of roads, in place of a disjointed system in a constant turmoil of jealousies and disputes. The needs of our internal trade will be better met, and at the same time by bringing order out of chaos, all the roads will be benefitted in the matter of rates and distribution of traffic.

It was to be expected that the usual amount of romancing should be indulged in by the city papers during the progress of the negotiations between Mr. Vanderbilt and the syndicate. As soon as it was reported that such a huge transaction was pending, every financial writer for the New York press had a clear insight into its deepest mysteries. A number proclaimed it as nothing more than a stock-jobbing rumor, and by watering their stock of virtue, found themselves able to denounce the dishonorable conduct of every person who credited the report as well-founded. But when the sale was finally consummated, every man of them cried "I told you so"—and rested from his labors.

The syndicate which made the purchase is composed of London and New York bankers and the managers of the Wabash system of railways. This syndicate take outright $15,000,000 of New York Central stock at 120, of which 20 per cent. is to be paid immediately, and the balance in equal instalments of 20 per cent. on the first of each month till all is paid. The stock is to be delivered in similar proportions as each payment is made. There is an option, understood to be for one year, to take another $10,000,000 of the stock on the same terms, and Mr. Vanderbilt agrees not to sell his other Central stock in the market during the period in which the syndicate are taking the $15,000,000 absolutely, as above stated. Though no part of the contract, it is the understanding that Mr. Vanderbilt will buy and hold stocks of the Wabash system of roads to the extent that the managers of the Wabash system of roads have by the recent negotiation become owners of New York Central stock. It is also a part of the programme that none of the New York Central sold by Mr. Vanderbilt will come upon the market. That part of it which is owned here will be held, and the only part that will be sold will be in the London market.

Here is a news item recently telegraphed from Boston to the New York papers;

"The Supreme Judicial Court has removed the injunction issued several months ago against the Broadway Savings Bank, of Lawrence, the bank now being perfectly solvent."

This simple announcement shows (1.) that Massachusetts has a wise general savings bank law, and (2.) that the administration of the law is in safe hands. These are two essential points in the strength and good name of the savings bank system in any State.

Considering the first point, the day of special charters for savings banks is fast passing away. The people who use these institutions will have great cause for rejoicing when the last State wheels into line, and savings banks over the length and breadth of the land will be under the salutary restrictions of general laws adapted to the requirements of these banks in the several States. Then the hundreds of so-called savings banks, in various sections of the country, will be obliged to either go out of business or else sail under their true colors. Under this head it will be observed that the Massachusetts law, referred to above, has an excellent provision governing banks which have suffered loss, from any cause whatever. As soon as the bank commissioners ascertain that a bank's assets are not sufficient to pay off its depositors in full, the concern is at once placed under jurisdiction of the Court, and by discontinuing the interest due depositors for a time, and judiciously caring for the affairs of the bank in co-operation with its officers and trustees, in many cases the bank is thus saved from the ruinous policy of turning it over to the tender mercies of a receiver. Then again, in other Eastern States, when the assets of a bank become impaired it is lawful to scale down each depositor's account, *pro rata*, to make the impairment good. This is infinitly better for the depositors than allowing the average receiver to step in and eat up a large share of the resources in fat fees for himself and the lawyers.

The second point under consideration must necessarily be brief. It is only reasonable to expect that the administration of laws governing savings banks shall fall into judicious hands. If there is one position more than another that requires a clear head added to the greater virtue of an honest heart, that one is the executive officer of a State department charged with the duty of guarding savings banks. No one will deny this. That these powers may, in the course of human events, fall into injudicious hands, the recent experience in New York furnishes the most prominent example. The lesson drawn from Mr. Lamb's conduct of the banking department of this State should not be used, however, as an argument against general laws for savings banks. This is an isolated case. It simply raises the question, guarding against such a contingency, whether it is wise in these general enactments to clothe an officer with such wide and varied powers.

It is interesting to note the effect of Controller Knox's recent effort to stop the over-certification of brokers' checks by certain New York banks. No one questions the wisdom of the controller's action; in fact it was a simple duty he had to perform. The banks doing the largest share of this Stock Exchange business, however, have adopted a plan something like this; brokers are allowed discounts or loans for the day, the same as merchants procure them for thirty days to four months; and against the deposits of these credits checks can be lawfully certified. Sure enough this is "whipping the devil around the stump," but the devious paths marked out by that personage are not entirely unknown in Wall street.

That ultimate good will come from the controller's course is evident. The sagacious banker will use his action as a pretext for refusing accomodation to persons or firms unworthy of credit. But the banks should not have waited for such a pretext, but should have had the courage to treat their broker customers precisely as they treat all other customers.

An important question in banking has been decided by the suit in equity brought by Max Rosenthal, a citizen of New York, against the Mastin Bank and Kersey Coates of Missouri, and the Metropolitan National Bank of New York. The suit was begun in the Supreme Court of the United States and afterward removed to the United States Circuit Court, where Judge Blatchford has given a decision in which he allowed the "demurrer with costs to the defendant to be taxed, with leave to the plaintiff to move, on notice of payment of such costs within twenty days after the service of a copy of the order to be entered on this decision to amend."

On the 1st of August, 1878, Mr. Rosenthal, at Kansas City, paid to the Mastin Bank of Kansas City, Mo., the sum of $2,000, in exchange for which the bank delivered to him a draft dated at Kansas City and signed by its cashier, addressed to the Metropolitan Bank, and containing this direction: "Pay to order Max Rosenthal $1,998." At that time the Metropolitan Bank had in its hands $2,000 belonging to the Mastin Bank. The draft was presented at the Metropolitan Bank on the 5th of August, when the bank refused payment and the draft went to protest. Mr. Rosenthal attached all the money in the Metropolitan Bank belonging to the Mastin Bank in a suit in the New York Supreme Court, which suit went to judgment. The present suit is to determine the claims of the respective persons to the money.

Judge Blatchford decides that the check or draft did not operate as an assignment of the funds in the Metropolitan Bank, but that the general assignment made by the Mastin Bank for the benefit of its creditors on the 3d of August, 1878, conveyed a superior title to the funds to the assignee, and that the telegraphic despatch to the Metropolitan Bank announcing the failure of the Mastin Bank, which was received by the Metropolitan Bank August 5, was sufficient notice to warrant the Metropolitan Bank in withholding payment of the draft. The defendants demurred to the bill because it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

CONTROLLER KNOX'S ANNUAL REPORT.

NATIONAL BANK STATISTICS—REFUNDING—COIN INFLATION.

It is a well known fact that the annual reports of Hon. John Jay Knox, Controller of the Currency, are always readable and instructive, and give evidence of the immense amount of labor involved in their preparation. The forthcoming report is even more interesting than any previous one issued of this important branch of the Treasury Department. From an advance copy obtained for RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, we are enabled to present our readers with the most valuable portions. Perhaps the fact of most interest in the new report is that of the enormous amount of currency now in this country. On the 1st day of November it was $1,165,553,504—or "$380,000,000 in excess of the highest point reached between the suspension and the resumption of specie payment." That is to say, there is about fifty per centum more currency than there was when prices were highest and speculation and other business were most extravagantly active during and after the war.

The first part of the report gives the statistics of banking operations in the entire country:

"The total number of national banks organized from the establishment of the national banking system, February 25, 1863, to November 1 of the present year, is 2,438. Of these 307 have gone into voluntary liquidation by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of their respective capitals, and eighty-one have been placed in the hands of receivers, for the purpose of closing up their affairs, leaving 2,050 in operation at the date last named. * * *

Since my last annual report thirty-eight banks have been organized with an aggregate authorized capital of $3,595,000, to which $2,390,-449 in circulating notes have been issued. Thirty-eight banks, with an aggregate capital of $4,450,000, voluntarily discontinued business within the same period, and eight banks have failed, having a total capital of $1,030,000. The insolvent banks include two, with a capital of $700,000, which failed after having previously gone into voluntary liquidation.

The table below exhibits the aggregate average capital and deposits on May 31, 1879, of all classes of banks other than national, and the capital and deposits of the national banks on June 14 following:

	State b'ks, savings b'ks, private b'k'rs, etc.			National banks.			Total.		
Geographical Divisions	No.	Cap'tl (Millions.)	Dep's's (Millions.)	No.	Cap'tl (Millions.)	Dep's's (Millions.)	No.	Cap'tl (Millions.)	Dep's's (Millions.)
New England States......	536	10.83	384.17	544	164.43	126.72	1,080	175.26	510.89
Middle States..............	1,280	75.77	532.56	640	170.21	393.12	1,920	245.98	925.68
Southern States	494	33.92	47.02	176	30.40	37.93	670	64.32	84.95
Western States and Ter's.	2,002	80.72	216.37	688	90.20	155.63	2,690	170.92	372.00
United States..........	4,312	201.24	1,180.12	2,048	455.24	713.40	6,360	656.48	1,893.52

The following table exhibits, for corresponding dates in each of the last four years, the aggregate amounts of the capital and deposits of each of the classes of banks given in the foregoing table:

Years.	National Banks.			State banks, private bankers, etc.		
	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.
1876	2,091	500.4	713.5	3,803	214.0	480.0
1877	2,078	481.0	768.2	3,799	218.6	470.5
1878	2,056	470.4	677.2	3,709	202.2	413.3
1879	2,048	455.3	713.4	3.639	197.0	397.0

Years.	Savings banks with capital.			Savings banks without capital.		Total.		
	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Deposits—millions.	Number.	Capital—millions.	Deposits—millions.
1876	26	5.0	37.2	691	844.6	6,611	719.4	2,075.3
1877	26	4.9	38.2	676	843.2	6,579	704.5	2,120.1
1878	23	3.2	26.2	668	803.3	6,456	675.8	1,920.0
1879	29	4.2	36.1	644	747.1	6,360	656.5	1,893.5

The aggregate capital of the various classes of banks shown by the foregoing table, has diminished from $719,400,000 in 1876, to $656,-500,000 in 1879, and the aggregate deposits have fallen off from $2,-075,300,000 in 1876, to $1,893,500,000 in 1879—a reduction of $62,900,-000 in capital and $181,800,000 in deposits during the last four years. The national banking capital has diminished $45,100,000, but the deposits of the national banks are almost precisely the same that they were in 1876. Savings banks with capital show a reduction of about one million in capital and the same amount in deposits. The capital and deposits of State banks and private bankers are less by seventeen millions and eighty-three millions, respectively. The greatest reduction, however, is in the deposits of savings banks without capital, which have diminished $97,500,000.

REFUNDING THE NATIONAL DEBT.

Of the recent operations of the Government in refunding, the Controller says:

"The great war debt of the United States was contracted in less than four and a half years. In 1835 the country was entirely out of debt, and on January 1, 1861, the whole debt of the Union amounted to but $66,243,721. During the next six months it increased at the rate of about four millions a month, being on the first day of July, 1861, $90,580,873. During the next year it increased at the rate of more than thirty-six millions per month, and at the close of the fiscal year ending July 1, 1862, it had reached $524,176,412. At the end of the succeeding year it was considerably more than twice that amount, being on July 1, 1863, $1,119,772,138. During the following year it increased nearly seven hundred millions, reaching on July 1, 1864, the sum of $1,815,784,370. During the next nine months, to the close of the war, April 1, 1865, the debt increased at the rate of about two millions a day, or about sixty millions a month, and for the five months next thereafter, at the rate of about three millions a day, or about ninety millions a month, reaching its maximum on August 31, 1865, at which date it amounted to $2,845,907,626.

There was an aggregate of more than $1,276,000,000 of temporary obligations of the Government, of which $830,000,000 bore interest at 7.30 per cent.

This immense amount of temporary obligations was funded within the three years which followed the close of the war, and the skill and good judgment displayed in so doing can only be fully appreciated by those who are familiar with the difficulties of and delicate conditions under which this great work was accomplished. * * *

The whole amount of the funded debt on the 1st of July, 1871, was $1,935,342,700, of which $1,437,097,300 consisted of five-twenty bonds and $194,567,300 of ten-forty bonds. On the 1st day of August, 1871, nearly sixty-six millions ($65,775,550) of new five per cent. bonds had been subscribed for, chiefly by the national banks. During the same month an agreement was entered into by the Secretary [Secretary Boutwell's Report, 1871, p. 17] with Jay Cooke & Co. for the sale of the remainder of two hundred millions of said bonds, and in the month of January, 1873, similar arrangements were made for the sale of a large additional amount. The remainder of the five hundred millions ($178,548,300) was sold during the next three years, the Secretary of the Treasury stating in his report of December 6, 1875, that he had "the pleasure of announcing to Congress that the funding of five hundred millions six per cent. bonds into those bearing 5 per cent. interest has been accomplished." [Secretary Bristow's Report, 1875, p. 12.]

On August 24, 1876, a new contract was made by the Secretary [Secretary Morrill's Report, 1876, p. 11] with A. Belmont & Co. and associates for the sale of the three hundred millions of four and a half per cent. bonds authorized. In this contract the Secretary reserved the right to terminate it by giving ten days' notice to the contractors, and under this contract, calls were made prior to March 4, 1877, for the redemption of one hundred millions of six per cents. In May, 1877, the present Secretary availing himself of the privilege secured in this contract, gave notice that he would limit the sale of four and a half per cents. to one hundred millions, and additional subscriptions were rapidly made until that amount was taken. The avails of eighty-five millions of these bonds were applied to the redemption of five-twenties, the remaining fifteen millions being held for resumption purposes. On the 9th of June, 1877, a contract was made with a syndicate for the sale, at par, in coin, of the four per cent. bonds, authorized to be issued by the Refunding act, with the right to terminate the contract at any time after December 31, 1877, by giving ten days' notice to the contracting parties. In 1877 seventy-five millions of the four per cents. were sold, and in 1878 more than one hundred and twenty-eight millions ($128,685,450). During the first four months of 1879, $497,247,750 additional fours were disposed of, of which more than one hundred and forty-nine millions were sold at a premium of one-half of one per cent. Of this amount, one hundred and twenty-one millions were taken by the First National Bank of New York and associates, and the remainder by other national banks. These, with the sales of forty millions of refunding certificates, completed the refunding of all the bonds of the United States which are redeemable.

The sales of United States bonds since 1871, under the Refunding acts, have been $500,000,000 of 5s, $185,000,000 of 4 1-2s, and $710,-345,950 of 4 per cents; in all, more than $1,395,000,000. There have also been sold for resumption purposes, since March 1, 1877, under the authority of the Resumption act of January 14, 1875, $25,000,000 of 4s, and $65,000,000 of 4 1-2 per cents; the latter being at a premium of 1 1-2 per cent.

The reduction on the interest-bearing debt of the United States, from its highest point, on August 31, 1865, to November 1, 1879, is $583,886,594, of which amount $105,160,900 was accomplished since the refunding operations were commenced on May 1, 1871.

At the highest point the annual interest on the debt was $150,977,-697, while it is now $83,773,778 only. There has, therefore, been a total reduction in this charge of $67,203,919.

The total annual reduction of interest under these refunding operations since March, 1877, has been $14,297,177, while the saving on this account growing out of the operations of the present year alone, is nearly nine millions ($8,803,707), and the total annual saving in all the refunding operations of the government since 1871, is nearly twenty millions ($19,907,607). The funding transactions are believed to be without parallel in financial history.

The public debt of England in January, 1793, amounted to $1,191,-145,000. At that date began the great expenditures caused by the wars of the French Revolution, and of Napoleon, extending from 1793 to 1816. Between these dates stocks and annuities to the amount of $3,881,000,000 were placed on the market at rates of interest varying from 3 to 5 per cent. The average rate of discount at which the stock was sold was 33 per cent., and the average rate of interest paid on the money actually raised by the sale was 5.15 per cent.

After a long interval of peace the Irish famine in 1847 and the Crimean War and Indian mutiny, from 1854 to 1856, caused another addition to the public debt. In the years 1847, 1855, and 1856, 3 per cent. interest-bearing stock to the amount of $170,000,000 was issued and sold at a discount of 10.94 per cent., while the average rate of interest paid on the money raised by the sale was 3.4 per cent.

The three great French loans in 1870, 1871, and 1872, of nearly

$1,592,000,000, realized $1,273,000,000 only. The first loan was at the rate of 3 per cent., and realized to investors nearly five per cent., while the two subsequent and larger loans were sold at 82.50 and 84.50, which was about equivalent to 6 per cent. bonds at par.

WHAT THE NATIONAL BANKS HAVE DONE.

In the course of the report, treating of the national banking system, the Controller says that "it is certain that if the national banking system had not existed, and United States notes had been issued in place of bank notes, the refunding operations here described and the consequent large reduction of interest upon the public debt would not have been possible." The credit of the Government, he says, and its ability to borrow, have been enhanced by placing its bonds in large amounts in the possession of nearly all the leading monetary institutions of every city and village in the country. The Controller believes that the debt can now be refunded into 3 1-2 per cents long before its maturity. * * * *

A number of new suggestions are presented with reference to the resumption of specie payments and kindred topics. The Controller says that "it is manifest that at no time since the date of suspension has so large an amount of currency been needed for the legitimate purposes of business as during the present year. The harvests have been unprecedentedly large, while the value of agricultural products, owing to the short crops of other nations and the consequent demand for our products abroad, has greatly increased. There has also been a continual rise in wages, in the value of manufactured goods, in provisions, and in the price of iron and other commodities."

If this statement is correct, it will explain the scarcity of currency in the city of New York during the last two months, and the consequent demand for additional issues; the amount of national bank notes issued during September and October being nearly six and one half millions, which is nearly equal to the amount issued for the whole ten months preceding. It will also explain why the banks in New York have grudgingly presented for payment their legal-tender certificates, and been obliged to designate one of their number as a depositary for gold, upon which Clearing House certificates are issued and used in settling their exchanges.

Notwithstanding the large increase of specie in the country during the past year, the amount held by the banks has by no means increased in proportion. * * *

The Controller urgently recommends that all the national banks shall take advantage of the present influx of gold to accumulate in their vaults an amount equal to the total cash reserve required by law. He indulges the hope that the reports of another year may show them to be possessed of at least $100,000,000 of gold coin. If this coin, which is still flowing into the Treasury, shall also be largely accumulated by the banks, it will be more likely to become diffused among the people. This certainly would be the case if the smaller denominations of notes were withdrawn from circulation, which might perhaps be done without inconvenience if postal orders were issued in small amounts, and at a minimum cost, at every post office.

In referring to the addition of coin to the circulation, and the consequent redemption of legal-tender and national bank notes, the Controller believes that with the influx of specie it is important that such a paper currency shall be in circulation as can be easily retired, if in excess. A currency is needed which will act automatically, and as a regulator, like the governor in machinery, or the balance-wheel in the chronometer. The best currency is that one which will most readily adapt itself to the needs of business, and its relative cost should not be taken into consideration; for the best money is always the cheapest in the end.

A Newspaper Savings Bank.

The New Orleans "Times" makes this startling announcement:

"Recent developments have caused a widespread distrust of institutions for the deposit of savings. In view of this fact, and at the earnest solicitation of friends of this paper, we will commence next Monday, November 10, to receive deposits, and will continue this arrangement until a properly-guarded savings institution shall be founded in this city. No deposit less than $1 will be received. Depositors will be allowed a uniform rate of 5 per cent. interest, and will be paid their money on demand."

There is something refreshing in the method of starting this newspaper savings bank. The inquiring saver might want to know how the newspaper people propose to invest the savings entrusted to their keeping, in order that the "depositors will be allowed a uniform rate of five per cent. interest." Is it not reasonable to suppose that the editor, publisher, and foreman of the composing room, might elect themselves a committee on investment, and put the money into a paper-mill or type-foundry? But, seriously, it is a lamentable condition of affairs when such a notice as the above can, in all soberness, be published in any community. After the church and school house, every State should see to it that the way is open to banks for savings. Not private concerns, with the sign SAVINGS BANK over their doors, but legitimate institutions, with their powers, rights, and liabilities clearly defined by State law. The day of "bucket shop" savings banks should be brought to a speedy close. The material interests of the thousands of poor people are too sacred to allow of a few of the "leading citizens" to come together and form themselves into a body corporate that they may play being a savings bank at the expense of the saving poor. We maintain that it should be a law of the land (as it is now by virtue of honesty and sound sense) that savings banks in each and every section of the United States should be under the care of general State enactments, gotten up on the most secure and conservative basis, and that it should be a grievous crime for others than those so constituted to advertise themselves or put forth a savings bank sign. The day is surely coming when this condition of affairs will exist, but the sovereign people demand it at once.

THE A B C OF BANKING.

PRACTICAL HINTS ON BANKS—THEIR USES AND DUTIES—TAXATION, AND THE NATIONAL SYSTEM.—BY J. W. PROCTOR.

1. A Bank is an aggregation of capital, either under corporate authority or by association of private individuals, and should always be established with a sufficient known capital to give an ample guarantee to its patrons of its ability to perform what it undertakes to do, because without such public confidence it falls short of the real design and object of banking, viz.: The proper aggregation of the unemployed capital of the country, with a reasonable prospect of profit to the guarantor (or stockholder) and a positive assurance of safety to the guaranteed party (or the depositor).

2. But somebody may raise the question of usefulness—as the generally received opinion is that banks are only organized to prey upon the unfortunate debtor, and their only object to make money. To such I would answer that a bank, properly organized and prudently managed, sustains the same relation to capital that manufactures sustain to the raw material—products of the country. That is, it gathers up the unemployed capital, in the form of deposits, and brings it into active use by distributing it in loans, exchanges and such other forms as will make it available in moving the crops (whether in the form of stock or grain), or in the running of mills, shops or other manufacturing establishments.

3. While they do not claim to be institutions of philanthropy, they nevertheless occupy a useful position in the business and commerce of every civilized community, and as such ought not to be the subject of unfriendly legislation, and are entitled to receive the same fostering care which agriculture and manufactures claim for themselves.

To illustrate this principle, I will give some facts and figures taken from the books of the Central National Bank, of Danville, Kentucky, and when it is considered that this is a country Bank, with a comparatively small capital, the contrast with city Banks and large capital will be the more apparent.

On a recent date, an ordinary business day, the books of the bank show individual deposits to consist of 117 items, amounting to $34,125; other credit items in general business, $27,300—making a total of credits of over $61,000. Individual checks on this bank 291, amounting to over $44,000; checks on other banks 71, amounting to over $13,000. Total number of checks paid 362, amounting to over $57,000—which, together with the other items entering into the general business of the day, showed an aggregate of $92,880 46—which aggregate was accomplished with a difference in cash on hand at the close of business on that day of only $2,526.

4. Having thus defined a Bank, with a portion of its duties and

functions, I state another proposition not generally well understood by those who have not taken the trouble to investigate it, but as susceptible of demonstration as the foregoing. As I am aiming more at plainness than elegance of diction, I affirm that the money of commerce consists not alone in gold and silver coin, Bank notes and Treasury notes, or what is generally known as the currency of the country, but is made up much more largely of credits in other forms, such as negotiable notes, bills of exchange, sight or time drafts drawn against produce stored or in transit, for sale or conversion, bank checks, &c., thus needing an intermediary agent to render available the vast values constantly in transit from producer to manufacturer or consumer. By this it will also appear that debtor obligations as a basis for circulation is not a novel idea, but is as old as the bill of exchange, said to have been invented first by the Jews about the 13th Century.

5. Did the scope of these notes allow, I might so far digress at this point as to offer an argument to prove that the importance of specie payments has been greatly magnified. Specie payments in finance is much like the equator in Geography—only an imaginary line, which may be unconsciously crossed—and yet we have had great political battles fought for several years between our statesmen and politicians about the precise point upon which this line should be drawn. If my theory of the money of commerce is correct, it is manifest that specie payments cannot be maintained during times of great financial distress or panic, because the volume of the money of commerce is so out of proportion to the specie supply of the country, that it is patent to the most casual observer that specie payments can not be maintained when the demand for it is anything like general, but only when comparatively nobody wants it. I therefore conclude that the controversy between parties and factions as to the enduring value of payments in specie, is a matter of minor importance, inasmuch as no legislation can determine when it shall not stop and because the time of its continuance rests upon public confidence in the future value of other commodities. But as there is a wide-spread and generally accepted opinion that we must conform to the usages of the world in the idea that specie, as the acknowledged money of the world, gives more stability to a currency redeemable in and exchangeable for coin; and inasmuch as we have surely passed what in mechanics is called the "dead-point," and the depreciation of values to the specie point exists now simply as a dream of the past, it is so much better to press forward than retrace our steps and fight the same battles over again. It is not the *quality* so much as the *quantity* of legislation and the consequent agitation of the future of this and other financial questions that is ruining the country.

6. It is pertinent to inquire what are the properties of a bank best suited to the wants of commerce, the convenience of the people, and offering the most security at the least cost. A better answer to this

inquiry does not now occur to me than that given by Secretary Schurz in a recent speech, in which he said: "If it be a bank of issue, its notes must be well secured and surrounded with such guarantee of convertibility that they may pass throughout the land without discount and without danger of loss to anybody. Second, its deposits must be well secured by reserves, so as to be reasonably safe; third, its discount and loan business must be conducted without extortion, so as to afford reasonable accommodation to the business of the country." This answer is so nearly correct that I shall not try to improve on it.

It will not be contended by many, however wedded to old ideas, that the State Bank circulation of former years met this first requirement, though a few are advocating a return to the old State Bank system. The memory of the heavy item of exchange under the old system, often ruling as high as one to two per cent. for exchange between the ports of New Orleans or Charleston and New York, and between San Francisco and the Atlantic ports, is too fresh in the memory of comparatively young men now living to allow them to advocate that system.

7. That the national bank note does bear these qualities of security and uniform value is proved by the fact that no holder of a national bank note has ever lost a dollar by reason of the failure of any national bank, and its uniform value is attested by the low rate at which exchange has been kept for the past twelve years, scarcely ever, if at all exceeding the cost of transporting bank notes and often much below that point. This difference may be readily understood, if we take up the history of State bank circulation, and compare it with that of the national banks.

Under the old State bank charters of Kentucky, for example, which were considered amongst the best and most conservative of the nation, the banks having a circulation were allowed to issue three dollars for every dollar of paid up capital, without other additional security than this capital pledged for its redemption; but, notwitstanding the generally high character of the officers in control of these institutions, a knowledge of the fact that they did frequently avail themselves of this privilege, made this authority, intended to give flexibility to the currency, one of the most dangerous elements in times of panic; because, at the sound of the first note of alarm, the note-holders, either in person or through the agency of brokers, presented their notes at the counters of the respective Banks demanding specie for them, and the Banks readily understanding that they could not meet three dollars of liability with one dollar of capital, would immediately call in their loans in the hands of the people, thus producing such distress as impaired greatly the ability of the people for payment, as no new or other loans could be obtained from other banks, and the consequence was, either an increased rate of interest demanded to meet the increased risk incurred, or the unavoidable sacrifice of property to meet these demands, and either the people or the banks must go under. It not unfrequently ocurred that both were ruined in the struggle.

8. The facts in relation to national bank circulation as to security are almost the reverse of the State bank. No national bank is allowed under any circumstances to have in its possession a greater amount of circulation than 90 cents on the $1 of her paid-up capital stock, and this only upon deposit with the Treasurer of the United States of bonds of the United States, to the extent of $100 for every $90 of circulation issued.

9. The most plausible argument ever offered for the old system of State bank circulation was flexibility of the currency and a reduction of rates of interest. It does not require a trained financier to recognize the fact that flexibility of the currency comes from another source, and history does not confirm the theory of cheap interest when we add the cost of exchange, produced by the limited sphere of the circulation of these State bank notes and the consequent depreciation of value when passing beyond the limit of the States in which they were issued, by reason of the limited points of redemption, and the fact that they were frequently made redeemable at points difficult of access; whereas the national bank note is redeemable both at the bank of issue and the Treasury of the United States.

10. But while it is candidly admitted by some that this system of banking, combining, as it does, the benefits of National credit, with the security furnished by the individual interest, and personal supervision of those who have their money in it, yet it is objected that it is too expensive, and it is claimed that it would be better if the Government should issue Treasury notes in lieu of the National Bank notes, and redeem the bonds held by the national banks as security for their circulation. To many this seems plausible and desirable, because it is claimed and admitted that the Treasury note furnishes that uniform currency now issued by the national banks, and upon principles of economy this should be done; but it should at the same time be remembered that it is neither claimed or admitted that the U. S. Government can or ought to supply this intermediary agency required by commerce.

11. It is charged that national banks are the great monopolies that devour the country. As to this, it is only necessary to say, briefly, that the number of share-holders of the national banks is about 220,000, and the average amount of stock held by each is about $3,100. More than one-half of these share-holders hold 10 shares or less each, while the entire number holding more than 100 shares ($10,000) each, is but 10,851, and of these but 767 hold more than 500 shares (or $50,000) each, thus demonstrating how generally these shares are distributed amongst the people. But that which is open to the world under the same conditions can be no more a monopoly than raising wheat or spinning cotton. Any number of persons, not less than five, who can

furnish the capital and pay the taxes are invited to this field, and the profits of the business, if so lucrative, ought to invite competition.

12. The public generally are coming to understand that the Government has set a distinguished example in taxing banks upon their indebtedness, viz.: on both their circulation and deposits, and the banks have appealed in vain to have this unjust tax removed. But all stockholders should be glad to know what inducements would be offered to capitalists to embark in the business of banking, with its attendant hazards and expenses, for the purpose of loaning its capital only, when that might as well be done without the additional expenses incident to the business of banking, and what additional benefits would the banks by that means extend to commerce above the private capitalist. So far as the writer can understand the question, this restriction to the use of capital alone would defeat the very spirit and intention of the business in its relation to commerce, and when I shall find a bank, National, State, or private that professes to confine itself strictly to the use of its capital in its resources of profits, I shall conclude there is indeed "a great cry for little wool."

13. But we are told there is no intention to interfere with the banking system of the country. It is only proposed to retire the national bank circulation. If it be true that national bank profits are not now excessive, what is to induce capital to remain in an institution maimed by the removal of one of its important limbs? If these institutions furnish better security than any others which we have tried, shall this go for nothing? And shall we wipe out a system that by the test of experience is proved and admitted (by its opponents even), to be the best we have ever had, simply because that a hobby is needed to ride into office, when nothing is offered as a substitute that is claimed to be better?

Legislation is what we have had and are continually having too much of. If some one could devise a plan for the suppression of legislation, and transfer this force to the machinery and muscle of the country, he would be entitled to the distinction of a philanthropist, and the gratitude of his countrymen. Indeed, if the former could be accomplished, the latter would start of its own volition.

14. If the readers of the JOURNAL will bear with me in summing up what I claim as the benefits of the National system, and if it is found that it is best adapted to the wants of commerce in furnishing a uniform currency and reduced rates of exchange, and by reason of the small profit on circulation it lifts that burden from commerce which would otherwise be charged in interest,—if it removes this perplexing question from the field of politics and suppresses the evils of a Government issue, to be regulated more by the caprice of partisans than the wants of commerce, if it supplies that quality of *intermediary* in commerce which the Government cannot supply without adding to the crowd of mischievous office-holders,—in short, if it possesses the qual-

ities of the best banking system ever known to the country, I leave you to judge whether it is worth more than it costs.

15. May I ask the readers of this magazine to keep clearly in mind the prime functions of a bank and its relations to commerce, and especially of that intermediary quality afforded by banks not practical through any other agency, and also the evidences of security offered by national banks above any other known to us, and more particularly to the definition of the kind of bank best suited to the wants of commerce and the convenience of the people. I presume it will not be controverted that any currency to be of uniform value in all parts of the country in which it is intended to circulate must be well secured, and I will assume that such a currency is of incalculable benefit to commerce in facilitating the exchange of commodities between the sections and the reduction of the cost of such exchanges; neither will it be denied by any that both the national banks and Treasury notes equally possess this uniform value.

To come directly to the cause of difference or the point at issue between the advocates of these respective systems, it is claimed by the advocates of the Greenback idea that it is a useless waste of public money to allow the banks to receive interest on their bonds deposited as security for circulating notes, (which, it is claimed, amounts to $21,000,000 annually), when the Government may as well pay off the bonds and issue Treasury notes instead. This, it will be perceived, leaves entirely out of the question the other offices which the banks perform for commerce, which, no thinking man can deny, could not be performed by the Government, one of the less important of which functions is the issue of circulating notes; but for the present we will pass that branch of the question and inquire for what purpose these bonds are required to be deposited by the banks. With great confidence, I affirm, that it is for the security of the note-holder, in order that it may impart to him that confidence essential to confer upon it that quality of uniform value, because it is secured by a consideration, the value of which is known to all and which could not be imparted to it if secured by any other property possessing a local value, though such local security might be many times greater. It is true, without controversy, that a banker to inspire such confidence as will enable him effectually to perform that office of intermediary, must have property of some kind, and the more universally the value of that property is published to the world the more extended his credit, and the better is he qualified to perform the functions of banking.

Now that business is reviving in every section of the country there are very few observers but recognize the resumption of specie payments as an important factor in bringing about this happy condition of affairs. Business conducted on a specie basis means a full return of public confidence, and whatever strengthens the confidence of the people strengthens public credit. If the national banks furnish such additional security as contributes to strengthen that public confidence above the other systems which we have tried, or which are now offered in substitution for them, this factor is not to be ignored in the work of transferring from an irredeemable currency to a coin basis the vast property interests and commercial transactions of this great nation, but are entitled to their proper credit for whatever they contribute in that direction.

Security is increased by a division of responsibility under the same conditions, and hence the division of issues of currency between the United States and the banks, makes each help to bear the other's burdens in the resumption of and maintenance of specie payments, and each may and must help to tide over the chasm of a hesitating public confidence until the fact of our ability to sustain it has been fully demonstrated. This qnality of a division of responsibility gives confidence that each will be the better able to meet these obligations, and will relieve the public mind of much of its urgency.

Amongst the sophistries of the stump we have often heard the Greenback orators declaim what they have borrowed from each other, giving it to the world as original from each that "the greenback during the war was good enough for the laborer and the soldier, but gold only was fit for the bondholder." Now these gentlemen propose to repeat what they condemned during the war as the Pandora's box from which all our evils sprung.

17. There are those who insist that by the issue of the entire currency of the country for circulation, a large amount of interest will be saved to the people, and deposit banks will supply all necessary banking facilities, in which proposition the security offered by this system is entirely ignored. I claim that the credit of national banks, by reason of their rigid government supervision and sound condition, preserved by a knowledge of their required published statements, is so far superior to that of deposit and private banks, that it returns to commerce in the security of business and decreased cost of exchanges, more than it costs the U. S. Government if the whole cost claimed by its enemies be admitted. Who can estimate the value of a sound currency to a commercial people? Most of the prejudice which exists to-day against the National system, comes from chronic objectors—many of them whose motive is to tear down rather than build up on strong foundations—then again there is another class whose prejudices result from large losses and repeated insolvencies under other banking systems.

That large number of outsiders who have lately been attracted to Wall street, having come from all parts of the country to seek to become suddenly rich by speculation, and who are known as "the lambs," have been shown by the professional speculators that prices can go down as well as up. To many of them it is their first lesson, and they have undoubtedly paid for it full tuition rates.

C

The Use of Checks in Germany.

[The following reference to the use of checks in Germany is from the London "Banker's Magazine" for November. It is of interest to note that, though checks are not commonly used in Germany, they are free of a stamp duty under the law. But, should the Chambers of Commerce referred to be instrumental in bringing checks into more common use, doubtless the government would impose the odious tax. At least, that would seem to be an outgrowth from the plan, if our own experience may be taken as an index. It is to be hoped that the next Congress will wipe out the obnoxious tax on checks.]

The employment of checks in all business transactions is so general in Great Britain, that we scarcely understand the difficulties which are still felt in many countries in introducing a system which is so familiar to us. The following statement relating to the desire felt at the present time to establish the employment of checks in Germany will, therefore, be of interest to our readers:—

The Chamber of Commerce at Brunswick has lately forwarded circulars to the other Chambers of Commerce in Germany inquiring whether they feel disposed to form a general meeting to discuss the plan of a law which would regulate the nature of checks for the whole of Germany, according to principles to be mutually agreed on. If the use of checks is to become more general in Germany, every educated person should have a knowledge of their nature and use, as he has of a bank-note or a bill. For this reason a legal enactment is required to regulate the nature of the check. The regulations fixed by a special law should include the definition, that is to say, the indication of the mark distinguishing it from the simple draft, which, amongst other things, enables checks to be free of stamp duty, as is permitted at the present time by the stamp law; also the remedy in case of non-payment, the time for which is regulated by the ordinary law of the land, but which should, undoubtedly, be made at least equal to the remedy for bills; further, the definition of the short periods allowed for presentation and limitations of term of validity, similar to those prescribed by foreign laws; finally, the protection against an illegal and fraudulent use of drawing, which appears to be especially required, owing to the characteristic nature of the check. Besides this, the various rights and obligations of the holder, the drawee, and the drawer would have to be fixed. In all these regulations it must be considered that the check demands a far greater amount of trust during the short period of its circulation than the bill, not being a form of paper money like the latter, but representing payment in cash. Without such regulations by law, the use of the check as a general circulating medium, with all its individual and general economic advantages, will never be thoroughly established, or only slowly and with great difficulty.

THE CONTROLLER ANSWERS W. H. BLISS.

[Some of our readers may have read, in the early part of October last, a letter, or at least extracts from a letter, sent by William H. Bliss, Esq., U. S. District Attorney at St. Louis, to the Attorney-General of the United States, concerning the relations of the Controller of the Currency with the late National Bank of the State of Missouri. To those who are so fortunate as to know the Hon. John Jay Knox, no word of his is necessary in vindication of either his private or public life; but occupying, as he does, one of the most responsible positions in the Treasury Department, many know him in his official capacity only. To such the following reply is especially commended. After all the newspaper notoriety given to Mr. Bliss' charges, they fell like a dead weight, as such allegations and insinuations, "wholly and gratuitously false" from beginning to end, always do.]

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CONTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
WASHINGTON, October 29, 1879.

SIR: I had the honor to acknowledge on the 17th inst. the receipt, by reference from your office, of a letter of the Attorney-General of the 16th inst., transmitting a communication of William H. Bliss, Esq., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, relative "to the position assumed by the Controller of the Currency in the matter of the prosecution of the officers of the late National Bank of the State of Missouri, now under indictment for violation of the National Banking law."

In my letter of acknowledgment I advised you that a copy of this communication would be forwarded to the Receiver of the bank for report, which was immediately done, and I have now his reply thereto, which I herewith inclose. In the meantime, and without affording me a reasonable opportunity to make my answer, the report of the District Attorney has, through his own procurement no doubt, been published in full in the public prints, accompanied, in some instances, by startling and conspicuous head-lines, attributing to me the grossest official negligence and malfeasance in office. I am the more surprised by these misrepresentations and by this display of malevolence on the part of the District Attorney, in view of the fact that from the time I went to St. Louis up to the date of his communication—a period of nearly ten months—he had never, so far as I know or have heard, made any complaint to his superior officers as to my official conduct or as to that of the Receiver. As no request from him for official action or information has ever been for a moment neglected or denied by me or by the Receiver, I had no cause to suspect, and did not suspect, that I was the object of the hostility which he now makes public.

The only formal complaint made in intelligible or unambiguous terms, concerning my action in relation to the criminal proceedings referred to, appears to be that I have misunderstood or failed to obey the public statutes which define my duties, and that I am not in sympathy with the public prosecutor in his efforts to bring to justice the violators of the National Banking law. The charges, however, which are made by indirection and innuendo, rather than by any definite allegation, and which he evidently wishes to have read between the lines of his letter, are, that I have in some way screened or wish to screen from the consequences of their crime the officers and employes of the bank: that I have withheld information essential to the successful prosecution of officers of the bank charged with offences against the law; that I have in some way prevented or desired to prevent investigation of the affairs of the bank; and that I have not given my official sanction to the prosecution of the particular cases to which he refers. These charges—those that are made by vague intimations as well as those definitely alleged, I declare to be maliciously false; and I believe them to have been made, not from a sense of public duty, but to subserve personal and unworthy motives and purposes. So far as they relate to me in my official conduct and motives, I *know* them to be false. So far as they relate to the Receiver and his conduct and motives, I believe them to be false; and their falsity is made plainly apparent by the records of this bureau and by the public history of the transactions in question.

Some months before the failure of the bank, having received unfavorable information as to its condition and management, I sent an expert examiner from Chicago, with instructions to make a searching inquiry into its condition. After careful inquiry by the examiner selected by me, Mr. William P. Watson, he sent me a full report relating to the assets, liabilities, and the condition of the bank, stating that about forty per cent. of its capital was gone. He also informed me that the last report which had been transmitted to me from the bank was incorrect as to the amount of past-due paper and the character of the cash items. Upon receiving the examiner's report, I at once required that there should be a reorganization of the board of directors, and the board thus organized—one of its members being Hon. John B. Henderson, an ex-Senator of the United States, a well-known citizen of St. Louis, and a lawyer of high standing—were put upon inquiry to ascertain the true condition of the bank, by the full and explicit letter which I had written, under the date of March 31, 1877, pointing out what was improper and needed correction in the administration of the bank's affairs, which letter was in their possession.

In June, 1877, the new board, after weeks of searching investigation into the condition of the bank, informed me that it was insolvent, and on the 23d of that month I appointed as Receiver of the bank Mr. Walter S. Johnston, who had previously had much experience in closing up insolvent banks, and who was not a resident of St. Louis, was unacquainted with any one connected with the bank, in no way involved in its complications, and in whose tried ability, integrity, and experience I had reason to place the most implicit confidence. The business incident to the payment of its creditors and the winding up of the affairs of the bank has been conducted by the Receiver with noticeable vigor and success. Since his appointment, the Receiver has paid dividends amounting to seventy per cent. of the claims proved against the bank, and distributed more than fifteen hundred thousand dollars in cash to its creditors.

On the 14th of December, 1878, in compliance with a telegram received from the District Attorney, I sent to him, by express, the originals of all reports and oaths of directors requested by him, contrary to the regulations of the Treasury Department, and directed the Receiver to give him a copy of the report of Examiner Watson, which was in his possession.

On the 23d of December, 1878, I received a dispatch from the District Attorney, requesting my immediate presence in St. Louis. After a delay of two days, which was occasioned by my effort, made by the advice of the Assistant Solicitor of the Treasury, to communicate with the judge in St. Louis, I left for that city and appeared before the grand jury on December 27.

I do not think it permissable to follow the example of the District Attorney, and state what occurred in the grand-jury room, further than to say that all the information I had relative to the bank and its management was communicated to the grand jury without any evasion, reservation, or concealment whatsoever; and that all the records of the bank and information possessed by any person under my control, were placed at its full disposal and subject to its action. The result was that indictments were found against the President, vice-president, and cashier of the bank. At a later day another grand jury took into consideration the conduct of the officers of the bank, and it, too, was furnished with all the information in possession of this office and of the Receiver: and an officer of this bureau was dispatched to St. Louis, on May 1, 1879, who testified before the grand jury as to what he knew relative to the affairs of the bank.

From that time up to the day of his complaint to the Attorney-General, the District Attorney has never sought my advice or given me any information concerning these criminal prosecutions, nor has he made application to me, or to the Receiver, so far as I am informed, for any action, aid, or sympathy in his proceedings against the persons accused and now under indictment.

It is not true that I am now, or have at any time been, in any way antagonistic or averse to the prosecution of the persons indicted: or that I have been unwilling or indisposed to have the cases brought to trial. On the contrary, I have always been ready to co-operate with the District Attorney, and to place at his disposal the necessary records and papers of this bureau.

I come now to the consideration of the complaints made by the District Attorney relating to the occurrences subsequent to the finding of the indictments already mentioned. The indictments were found nearly a year ago, but the accused have not yet been brought to trial. The District Attorney does not venture to assert that this delay has resulted from any fault or negligence on my part, or that I have directly or indirectly hindered or prevented a prompt or vigorous administration of the law. He knows that such a charge would be so obviously false and unfounded that it would be injurious rather than useful to his purpose. He prefers, therefore, to convey indirectly the impression that my action in securing the payment of money by Mr. Eads, the surrender to him of the evidence of his indebtedness, the action of the Receiver in reference to the custody of the books of the bank, and in retaining Hon. John B. Henderson as his counsel after he had become, as is alleged, counsel for one of the persons against whom an indictment had been found, and in retaining in his employ the late cashier, who is now under indictment, have, in some unexplained way, injuriously affected the interests of the prosecution.

It is true that, on the advice of the Receiver and his counsel, I did, having first obtained an order of a competent court, as provided by law, accept from Mr. Eads the payment of a large sum of money in full satisfaction of his indebtedness to the bank. I accepted it, because I believed the settlement to be of vital importance to the interests of the creditors of the bank; but in so doing I did not condone any infraction of the law, nor did I intend to deprive the prosecution of any evidence which the District Attorney intended or desired to use. If the District Attorney had desired the retention of the notes which, I am informed by his communication, were produced before the grand jury, he should have so informed the Receiver when he returned the notes to him, after he had made what use he wished of them.

As to the action of the Receiver, I never knew, until I read the District Attorney's complaint to the Attorney General, that the late cashier continued in the employ of the Receiver after the finding of the indictments, or that Mr. Henderson was the counsel for one of the accused officials. I had not heard that the District Attorney had ever had any difficulty in obtaining access to the books of the bank. It would naturally be supposed that, if the District Attorney sincerely entertained the belief that these matters were detrimental to the public service, he would have felt it to be his duty as a public officer to give to me or some officer of the Government timely information and notice, by telegraph or otherwise, of his objections. From his silence, the unavoidable inference is that he considered them frivolous and insignificant, as they really are, and that he has brought them into notice merely to subserve his own interests.

In explanation of the continued employment of the late cashier of the bank, it appears that the Receiver considered it important that the bank should have the benefit of his knowledge of its books and business. It also appears that the District Attorney informed the Receiver that there was no need to discharge Mr. Curtis, and that he did not know that his case would come to trial.

It is but just to the Receiver that I should quote from his letter his reasons for the retention of Mr. Curtis, and also his statement concerning his counsel and the custody of the books of the bank.

He says:

I found Mr. Curtis here on hand, the cashier of the bank for ten years, a man of "natural moral excellence" and "fine business habits," to quote Mr. Bank-Examiner Watson's report. He was familiar with every book, paper, and transaction in the bank—and their name is legion—and could in a moment lay his hands on any paper or entry wanted in the vast mass and array of records. He was the necessary and indispensable witness in the important litigation of the bank, involving enormous pecuniary demands *pro* and *con*. There was but one other officer comparable to him in usefulness to creditors, and that was the assistant cashier, equally guilty as the cashier, if there be any guilt in the alleged false entries and reports, who refused my offer of retention as too low pay for so important a person as the late assistant cashier of this bank, but who is the person referred to by the United States District Attorney as furnishing the "expert services of the late employe" in informing on his old employers, in return for which we have the gratuitous tender of him by the District Attorney as a person "equally competent" with Mr. Curtis, whose services can be "readily obtained if desired." Mr. Curtis was continued by me as my principal assistant because I believed him to be, as I have found him to be, an invaluable assistant. He has a wife and children to support, and God forbid that I should prejudge his conduct. Let the law proceed in due course.

Mr. Bliss is egregiously mistaken in speaking of him as "employed by the United States Government." On the contrary, he is employed by me. Said the United States Supreme Court, in *Case vs. Terrill*, 11 *Wall.*, p. 199: "The Receiver represents the bank and its creditors, and in no sense represents the United States Government." The Government does not employ or pay Mr. Curtis. And to show that the District Attorney is pitifully insincere in his complaint that Mr. Curtis has charge of the dumb mouths of these books, (any attempt at alteration of which would be manufacturing his own ruin,) I am compelled to recall the fact that immediately after his indictment, in Mr. Bliss's office, I deprecated the prospective loss of Mr. Curtis's services; whereupon Mr. Bliss remarked that there was no need of discharging Curtis, and that he didn't know that his case would come to trial. As to the defendants having free access to the books, pray why shouldn't they? The District Attorney kept them for five months after they were indicted. Their attorneys made repeated demands of me, as a matter of simple right and justice, to see their books and papers; to which I responded constantly, that I did not intend to interfere in the slightest degree with the claim of right of possession of this very peculiar District Attorney, if he kept them all until doomsday. In point of fact, however, although the books were returned in June last, I have never once seen defendant's attorneys in this bank during office-hours making any examination of anything in these cases; and no one knows better than Mr. Bliss that he has and can come to this office without surveillance or intrusion, and that he has always been received with courtesy and familiarity, and that every request of his has been promptly met, and that Mr. Curtis (who "receives and answers" nothing, all of which is done by myself alone) has, with intelligent alacrity, furnished forth every book, paper, or piece of information requested by Mr. Bliss or by the grand jury. He, possibly, has a different theory about the effect of it all; but I vouch for his perfect integrity in furnishing the facts. Mr. Bliss never addressed me a solitary letter other than requests for such and such a book or paper or kindred matter, and whose contents might have been "known to the defence" to their hearts' content for all the good it could have done them. What nonsense this all is! I am ashamed to have to take so much time in answering it.

6. When I came here I found General Henderson virtually directing proceedings, and freshly and fully informed of the whole affairs of the bank. He was a leading attorney of high reputation for ability and probity, so I concluded to employ him in any litigation we might find necessary to commence or defend. I have from time to time employed other attorneys. Some of the accused in this matter saw fit to employ General Henderson to defend them; not by my "advice and consent," but with my knowledge and consent, although I don't see what my consent had to do with the matter. General Henderson, I presumed, could safely be trusted to square his conduct in any matter by a high sense of professional duty. I don't presume to dictate to him, nor does he ask my advice and consent about what clients he shall have, and what not; and the Controller of the Currency does not know, so far as I know, whether he has been retained by any of the accused or not.

I have accurately and carefully stated what my position and official action have been in relation to the affairs of the bank and the proceedings against its officers herein referred to. There can be no serious dispute as to what I have done, or left undone, because the evidence of my official acts is preserved in the records of the bureau. The only inquiry suggested by the statements I have made appears to me to be whether, in the course I have pursued, I have fully performed the duties which devolve upon me as the chief officer of this bureau, which is by statute charged "with the execution of all laws passed by Congress relating to the issue and regulation of a national currency secured by United States bonds?"

Inasmuch as section 380 of the Revised Statutes provides that "all suits and proceedings arising out of the provisions of the law governing national banking associations, in which the United States or any of its agents shall be parties, shall be conducted by the District Attorney of the several districts under the direction of the Treasury," and inasmuch as section 771 of the Revised Statutes makes it "the duty of every District Attorney to prosecute in his district all delinquents for crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States," I have considered that criminal prosecutions against officers of national banks were, like prosecutions for counterfeiting national bank notes, and for committing various other crimes against the laws of the United States, placed under the immediate charge of the attorneys of the United States, subject to the control of the Solicitor of the Treasury and the Attorney General. It is not true, therefore, as is stated by the District Attorney, that in many past instances of criminal violations of the banking law indictments have been procured or prosecuted under the especial guidance and assistance of the

Controller. The records of the Treasury Department and of the Department of Justice show that I have never assumed the guidance or control of criminal prosecutions, but that in almost all instances prosecutions for offences against the banking law have been commenced, carried on, and concluded by the prosecuting officers of the Government, without any consultation with the Controller, and without seeking or obtaining from him any aid or instructions. It has occasionally occurred that prosecutions have been begun in consequence of communications or reports received by me, and referred to the Solicitor of the Treasury, who is the legal adviser of this bureau. But it has never occurred that this bureau has assumed to have or to exercise authority to set on foot, to control, or to terminate criminal prosecutions. That authority, so far as I know has always been claimed and exercised by the attorneys of the United States, under the direction of the Solicitor of the Treasury and the Attorney General, but without the advice or consent, *and usually without the knowledge of this bureau.*

Section 324 of the Revised Statutes prescribes, briefly, the general duties of the Controller, and various other sections of the statutes specifically provide what the Controller shall do under certain given circumstances; that he shall require banks to keep reserve; to redeem their circulating notes; not to wrongfully certify checks; to pay up capital stock; not to continue to hold their own stock; and the law provides that if the banks fail in any of these particulars, the Controller shall appoint a Receiver, and that for continued violations of law he shall bring suit for forfeiture of the charter of the bank.

Section 5234 of the statutes also specifically prescribes the duties of the Receiver; that he "shall take possession of the books, records, and assets of every description of such association, collect all debts, dues, and claims belonging to it, and, upon the order of a court of record of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and on a like order may sell all the real and personal property of such association, on such terms as the court shall direct; and may, if necessary to pay the debts of such association, enforce the individual liability of the stockholders." He is also required to pay over all moneys to the order of the Controller, and to make a report to him of all his acts and proceedings.

The criminal sections of the National Bank Act do not impose any duties whatever upon the Controller or Receiver, but I beg leave to say that I am, and have always been, ready and willing to give to the proper officers of the Government full and prompt information of all criminal violations of the banking law, and to do everything in my power to further their efforts to secure the punishment of offenders against it; but I do not consider that I am charged with the duties or responsibilities of a public prosecutor. If I am mistaken in my construction of the law, the action of this bureau has been wrong from the day of its creation, but can be corrected in compliance with any instructions you may think proper to give.

Having, as I believe, fully answered the charges of the District Attorney, I now beg leave to call your attention to some peculiar and noticeable features in the conduct of that officer in relation to the prosecution in St. Louis, which explain the motives of his bitter and malicious attack on me, and show how little consideration his complaints are entitled to receive.

Although the circumstances which led to the failure of the bank, and the transaction in which its officers had been engaged, became matters of public notoriety and report at the time of the failure, and although the Receiver, in the fall of 1877, within six months after the failure, communicated to him all the particular causes thereof of which he had any knowledge, the District Attorney took no steps to secure a judicial inquiry into the management of the bank or the punishment of the delinquent officers and directors. Not only did the District Attorney fail to set on foot a judicial investigation or any criminal proceeding, but when the grand jury at St. Louis, more than a year after the failure, itself took the initiative and demanded that the Receiver of the bank should be required to appear before it, the District Attorney, as is stated by the Receiver, upon information derived from the District Attorney himself, steadily opposed this demand, on the ground that the grand jury had no right to demand the presence of any witnesses except upon the direction of the District Attorney, and that he had no knowledge of the commission of any crime in relation to the management of the bank, as the Receiver had not appeared before him and made complaint upon his oath. But, finally, and in the face of the opposition of the District Attorney, and after the grand jury had made complaint in open court of their inability to obtain the attendance of the witnesses they wished to examine, as I am informed by the Receiver, the inquest was begun.

As I have already stated, I appeared before the grand jury, as did also the Receiver, and offered for their examination all the records and papers of the bank, and gave them full information as to the transactions which brought about its failure, and as to all the persons who participated in those transactions. In the course of their investigations the conduct of all the directors in reference to the mismanagement of the bank's affairs must have become known to the grand jury as fully as did the conduct of the president and vice-president and cashier. The result was that, after a long inquiry, indictments were found only against the former president, the vice-president, and the cashier of the bank, for making unearned dividends, for purchasing the stock of the bank, and for making false reports; but although there is a provision of the statute which makes the "wilful misapplication" of the funds of a national bank a crime, no indictment was found with reference to the disposition of the immense sums of money which the bank had lost by the action of the directors, nor were there any indictments found against any other directors, although it is, of course, absurd to suppose that of the board of directors, the president and vice-president were alone responsible for or concerned in the payment of unearned dividends, or for the purchase of the stock of the bank.

It is of course true, and indeed notorious, that the persons indicted were not the only or the chief offenders against the banking law. Why are there criminal proceedings now pending against the president, the vice-president, and the cashier, but not against the other directors?

One of two explanations for their immunity and escape must be true. Either the grand jury of their own motion dismissed their cases from consideration, or its action was caused by the advice and influence of the District Attorney. As the District Attorney has felt at liberty to repeat and publish in part the testimony which he says I gave before the grand jury, he will, perhaps, not be unwilling to state what communications he made, what influence he exercised, and what advice he gave to the grand jury to induce them to ignore the grave offences of the other directors, and to fix their attention upon and confine their action to the acts of the president and the vice-president alone. He will, perhaps, also state whether or not he informed me, without solicitation, in his own office, and other persons elsewhere, of his proposed visit to Washington for consultation, and if such visit was not afterwards brought about by his own contrivance, and also whether or not such visit did not interrupt the business of the grand jury, and was not made for the purpose of obtaining instructions that would relieve him of the duty of instituting criminal proceedings against those who had misapplied the funds of the bank.

My own action, from the inception of the proceedings in question to the present time, has been absolutely impartial. I have favored no directors or set of directors. I have fully stated all facts within my knowledge. I have neither modified my official action nor withheld information in consideration of its probable effects upon certain individuals. Can the District Attorney say as much for his own official conduct?

The public, to which the District Attorney refers, will probably take very little notice of any controversy between that officer and myself; but it has not failed to notice the fact that no one has, up to the present time, been criminally punished for any offence committed in the management of the bank, and that with the reference to the most flagrant offences committed by the directors, no prosecution whatever has been commenced.

It is my earnest wish that some competent and impartial person may be directed to make a careful scrutiny into the cause of this conspicuous and scandalous failure of justice, not forgetting to inquire of the grand jury what transpired during their investigation, and what personal advice the District Attorney gave to certain members of the jury in reference to screening those directors who were equally guilty with those indicted. It will give me pleasure to have my conduct, in its minutest particulars, made the subject of the most thorough examination and criticism, and I will cheerfully abide by and accept the result of such an inquiry.

In the meantime, I take occasion to express the conviction, formed deliberately and on sufficient ground, as I believe, that the purpose of the District Attorney in making false and groundless charges against me, is to divert attention from his own gross negligence and omissions of duty, and to conceal the partiality and inefficiency of his official conduct, and to prepare the public mind in advance for the probable failure, through some weakness or defect in the testimony or in his indictments, of the prosecution to which he refers.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JOHN JAY KNOX,
Controller of the Currency.

HON. JOHN SHERMAN,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Three Great Financial Disasters.

The Pittsburg "Telegraph" has published a review of the various financial panics which have occurred in our history, and, after reciting, briefly, the history of the United States Bank up to the year 1819, thus tells the story of the disaster that befell our trade in that year: "Fortunes were wiped out in a day, speculative companies that stood everywhere thick as shocks in a wheat field, vanished magically, and shareholders were aghast; suburban lands and city lots that were to return a hundredfold dropped to almost worthlessness. As an example of the effect of the panic on real estate here, an old citizen says that land on Boyd's Hill held at $2,000 an acre dropped to $100; lots on Fourth avenue held at $2,000 fell to $100; property in the region of Market street, on which were good brick houses, only partly paid for, were wholly abandoned, as property quite as good could be bought for less than the sums due on these. But the United States Bank with its capital of $35,000,000 weathered the storm, and by furnishing the country again with a stable currency of uniform value, won back coy confidence, and again compelled the State banks to go into liquidation, or to raise the value of the notes to the standard of the national bank notes. This together with the temporary settlement of the slavery agitation by the compromise of 1820, and especially with the impetus given to home manufactures by the tariff of 1824, and the work of internal improvements, set the country upon its feet once more.

"It is not in man, however, to let well enough alone, above all when it stands in the way of his political theory. The second charter of the bank was to expire in 1836. When the Thirty-Third Congress assembled on the 2d of December in that year, President Jackson said in his Message that in the interim his Secretary of the Treasury had ordered the removal of the Government deposits from the United States to the State banks, and he gave as his principal reason for this that the bank had used these deposits for partisan purposes. The parliamentary warfare that followed this action was unparalleled for vindictivness, and is too long to be related here even if germane to the subject. The constitutional point involved was the old one that Jefferson had contended for, viz., the power to charter banks is a right reserved to the States; they alone could supply a constitutional paper currency. The State rights question had come bounding to the surface again. This authoritative recognition of the value and usefulness of the State banks, and the importance attached to them as Government depositories, stimulated their organization to an extraordinary degree. Many were chartered to take the place of the United States bank, the closing of which was expected. The State banks increased from 282 in 1830, to 632 in 1837. During the same period their capital rose from $145,000,000 to $290,000,000; their circulation from $61,000,000 to $149,000,000; their loans and discounts from $200,000,000 to $485,000,000; their deposits from $55,000,000 to $127,000,000. Thus during these seven years the banking facilities of the country had been considerably more than doubled, while the increase in the capital of the country was small, and there was no manifest need of the addition of a dollar to the currency. The result of the increase of the currency was an unexampled delirium of extravagance and speculation, in the midst of which came the destructive collapse of 1837. Ruin reigned on every hand; almost every business man and business house in the land was involved in the common wreck. Collections were next to impossible, and in some States, as notably Mississippi, wholly so. Credit everywhere was destroyed. There was a general suspension of the banks at the first blast of the storm in 1837. In 1838 they made a heroic endeavor, and resumed payment, but the year following those of Philadelphia and the regions of the South and West again bent before the storm. The distress was pitiful, and during the first two years of the panic it was necessary to import large quantities of food from Europe. The country that a short time before abounded in what it called wealth, and boasted loudly of its many resources, could not furnish bread to the hungry. The failure of the banks holding the deposits of the Government left it without a penny. Congress was hastily summoned, and Treasury notes were issued to keep the department going until the Sheriff could sell out the shareholders of the defunct banks and recover the deposits. Finally the Government divorced its monetary affairs from those of trade and commerce, and established the Independent Treasury. The disaster was so complete that one cannot point to any exact date when the hard times ceased. The recovery was in fact the gradual re-creation of the ruined industries.

"Until 1853 the volume of paper money increased slowly, and only according to the actual wants of expanding trade, but at that period specie began to gain largely on the volume of paper, and the people, learning nothing from the painful lessons of the past, enlarged the volume of paper in proportion to the influx of gold from California, until, in 1857, the circulation reached $214,000,000, which was far beyond the legitimate need, and then came the third great commercial crisis of our history—the panic of 1857. According to Treasury statistics, the actual bank circulation of that year was $214,778,822, and inside of a twelve-month it shrank to $155,208,344, a contraction of nearly $60,000,000. And during the same period the total of bank loans shrank from $684,456,000 to $533,165,000, a contraction of more than $150,000,000, which of itself reveals the suffering of business then. The crisis was quick and sharp and bitterly felt, but our rich soil, a fine foreign market for our crude productions, and the rapid development of industry under mild taxation, restored property, and by 1860 the paper circulation had risen to $207,000,000, almost as great as before the panic. Another panic was imminent then, and only averted by the outbreak of the war and the suspension of specie payment by the banks, Dec. 30, 1861, when the Government loans, first of $50,000,000 and then of $150.000,000, had been drawn by Secretary Chase.

'Several prominent facts are observed as one glances over our commercial history. The first of these is its popular passion for paper money. No disaster has been severe enough to teach its people the dangers of speculative wealth. The second is the fact that the longest and cruelist period of suffering that this country ever endured, previous to the civil war, was brought on by political tampering with the currency. The financial question was a leading issue in the re-election of President Jackson, and he had hardly stepped from his high office when the panic of 1837 spread dismay in every household. The third fact is the marvelous recuperative powers of the country, as exhibited in the signal instance, to take only one, of the aggregate wealth of the country, in spite of the desolating panic of 1837, increasing twice as much during the 10 years from 1840 to 1850 as it did during the 10 years from 1850 to 1860."

A Very Short History.

[From "The Safeguard and Savings Bank Reporter."]

A book entitled the "Cashier's Scrap-Book," by H. C. Percy, has just been issued from the press of Messrs. G. W. Carleton & Co., of this city.

The work contains a great deal of interesting matter, among which are two chapters on savings banks, one being a "General View of Savings Banks in the United States," and the other dealing with "New York Savings banks." The latter chapter after reviewing the rise and progress of these banks, closes thus:

"The following are some noteworthy facts in the history of savings banks in the State of New York:

1. The first thirty-five years were entirely free from failures. Fifty years passed and the loss to depositors was an inconsiderable sum. In 1871, two failures, both banks under "Ring" rule. In 1872-3, three failures.

2. In 1875, a General Savings Bank Law was passed, conforming the banks to equal rights, liabilities and powers. Before that time each institution was operated under its own charter.

3. From 1875 to 1879, twenty-four failures. Amount due depositors in all the failed banks, about $15,000,000; of this amount a trifle over one-half has been returned to depositors—the balance goes to the receivers, lawyers, "assistant wreckers," referees, &c.

4. In the summer of 1877, Mr. H. L. Lamb, the Bank Superintendent's deputy or assistant, "*fell on the mantle* of his deposed superior," (as RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING puts it), and since then he has been in charge of the department. Thus far his record cannot be described as enviable. In order to gratify his desire to make a show of extraordinary vigilance, many of his acts have been calculated to impair public confidence and bring the institutions and their management into disfavor. Under the New York law extraordinary powers are given to the Bank Superintendent, and in the hands of an incapable or unscrupulous man, the office may be subserved to personal and selfish aims."

Would it not be well for our law-makers (and their constituents as well), to ponder over the fact that the enormous commerce of the past year has been transacted principally in foreign ships? Only 17 per cent. of the grain, provisions, cotton, tobacco and other products shipped abroad were carried in American vessels, the reason of this being that this trade now seeks steam transportation. The Americans have only four steam vessels running to Europe, while foreigners have from 150 to 200 in the trade. Of the goods imported, 32 per cent. was carried in American vessels, the larger share of the business enjoyed by the Americans being due to the establishment of Mr. Roach's line of steamers to Brazil, and to the fact that the trade with Cuba is now transacted almost entirely in American bottoms.

Should Interest be Regulated by Law?

A sample of bungling legislation is furnished by the law rushed through the New York Legislature the last session, reducing interest from seven to six per cent. Its promoters thought that it would go into effect immediately after its passage, but in their undue haste this point was not clearly set forth, and after a vast amount of legal lore and expert knowledge was brought to bear on the subject, it was decided that the law should go into effect January 1, 1880. Then again, the matter was left in such confusion that no one appears to know whether all usury penalty has not been unwittingly cut off. It surely would not be a cause for deep regret if it should prove so. In referring to this subject the "Commercial Chronicle" is entirely right when it says: "The rural interests are quite welcome to have the rate stand at six per cent. after this year, for that will do as well as any other, in absence of any contract; but it will be a wise step, and one in the way of progress, if those interests can only be brought to accept the situation and promptly end the problem by expressly altering the law so as to prescribe six per cent. unless a different rate is specified. Usury will then disappear, both as a crime before the law and a word in men's mouths; if any effect follows, it will be in the direction of lower rates and freer lending; and the recognition of the fact, that the fullest freedom is the amplest protection, may be brought a little nearer."

Then again it is a question whether usury laws tend to keep down interest rates, or to put them up. The fact that they do go up notwithstanding the law, and the inconsistency between a law that interest on money borrowed shall be at the rate of seven per cent. a year, and the actual payment of a rate ranging from seven to twenty times seven (see the rates paid for the use of money in Wall street recently), seem enough to prove that the law does not keep rates down. To say that, but for the law, rates would rule even higher than they rule with it, seems a ludicrous assertion rather than an argument.

There is no question that a poor security justifies and compels an advanced rate, the borrower having to pay for the extra hazard; the non-taxability of government bonds benefited the borrower only, and not the lender, the advantage appearing in a higher price brought by the bonds; a tax on mortgages is borne by the mortgagor; these are incidental illustrations of the rule, too often forgotten, that the purchaser pays all expenses. Make loaning money difficult, hazardous, or in any way unremunerative, and the borrower must pay for all the hazards; on the other hand the borrower profits by giving money the utmost freedom of movement.

[*LAW DEPARTMENT OF RHODES' JOURNAL.]

BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW.

†Duty of Bank to Return Vouchers for the Amounts Debited in Pass Book Against the Account of a Depositor.

Thomas C. Clark, from the latter part of 1855, to June, 1874, kept an account with the Mechanics' Bank in the City of New York. According to his own testimony he was a man of careless business habits, and after keeping his account with the bank for several years, and finding that his check book invariably agreed with his bank book as balanced by the bank, he discontinued keeping a check book and thereafter depended upon the bank to keep his account, writing his checks upon such blanks as he picked up on the bank counter, or upon the blanks of other banks, properly altered when this was necessary. He also testified that he had no receipts for payments made by him, nor any ledger or other book containing a record of such payments during the time hereafter mentioned. Also that the bank on one occasion prior to the time in question made a mistake in his account and did not pay a check of his through such mistake, when his funds in its hands were ample to meet it.

On the 11th day of July, 1864, Mr. Clark's balance with the bank was $394.44.

Between that date and the 14th of September, 1865, he deposited $56,864.76.

During this interval his book was not balanced by the bank, but remained in the custody of its book-keeper. The plaintiff testified that whenever he made a deposit during this time he would go to the

† The case here reported, Clark vs. The Mechanics' Bank of the City of New York, was argued and submitted on appeal to the General Term of the New York Court of Common Pleas, at the last November term of that Court. It has been the care of the writer to abstain from any partial or improper comments upon a question which is now submitted to a high judicial tribunal for determination, but simply to lay before the readers of this JOURNAL early information as to the facts and law, so far as promulgated, of an important and interesting case in banking law.

*The editor of the Law Department of RHODES' JOURNAL will be pleased to furnish, on application of subscribers, detailed information regarding any case referred to herein, or will answer questions in banking law. Address: *Law Department, RHODES' JOURNAL, 13 Spruce Street, New York.*

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book-keeper and obtain his book for this purpose, make the deposit, and return the book, and that he frequently complained of the fact that his book was retained so long, and that the book-keeper explained that he retained it because he was very busy. Finally, on or about September 14, 1865, the book was returned to him balanced. In it he was charged with 72 checks, reducing his deposits to a sum stated at $2,151.49, but 23 of these checks were not given him. They extended over the period of July 14th—Oct. 19, 1864, inclusive, and amounted to the sum of $27,149.70, and on the pass book were marked "missing." The plaintiff's testimony as to what was said when the bank first brought this to his notice, was given in the following language:

Q. He handed you the book with some vouchers in it. Now tell what occurred.

A. He handed me the book with some vouchers in it, and I immediately opened it and looked at it. The first thing I saw was the amount of the balance, and I said what have you been doing with my money; why, said he, did you think you had a large balance? No said I, I was sure of it. How much did you think it was? Said I at least $30,000. Oh no, said he, and I laid my eye right on the missing vouchers, and I said what does this mean? Well, said he, vouchers I could not find. Oh said I, you have made another mistake with my account, as you did once before, giving somebody else credit for my moneys. He said I think not, but I will look. Well, said I, you look and find, "so I passed along and took no more notice of it till I thought he would have found his mistake, but I went there different times."

After this the plaintiff continued dealing with the bank, deposits were made by him, which were credited in the same bank book, and added to the balance of $2,151.49, which the bank reported, and the plaintiff drew drafts against the same. This state of things lasted until June, 1874, during which time the plaintiff's account was balanced twenty-three times.

The plaintiff further testified that during the eleven years that elapsed before the bringing of suit he called frequently at the bank about the matter, until at his last interview with the cashier the latter told him that it was by courtesy only that vouchers were returned to depositors, and that the claim was outlawed. Thereupon the plaintiff drew a check for the sum of $27,149.70, payable to bearer, presented it to the bank, and upon obtaining its refusal to pay brought this action.

The case was tried before Judge J. F. Daly and a jury, at Common Pleas Trial Term. At the close of the evidence for plaintiff, a motion was made to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the repeated balancing of the account constituted so many accounts stated, which were binding upon plaintiff, and for the further reason that it appeared by the evidence that the cause of action did not accrue within six years prior to the commencement of the action. This was denied, and thereupon the defendant proved by way of defence that the disputed checks were received in the ordinary course of business in the bank, and entered in regular order daily as received, in the regular record of the bank, that there was nothing unusual or singular about these entries by which to distinguish them from any other entry; that such checks were examined and scrutinized by the paying-teller, Mr. Cook, by two clerks, Hoffman and Brinkerhoff, who entered them in the debit book; by Hoffman, Brinkerhoff and Dennison, who entered them in the check list, and by Wright, who entered them in the pass book. Thus these 23 checks were actually in existence and in the custody of the bank, and had passed the scrutiny of two experts, and had each been entered three times in different books up to Dec. 19, 1864. Another matter of defense was stated by the Judge who presided at the trial, in his charge to the jury, the latter part of which was as follows:

"They (defendants) next produce in corroboration of this testimony (relating to 19 of the missing checks) and of the genuineness of the four checks entered in the debit book by Mr. Brinkerhoff, evidence going to show that six of these contested checks came in the regular course of business from other banks, and were deposited in such banks immediately prior to their appearance in the Mechanics' Bank, and were so deposited by persons with whom the plaintiff dealt at that time, namely, Demarest & Wygant, Kingsland & Comstock, Sayre & Bro., and Meyer & Strauss. In the case of Demarest & Wygant, evidence is given to show that the plaintiff on the date in question is credited in the books of the firm, in the handwriting of Wygant, one of the partners, with the payment of the exact amount so charged by that firm, and so charged among these original vouchers. Now, gentlemen, that presents in about as short and concise a form as I could put it, the evidence in this case upon which the jury is to determine whether these 23 checks were drawn by the plaintiff or not. All outside of this is a matter of argument, or of inference, or of reasoning from attendant circumstances. That is just as important an element, and these inferences and these circumstances are to be considered as much as those circumstances that I have alluded to. This jury may consider from its knowledge of business, and its knowledge of men, and its knowledge of the course of business, all these facts and the circumstances of this case, for the purpose of ascertaining where the preponderance lies between the parties. To go further than this—to take up each one of these circumstances, the question of delay, the question of demand, the question of the plaintiff keeping or not keeping books, the question of the loss of the vouchers—any of the circumstances on the one side or the other would insensibly draw me into a discussion of the weight of these circumstances, and lead me unintentionally perhaps to lay greater stress upon one fact than another. Now I forbear running the risk of doing so, because this jury is to be the judge of the facts, and as this case involves almost altogether a question of fact, I mean that this tribunal shall decide it entirely unbiased by any observation of mine. I am here more to preside over your deliberations than for any other purpose, to see that the proper evidence is laid before you, from which you are to make up your minds. Further than that I will not go. The parties will have to be satisfied with your verdict. You are the only tribunal which can decide this controversy. I say that not only for the purpose of inviting you to grasp the issue boldly, but also to impress upon you the necessity for an agreement in this case, if an agreement be possible."

The jury returned a verdict for the full amount claimed.

A motion was then made on the Judge's minutes to set aside this verdict, which was granted.

Several months' consideration of the motion was given by the Judge, and an elaborate opinion written by him.

In it he says, after reviewing the evidence: "In the face of this proof the jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for the full amount of his claim, not even deducting the amounts traced to the plaintiff through the books of Demarest & Wygant and the North River Bank. This verdict must be due to a mistake on the part of the jury as to the issue involved in the case. They could not have thoroughly comprehended the instruction that they were to ascertain whether these missing vouchers or any of them had been drawn by the plaintiff. They must on the contrary have supposed that the bank was entitled to no allowance for a genuine check which had been lost."

From this order the plaintiff has appealed to the General Term, and it was that appeal which has just been argued. The position of the case now is such that it may turn entirely upon the *power* of the Judge at Trial Term to set aside the verdict of the jury* under the circumstances, but it would be fortunate if the merits of the case could be gone into and passed upon.

* Defendant's counsel indulges in his brief in a little sarcasm directed against the jury in this case: "We doubt if this result is paralleled by any verdict, unless perhaps by the verdict obtained by Mrs. Bardell against the unfortunate Mr. Pickwick, from the 'enlightened, the high-minded, the right-feeling, the conscientious, the dispassionate, the sympathizing, the contemplative jury of her civilized countrymen.'"

BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

Interesting Pamphlet on Bimetalism.—Mr. Henry H. Gibbs, who was one of the delegates on the part of Great Britain to the Monetary Conference at Paris last year, has recently furnished an extremely interesting contribution to the literature bearing on the silver question. He has printed in pamphlet form a letter to Mr. Cazalet, in which he announces a change in his views on that subject, and this change is so decided that it must attract great attention both in England and in America. Mr. Gibbs takes up and undertakes to answer the principal objections to the double standard concisely.

First—To the objection that it is impossible to regulate by legislation the value of any commodity, he replies that money is not a commodity, but a measure of commodities; that the consent of the people or the authority of the Prince can give an exchangeable value even to worthless paper.

Second—It does not necessarily follow that the cheaper of the two metals would remain in, while the dearer would be exported from, the country; because if the commercial nations should unite on a standard, or ratio of values, there would be no place for it to go, being of equal value in all countries.

Third—Such a compact is not impossible. France, Italy, Austria, and the United States would assuredly make no difficulty. Germany is beginning to waver, and could doubtless be made to see her advantage in it, and if England would set the negotiation on foot, the consent of all would speedily follow. He "does not see that England would have any inducement to refuse to join in a compact which would confessedly bring some advantage with it and afford relief from great existing difficulties."

Fourth—To the objection that there will always be a preference for gold, he answers that "half the world has now a preference for silver. In point of fact, it is not cheaper to transport gold than it is to transmit silver, the freight and insurance being *ad valorem*, and the same for either. If there be any difference between them, silver would have the advantage, inasmuch as gold, by reason of its less bulk, value for value, is more exposed to the danger of robbery." There would be but few cases in which either would require to be transported, except in the first instance to the bank or the mint, when it would furnish the basis for checks or bank notes.

Fifth—To the objection that any new discoveries of silver would dangerously disturb prices he replies, that the dangers resulting from an increase of silver would be no greater than the danger to monometallic countries, of an increase in the production of gold, and as this risk is now incurred without serious apprehension, the other might well be. "What is it that has caused the fall in the price of silver? Demonetization almost wholly, and remonetization would raise it again to its former level."

Sixth—To those who urge as an argument the sixty years of prosperity England has enjoyed, he says that, whatever may be said of the past, England is not at present remarkably prosperous, and that her troubles are aggravated by the fact that France as a bimetallic country has heretofore been used as the medium of exchange between the silver and gold countries, but she is no longer available for that purpose.

In conclusion he says: "I have expressed in this letter conclusions which differ very widely from the spirit of the report of the Paris Conference, presented to the government by my colleagues and myself. I fully concurred in that report, but the more I have, since then, thought over the subject of the conference, the more I have been led to distrust some part of our reasoning, and to doubt in part the wisdom of the conclusions to which we came. In no case was it to be expected that the conference would have simply affirmed the original resolutions of the Commissioners of the United States. Indeed, the evil from which we suffer had not at that time pressed so strongly upon the minds of Englishmen as it has since done, and public opinion was less prepared than I think it now is to look with favor on any change which might promise to alleviate it; but I incline to think that the conference might have been a starting-point for negotiations for an international accord which should cut the root of the evil. I have tried to show that such a policy is practicable, and that though a universal monometalism would be better if it was possible, no such possibility exists; that though England has flourished long, trusting in her gold monometalism, there was a cause which enabled her to do so—a cause which no longer exists—and that, even granted that there would be inconvenience in surrendering our single standard, there may be a greater inconvenience still in remaining as we are."

M. Philippart's Speculations.—A Paris dispatch to the London press, Nov. 11th, says: "The settlement between the Banque Europeenne (which has now frankly accepted all of M. Philippart's operations), and outside brokers began yesterday, the necessary money for the liquidation of his indebtedness having been obtained from the Credit Lyonnais under the guarantee of a syndicate formed among outside brokers, and in pledge of which some thousands of Credit Mobilier and Tramway shares have been lodged with that institution."

English Iron.—The Manchester "Guardian" of Nov. 11th, says that the production of pig-iron in Cleveland has increased from 52,000 tons per month to 164,000 tons, and that there has been more than an equivalent increase in the shipments.

Where the Gold Comes From.—The following compilations which we take from the "Commercial Bulletin," show the extent to which the principal European national banks have lost specie since the beginning of September. A good part of this loss has been a gain to this country:

	Specie on hand.	
Bank of England, Sept. 4	£34,658,000	
" " Oct. 22	32,258,000	
Decrease		£2,400,000
Bank of France, Sept. 4	£88,030,000	
" " Oct. 22	82,190,0.0	
Decrease		5,840,000
Bank of Germany, Aug. 30	£27,229,000	
" " Oct. 15	24,528,000	
Decrease		2,701,000
Bank of Belgium, Aug. 28	£3,894,000	
" " Oct. 16	2,495,000	
Decrease		1,399,000
Total decrease		£12,340,000

Interest on Government Bonds.—In view of the purchases by the United States Treasury of 6 per cent. bonds for the sinking fund, the following calculations will be found interesting:

A 4 per cent. bond, having 28 years to run, if bought

At 102¾	will pay	3⅞	per cent. interest to maturity.
At 104.31	"	3¾	" " "
At 108.88	"	3½	" " "
At 113.72	"	3¼	" " "
At 118.85	"	3	" " "

A 4½ per cent. bond having 12 years to run if bought

At 104.73	will pay	4	per cent. interest to maturity.
At 107.19	"	3¾	" " "
At 109.73	"	3½	" " "
At 112.34	"	3¼	" " "
At 115.02	"	3	" " "

A 6 per cent. bond having 2 years to run

At 104.79	will only pay	3½	interest to maturity.
At 105.28	"	3¼	" "
At 105.78	"	3	" "

The 6s of 1881 have only twenty months to run, and therefore at the present market price—say 106½, less 2.10 accrued interest, or 104 40 for principal, will pay only about 3¼ per cent. to maturity.

A 6 per cent. bond having only eighteen months to run at 104.37 for the principal, will pay the holder just 3 per cent. interest to maturity. It seems, therefore, to be greatly to the advantage of the holders of the 6 per cents of 1880 and 1881 to promptly accept the opportunity which the government now offers to sell their bonds to the Treasury, and reinvest in the 4s and 4½s, and thereby secure a long investment at a higher rate of interest.

On the other hand the government, which does not lend its money, can afford to pay as high as 109 for the 1880s and 112 for the 1881s. That is to say, if the 1880s run until maturity, the government will pay the principal of them (100) and the interest (9 per cent). If the 1881s run until maturity, the government will pay the principal (100) and the interest (12 per cent). It follows, therefore, that the government in its purchases for the Sinking Fund saves the difference between 109 and the price it pays for the 1880s, and the difference between 112 and the price it pays for the 1881s.—*N. Y. Evening Post.*

Silver Should Circulate.—After referring to the recent purchase by the Government of $10,000,000 U. S. bonds for the Sinking Fund, and paying for the same in gold coin, the "Post" of this city goes on to say that "this gold will release an equal amount of legal tender notes available for the payment to the South where currency is much needed. The purchase by the Treasury, together with the movement to enforce the Usury law, will also probably have the effect of restoring to the loan market money that has been withheld from it, and of deterring stock speculators from manipulating rates. There is general complaint on all sides of the scarcity of small notes. The Treasury contains many millions of silver dollars, and there will probably never be a better time to force them into circulation. It is true that they are burdensome and costly to move, but it is full time that the people of the country should become intimately acquainted with this class of currency, which it was represented the entire people clamored for. The effect of the silver law has been repressed now for many months, and as there is little prospect of its repeal, the sooner the people at large know what they have bargained for the better. For a time these dollars, although now worth only about 90 cents, will circulate at their legal tender value (100 cents). But as said, it is full time they were used for the purpose for which they were created. It is to be hoped therefore that requests on the Treasury for small notes will be met by shipments of silver dollars."

The Specie Movement.—"The specie imports at this port during the week ending November 7, amount in the aggregate to $5,472,511, of which $5,081,895 is gold, and $390,616 silver. The total from January 1 to that date is $63,992,418, consisting of $55,173,280 gold and $8,819,138 silver. From the 1st of August to November 10, inclusive, the importations foot up $56,927,564, including $8,223,010 American gold coin, $33,549,625 foreign gold coin, $13,483,598 gold bullion, $98,914 gold dust, $1,016,741 American silver coin, $600,887 foreign silver coin, and $14.799 silver bars. Of the total during this period, $34,690,957 was from the Continent, $17,439,761 from Great Britain, and $4,796,846 from West Indies and South America."—*N. Y. Bulletin.*

From the above it will be seen that over $55,000,000 of legal tender could, if the law permitted, have been replaced with gold without contracting the volume of the lawful money currency of the country.

Illinois Finances.—The Governor of this State will, on the 1st of January, call in a large part of the bonded debt of the State. The total debt was, on October 1, 1878, $802,312.59. There was called in and paid on January 1, 1879, $88,865.20, so that on the date last named the debt was $713,447.39. On the coming 1st of January there will be $400,000 available for the payment of the debt, but because of the fact that the entire debt is not due until some time in 1880 and 1881, less than $300,000 can be called in. From these figures it will be seen that after January 1, 1880, the State debt will be less than $500,000. The fund for the payment of the debt arises from the 7 per cent. gross earnings of the Illinois Central Railroad, which that corporation pays into the State Treasury in lieu of all taxes, and which will extinguish it as fast as it becomes due. As the earnings of the road increase, the revenue derived from that source will in time be sufficient to pay the entire expense of the State government.

New York City Finances.—Controller Kelly has issued his monthly statement of the city debt, under date of November 1, as follows: Warrants drawn in October, $15,159,536.70; total in 1879 to date $42,945,985.61; stocks and bonds issued, $20,066,739.60; total bonded debt less sinking fund on October 31, 1879, $125,137,651.24, against $113,416,403.49 on December 31, 1878. Cash on hand, $5,750,749.91. The debt of the annexed district, aggregating $1,036,614.58, is not included in the above.

The Government Buying its Own Bonds.—Proposals were opened at the New York Sub Treasury on Saturday Nov. 8th for the sale of $10,000,000 six per cent.

bonds to the Treasury, to be applied to the sinking fund, in accordance with the recent notice issued by Secretary Sherman. There were received in all thirty-four bids, aggregating $11,110,200, at prices ranging from 104.50 to 110. The result was immediately telegraphed to Washington. At 3 P. M. a despatch was received from Secretary Sherman rejecting all the offers and authorizing the assistant Treasurer to pay 106 for $10,000,000 of July bonds of 1881. The Sub Treasury was kept open until 4:30 when it was announced that the offerings amounted to $6,122,900. On the Monday following, before 2:30, the offerings exceeded by $600,000 the amount necessary to make up the $10,000,000.

Hartford, Ct.—On January 1, $300,000 of the bonds of the town of Hartford will mature. These bonds were issued in aid of the Connecticut Valley Railroad. The town has voted to issue new bonds in their place, the bonds to run twenty-five years, and bear 4½ per cent. interest. The bonds are to be duly advertised, and not to be sold below par.

General Transactions of the Bank of France.—The London "Banker's" Magazine" for November contains the report of the Censors to the General Meeting of the shareholders of the Bank of France, showing the transactions for 1878. The "General Transactions" and closing of the report, are as follows:

In 1877 the transactions of the bank amounted to		£380,423,320
In 1878 those of the 85 branches in operation amounted to	£209,077,644	
Those of the Central Bank, to	182,383,944	
Total		£391,461,589
Being an increase in 1878 of		£11,038,268
The ordinary expenses of the branches, excluding those of the conveyance of specie, amounting to £7,168, have been		£222,196
Those of the Central Bank, excluding £3,189 for the same purpose, and £21,448 for the tax on the dividends, have been		248,313
Total		£470,509
To this sum has to be added the tax of 3 per cent. paid on the dividends for the year 1878		21,449
Total		£491,958
Among these expenses the stamp duties on the circulation paid to the Government, contributions, tax on the dividends, etc., have amounted alone to the sum of		£136,472
The net profits realized by the branches have been		£94,095
Those of the Central Bank, deducting £396,566 of *rente*, and £27,800 taken from the reserves		209,599
Total		£303,694

The proportions for the transactions are as follows:

Transactions at the branches......54 per cent.
Transactions at the Central Bank......46 per cent.

With regard to the profits, their proportion amounts to:

31 per cent. at the branches.
69 per cent. at the Central Bank.

The net dividends, distributed in 1878, have amounted to £3 15s. 2d.

In spite of the reduced duty on the circulation of notes this distribution, which is similar to that of last year, has, as you have just seen, only been maintained at this figure through the assistance of a sum taken from your reserve fund.

This shows you, gentlemen, that the position of which we informed you in our preceding reports, has not been modified to any extent.

The present condition of commerce and industry in France, and the economic crisis which is overwhelming all European nations in general, with a force much to be regretted, unfortunately forbid us to assign any approaching termination to this state of affairs so eminently prejudicial to the progress of your business.

Under these circumstances a double task has been allotted to the bank, that o choosing with extreme care the paper discounted, and of enforcing the strictest economy in the bank itself and all its transactions.

In accordance with the sentiments of the Council, the authorities of the bank have undertaken this task.

The re-establishment of the discount department on a new basis, the more active impulse impressed on our operations, and the modifications introduced into the organization of various branches of business, have already produced satisfactory results. In fact, the amount of debt on account of bills over-due, has greatly diminished during last year's work, and if the liquidation can only be accomplished slowly, it does not necessarily promise any serious drawback for the future. On the other hand, a certain number of your expenses will have in the future to be greatly reduced, which, as far as concerns us, we shall not cease to use all our efforts to perform. We have reason to hope, that by persevering in this line of conduct, the bank will lessen, as much as possible, a position not made by itself, and to which it has to submit.

Since our last meeting the bank has received a severe blow; Monsieur Rouland, who governed it during fourteen years with equal tact, intelligence, and wisdom, has been suddenly taken away from us. His loss is irreparable, and the special benevolence of his disposition, combined with his extreme kindness, causes it to be all the more felt by all those who knew him. Commerce whose interpreters we are, has not forgotten the part he took in the liberality by means of which the bank averted the disastrous effects of the war and the commune. By paying him this mark of respect to-day, we are only acquitting ourselves of a debt of truly sincere and legitimate gratitude. Allow us, therefore, gentlemen, to unite our feelings of regret with those which have been so well expressed in the name of the Council.

By the late command of the President of the Republic, Monsieur Denormandie, Senator, has just been appointed in the place of Monsieur Rouland.

You know, gentlemen, the qualities which distinguish our new governor, and his rare merit. We congratulate ourselves on seeing him appointed to fill this eminent post, and we doubt not that the choice made of his high qualities, is, in all respects, a precious promise for the interests of the bank, which are, at the same time, those of the State, of the public, and yours.

Another very sad loss has befallen us, to our sorrow; that of our honored and revered senior member, Monsieur Darblay, on whom you conferred last year the title of honorary censor as a reward due to his long and honorable career. With him we have lost an excellent heart, and a superior intelligence, which we shall always remember. You will join us, gentlemen, at the present moment in paying a last tribute of respect to the memory of this indefatigable worker, of this good man, who, during twenty-four years gave to the committee of censors the useful support of his counsel and the assiduous assistance of his authority, his experience, and his enlightened mind.

The Post-Office Savings Banks of Great Britain.—A Parliamentary return just issued shows that the balance due to depositors in the Post-Office Savings Banks on 31st December last (including interest) was £30,411,563. There were funds and securities in the hands of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt and the Postmaster-General amounting to £31,189,325. Since the establishment of these Banks there has been received from depositors (including interest) a total sum of £111,014,219, and the amount repaid was £80,602,655. The number of accounts opened has been 5,783,529, and the number closed 3,890,771. The total cost of the Post-Office Savings banks from their establishment to the 31st December last was £1,647,962. The total number of transactions—*i.e.*, deposits and withdrawals—in the period was £49,892,161. The sums of £126,279 and £147,116 have been paid into the Exchequer out of the funds of the Post-Office Savings Banks in 1877 and 1878 respectively, being the excess of interest accrued during 1876 and 1877. The sum of £70,000, the cost of the site of the new savings bank building in Queen Victoria street, and a portion of the cost of the new building, have been paid for out of the accumulated funds of the Post-Office Savings Banks.—*Leeds (England), Mercury.*

The same paper in referring to the subject editorially, says: "The 'American Cyclopedia,' the concluding volume of which has recently been issued by D. Appleton and Co., of New York, in a very interesting and instructive article on savings banks generally, thus refers to the origin of Post-Office Banks:—

'In 1859 at the meeting of the Social Science Association at Bradford, a paper was read upon the subject by Mr. C. W. Sikes of the Huddersfield Banking Company, which attracted the attention of the Postmaster-General and others, and finally a plan, to a great extent based upon Mr. Sikes' suggestions, was matured by George Chetwynd and Frank J. Scudamore, with the co-operation of Sir Rowland Hill. This plan, embodied in a bill, was carried through Parliament by Mr. Gladstone, and became law on May 17th, 1861, and went into effect Sept. 17th. By December 31st, 1862, the total balance on hand was £1,694,724.'"

A Philanthropist's Opinion—Savings Banks of the United Kingdom.—Mr. Charles W. Sikes of the Huddersfield Banking Company, England, in writing to the editor of RHODES' JOURNAL in reference to the "*Safeguard Almanac" says: "The old country will never take her right place amongst the nations until her entire people have learnt the great lesson—the value of Thrift—your excellent almanac is doing so much to diffuse amongst the people of the United States."

Mr. Sikes writes in reference to the savings banks of the United Kingdom, that "a return recently issued shows, county by county, the amount due to depositors in trustee savings banks, for principal and interest, at the end of the last "savings bank year" on the 20th of November, 1878. It was a year of bad times, and comparing it with the preceding year, we find a decrease in Lancashire, Cheshire, and the West Riding, but an increase in Middlesex, some of the midland and southern counties. The decrease in England and Wales was about £100,000, and in Ireland £50,000. But these decreases are counterbalanced by increases in Scotland and the Channel Islands, and the result for the United Kingdom is a small increase in the total amount due to depositors. These figures relate only to trustee savings banks. The Post-Office savings banks increased the number of their depositors (or accounts open) from 1,791,240 at the end of the year 1877 to 1,892,756 at the end of 1878, and the amount due to depositors (for principal and interest) advanced from £28,740,757 to £30,411,563; and added to the amount in trustee savings banks the sum due to depositors is £74,667,453. It is satisfactory that on the two classes of savings banks taken together, the result of such a year as 1878 is an increase of 107 394 in the number of depositors, and of £1,688,010 in the amount due to them at the end of the year for principal and interest. The year's interest, credited to depositors, not far from £2,000,000, is a very important item in the savings banks accounts. In a recent case the representative of a deceased depositor, who placed £25 in a savings bank in 1824, had £127 to receive, the accumulation of compound interest added every year to the deposit having raised the amount due to more than five times the sum deposited. A large number of penny banks now pay their funds into a Post Office savings bank, for which they thus act as collectors; and an arrangement was sanctioned in March, 1878, by which managers of penny banks in remote villages may, by means of a system of free registered letters, assist depositors in penny banks to open, and afterwards continue, accounts in their own names at the nearest Post-Office savings bank without personal attendance. Many depositors like a Government receipt for their money. Last year a vender of cats'-meat—a man of business—in applying for an acknowledgement for a deposit which had failed to reach him in due course, took occasion to add, "The next time it occurs I shall write to the Queen." An attempt has been made to ascertain what classes of persons principally use the Post-Office savings banks, and with this view eighteen different offices were selected, embracing all varieties of locality, and 11,260 accounts were examined. It was found that 1,664 of these depositors were female servants, with balances averaging £14; there were 1,279 depositors of "no occupation," with £13 on an average; 1,236 artizans with £15 average; 1,186 minors over seven, with £7; and 397 minors under seven, with £5 average; 1,136 married women, with £21 average; 857 tradesmen, with £16 average; 675 clerks with £11 average; 579 laborers, with £21 average; 405 unmarried women, with £16 average; 297 male servants, with £22 average; 227 public officials, with £40 average; 225 soldiers and sailors, with £18 average; 220 professional men, with £20 average; 187 milliners, with £11 average."

*The Fifth Annual issue of the "Safeguard Almanac" will be ready for delivery early in January, 1880.

It will maintain its high standard as an advocate of INDUSTRY, ECONOMY, and general habits of THRIFT.

The sole aim of the "Safeguard Almanac" is to induce the people to practice these cardinal virtues; to teach them, at the same time, that Savings Banks are the only legitimate depositories for the savings of the people.

The Rights of a State.—The New Orleans "Picayune" thus editorially sums up the recent decision of Judge Woods, in the case of the city *vs.* Pickles *et al.*:

The opinion of Judge Woods in the case of the city of New Orleans against Thomas Pickels *et als.*, adds another to the series of decisions by which the U. S. Courts seek to guard their powers and their privileges against what they regard as attempted encroachments on the part of the States. The decision in the case of Pickles is a conspicuous illustration of this tendency, and another example of the futility of attempts by State legislation to limit the jurisdiction or the powers of the Federal Courts. Like all the opinions of that eminent jurist, Judge Woods' decision is closely logical in its reasoning, and clear as well as condensed in its language. In brief, its points are these:

Thomas Pickles having two judgments against the city of New Orleans, got out an execution and writs of garnishment in the United States Court, with the object of satisfying his judgments out of the proceeds of the sale of the Railroad franchise to the New Orleans City Railroad Company. The city applied for an injunction to restrain Marshall Wharton from executing these processes. The counsel for the city relied on a law of the legislature of Louisiana making a special exception in favor of the city as to the enforcement of judgments for money, and prescribing certain rules as to the manner in which such judgments against the city should be executed. Counsel for the city further maintained that a subsequent act of Congress made this law binding on the Federal Courts.

Judge Woods decides that the Louisiana act had never been adopted by a rule of his Court; that the statute of the United States which provides that judgment creditors in the Federal Courts shall be entitled to similar remedies, "by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided by the laws of the State within which such Circuit or District Court shall be held in like causes," was not intended to limit the power of the Courts of the United States to enforce their judgments by execution by imposing on them the restraints and limitations provided in particular cases in the State law. Its purpose was, on the contrary, to enlarge and not to restrain the rights of the plaintiff and judgment creditor.

The suggestion that the States can in any manner limit or otherwise affect the powers of the Federal Courts is met by the declaration that if "the Legislature had seen fit to extend its provisions (the provisions of the statute in question) to the Courts of the United States, it would, as far as those Courts are concerned, have been inoperative and void.

New York, Lake Erie & Western.—It has been learned from a reliable source that the gross earnings of this road for the month of October exceeded $2,000,000, and the net earnings, after deducting operating expenses and all other disbursements, were, in round numbers $800,000. This is at the rate of $24,000,000 gross and $9,600,000, net per annum. The interest account for 1880 will be $3,967,878.16. In 1884 and thereafter, when all bonds bear interest, the interest account will be $4,314,884.68, other charges and rentals now paid (provided that no reduction in these latter items is effected) will amount to $1,626,080, making the total fixed charges per annum $5,940,966.68. It is not probable that the results for October can be duplicated each month, although we may, with reason, look for a comparative increase month by month for the whole of the present fiscal year of this road. But making the month of October a basis, we find that after deducting from the net earnings of $9,600,000 the fixed charges of $5,940,966.68, there is remaining $3,659,133.32 applicable to dividends. The capital stock consists of 771,077 shares common and 81,467 preferred. The preferred stock is entitled to 7 per cent. dividend, which would call for $570,269, leaving $3,088,864.22 for the common stock, or over 3½ per cent. This may be called a rose-colored view, and doubtless in some respects it is, but if our information is correct this is what this road has done in October, and it will certainly continue to do better in the future than it has in the past. This statement no one familiar with railroads will doubt.

Silver and Gold for the Mints.—The Treasury Department on November 11 purchased 365,000 ounces of fine silver for the Philadelphia and San Francisco Mints.

Five hundred and fifty-one thousand ounces of standard gold bullion was received from Europe the same date, and was ordered from the Assay Office in New York to the Philadelphia Mint for coinage into gold coins. The value of the bullion is about

$10,250,000. The Director of the Mint has decided that until further orders the coinage of the United States Mints will be confined to eagles and half eagles.

John Bonner's Company.—Robert L. Cutting, as Receiver of the Bankers' and Brokers' Association, New York, which suspended in December, 1877, has brought a large number of suits against the persons appearing upon the books of the corporation as stockholders, to recover an assessment of $30 per share laid for the purpose of paying the creditors. The capital stock of the company was $1,000,000, in shares of $100 each, of which but $50 was paid in, so that under the law each stockholder was liable to the amount of his stock, and to pay for the full stock standing in his name. The first of these suits, being that against William G. Damerel, was tried recently in Supreme Court, Circuit, before Judge Barrett. It was shown that though ten shares of stock stood in Mr. Damerel's name on the books of the company he had, in fact, sold the stock to John Bonner & Co. nine years ago, and that Bonner, who was President of the Association, had at the time instructed the Secretary not to make the transfer upon the books. Judge Barrett directed a verdict for the defendant.

The Elevated Railroad Suit.—The text of the decision in the case of Rufus Story against the New York Elevated Railroad Company, which suit involved the liability of the elevated railroad for damages to adjacent property, has appeared. Judge Beach in rendering the decision affirmed the judgment of the court below, and said:

"The opinion of the lamented judge before whom this case was tried at Special Term, is very learned and elaborated. It contains a careful examination of the various points presented, and I coincide in its conclusions without attempting to reproduce the arguments and the authorities by which they are maintained. I am of opinion that the original grant under which the plaintiff claims, does not convey a fee to any part of the street upon which the railway of the defendants is located. It seems plain to me that it is held by the city in trust for the general public. Doubtless the plaintiff is entitled to the use of the street in common with others, and may complain if unlawfully subjected to special damages. The case of People against Kerr (27 N. Y., 188), sustained by Kellinger against Second Street Railroad Company (50 N. Y., 209), seems conclusive upon the proposition that plaintiff, as a building owner, having no freehold interest in the street, is not entitled to compensation on account of its appropriation to public use because of resulting inconvenience to the enjoyment of his property. If the position he maintains be that the fee of Front street remains in the city, as I conclude it does, I am unable to see any ground or principle upon which the plaintiff is to be entitled to the relief he demands. The judgment should be affirmed upon the opinion given by the court below."

The decision probably explains the recent rise and strength in the market price of the various elevated railroad stocks.

Wanting a National Bankrupt Law.—At a special meeting, Nov. 12, of the Newburyport (Mass.) Shoe and Leather Association to consider the subject of the National Bankrupt law, resolutions were unanimously adopted stating that as "the repeal of the National Bankrupt law has thrown the collection of debts under the jurisdiction of State courts, with all their conflicting laws, the mercantile and manufacturing interests of the country deem it a pressing necessity that a modified National Bankrupt law should be passed by Congress."

Devices of the Stockbrokers.—In referring to the New York money market the "Times" of Nov. 13 says that "the fact that there are still $17,000,000 of called bonds on which interest stopped last July in the hands of the public, is regarded by many persons as explanatory of one of the reasons why money has recently been stringent when there was apparently no adequate cause why it should be so. It is believed that the big gamblers deliberately withheld that amount of bonds from redemption for the purpose of locking up an equal sum of coin in the Treasury vaults, and thus preventing borrowers from obtaining the benefit of it, their ultimate object being to shake small holders out of the market, and thus obtain stocks themselves at lower rates than those current. Other dodges of the same fraternity have heretofore been exposed in these columns. The other fact, simultaneously reported, that $7,000,000 of similar bonds are allowed by some of the national banks to remain on deposit in the Treasury, is severely commented upon in the same connection, and there are not wanting those who assert that certain banks have further assisted the gamblers against the public by loaning money on called bonds, which are in the nature of sight drafts on the Treasury. A demand is made that the Controller of the Currency hold another investigation."

Missouri Pacific.—Jay Gould has bought a controlling interest in this road. The price paid was $900 per share. The total capital being only $800,000. The funded debt is $15,828,000. The road extends from St. Louis to State line of Kansas, 283.5 miles, with a branch from Kirkwood, Ind., to Carondelet, Mo., thirteen miles. It leases Osage Valley & Southern Kansas railroad, 25; St. Louis & Lexington Railroad, 55.25; Missouri River Railroad, 25.25; Leavenworth, Atchinson & Northwestern Railroad, 21.50.—Total length owned and leased, 423.50. This road is the successor of the Pacific Railroad of Missouri, which was chartered March 12, 1849, and sold under foreclosure of the third mortgage September 6, 1876. The present company was created October 23, 1876. The third mortgage bondholders have a suit pending against the reorganized company, arising out of that sale, and it is understood that Mr. Gould assumes his share of the risk involved in the outcome of this suit. The purchase is believed to be in the interest of the Wabash and Kansas City & Northern combination, and will practically add about 423 miles to the lines now composing the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway. For some distance the Missouri Pacific Railroad runs parallel with the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railroad, and recently a pooling arrangement was entered into by the two lines for a division of the competitive business.

Central Pacific.—This Company has made a cash payment to the United States Treasury of $220,520, which payment, with their credits for government transportation, is $536,291, or 25 per cent. of the net earnings of the subsidized portions of the lines.

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.—There have been placed on the New York Stock Exchange list the first mortgage bonds on the Parkersburg branch, extending from Parkersburg to Grafton, W. Va., 104 miles. The bonds bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, are payable in 1919, and their authorized issue is $3,000,000. The mortgage under which they are issued is the first mortgage on the road, except a mortgage previously executed by the Northwestern Virginia Railroad Company in 1855 (and of the bonds secured by the latter mortgage only $140,000 remain unpaid), the payment of which has been assumed and guaranteed by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.

New Securities at the Stock Exchange.—The Governing Committee of the New York Stock Exchange have added the following securities to the active lists: Placed on the regular list—Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company common stock, $32,726,375.28; preferred stock, $1,551,800; bonds, $72,501,027.30. Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Railroad first mortgage preferred bonds, $1,000,000; first mortgage bonds, $3,500,000; second mortgage bonds, $1,500,000. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company first mortgage 6 per cent. bonds, Parkersburg branch, $3,000,000. Oregon Railway & Navigation Company bonds, $6,000,000. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co. sinking fund 6 per cent. bonds of 1879, $2,400,000. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company bonds of the Davenport & Northwestern Railroad Company, $3,000,000. Michigan Central Railroad Company six per cent. bonds of 1909, $1,000,000. St. Paul Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad Company first mortgage bonds, $8,000,000, and second mortgage bonds, $8,000,000. Excelsior Water & Mining Company common stock, $10,000,000. Placed on the free list: Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railroad Company stock, $3,000,000. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad Company stock, $15,000,000. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company common stock, $20,000,000, and preferred stock, $20,000,000. Oregon Railway & Navigation Company stock, $6,000,000. Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Railway Company stock, $2,500,000. Placed under the head of miscellaneous: Boston Land Company stock, $800,000. Placed under the head of income bonds: Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Railroad Company income bonds, $1,500,000. The Philadelphia & Reading Company have named the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company as their local transfer agents.

Michigan Central.—The following new bonds of this company have been admitted to the New York Stock Exchange list: Six per cent. bonds of 1909, of which the amount authorized to be issued is $1,500,000. The bonds are secured by a first general mortgage on the Grand River Valley Railroad, extending from Jackson to Grand Rapids, Mich., a distance of 82.4 miles, and all its property and franchises. Of the issue, $1,000,000 bonds are held in trust by the Union Trust Company of New York for the retirement of the outstanding bonds of the Grand River Valley Railroad Company of the same amount, maturing in 1885.

The Gigantic Stock Speculation.--The financial week proper, at the New York Stock Exchange comes to an end with the close of business every Friday afternoon. In its summary of the business transacted in Wall street for the week ending with November 21, the daily "Tribune" says: "The week will be memorable at the Stock Exchange for the culmination and liquidation of the most gigantic stock speculation that has ever been witnessed in this country.

After an almost uninterrupted advance of eight months, during which the prices of some stocks have risen from 2 and 3 to anywhere between 25 and 75, there has been a sudden and rapid decline, ranging from 10 to 30 per cent. Speculators with small and some with large margins have had their stocks sold out because of their inability to protect them with additional deposits, and in many instances the profits of the year have been lost in forty-eight hours. Yet it is creditable to the Stock Exchange that this tremendous shrinkage has been sustained without a single important failure or default, so far as the members of the Board are concerned.

That some of them have lost money by the failures of their customers is undoubtedly true, but that loss has not been put upon the persons with whom the brokers had their contracts. The first two days of the week were marked by as strong markets as those of any days that had preceded them. On Tuesday there was a slight decline, and some hesitation in the speculation was observed. Wednesday the decline was more marked, and the market that night closed so feverish and unsettled that the uneasiness of operators generally was plainly apparent. Thursday the decline continued, simply because of the sales of stocks by commission houses on orders from customers in and out of town, who were forced or frightened into selling; notwithstanding this, it is certain that some of the leading operators were buyers all day.

That night the market closed unsettled after a sharp rally from the extreme lowest prices of the day, but there was a general belief that the worst for the present was over, and that prices would speedily rebound. But this belief was doomed to a great disappointment. Yesterday's (Nov. 20) further decline brought by mail and telegraph this morning an avalanche of orders to "sell all my stocks," before which it was simply impossible for the few buyers to stand and maintain prices, even if it had been their disposition to do so, which may well be doubted when the fact was developed that the majority of holders were sellers at any figures. Hence there was a further drop of 19¾ per cent. in the price of Delaware and Hudson in almost as many minutes, of 13 per cent. in Union Pacific, of 13 per cent. in Iron Mountain, and as rapid but smaller declines in other stocks. Seemingly the panic—for such it was to-day—has spent itself for the want of additional material. There is little doubt that the decline of to-day brought to market all the stocks that were held on light margins, and probably there is no more of that kind of stuff with which to feed the excitement. There is no doubt that the same operators who were large buyers yesterday have continued their purchases to-day, and at prices much more satisfactory than they expected. So without regard to the merits of this or that particular stock, it seems probable that the leading speculators are now or are about ready to be again on the "bull" side of the market, and to take a cheerful view again of the future greatness of their country.

The liquidation may be expected to have an important influence upon the immediate future of our local money market, although with the large demands made upon us by the South and West to move their crops, it is perhaps unreasonable to look for lower rates for loans than about 7 per cent. for the remainder of the year; but it is not likely that after a day or two there will be any commission demanded or paid. The business of the week amounts to the unprecedented figures of 3,410,044 shares—figures that probably will not be equalled again in months if in years."

The National Bank Note Circulation.

Statement of the Controller of the Currency, showing by States the amount of National Bank circulation issued, the amount of Legal-Tender Notes deposited in the United States Treasury to retire National Bank circulation, from June 20, 1874, to November 1, 1879, and amount remaining on deposit at latter date.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	*Addition'l circulat'n iss'd since J'ne 20, '74*	Legal-Tender Notes Deposited to Retire Nat'l B'k Circulat'n since June 20, '74. *For redempt'n of notes of liquidati'g banks.*	*To retire circulat'n und'r Act J'ne 20, '74*	*Total Deposits.*	*Leg'l t'd's on deposit with U. S. Treasurer at date.*
Maine	$1,461,180	$317,000	$600,000	$917,000	$225,051
New Hampshire	505,365	72,997	55,800	128,797	39,589
Vermont	1,672,310	169,097	1,069,340	1,238,437	137,950
Massachusetts	17,181,265	234,800	6,682,900	6,917,700	606,231
Rhode Island	1,345 550	32,350	735,385	767,735	76,742
Connecticut	2,426,500	65,350	1,555,830	1,621,180	299,281
New York	19,044,685	2,135,398	19,198,850	21,334,248	2,065,338
New Jersey	1,702,665	151,660	1,517,280	1,668,940	345,151
Pennsylvania	9,063,650	1,16[illegible],226	6,097,071	7,257,297	974,605
Delaware	173,275	......	......	......	......
Maryland	923,560	166,600	1,646,380	1,812,980	95,005
District of Columbia	455,500	407,664	427,500	835,164	30,186
Virginia	719,500	908,369	880,510	1,788,879	284,171
West Virginia	63,370	731,060	270,000	1,001,060	120,855
North Carolina	1,217,660	128,200	1,012,585	1,140,785	205,126
South Carolina	59,200	....	953,380	953,380	37,005
Georgia	470,850	287,725	437,675	725,400	9[illegible],360
Florida	45,000	......	......	......	......
Alabama	207,000	......	139,500	139,500	44,813
Mississippi	.....	......	......	......	366
Louisiana	1,284,110	345,750	745,000	2,745,000	230,428
Texas	116,100	10,000	229,340	239,340	1,575
Arkansas	114,000	......	144,000	144,000	7,352
Kentucky	3,599,930	629,867	1,441,933	2,071,800	393,645
Tennessee	534,800	280,901	533,859	814,760	113,351
Missouri	614,200	998,510	3,607,410	4,605,920	755,004
Ohio	2,429,580	1,538,754	2,949,787	4,488,541	1,050,614
Indiana	2,894,080	1,222,797	5,488,483	6,711,280	1,740,508
Illinois	2,074,575	1,729,934	6,377,746	8,107,680	1,055,153
Michigan	1,620,310	364,500	2,114,995	2,479,495	439,375
Wisconsin	627,530	626,860	878,439	1,505,299	333,222
Iowa	1,290,400	811,669	1,554,955	2,366,624	455,854
Minnesota	1,017,800	420,095	1,316,445	1,736,540	283,700
Kansas	147,600	781,721	190,550	972,271	262,661
Nebraska	67,500	45,000	188,080	233,080	9,295
Nevada	......	......	......	......	2,108
Colorado	455,400	135,083	149,400	284,483	27,407
Utah	89,900	161,191	196,800	357,991	20,272
Montana	63,100	72,300	45,000	117,300	42,850
Washington	135,000	......	......	......	......
New Mexico	27,000	......	......	......	......
Dakota	99,000	......	......	......	......
California	297,000	......	......	......	......
Legal-tenders deposited prior to June 20, 1874.				3,813,675	
Totals	$78,366,060	$17,443,428	$72,786,458	$94,043,561	$12,907,199

JOHN JAY KNOX,
Controller of the Currency.

The National Bank Note Circulation.

Statement of the Controller of the Currency, showing by States the amount of National Bank circulation issued, the amount of Legal-Tender Notes deposited in the United States Treasury to retire National Bank circulation, from June 20, 1874, to December 1, 1879, and amount remaining on deposit at latter date.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	*Addition'l circulat'n iss'd since J'ne 20, '74*	Legal-Tender Notes Deposited to Retire Nat'l B'k Circulat'n since June 20, '74. *For redempt'n of notes of liquidati'g banks.*	*To retire circulat'n und'r Act J'ne 20, '74*	*Total Deposits.*	*Leg'l t'd's on deposit with U. S. Treasurer at date.*
Maine	$1,461,180	$317,000	$600,000	$917,000	$224,931
New Hampshire	505,365	72,997	55,800	128,797	38,509
Vermont	1,681,310	169,097	1,069,340	1,238,437	137,220
Massachusetts	18,511,545	234,800	6,799,900	7,034,700	707,641
Rhode Island	1,497 570	32,350	735,385	767,735	73,882
Connecticut	2,485,460	65,350	1,645,830	1,711,180	3-0,751
New York	19,695,485	2,135,398	19,198,850	21,334,248	2,012,920
New Jersey	1,702,665	151,660	1,517,280	1,668,940	335,571
Pennsylvania	9,299,910	1,160,226	6,097,071	7,257,297	962,675
Delaware	194,275	......	......	......	......
Maryland	1,091,810	166,600	1,646,380	1,812,980	85,235
District of Columbia	455,500	407,664	427,500	835,164	30,186
Virginia	719,500	908,369	880,510	1,788,879	282,661
West Virginia	63,570	731,060	270,000	1,001,060	120,855
North Carolina	1,217,660	128,200	1,012,585	1,140,785	200,276
South Carolina	59,200	....	953,380	953,380	36,165
Georgia	470,850	287,725	437,675	725,400	95,060
Florida	45,000	......	......	......	......
Alabama	207,000	......	139,500	139,500	41,753
Mississippi	......	......	......	......	366
Louisiana	1,284,110	645,750	2,099,250	2,745,000	224,868
Texas	136,340	10,000	229,340	239,340	1,575
Arkansas	144,000	......	144,000	144,000	6,432
Kentucky	3,599,930	629,867	1,441,933	2,071,800	391,765
Tennessee	534,800	280,901	533,859	814,760	112,181
Missouri	623,760	998,510	3,607,410	4,605,920	754,094
Ohio	2,479,080	1,538,754	2,949,787	4,488,541	1,036,144
Indiana	2,935,130	1,222,797	5,668,483	6,891,280	1,895,418
Illinois	2,211,065	1,729,934	6,400,246	8,130,180	1,065,823
Michigan	1,661,010	364,500	2,114,995	2,479,495	435,195
Wisconsin	639,830	626,860	878,439	1,505,299	329 62
Iowa	1,380,400	811,669	1,554,955	2,366,624	455,614
Minnesota	1,017,800	420,095	1,316,445	1,736,540	281,768
Kansas	147,600	781,721	190,550	972,271	262,661
Nebraska	67,500	45,000	188,080	233,080	9,295
Nevada	......	......	......	......	2,108
Colorado	455,400	135,083	149,400	284,483	27,407
Utah	134,900	161,191	196,800	357,991	20,272
Montana	62,100	72,300	45,000	117,300	42,850
Washington	135,000	......	...	......	......
New Mexico	45,000	.....	......	......	......
Dakota	99,000	......	......	......	......
California	297,000	......	......	......	......
Legal-tenders deposited prior to June 20, 1874.				3,813,675	
Totals	$81,455,410	$17,443,428	$73,195,958	$94,453,061	$13,121,779

JOHN JAY KNOX,
Controller of the Currency.

STATEMENT of the Controller of the Currency on December 1, 1879, showing the amounts of National Bank Notes outstanding at date, and the increase or decrease:

Amount outstanding at date	$338,618,658
Increase during the last month	2,884,360
Increase since January 1, 1879	16,.95,804

RHODES' JOURNAL RECORD OF DEATHS.

SOLOMON A. SMITH, a well known banker, and president of the Merchants' Savings Loan and Trust Company, of Chicago, died November 25, 1879, aged sixty-four years.

He was one of the most prudent financiers in the West, and the absence of his conservative influence will be felt throughout that section, as well as in Chicago, the more immediate field of his business career.

E. H. SAWYER, President of the East Hampton (Mass.) Savings Bank, and one of the most prominent business men in that section of the State, died November 26, 1879, aged ninety years.

He was the treasurer of the Niashawannuck Manufacturing Company and a director of several other local manufacturing companies. He was also a trustee of the Williston Seminary at East Hampton, and of the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary at South Hadley. No man residing in the Connecticut Valley displayed a greater public spirit.

WILLIAM MCCONKEY, President of the First National Bank, of Wrightsville, Pa., died Nov. 21, 1879, in the sixty-second year of his age.

When the bank was organized, about sixteen years ago, he was elected its President, and he held the position up to the time of his death. In 1854 he was elected a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives from York county, and a few years ago he was a candidate for Congress. During his long residence in Wrightsville, he occupied a prominent place in the community, no enterprise seeming to be thought complete without his participation. By his active business enterprise, his unostentatious charities, and his public spirit, he won for himself the esteem and regard of the entire community.

I. SMITH HOMANS, publisher of the *Banker's Magazine*, died November 27th, 1879, aged forty-six years.

Mr. Homans was well-known as a most estimable citizen and upright business man. In common with its large circle of friends, we extend our heartfelt condolence to the management of our valued contemporary.

We are pleased to learn that the death of Mr. Homans will cause no change in the management of this publication, as for some time past Mr. Benjamin Homans has been in charge of both its editorial and business departments, and will so continue.

Bank Changes, New Banks, Etc.

ARKANSAS.—Hot Springs Bank and Safe Deposit Co., Hot Springs; John B. Roe President; Van L. Runyan, Cashier.

Commercial Bank, Texarkana; capital $25,000; M. V. Flippin, President; H. N Samstag, Cashier.

CALIFORNIA.—Mono County Bank, Bodie; Robert Barton, President, in place of O H. LaGrange.

Bank of Alameda, Alameda; now First National Bank.

COLORADO.—Rocky Mountain National Bank, Central City, Joshua S. Raynolds President, in place of H. M. Teller; T. H. Potter, Cashier, in place of J. S. Raynolds

Merchants' National Bank, Georgetown; J. S. Raynolds, Cashier, in place of J. Raynolds.

Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank, Leadville; L. M. Smith, President, L. J. Smith Cashier.

Merchants' & Miners' Bank, Rosita.

CONNECTICUT.—Uncas National Bank, Norwich; Charles M. Tracy, Cashier in place of E. H. Learned.

Seth E. Thomas, Thomaston.

West Killingly; P. O. address, Danielsonville.

DAKOTA.—Bank of Grand Forks, Grand Forks; S. S. Titus Cashier.

GEORGIA.—Blun & Demere, Savannah; now Henry Blun.

ILLINOIS.—German American Bank (Gardner Reising & Co.), Aurora.

Bank of Bement, Bement.

Schlafy Brothers, Carlyle.

Kingman, Blossom & Co., Peoria.

Farmers' Bank, Yates City; James McKeighan, President; James M. Taylor, Cashier.

INDIANA.—Hamilton National Bank, Fort Wayne; No. 2439; capital $200,000; Charles McCulloch, President, John Mohr, Jr. Cashier.

Citizens' Bank, Monticello; George W. Robertson, Cashier.

Vermillion County Bank, Newport; closed.

People's Bank, Portland; Walter M. Haynes, Cashier, in place of W. C. Johnson.

National Bank of Salem; now Bank of Salem, same officers.

First National Bank, South Bend; Lucius Hubbard, President, in place of J. R. Foster.

Washington National Bank, Washington; John N. Breen, President, in place of M. L. Brett.

IOWA.—Bank of Casey (William Ivers) and Exchange Bank (Burns & McFarland), Casey; succeeded by Savage & Crawford.

Clayton County Savings Bank, McGregor; winding up.

Kalbach, Sons & Co., New Sharon.

KANSAS.—Bank of Blue Rapids City. Blue Rapids.

Bank of Lyons, Lyons; Edwin A. Deupree, Cashier.

Riley County Bank, Manhattan; William T. Elliot, President, in place of S. French.

Whitehill & Morse, Peabody; now Whitehill, Morse & Weidlein.

Rice County Bank (Davis & Taber), Sterling.

LOUISIANA.—Townsend & Lyman; now G. Townsend.

MASSACHUSETTS.—Cape Cod National Bank, Harwich; Prince S. Crowell, President, in place of J. K. Baker.

National Pemberton Bank, Lawrence; J. A. Perkins, Cashier, in place of J. M. Coburn.

MICHIGAN.—Edsell & Peck, Otsego; now W. C. Edsell & Son.

Bank of Oxford (G. S. Holbert), Oxford.

MINNESOTA.—Pipestone County Bank, Pipestone; Charles C. Goodnow, President, James E. Craig, Cashier.

MISSOURI.—Farmers' Bank of Cameron, Cameron. Louis DeSteiger, President, in place of H. A. McCartney, deceased.

MONTANA.—Raymond, Harrington & Co., Virginia City.

NEBRASKA.—Grimes, Dinsmore & Co., Aurora.

State Bank, Crete; George D. Stevens, Cashier, in place of J. P. Clarey.

Grimes, Dinsmore & Co., Edgar.

First National Bank, Fremont; Manley Rogers, Cashier, in place of E. H. Rogers.

C. R. Jones & Co., Juniata.

Oakland Bank (Drury, Ashley & Co.), Oakland.

F. McGiverin, Stanton.

NEW JERSEY.—First National Bank, Hackensack; in liquidation.

Vineland National Bank, Vineland; Willis T. Virgil, Cashier, in place of T. H. Vinter.

NEW YORK.—First National Bank, Amsterdam; James A. Miller, President, in place of J. McClumpha, Jr.

A. J. Dow & Son, Randolph; dissolved; now Dow & Co., Bradford, Pa.

William J. Ashley, Rochester.

OHIO.—First Fational Bank, Monroeville; No. 2438; O. W. Head, President, H. P. Stentz, Cashier; $50,000 capital.

Exchange Bank (Davis, Grim & Stentz), Monroeville; succeeded by First National Bank.

E. W. Bond & Co., Willoughby.

PENNSYLVANIA.—Workingmen's Savings Bank, Allegheny; Chas. W. Dahlinger, Cashier, in place of G. L. Walter.

Dow & Co., Bradford.

Lineville Savings Bank, Lineville Station; G. W. Baldwin, President, R. W. Baldwin, Cashier.

TEXAS.—Miller Brothers, Belton; now L. Burr & Co.

VIRGINIA.—Bank of Bedford, Liberty; $25,000 capital; Orville P. Bell, President, Thomas J. Matthews, Cashier.

Lynchburg National Bank, Lynchburg; David E. Spence, President, in place of T. C. S. Ferguson.

WISCONSIN.—First National Bank, Boscobel; Closing; succeeded by A. J. Pipkin.

THE BANKER'S INDEX.

The Money Market and Financial Situation.

NEW YORK, December 1, 1879.

The bull movement in the stock market was brought to a culmination during November. When our review for the month of October was written, the tendency of the market was upward, notwithstanding the stringency in money, which was brought about by natural and artificial means, and the buying of substantial and fancy properties was very confident, the purchasers being in most cases those outside speculators who had been successful in previous operations, and sought by new ventures to augment their profits. There were not wanting, even at the close of October, indications that the speculation was being carried on at too rapid a pace. The enormous business in stocks and the operations in the leading staples were making extraordinary demands upon the resources of the banks, and, by the end of October, the twenty-five per cent. of reserve to deposits which the national bank act requires shall be maintained, had been so far encroached upon that, taken collectively, the national and the State institutions embracing the associated banks of this city, were $311,800 below the twenty-five per cent. rule, and by November 8th the deficiency was $671,225. During October the Treasury had been compelled, by reason of the reduction of the currency balance, to pay out coin in settlement of current demands, and toward the close of that month the clearing house balances were adjusted with gold coin instead of legal tender or national bank notes. The drain of currency to the West and the South for crop purposes was augmented by this enforced action of the Treasury Department, and thus the legal tenders were reduced about $10,000,000 during October, and by the close of November this item stood at $16,771,700, against $38,093,500 on October 4th. The coin reserves of the banks were increased in about the same proportion in the month of October, the gain being $9,526,200, but the coin was available mainly as a bank reserve, the demand from all quarters being for paper, as more convenient for transportation. Thus the total reserve remained almost at a stand, while the enormous speculation in stocks and staples was daily increasing, and causing a severe strain upon the limited resources of the banks, as was shown by the increase in discounts from $266,364,300 on October 4th, to $271,238,600 on November 1st. Gold continued to flow into the country from Europe, but the facilities at the assay office were insufficient to make these imports promptly available in the market, although the Treasury Department placed at the disposal of the assay office all the gold that was required to meet payments for the bullion deposited as fast as the value of the same could be ascertained.

We have thus referred to the condition of affairs toward the close of October because they had an important bearing upon the situation during the month under review. The leading operators were far-sighted enough to see that the wild speculation in stocks must soon receive a check, and those of them who had an opportunity adroitly withdrew from the market, but still prices advanced. An unhealthy impulse was imparted to the speculation early in November, by the announcement by the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 3d, that he would on the 8th receive proposals for the purchase of $10,000,000 six per cent. bonds for the sinking fund. This stimulated the purchase of stocks by outside speculators, who argued, not without reason, that the payment of this large amount of money would immediately augment the reserves of the banks, would defeat the plans of those of the leading operators who were seeking to maintain stringency in the money market for the purpose of breaking down prices f stocks, and would have the effect of advancing all the active shares on the list.

During the first week in November the market was influenced more or less by reports regarding the amount of the bonds that would be offered to the Treasury on the 8th inst., but the tendency of leading stocks was generally upward. The offers were opened at noon on Saturday, and the aggregate was found to be over $11,000,000; but when the Secretary of the Treasury was informed of the average prices, he promptly rejected all the offers as being too high, and this news caused a sharp decline in the stock market. Before the close of business, however, a telegram was received from the Secretary instructing the Assistant Treasurer to accept all six per cents of 1881 that holders were willing to sell at 106. This had the effect of rallying the market in the late trade.

On Monday, the 10th, by noon, the whole amount of bonds called for by the Secretary had been sent into the sub-Treasury, and in a few days payment was made for them, the coin going almost directly into the banks. These prompt payments by the Treasury made money comparatively easy for the time, stimulated the speculation in stocks, and during this, the second week in November, about the highest prices of the year were reached for the leading favorites. But the movement soon culminated. While the outside speculators were buying confidently, expecting that the market would continue to rise; while they were being misled by industriously circulated reports that certain stocks would advance many points above those at which they were then selling, the leading operators were again unloading, and the market was so strong excited that it and took the bulk of these stocks without suffering any important decline. The books of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railway Company had closed toward the last of October for the annual election, and this stock and the bonds of the Company were sharply advanced on the report that Mr. Vanderbilt would be found to have the control. The coal companies gradually advanced the price of their product, and rumors were circulated that there was likely to be such a scarcity of coal as would compel a further rise in price. Then came stories that the business of some of the companies had been so good, notwithstanding the low prices at which coal had ruled during the greater part of the year, that dividends would soon be paid. Upon these reports the coal stocks were rapidly moved upward, and found buyers at the top figures. Mr. Gould purchased the controlling interest in the Missouri Pacific road from Mr. Garrison. At the election for directors of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company, Messrs. Gould and Sage were chosen directors, and the former bought largely of Southwestern Railroad properties. These facts stimulated the speculation in stocks of roads in that section of the country, buyers of the shares were confident that there was a brilliant future for all these lines, and the Southwesterns were for the moment the favorites. The Granger stocks steadily advanced, the Telegraph shares improved, and the stocks of the Trunk line roads moved upward, keeping pace with the gain in the other properties.

The outsiders bought so largely and the speculation in stocks was so wild that conservative bankers began to make an effort to check the movement. As early as the middle of September the market price of stocks and bonds dealt in at the New York Stock Exchange had been increased over $500,000,000 compared with the market value at the corresponding period in 1878, and the greatest advance was in stocks and bonds of roads which had been reconstructed after having defaulted immediately following the panic of 1873. These stocks were classed as "fancies," and bankers generally declined to accept them as collateral for loans when offered by brokers. The outside speculators in the market were among the largest traders in these "fancies;" they had carried them upward after the prices had already been advanced to points far above their intrinsic value by the original purchasers of the properties, and they expected to be able to trade in them upon margins with the same facility that they could speculate in more substantial stocks.

As money became active from natural or artificial causes, the brokers labored under increased difficulties in borrowing money, and soon found that even in the Stock Exchange lenders of money discriminated against 'fancy' stocks as collateral. The broker's customers were warned of the trouble they were likely to make for themselves, but many were allured onward by "points" freely circulated that even those of the "fancies" which were apparently of the least intrinsic value would be advanced much furtherbefore the movement in them culminated. Some brokers took the precaution at this time to notify their customers that they would not buy or sell upon margin the stocks known as "fancy," and a few went so far as to demand twenty per cent. margin upon the more substantial properties. This action doubtless hastened the liquidation which it was seen must be the result of the wild speculation of the previous month or two.

About the 15th of November the first warnings of the approaching crash were given by a sharp drop in the market. It immediately rebounded, and the impression gained ground that some of the leaders who had sold stocks were seeking to get them back again, and that whether they succeeded or not, the market would continue to rise. On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday following, there were sharp breaks in the favorites, followed each day by a recovery, but as each successive attack was made the effect of the persistent hammering was seen in a more feeble rebound. On Thursday, the 20th, the efforts of the bear leaders were more vigorous, and prices fell heavily. The outside speculators became alarmed. Orders to sell came in by telegraph and mail from every quarter, and although there was no panic in the Exchange, the speculators who had been caught by the decline appeared to lose their judgment. In some instances the fall was so rapid that even liberal margins were wiped out, brokers called in vain upon their customers for more margin, and stocks were thrown upon the market to bring any price that could be obtained for them. Friday morning brought in another flood of orders to sell, and there was a further drop in prices to the lowest figures of the month. During the morning the tone was panicky, and had there been a failure of any magnitude the results might have been disastrous. But fortunately there were no failures, mainly for the reason that the brokers had for some short time previously been confining themselves strictly to the execution of commissions for their customers, and the latter were the parties who were suffering loss by the decline in values. By one o'clock the downward movement was arrested. The market was turned gradually upward, and after the delivery hour had passed, when it was seen that there were no defaults among the brokers, the rise was more rapid and the market closed strong, to the great relief of all concerned.

On Saturday morning the market was whirled upward through the efforts of the leaders in the late bear movement, and the rise was so rapid that it left many of the followers of the clique largely short, they having had no opportunity to cover. The tone was feverish at the close of Saturday, but generally strong. On Monday there were sales to realize the late advance, and the bears took advantage of the decline to make another demonstration upon the market, and in this they were measurably successful on that day and on Tuesday. On Wednesday the attack was renewed, but toward the close of business the announcement was made that Mr. William H. Vanderbilt had sold to a syndicate of bankers, representing European and domestic capitalists—the latter chiefly interested in the Wabash system of roads—250,000 shares of New York Central stock at 120, payment to be made in instalments, and chiefly in United States four per cent. bonds. This news and the positive assertion that Mr. Vanderbilt had a controlling interest in the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railway, the election for directors of which was held on the day previous, gave a fresh impulse to the market, and led by the Vanderbilt specialties and Erie, it bounded upward, and closed strong. Thursday was the Thanksgiving holiday. On Friday the market opened much higher than it had closed on Wednesday, but this gave an opportunity for realizing sales, the bears renewed the attack and a decline followed, which made the tone greatly unsettled at the close, and it was feverish and generally lower on Saturday. Confidence in the immediate future of prices was destroyed by the disastrous events of the previous week, and at the close of the month the market was left in the hands of the cliques, the strongest of whom were desirous of bringing about a further decline in values. The situation outside the Stock Exchange remained unchanged. No other interest suffered by the decline in stocks, but a lesson was taught which will not soon be forgotten, especially by those who were the chief sufferers.

It may appear strange to some of our readers that the warning which was given by the growing natural stringency in money and the wild character of the speculation in stocks, was not sooner heeded by the outside operators. The explanation is that so far as the condition of the banks was concerned, those who gave a thought to the situation felt confident that the flow of gold from Europe would soon greatly exceed in amount the drain of legal tenders for crop purposes, and that the banks would be able to continue the accommodation to daily borrowers on stocks, even though the legal tender reserve should be drawn down to an insignificant amount. They did not see that paper money was being retained at the West and elsewhere in the interior, in consequence of a demand for it in preference to gold, and thus the drain from this centre was steady. The increased advance of business at all Western cities and in their vicinity, was giving employment to all the funds that could be obtained from the distributing centres, and the almost unexampled prosperity of the country, upon which speculators were basing their operations, was really the means of aiding in bringing that speculation to a crisis later on. Not only did stocks advance, but grain, provisions, petroleum, and all the staples were traded in to an enormous extent, and all together aided in straining the resources of the banks to the utmost. After nearly five years of depression following the panic of 1873, the pressure which had held all branches of business down for this period, was removed, and everything bounded upward. Specie payments were maintained without the least effort, the refunding of the public debt had been effected with unexampled rapidity; the operations of the Treasury in connection with refunding had made money artificially easy during the entire summer, thus fostering speculation; the demand in the market for securities which would yield a better rate of interest than United States four per cent. bonds, had swept out of the street large amounts of mortgages and stocks that had a substantial value; the prosperous business which almost everybody was enjoying stimulated their desire to acquire wealth without labor and by the somewhat questionable and hazardous means of speculation, and Wall Street was flooded with orders from every section of the country to buy stocks regardless of their intrinsic value. Thus the mad whirl went on through the summer months. Operators who are regarded as constitutional bears took a survey of the market after it had had an enormous rise, and came to the conclusion that the tendency was so strongly upward by reason of the purchases by outside speculators, that the time had not yet come for them to attempt to stem the tide, and they joined the throng that were operating for a rise. This fact gave a fresh impetus to the movement. The news that this or that operator was buying stocks set the followers of these men speculating in the same direction, and it needed but a suggestion that men prominent as operators or capitalists were interesting themselves in a share property, to induce outsiders to buy it so eagerly that it appeared at times as if they were fearful that there would not be enough stocks to go around.

We may give a few illustrations. Late in August a disagreement among leading coal producers as to the policy of the trade, caused a sharp decline in the coal stocks. Early in September Mr. Gowen, of the Reading, determined to bring about a settlement of the difficulties, and had several conferences to this end. While these were in progress a shrewd stock operator, with large capital, took hold of the coal stocks, in which there was a large short interest, and taking advantage of this fact and assuming that Mr. Gowen would be successful in bringing about an agreement, he whirled the market upward, compelled the shorts to cover, and when this was accomplished, the news came that harmony prevailed among the coal producers, and the outside speculators rushed in, bought the coal stocks, and carried them still further upward. The rise was even more rapid after the highest figures of the last few years had been exceeded, for then it was said that the demand for coal at good prices was so great by reason of the revival in the iron and other industries, that it was regarded as certain that the enormous output of the year would be exhausted, and that the profits upon coal would be so large that the companies would be able to resume dividends. Buyers did not stop to consider whether even such an event was possible, but they knew that coal and iron were advancing, and they acted as if dividends on the coal properties were already assured.

The consolidation of the Wabash with the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern was no sooner announced, than speculators began to look earnestly after the stock of roads that might possibly be wanted as feeders to the new Trunk line and the shares of those roads which would probably form the seaboard outlet for the consolidated line. This started the speculation in the bonds of the New York & Oswego, and the New Jersey Midland, and the Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg roads, and in the stock of the Indianapolis, Cincinnati & Lafayette, the Lafayette, Bloomington & Muncie, the Alton & Terre Haute, the Denver & Rio Grande, and a host of other roads that might be mentioned.

The enormous crops of cereals in this country and the deficient harvests abroad, stimulated the speculation in the stock of the Granger roads, and new lines in the northwest being rapidly extended, the shares of these roads came in request, as they promised to rise rapidly upon their merits alone. No sooner were the stocks placed upon the list than they were carried upward, and buyers seemed to feel that their fortune was assured if they could only obtain a few hundred shares of the property.

This steady buying soon began to tell upon the market, and turned the heads of the speculators. Conservative bankers, who had grown gray in the Street, and had always been accustomed carefully to examine into the merits of property before they invested, confessed that in all their experience they never saw anything to equal the madness of the speculation. If their opinion was asked, they gave their advice to let the market alone, but even while they were speaking stocks were rising with startling rapidity. If these bankers were doing a commission business, they could scarcley afford to let their customers go to other houses, where the broker might not be so outspoken in his views, and consequently the conference generally ended by an order being given and executed, for the purchase of some particular stock. Outsiders came down into the Street in the morning, went up town in the afternoon several hundred dollars richer, told their friends of their good luck, and the next day down came these friends to try their fortune. Men, women, and boys, were speculating to a greater or less extent, according to their means, and business men neglected the slower, but perhaps surer methods of gaining a competency, to which they had been educated, to plunge into Wall street, where they were the merest novices. Thus were the outsiders lured onward to what proved to many their destruction, and to almost all a sad, if not irreparable misfortune. The object to be attained was wealth, by unknown paths, which all should tread with care lest the goal was apparently so near and withal so glittering, that those who would not dream of pursuing such a course in ordinary business enterprises rushed recklessly onward to the end. These speculators were not lacking good sense, but they were imprudent. None but those who have made a study of the Street and its ways, can readily conceive how it was that these men gave way to impulse, and did not exercise sound judgment.

The catastrophe of the 21st was not brought about by the managers of the raid solely with a view of punishing the unwary speculators. The bear leaders early saw what must be the inevitable result of the mad movement, and they laid their plans accordingly. They had sold their stocks at a handsome profit, and seeing the market still rising, knew that the list was being carried by speculators who would probably take fright at the first serious break. But when the raid early in the week was made, the leaders found that the market did not yield as readily as they had expected, and that it was rebounding, so they made another, and still another demonstration, with the results already described. The cliques had sold a large line of stocks which they wanted to get back at lower prices. They accomplished their object and then the raid ended.

The following shows the averages reported by the associated banks during the last five weeks, and the condition of the reserve. It will be seen that there was a decided change for the better during the week ending November 15th, in consequence of the payments by the Treasury for interest upon the public debt, and for the bonds purchased for the sinking fund. The banks continued to lose currency but they gained gold, so that the total reserve was augmented by the close of the month more than $10,000,000, compared with November 1st. The loans were largely increased during the week of the greatest excitement, showing that the banks did all that could safely be done toward meeting the demands daily made upon them:

	Nov. 1.	Nov. 8.	Nov. 15.	Nov. 22.	Nov. 29.
Loans	$271,238,600	$270,076,800	$268,538,800	$276,194,400	$278,439,900
Specie	29,675,300	33,823,800	42,992,800	50,006,700	52,310,700
Legal-tenders	28,615,900	23,486,900	22,595,800	18,985,200	16,771,700
Total reserve	58,291,200	57,310,700	65,588,600	68,991,900	69,082,400
Deposits	234,412,000	231,927,700	239,201,200	250,297,300	247,195,500
Reserve required	58,603,000	57,981,925	59,800,300	62,574,325	61,798,875
Surplus	......	......	5,788,300	6,417,575	7,283,525
Deficiency	311,800	671,225	......	......	......
Circulation	22,600,500	22,841,500	22,475,700	22,550,400	23,024,800

CURRENCY PAPER.

There has been no change in rates for commercial paper during the month, and they remain nominally as follows:

	Sixty days.	Four months.
Double-named—		
First-class	5½@ 6	6 @ 6½
Good	6 @ 7	6½@ 7
Single-named—		
First-class	6 @ 7	6 @ 7
Good	8 @ 9	8 @ 9
Not so well known	9 @10	9 @10

CALL LOANS.

The following shows the daily rate for money on call at the Stock Exchange during November:

	Opening.	Highest.	Lowest.	Closing.
November 1	¼ & 7	¼ & 7	¼ & 7	¼ & 7
" 3	¼ & 7	¼ & 7	1-16 & 7	1-16 & 7
" 5	⅛ & 7	⅛ & 7	7	7
" 6	1-16 & 7	⅝ & 7	1-16 & 7	¼ & 7
" 7	1-16 & 7	⅛ & 7	7	7
" 8	1-16 & 7	1-16 & 7	4	4
" 10	7	1-32 & 7	7	7
" 11	7	7	3	3
" 12	7	7	4	4
" 13	7	1-16 & 7	4	4
" 14	7	7	3	3
" 15	7	⅛ & 7	5	5
" 17	7	7	4	4
" 18	7	1-16 & 7	7	7
" 19	7	1-16 & 7	5	5
" 20	7	¼ & 7	7	⅛ & 7
" 21	7	¼ & 7	7	1-16 & 7
" 22	7	7	4	4
" 24	7	7	4	4
" 25	6	7	4	4
" 26	7	7	4	4
" 28	7	7	4	4
" 29	6	7	5	5

THE GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET was active and higher during the first week in the month, and speculators advanced the price of the six per cent. bonds, proposals for the sale of which for the sinking fund had been invited by the Secretary of the Treasury. During the second week the market settled down, and was not in the least disturbed by the events of the third week in the month. On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the last week, there was a sharp advance in the four per cents, caused by the purchase of about $8,000,000 by the bankers who were parties to the New York Central transaction, they requiring the bonds for delivery to Mr. Vanderbilt in settlement for the Central stock. There were some purchases by the banks for deposit as security for circulation, but the bulk of the demand came from investors. The following shows the highest and lowest prices for the month, and the closing bids and sales November 29th as compared with October 31st.

	Int. Periods.	Closing Oct. 31.	Highest for Nov.	Lowest for Nov.	Clos'g Nov. 29.
6s, 1880, reg	J. & J.	104⅝	105½	104⅝	104⅛*
6s, 1880, coup	J. & J.	104¼*	105½	105⅛	104⅛*
6s, 1881, reg	J. & J.	105⅝	106⅛	105⅝	105⅞*
6s' 1881, coup	J. & J.	105¼	106⅝	105¼	105⅞*
5s, 1881, reg	Q.—Feb.	102¼	102⅝	102¼	102¼*
5s, 1881, coup	Q.—Feb.	103¼*	102⅞*	102	102⅞
4½s, 1891, reg	Q.—Mar.	105⅝*	105⅝*	105¼	105¾*
4½s, 1891, coup	Q.—Mar.	105¾	107¼	106¼	106⅞*
4s, 1907, reg	Q.—Jan.	102¼	103¾	102⅛	103⅝
4s, 1907, coup	Q.—Jan.	102⅛	103¾	102⅛	103⅝
4s, of 1907, small		102¼*	103⅛	103	103⅛*
6s, currency	J. & J.	122*	125	123	123 *

*Bid.

STATE BONDS.—The movement in State bonds was unimportant, the sales at the Stock Exchange amounting to only $906,000 chiefly Missouris, Louisianas, and District of Columbias.

RAILROAD BONDS.—The sale of railroad mortgages for the month amounted to $54,822,940, and the largest business was in Erie 2d consols, the bonds of the Southwestern roads, and the more substantial investment securities.

THE STOCK MARKET for the month has been fully sketched above. The total reported sales of stocks were 10,715,066 shares, and the largest transactions were in Erie, 2,756,159 shares. It is probable that had all the business been reported, the total would have reached 12,000,000 shares. The fluctuations are shown below.

STOCK TRANSACTIONS FOR THE MONTH.

The following table shows the closing prices on October 31, the highest prices reached during the month of November, the closing prices on November 29 (the end of the month), together with the total reported sales for the month of November of the active stocks dealt in on the Stock Exchange:

	Closing Oct. 31.	Highest in Nov.	Closing Nov. 29.	No. of shares sold.
C., C., C. & Ind.	69	85½	80	36,867
C., C. & Ind. Cen.	15½	28	20½	201,191
Chesapeake & Ohio	13¾	23¼	19⅛	96,745
Ches. & Ohio 2d pref.	15¾	29	23	18,560
Ches. & Ohio 1st pref.	22⅞	37	31½	20,292
Chicago, St. Paul & Minn.	45½	56	48	33,760
Chicago & Northwestern	90	94½	90⅛	398,500
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	74⅛	82⅛	73	481,405
Del. Lack. & West'n	88¾	94	82¾	759,184
Del. & Hud., Canal Co.	79	89⅛	75	177,410
Hannibal & St. Jo	36¾	41½	33	157,590
Han. & St. Jo. pref.	60¾	70½	61	95,275
Lafayette, Bloom. & Muncie	54	90	84	5,762
Louisville & Nash	76½	89¼	87	61,061
Lake Shore	101	108	104½	513,270
Manhattan Railway	75¾	72¼	60	97,827
Michigan Central	93½	98	94	116,040
Mo., Kan. & Tex.	28½	35¾	30	488,769
Nashville, Chat. & St. Louis	58½	83	75	107,987
New Jersey Cen.	77¾	89⅞	75½	333,026
N. Y. Cent. & Hud.	130	139	132½	30,858
N. Y., Lake Erie & West.	40½	49	40⅝	2,756.159
N. Y., Lake Erie & West. pref.	65	78⅛	69¾	198,297
Ohio & Mississippi	23¾	33⅜	28⅛	309,287
Ohio & Miss. pref.	53½	64¼	57⅝	32,034
Philadelphia & Reading	....	75¼	68½	196,726
St. L. & S. Francisco	27	53	45	60,075
St. L. & San Francisco pref.	33½	60½	49¾	116,415
St. L. & San Francisco 1st p'd.	54	78½	70¾	19,358
St. L. I. M. & South.	49¼	56	46¼	201,570
Union Pacific	91½	92¼	88	85,675
Wabash	59½	62¾	56¾	338,733
Western Union Tel.	105¼	110	107¾	273,337
Pacific Mail	37¾	39⅜	29½	367,665
All other stocks	....	...	....	1,530,633
Total number of shares sold				10,715,066

FOREIGN EXCHANGE was dull, and at times heavy, being influenced mainly by teh stringency in money. The Bank of England rate of discount was advanced, thus causing a decline in long sterling. The rates remained below the gold importing point during the entire month. The following were the closing rates:

The market closed dull and weak. We quote:

	60 days.	Demand.
Prime bankers' sterling bills on London	4.80 @4.81⅛	4.83¼@4.84
Good bankers' and prime commercial	4.80 @4.80⅛	4.82¾@4.83¼
Good commercial	4.79⅛@4.80	4.82 @4.83
Documentary commercial	4.79 @4.79⅛	4.81⅛@4.82
Paris (francs)	5.25⅝@5.24⅜	5.23⅛@5.21⅞
Antwerp (francs)	5.26⅞@5.25	5.23⅛@5.21⅞
Swiss (francs)	5.25⅝@5.24⅜	5.22½@5.21¼
Amsterdam (guilders)	39⅝@ 39¾	39⅞@ 40
Hamburg (reichsmark)	94⅛@ 94⅜	94⅞@ 95⅛
Frankfort (reichsmark)	94⅛@ 94⅜	94⅞@ 95⅛
Bremen (reichsmark)	94⅛@ 94⅜	94⅞@ 95⅛
Berlin (reichsmark)	94⅛@ 94⅜	94⅞@ 95⅛

The Central Pacific Pays Under Protest.—Mr. French, the United States Auditor of Railroad Accounts ,has received a communication from Mr. C. P. Huntington, Vice-President of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, inclosing a check for $609,080,69, which, in connection with the amounts due the company and withheld by the United States Treasury for government transportation, both on its subsidized and unsubsidized roads, between Nov. 6, 1869, and June 30, 1878, fulfills the requirements of all existing laws in regard to the payment to the government of 5 per cent. of the company's net earnings during the period named.

Another recent payment made by the company, published elsewhere in this issue of the JOURNAL, settled its indebtedness on account of the 5 per cent. requirement, and also discharged its obligations under the Thurman Sinking Fund law, for the six months following the 30 of June, 1878, from which date the Sinking Fund obligation was to be computed; and it may be stated, therefore, that the Central Pacific Railway Company has settled all its accounts with the government up to the 31st of last December. The cash payments for the year 1879 will not be due until next February.

Vice-President Huntington in the course of his letter transmitting the check for $609,080,69 refers to some of the points in dispute between this road and the government and says: "The Central Pacific Railroad Company reserves the right to appeal to the courts for redress of this and like grievances; and this payment I desire to be understood as being subject to that reservation. This "5 per cent.," when accurately ascertained, we have always regarded as the right of the government, but the 20 per cent. and half the earnings from government business, taken and withheld in excess of the 5 per cent. under our contract for the period subsequent to June 30, 1878, (as required by the Thurman act of Congress), we must regard as having been wrongfully extorted from the company, in defiance of justice, equity, and good faith, in fact, 'by the law of the strongest.'"

STOCKS AND BONDS—PRICES IN NEW YORK AND OTHER CITIES.

The following tables give the latest bid and asked prices at the New York Stock Exchange; also Southern securities, a full list of general stocks not called at the Exchange, and correct quotations from other cities.

Quotations in New York are to Thursday, Nov. 27; latest mail advices from other cities.

The prices named represent the percentage upon a par basis.

*** Indicates ex-interest. § With interest added. x Dividend.**

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
STATE STOCK.		
Alabama 5s, 1883		
do 5s, 1886		
do 8s, 1886		
do 8s, 1888		
do 8s M & Eufala R R		
do 8s Ala & Chat R R		
do 8s of 1892		
do 8s of 1893		
do consols class A	49	
do do do B		
do do do C		
Arkansas 6s funded		
do 7s L Rk & Ft S iss		
do 7s Memp & L R		
do 7s L Rk P B & N O	3	7
do 7s Miss O & R Riv		
do 7s Ark Cent R R		8½
Connecticut 6s	105	
Georgia 6s		
do 7s new bonds	111½	
do 7s endorsed		
do 7s gold bonds		
Illinois coupon 6s, 1879		
do war loan		
Kentucky 6s		
Louisiana 6s		
do new bonds		
do 6s new floating debt		
do 7s penitentiary		
do 5s levee bonds		
do 8s do		
do 8s do of 1875		
do 8s do of 1910		
do 7s Consolidated		44¼
do 7s Small Bonds		
Michigan 6s 1878-1879		
do 6s, 1883	103	
do 7s, 1890	110½	103
Missouri 6s due in 1883	102	
do do in 1886	103½	
do do 1887	104	
do do 1888	105½	
do do in 1889 or 1890	105½	
Asyl or Univs'y due 1892	105½	
Fund'g bds due in 1894-5	106	
Han & St. Jos. due 1886	104	
do do 1887	104	
New York 6s gold reg'd, 1887	108	
do 6s do coup., 1887	108	
do 6s do loan, 1883	106	
do 6s do do 1891	117	
do 6s do do 1892	117	
do 6s do do 1893	117	
N Carolina 6s old Jan & July		
do Apr & Oct		
do N. C. R., Jan & July		
do do Apr & Oct		
do do cp off Jan & July		
do do cp off Apr & Oct		
do funding act, 1866		
do do 1868		
do new bonds Jan & July		

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
N. C. new bonds, April & Oct		
do special tax, class 1	4½	5
do do class 2		4½
do do class 3		
Ohio 6s, 1881		
do 1886		
Rhode Island 6s		
South Carolina 6s		
do Jan & July		
do April & Oct		
do funding act 1866		
do land C 1889 Jan & J		
do land C 1889 Apr & O		
do 7s of 1888		
Non-fundable bonds		4
Tennessee 6s, old	33½	34⅞
do 6s, new	28	
do new series	29	
Virginia 6s, old	20	
do 6s, new bonds, 1866	20	
do 6s, do 1867	20	
do 6s, consol. bonds	75	
do 6s, ex-mat'd coup	55	
do 6s, do 2d series.	25	
do 6s, defer'd do		8
Dist. of Col. 3-65's 1924	84⅞	85¼
do Small Bonds		
do Registered	85	85¼
CITY AND COUNTY.		
Brooklyn 6s		
do 6s, water loan		
do 6s, imp'm't stock		
do 7s, do		
do 6s, pub, p'k loan		
do 7s. do do		
Jersey City 6s, water loan		
do 7s, do		
do 7s, improvement		
Kings county 6s	104	
New York City 6s, 20-50's, 1876		
do do 6s, 1877		
do do 6s, 1878		
do do 6s, 1887		
do do G'd 6s, Con. 1902		
do do 6s, 1896		
do do 6s Dock b'ds		
do do 6s co. b'ds		
do do 6s Cen. Park		
do 5s, 1890		
do 5s, 1898		
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Boston, H. & E. 1st m	50½	50⅝
Boston, H. & E. 1st m guar		
B., Cedar Rap. & N. 1s 5s g	90⅜	90⅝
Chesapeake & Ohio 6s 1st mtg.		
do do ex-coupon		
Chicago & Alton 1st mortgage.	118⅛	118½
do income		
Joliet & Chicago 1st mortgage.		
La. & Mo., 1st guaranteed		
St. L Jacksonville & Chic 1st		
Chic. Bur. & Qu. 8 per ct. 1st m		

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Chic. Bur. & Qu. cons......M 7s	121	121¼
do do 5s Sinking Fund	98	......
Chic. R. I. & Pacific 1st M 7s...		
do 6s 1917, coupon...	114¼	......
do 6s 1917, registered	114	......
Keokuk & Des Moin. 1st 5s.....	91¾	93
Central R R of New Jersey....		
Cen. R of N. J. 1st m. new..	115	......
do 1st consolidated	......	......
do convertible	......	......
L. & W. B'e. con. guaranteed	110	......
Am' Dock & Imp. bonds	106	108
Chic. Mil. & St. Paul R. R	......	......
M. & St. P. 1st mtg 8s P. D...	125⅛	......
do 2d 7 3-10 P. D.....	......	......
do 1st 7s $ gold R. D	113	114
do 1st 7s £ do	......	......
do 1st M. LaC. D.....	112⅝	......
do 1st M. I. & M. D..	111½	....
do 1st M. I. & D......	109	.. ..
do 1st M. H & D.....	109	......
do 1st M. C. & M.....	113	115⅛
do consolidated s f..	110	111
do 2d mortgage.	......	......
Chic. & N. W. sinking fund....	109	111
do do int. bonds.......	105	107
do do cons. bonds.....	119	......
do do exten. bonds...	103	......
do do 1st mortgage...	107½	......
do do coup gd bonds..	115	......
do do reg'd do	......	......
Iowa Midland 1st m. 8s......	......	125
Galena & Chicago extension.	......	......
Peninsula 1st m. conv........	......	......
Chicago & Mil. 1st m..........	......	117
Winona & St. P. 1st mort.....	......	......
do do 2d mort.....	107	......
C. C. C. & Ind's 1s m. 7s s. f.....	116	......
do consol, M. bonds.	......	111
Del., Lack. & W. 2d m..........	......	104½
do do 7s conv.......	......	......
Morris & Essex 1st mor.......	123	......
do 2d do	......	......
do bonds, 1900...	......	......
do constr'n	96¼	......
do 7s of 1871.....	110	.....
do 1s con. gd....	108	112
Del. & Hud. Can. 1s m. 1884....	102	104½
do do 1891....	104½	......
do Coup. 7s 1894...	106	......
do Regis'd 7s 1894 ...	108	......
Albany & Susq. 1st m'ge.......	......	115
do do 2d do.......	105	107
do do 3d do.......	103	......
do do 1st c gua'd....	105	......
Rens'r & Sara. 1st Coup......	123	125
do do 1st reg'd	......	......
Erie 1st mort. extended.	......	......
do 1st do endorsed.......	......	......
do 2d do 7s, 1879...........	......	......
do 3d do 7s, 1883........ ...	106	106½
do 4th do 7s, 1880...........	102½	102½
do 5th do 7s, 1888...........	111½	113½
do 7's cons. m'ge gd bds.....	114¾	114⅞
Long Dock Bonds	114	......
B., N. Y., & E. 1st m 1916.....	117	......
Han. & St. J. 8s convertible m.	107	108
Illinois Central,	......	......
Dub. & Sioux City 1st m......	......	114
do do 2d div....	......	118
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st m....	102	104
Indp's Bloomn & W'n 1st m...	68	70½
do do 2d m...	55	61
Lake Shore Bonds	......	.....

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
RAILROAD BONDS.		
M. So & N. I. Sink. fd 7 p c.....	108	108⅝
Cleve. & Tol. sink. fd...........	110	111
Cleve. & Tol. new bonds........	......	......
Cleve. Painesv & A old bonds..	......	......
do do new do....	......	......
Buff. & Erie, new bonds...	114	115
Buff. and State Line 7s.........	......	......
Kala. & W. Pigeon 1st m........	......	......
Det. Mon & Tol 1st 7s 1906......	113	115
Lake Shore div. bonds..........	114	......
do con c'p 1st bds.....	121⅛	......
do con reg 1st bds.....	120	......
do con coup 2d m......	115	.. ..
do con re'gd 2d m.....	111⅛	x
Marietta & Cin. 1st m..	102½	108
Mich. Cent. consol. 7s 1902......	117⅝	118
do 1st m. 8s '82 s f	107	......
do equipment bds.....	......	......
New Jersey So. 1st m. 7s........	......	......
do consol 7s.......	......	......
N. Y. Cent. 6s, 1883.............	103	107
do do 6s, 1887.............	108⅛	......
do do 6s, real estate......	......	......
do do 6s, subscription...	......	......
do do & Hud 1st m c.......	......	......
do do do 1st m reg....	......	125⅛
Hud. Riv. 7s 2d m s f 1885.....	111⅛	......
Harlem 1st m 7s coupon......	124	124⅛
do do reg'd.........	.....	......
North Missouri, 1st mort.	......	......
Ohio & Miss cons s f............	112	112⅝
do consolidated.......	......	......
do 2d do...........	109⅜	......
do 1st Springfield div.	75⅝	80
Pacific R R bonds............	......	......
Cent Pacific gold bonds......	110⅛	......
do San Joaquin branch....	99½	100
do Cal & Oregon 1st.........	100	......
do State aid bonds	......	......
do land grant bonds.........	......	......
Western Pacific bonds.........	104¾	......
Union Pacific 1st m bds.......	105	......
do land grants. 7s...	......	......
do sinking fund.....	......	......
Pacific R of Mo. 1st m..........	105	......
do 2d m.............	107¾	.....
do Income 7s.........	......	......
do 1st Carnod't B....	......	......
Pennsylvania R R		
Pitts, Ft W & C 1st m	......	128
do do 2d m..........	122	......
do do 3d m..........	115	117½
Cleve & Pitts con s f....	115½	118
do 4th do............	107	......
Col. Chic & Ind 1st m.........	86½	88
do do 2d m.........	45	49
Rome, Water'n & Og con 1.....	64¼	.....
St. L. & Iron M 1st m...........	112	113
do do 2d m............	96	97
St. L. Alton & Terre Haute....		
Alton & Terre Haute 1st m..	112½	113⅝
do 2d do pref....	95	97
do 2d do inc......	76	78
Bell & S. Ill R. 1st m 8s........	103	......
Tol, Peo & War, 1st E D.......	......	......
do do do W D..........	......	......
do do do Burl div.....	......	......
do do do 2d m..........	......	......
do do do consol 7s.....	.....	......
Toledo, Wabash & Western....		
Tol & Wab 1st m ex...........	89	......
do Ex coupon...	......	......
do 1st m St L div......	108½	109⅝
do Ex mat'd coup.. ..	......	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Tol & Wab 2d m	102⅛	102¼
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	96⅞	97¾
do equipment bonds.	......	40
do cons conv'ble	......	......
do Ex Aug 78 & priv's.	93	94
Gt West'n 1st m 1888	......	......
do Ex coupon	......	......
do 2d m 1893	......	......
do Ex & Nov 77 coup.	......	......
Quincy & Tol 1st m, 1890	......	......
do Ex M & Nov 77 c p.	......	......
Illinois & S Iowa 1st m	......	......
do Ex coupon	......	......
Han & Cent Mo 1st m.	......	......
Pekin, Lnc'n & Decat'r 1st m.	......	......
West'n Un bds, 1900, c'pon	......	......
do do do reg	......	......
MISCELLANEOUS LIST.		
Arkansas Levee 7s	2½	7½
Atchison & P Pk 6s gold	......	......
Atchison, Top & S Fe 7s, g	112¾	113½
Cairo & Fulton 1st 7s	101	102
California & Oregon 6s g'd	100	101
California Pac R R 7s gold	105	110
do 6s 2d m gold	100	101
Central Pac 7s gold, conv	105½	108
do land grant	104½	105
Cent of Iowa 1st M 7s gold	107½	110
Chi & Southwestern R R 8s	110	115
Chi & Eastern Ill. 1st 6s	92	95
do do income 7s	60	65
Chi & Mich Lake Shore 8s	......	......
Chi & Can South 1st m'g 7s	60	65
Chi, St. P. & Min 1st M 6s	100	101
do land grant 6s	92½	94
Cin, Rich & F W 1 m g 7s	70	80
Cleve, Mt V & Del 7s gold	......	......
Connecticut Valley 7s gold	50	70
Connecticut Western 1st 7s	......	......
Col & Hock Val 1st 7s 30 ys	105	110
Dan, Urb, Bl & P 1st m 7s g	......	......
Denver Pacific 7 gold	88	89
Denv and Rio Grande 7s g	95½	96
Det, Hillsdale & Ind R R 8s	......	......
Dixon, Peoria & Han 8s	......	......
Erie & Pittsburg 1st 7s	100	102½
Evans & Crawfordsville 7s	100	105
Evans, Hend. & Nashville 7s	......	......
Evansville, T & H Chic 7s g	70	80
Flint & Pere M 7s land grant	100	105
do 7s consol	51	52½
Fort W, Jackson & Sag 8s	......	......
Grand River Valley 8s	105	110
G'd Rapids & Ind 1 guar 7 g	109	110½
G'd Rapids & Ind 1st 7s g	100	102
Houst, & Gt N. 1st m g 7s	93	94
Houst. & Tex. C. 1st M L	107¾	108
do 1st W D	104	105
do Con. 8s	110	110½
Ill Grand Trunk 8s	113	115
Ind, Bl & W Ext 1st m g 7s	......	......
Indianapolis & Mad. 1st m 7s	100	103
Int'national R R Tex 1 m g 7s	93	94
Ind. Bl. & W., 1st 7s, pref	110	112
do 1st	69½	70½
do 2ds	60	62
do Income	51	55
do stock	34	37
Indianapolis & Vinc's 1st 7s gr.	105	107
Indianapolis & St. Louis 7s	80	90
Io Falls & Sioux City 1st 7s	105	110
Jack. Lansing & Sag. 1st m	......	......
Jeff'ville, Mad & Ind 1st m 7s	111	115
Kala'zoo & South H 8s guar	......	......

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Kal, Alleghan & G R 8s gr	105	......
Kal & White Pigeon 7s	100	......
Kansas City & Cameron 10s	112	116
Kan Pac 7s ex Ma & No g	102	103
do 7s land gr Ja & Jy g	121	123
Kan Pac 7s do 2d m	100	101
do 6s gold June & Dec	113½	114½
do 6s do Feb & Aug	117	119
do 7s Leaven Branch	96	98
do Income No 11	73	75
do do No 16	73	95
do stock	88¾	89½
Michigan Air Line 8s	......	......
Mil & North 1st m 8s	65	70
Mo, Kan & Tex assent'd bds	91¼	91¾
do 2d inc	44½	45
N. J. Midland 1st 7s gold	64	65½
N. Y. & N. J. 7s, con. gold	15	16
N. Y. & Osw Mid 1st 7s gold	35	36
Omaha & S West'n R R 8s	113	115
Oregon & Cal 7s gold	28	30
Oswego & Rome 7s guar	100	110
Ott, Oswego & Fox R V 8s	......	......
Pitts, Cin & St Louis 1st 7s	109	110
Pt Huron & L M 7s g end	30	......
Quincy & Warsaw 8s	......	......
Rome, W & Ogdensburg 7s	64½	65
Sand, Mans & Newark 7s	100	105
Sioux City & Pacific 6s	......	......
South Side (L I) 7s	90	100
Southern Central N Y 7s	60	80
Steubenville & Indiana 6s	101	104
Southern Minn construc 8s	109	110
St. Jo & C Bl 1st m 10s	......	......
St. Louis, Vanda & T H 1st	110	115
do do 2d	95	100
St L & S Eastern 1st 7s gold	75	80
Union Pacific So br 6s gold	93	96
Union & Logansport 7s	92	100
Texas & Pacific L G 7s	70	72
CINCINNATI.		
STATE, CO. AND CITY BONDS.		
Ohio State 6s	111	112
Hamilton County 6s	100	......
do do 7s	101	105
City of Cincinnati 6s	104½	......
do do 7s	112	......
do do 7 3-10	115	......
City of Covington, Ky 6s '81	102	......
do do 7 3-10, '81	102	104
RAILROAD BONDS.		
L Miami & I & C con 6s	80	......
do do 1st 6s '83	102	......
Cin, Ham & Day 1 m 7s '80	101	......
do do 2 m 7s '85	105	105
do do 3 m 8s	......	......
Dayton & Mich, 1 m 7s '81	103½	104
Dayton and Mich, 2 m 7s '84	......	105
do do 3 m 7s '88	100¼	x
Cin, Rich & Chi, 1 m 7s '95	92	......
Cin, Han & Ind 1st m gr 7s	82½	86
Marietta & Cin 1st m 7s '91	87	90
do do 2d m 7s '96	30	32
Indianap & Cin 1st m 7s '88	102	......
Cin & In guar 1st m 7s '92	102½	105
do 2d m 7s '77 '82	75	100
Indianap C & L 1st m 7s '97	80	......
Day & W 1 m, 1881	100	......
do 2 m, 1905	87	90
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Columbus & Xenia 50	118	......
Cin, Ham & Dayton 100	60	65
Dayton & Mich 3½ guar 50	47½	50
Little Miami 50	115	116

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Marietta & Cin 1st pref.......50	......	5
do do 2d do.......50	......	3
Cin Gas Light & Coke Co....100	161	165
SOUTHERN SECURITIES.		
CITIES.		
Atlanta, Ga 7s	102	105
do 8s	106	110
Augusta, Ga 7s bonds	102	105
Charleston stock, 6s	55	58
Charleston, S. C. 7s F L bonds	80	90
Columbia, S. C. 6s	40	60
Columbia, Ga. 7s bonds	70	80
Lynchburg 6s	100	103
Macon 7s bonds	70	80
Memphis bonds 6s	15	25
do new consols	20	35
do end, M & C R R	15	......
Mobile 5s	15	20
do 8s	15	20
Montgomery 8s	22	27
Nashville 6s old	80	90
do 6s new	85	91
New Orleans 5s	29	31
do consol, 6s	28	31
do bonds, 7s	27	31
do to railroads 6s	27	31
Norfolk 6s	98	......
Petersburg 6s	100	102
Richmond 6s	102	105
Savannah 5s	69	71
RAILROADS.		
Atlantic & Gul, consol	102	104
Central Georgia cons, 7s	109	112
do do stock	74	76
Charlotte Col & A, 1 m 7s	96	100
do do stock	20	25
E Tenn & Georgia 6s	90	100
East Tenn, Va & Geo 1st m 7s	100	102
do do stock	45	50
Georgia R R 7s	107	110
do stock	83	86
Greenville & Col 7s guar	60	64
do do 7s certiff	50	55
Macon & Western Stock	98	101
Macon & Augusta bonds	85	90
do do endorsed	95	100
Memphis & Charleston 1st 7s	97	100
do do 2d 7s	80	90
do do stock	15	17
Mississippi Central 1st m 7s	101	104
do do 2d m 8s	104	106
Mississippi & Tenn 1 m	110	113
do do cons, 8s	90	......
Motg'y and West P, 1st 8s	107	108
do do 1st end	......	......
Mobile and Ohio Sterling	80	......
do do do ex ctfs	80	......
do do 8s interest	27	35
N Orleans and Jackson 1st m	112	114
do do 2d m	105	110
Nash and Chattanooga 6s	100	102
Norfolk and Petersb 1st m 8s	106	108
do do 2d do	102	104
Northeastern, S C, 1st m 7s	105	110
do do 2d do	84	90
Orange and Alex 1st 6s	99	102
do do 2d 6s	84	90
do do 3d 8s	83	90
do do 4th 8s	......	......
Rich and Peters'b 1st m 7s	......	......
do do 2d m 6s	......	......
do do 3d m 8s	102½	105
Rich and Fred'b and Pot 6s	97	100
do do do con 7s	97	102

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Rich and Danv 1st con 6	95	98
do Piedmont 8s	103	......
do 1st 8s	......	90
Southside Va 1st m 8s	109	111
do 2d m guar 6s	90	100
do 3d m 6s	80	90
do 4th m 8s	......	......
Southwest R R, Ga 1st m	104	106
do do stock	99	102
S. Caro R R, 1st m 7s, new	102	104
S. Caro R R 6s	......	......
do 7s 2d	57	61
Virginia and Tenn 2d 6s	100	103
do do 3d 8s	110	......
West Ala, 8s guar	108	110
Wilmington and Weldon 7s	108	114
PAST DUE COUPONS.		
Tennessee State coupons	10	20
Virginia consol coupons	81	83
Memphis city coupons	20	......
South Carolina consols	......	......
BOSTON.		
STATE BONDS.		
Maine 6s 1889	114⅜	......
N. Hampshire 6s 1876-84	116	......
Vermont 6s, 1874-78	......	......
Massachusetts 5s, 1883, g	110	......
CITY BONDS.		
Boston 5s, 1880-86, gold	......	......
do 6s, currency	......	......
Chic 7s, 1890-95, riv. impr	113¾	......
do 1884	......	......
RAILROAD STOCKS AND BONDS.		
A T and Santa Fe, 1st m 7s	......	113
do do L G	......	113
do do stock	112⅝	......
Bost and Alb'y 6s, '75 (W RR)	......	111⅛
do 7s, 1892	121¼	......
do stock	......	137
Boston and Lowell 7s, 1892	114	117
do stock (par 500)	83	84¾
Boston and Maine, stock	116	......
Boston and Providence, stock	126	......
Bur & Mo R 7s, '93, land grant	112	115
do do 8s, 94, conv	......	106
do do 8s, 83 (in Neb)	100¾	101
Chicago, Bur and Quincy	120	121¼
Bur & Mo Riv stock (in Neb)	128	128⅛
Cheshire 6s, 1898	103½	......
do preferred stock	46½	......
Cin, San, and Cleve, 7s, 1890	75½	......
do do com stk (par 50)	15⅞	16
Concord stock (par 50)	80	......
Conn and Pass Rivs 6s, 1876	......	......
do do 7s, '76, notes	......	......
do do pref. stock	......	60
Connecticut River, stock	140	141
Eastern stock	25	......
Fitchburg, stock	122	......
Manch and Lawrence stock	140	......
Nashua and Lowell, stock	105	......
Northern (N. H.) stock	......	86
Norwich and Worcester stock	124⅛	......
Ogdenburg and L Champ stock	25¼	25⅛
do do pref stock	65	69
Old Colony stock	107	107¾
Phil, Wil & Balt stock (par 50)	68⅛	68¾
Portl, Saco & Portsmouth st'k	......	101
Portsmouth, Gt F & Con'y s	12¼	......
Rutland pref. stock	......	27⅛
Vermont and Canada stock	......	12
Vt. Ct. 1st m 7s, 1886 cons	......	......
do do 8s, '91	......	......

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

Securities.	Bid	Askd
Vermont and Mass	......	......
do do stock	117	......
Worcester and Nashua	62	63½
MISCELLANEOUS STOCKS.		
Boston Land Co	9⅞	10
Boston Water Power	10	10½
Pullman Palace Car	103½	104
PHILADELPHIA.		
STATE AND CITY BONDS.		
Penn. 5s, new, reg, '92 1902.	112	112⅝
do 6s, 10-15, reg, '77 1882	101¼	102
do 6s, 15-25, reg, '82 1892	107½	109
Philadelphia 6s, old	104	......
do 6s, new, over 1895	117	118¼
Pittsburg 5s, reg, 1913	......	......
do 7s, water loan	112½	......
do 7s, street improv	102	......
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Allegheny V R R 7 3-10, '96	112	......
Bel & Del R R, 1st m 6s, 1902	109	......
do 2d do '85	105	......
do 3d do '87	103½	......
Cam & Amboy R R 6s, 1883	105	......
do do do 6s, 1889	......	107½
do do do m 6s, 1889	111	......
Cam & A. T. 1st m 7s, gold, 1893	......	120
do do 2d do cur, 1879	102¾	103
Cataw R R new 7s, 1900	110	......
Connecting R R 6s. cp. 1900	108	112
Del & B B R 1st m. 7s, 1905	113	113½
El. & Wmsp't R R, 1 m, 7s, '80	111	......
do do 5s c. perpe'l	83	90
H. & B. T. 2d m 7s, gld 1895	114½	......
do 3d do cur. 1895	......	......
Lehigh Valley, 1st m, 6s, c,'98	117	......
do do reg '98	117	118
do 2d m, 7s, reg 1910	122	......
do cons. m, 6s reg, 1923	109	......
do do 6s, coup. 1923	109	......
N Cent. 2d gd. m. 5s, cp'n 1926	76	80
North Penn, 1st m 6s, c. 1885	......	108½
do 2d m 7s, c. 1896	119	......
do gen. m 7s, c. 1906	112	......
do do reg., 1906	115	......
Oil Creek 1st m 7s, coup '82	......	88
Pittsb'h Titus & Buff 7s, c, 1896	36	40
P & N Y C. & H. R. 7s, r&c 1896	120¾	......
Penna. 1st mort 6s, c, 1880	104	106
do gen do 6s, c, 1910	115½	116¼
do do do 6s reg 1910	109	......
do cons m, 6s reg. 1905	......	110½
Phila & Erie 1st mort 6s c 1881	103	103½
do 2d mort 7s, c 1888	109	111
Phila & Reading 1st m 6s, 1880	103	103¼
do 2d m 7s, c 1893	114½	115
do cons m 7s c 1911	111½	......
do do m 7s r 1911	113	......
do do 6s, g r & c 1911	101½	102
Pitts, Cinn. & St. L 7s c 1900	110	111½
Tex & Pac 1st m, 6s, g 1905	101	103
do cons m, 6s, g 1905	......	108
Un & Titus 1st m, 7s, 1890	......	59
War. & F. 1st mort. 7s, c 1896	87½	......
West Jersey 6s, d coup 1883	101	105
West Jersey 1st mort 6s, c 1896	108	......
do do 7s, r & c '99	110	......

Securities.	Bid.	Askd
West Penn 6s, coup, 1893	102	103
do 6s. p b c, 1896	......	......
CANAL BONDS.		
Lehigh Nav. m 6s, r 1884	......	107
do M.R. R. r, 1897	109	109½
do M conv g. r. 1894	102½	103
do M. gold, r. c, 1897	......	106
do cons m 7s r, 1911	100	100
Schuyl. Nav. 1st m 6s, reg 1897	98	......
do 2d do r. 1907	74	75
do m 6s, coup. 1895	......	40
do 6s, bt&car r 1913	63	......
do 7s, bt&car r 1915	72	......
RAILROAD STOCK.		
Camden & Atlantic pref. 50	......	41
Catawissa 50	14½	15
do pref 50	49½	50
do new pref 50	48½	......
Elmira & Williamsport 50	30½	......
do do pref 50	48	......
Lehigh Valley 50	50½	50¾
Liltle Schuylkill 50	49	49½
Minehill	55	......
Nesquehoning Valley	......	54¼
Norristown 50	100	......
Northern Pacific	36¼	......
do pref	60½	66
North Pennsylvania 50	49	......
Pennsylvania 50	48⅝	48¾
Philadelphia & Reading 50	31¾	31⅞
Pitts. Titus. & Buffalo	7½	7⅝
St. Paul & Duluth	26	......
do pref	57	58
United Cos. of N. J. 100	149	......
CANAL STOCKS.		
Lehigh Navigation 50	37	37¼
Morris Canal grd 4 p c 100	53	60
do preferred 10 p c 100	135	......
Schuylkill Navigation	......	......
do do pref	......	......
BALTIMORE.		
Maryland 6s, defence, J. & J.	108½	109
Virginia 10-40s, J. & J	45	45⅛
do deferred, J. & J	6	8
do consol. do	55¾	56
do do 2ds do	24	30
do consol coup, p due	83¾	84
N. Carolina 6s, Jan. & J., old	25	26
Tennessee 6s, do old	35	40
do 6s, do new	......	34
do 6s, do n. s.	......	33
Balt. 6s, J., A., J., O., 1890	111	111¼
do 6s, J. & J., 1902	115	......
do 5s, M. & N., ex., 1916	113	......
Memphis City 6s, J. & J., n	......	......
Balt. & Ohio, May & N 100	151½	152½
do 1st preferred	112½	113½
do 2d do	106	106½
Northern Central, M. & N 50	33	34
Central Ohio, June & Dec 50	35	39
do preferred 50	45	50
City Passenger R'y, J. & J 25	38	40

STOCK AND BOND QUOTATIONS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
Balt. & Ohio 6s, 1880, J. & J.....	102¼	103
do 1885 A. & O....	106½	107
Pitts. & C. 1st 7s, 1898, J. & J....	112	112½
N. Cent. 6s, 1885, J. & J.........	108	109½
do 6s, 1900,, A. & O... ...	108	109
do 6s, gold, 1900, J. & J..	106	106½
Cen. O. 6s, 1st m., 1890, M. & S..	106	106½
South Side, 1st 8s, J & J.........	106	......
do 2d 6s, do	92	94
do 3d 6s, do	88	92
Cin. & Baltimore 1st 7s..	100	......
W. M. 1st m 6s gu. 1890, J. & J..	113	116
do 1890. J. & J..	105	109
W. Maryland 2d m (pref).......	80	90
W. M. 2d m. 6s gu. by W. Co....	108	110
M. & Cin. 1st m 7s F and A 1892	102½	103
do 2d m 7s M. and N....	72¼	72½
M. & Cin. 3d m 8s 1900 J. and J..	41½	41¾
Rich. & Dan. 1st m. M.and N...	95½	96½
Union R. R., End. Cant. Co.....	110	......
Canton Co., 1st 6, gold, J and J.	106	106½
Orange, Alex. and Mn's 7s do..	70	71
Orange & A. 1st 6s, M. and N...	96	100
do 2d 6s, J. and J.....	95	100
do 3d 8s, M. and N.. .	65	68
do 4th 8s, M. and S ...	34	35
Virginia & Tenn 6s 2d J. and J.	100	.....
do 8s, J. and J..	114	118
W. & W. 7s gold 1900 J. and J..	111	112
W. and Columbia and Aug. 7s.	45	48
Ohio & Miss, 2d 7s, A & O.......	109	......
Balt. Gas, J. and Dec....... 100	110	......
do gold certif.....100	103	......
People's Gas, J. and J....... 25	15	15⅝
Consumer's Gas..............	5	5⅛
do gold 6s, J & J, 1892...	98	100
Georges Creek Coal, J & J.....	90	100
Chesapeake and O. Canal bonds	......	50
Balt. Warehouse Co, J & J. ...	19	20
Cincinnati 7-30s, J. and J.......	......	......
Norfolk Water, 8s.............	115	117

LOUISVILLE.

CITY AND CANAL BONDS.

SECURITIES.	Bid.	Askd
City improvement 6s...........	*102	*103
do bounty 6s..................	*102	*103
do school 6s.............	*102	*103
do wharf (old) 6s...............	*102	*103
do do (new) 6s............	*102	*103
do water works (old) 6s......	*102	*103
do do (new) 6s.....	*102	*103
do L. and N. R. R. (M. S.) 6s...	*102	*103
do L. and N. R. R. (L. E) 6s...	*102	*103
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (old).....	*105	*106
do E. and P. R. R. 7s (new)....	*107	108
do old liabilities due 1880......	*101	......
do St. Louis A. L. R. R.... ...	*102	*103
Canal bonds, 3d issue, 6s.......	*102	*103
do 4th issue, 6s......	*106	*107

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
Louisville Bridge Co. 7s.........	*112	113
RAILROAD BONDS.		
Greensbury Branch............	*100	......
Louis. and Nash. Leb. Br.......	*101	102
Louis. and Nash.Cons..........	*110	111
L. and N. 2d mort..............	*102	*103
Louis., Cin. and Lex. 1 m 7s....	*112	111
do do 2 m 7s....	102½	99½
Jefferson. M. and I. 1st m 7s....	*110	113½
do do 2d m 7s....	*98½	*103
Eliz. and Paduc. 1st m. 8s	......	......
E. and P. Louisville Br'ch 7s...	......	......
Shelby, 1st mortgage 8s........	101	102
Owensboro and Russel, 1 m 8s.	......	......
MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.		
Kentuc. State bonds (old) 6s...	§105	......
do do (new) 6s..	§105	......
New Albany City..............	*104	105
Water Works bonds, 6s.........	*106	......
Louisville Transfer Co. 8s......	*100	......
STOCKS.		
Louisville and Nashville R. R..	84	85
Gas Company stock........ . .	109	110
Louisville Bridge Co. stock....	110	......

ST. LOUIS.

CITY AND COUNTY BONDS.

SECURITIES.	Bid	Askd
City water (is. '67) 6s gold......	§104½	106½
City water (is. '70) 6s gold.......	§104½	106½
City water (is. '72) 6s gold......	§104½	106½
City sewer (is. '73) 6s gold......	§104½	......
City park 6s gold.......	§104½	......
City bdg approach 6s gold.....	§104½	......
City 6s Currency..............	§103	......
County 6s, gold various.........	§103	......
County 6s, gold of 1892.........	§103	......
do do 1893.........	§103	......
County 7s, Currency...........	§104½	......
RAILROAD BONDS		
At. & Pac. 1st Cent. div..	53	......
Denver Pacific and Telegraph.	......	......
Kan. Pac. 1st m. F. and A......	116	118
do 1st m. J. and D	113	114
do 1st m. (Lea. br.).....	87	90½
do income No. 11.......	73	......
do income No. 16.......	73	......
do (Den. ext.) 1 m......	102	104
Kan. Pac., 1st m. L. G. 7s.......	120	122
Missouri Pacific 1st mort.......	104¼	105
do do 2d do	105½	......
North Missouri, 1st mort.......	113½	114
RAILROAD STOCKS.		
St. Louis & San Francisco......	51	......
do do pref......	59	......
do do 1st do	76	......
Kansas Pacific.................	89½	......
Pacific of Missouri.............	12	......
St. L. Kan. C. and Nort. pref..	......	......
do do commom..	......	......